John Stewart Service

John "Jack" Stewart Service (born August 3, 1909 in Chengdu , Sichuan , China ; † February 3, 1999 in Oakland , California , United States ) was an American diplomat whose political career was driven by the Communist hunt of McCarthy Era was destroyed.

As one of the Far East experts ( “ China Hands ” ) of the US State Department , Service was the victim of targeted attacks by the “ China Lobby ” during the McCarthy era . He was defamed as a sympathizer of communism and a spy; and like other "China Hands" made responsible for the loss of China to the Chinese communists.

Life

John Service was the fourth child of Robert Roy Service and his wife Grace, b. Boggs born. His parents had been missionaries for the YMCA there since 1905 and so Service spent his early childhood in the Chinese province, learning the Chinese language. In 1915 the service family returned to the United States, Cleveland , Ohio , and John attended primary school here.

When his family returned to China in 1920, this time to Shanghai , John attended the Shanghai American School , an international private school founded in Shanghai in 1912 . The family went back to the United States again, this time to California and John went to Berkeley High School in Berkeley , California . After school, Service worked for an architecture firm for a short time, but decided in 1927 to study art history and economics at Oberlin College , Oberlin , Ohio , from which he graduated in 1931 with an AB (Artium Baccalaureus - Bachelor of Arts). On November 9, 1931 he married Caroline Schulz (born November 30, 1909 in Kansas City , Missouri , † November 18, 1997 in Oakland , California ), whom he had met while studying at Oberlin College. The marriage was concluded in Haiphong , French Indochina (now: Vietnam ) - where John's father was a missionary at the time.

Diplomatic service in China

In 1932 the economic crisis was at its height, Service lacked the money for a doctoral degree and, with his subjects, there were no great prospects for a job. Service accepted a friend's suggestion and applied to serve in the United States' diplomatic service. He passed the entrance exam straight away and got a job at the American consulate in Shanghai in 1933 , albeit initially only as a simple clerk. However, just two years later, in 1935, he was accepted into the United States' Foreign Service as Foreign Service Officer and stationed at the American Consulate in Kunming , the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan . He was promoted and served from 1938 to 1941 as an interpreter (language attaché) at the American embassy in Shanghai. Clarence E. Gauss was the American ambassador from May 1941 to November 1944 .

Gauss promoted Service first to Third Secretary in 1941 , and in 1943 to Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Chongqing . In an assessment from 1942, Gauss describes Service as tolerant, sincere, balanced, hardworking, cooperative, persistent, conscientious, with astute judgment.

Service's reports of the political and military situation caught the attention of John Paton Davies , a Foreign Service officer who had served as political attaché for General Joseph Stilwell since 1942 . At that time, Stilwell was the commander of the US armed forces in the Sino-Burmese-Indian theater of war (China-Burma-India theater / CBI), and at the same time, as chief of staff of Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing, he was in charge of all military and other aid from the United States the Kuomintang regime. From the summer of 1943 Service worked for Davies and General Stillwell. Stilwell, Davies and Service quickly and unanimously came to the conclusion that the corrupt Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek would not be able to defeat the Japanese invaders, no matter how many millions of dollars the American government gave its allies would flow. Stilwell described the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-sheks in his concise, straightforward way:

"A gang of fascists under a one-party government similar in many respects to our German enemy."

"A band of fascists under a one-man government and in many ways very similar to our German opponent."

- MJ Ybarra, Washington gone crazy, p. 541

Stilwell, Davies and Service therefore saw the only way to deal decisive blows to the Japanese troops in the (military) cooperation with the Chinese communists. In view of this situation, they also considered possible developments in the post-war period and the foreign policy strategy of the United States to be aligned with them.

Service wrote in a report from April 1944 a. a .:

“The Communists, from what little we know of them, also are friendly toward America, believe that democracy must be the next step in China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the United States is the only hope for speedy postwar rehabilitation and development . It is vital that we do not lose this good will and influence. "

“The [Chinese] communists, as little as we know about them, [yet] have a friendly attitude towards America. They believe that [the establishment] of democracy must be the next step [of development] in China, and they believe that economic cooperation with the United States is the only hope for rapid reconstruction and development after the war is over. It is of vital importance that we do not lose this openness [towards ourselves], [our] influence. "

- MJ Ybarra, Washington gone crazy, pp. 541f.

And John Paton Davies wrote in a memorandum dated November 15, 1944:

“We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek, but we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime. We must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. "

“We shouldn't drop Chiang Kai-shek [yet] at this point, but we should be realistic. We shouldn't support a politically bankrupt regime until St. Never's Day. We should make decisive efforts to win over the Chinese communists politically [for us] before they completely turn over to the Russians [ie SU] out of disappointment. "

- (quoted in New York Times , December 24, 1999

In the following months, Stilwell, as well as Davies and Service, therefore increasingly advocated the opening of talks with the Chinese communists with the American government. At this time, however, Chiang Kai-shek strictly prohibited any attempts to contact the Chinese communists.

Service and the Amerasia Affair

In April 1945 John Stewart Service returned to the United States from China. A short time later he was asked by Philip J (acob) Jaffe , an editor of Amerasia , a left-leaning magazine that predominantly dealt with political, economic and socio-political issues in the East Asian region, particularly China, for background material for a planned article. Service met with Jaffe a number of times and gave him several reports he had written himself (originally for the State Department). What did not suspect Service, was that he got into it with these meetings into what later than Amerasia Affair ( affair Amerasia ) was defined and should be decisive for his entire later life.

The Amerasia Affair began when Kenneth Wells , an East Asia expert with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (a forerunner of the CIA ), remarked that an article printed in Amerasia on January 26, 1945 was almost verbatim matched a report he had written a year earlier. The report had been classified as secret.

The OSS appointed Frank Brooks Bielaski as a special investigator on the case. On March 11, 1945, Bielaski and four assistants illegally broke into the Amerasia's New York editorial offices. They found around 300 documents (originals + copies) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War, the Navy, the OWI and the OSS . Some with the imprint "Confidential", "Secret" or "Top secret" ("Confidential", "Secret", "Top secret").

The OSS brought in the FBI . The FBI then monitored Amerasia's employees, in particular Philip Jaffe and Kate Louise Mitchell, the two publishers of Amerasia, as well as those in contact with them. Since Philip J. Jaffe had close contacts with the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA), for example with the former leader of the CPUSA, Earl Browder, but also with other party officials (the CPUSA), the FBI assumed that the documents found in the editorial offices of Amerasia were were ultimately intended for the Soviet Union. The FBI investigation revealed that Phillip J. Jaffe most likely obtained the documents from Larsen and (John) Andrew Roth . Larsen worked as a Far East expert in the middle service of the US State Department, (John) Andrew Roth had worked for Jaffe in the IPR before the Second World War and was Reserve Lieutenant (Navy Reserve Lieut.) Of the Office of Naval Intelligence . There were illegal actions. Without any authorization, the FBI broke into and ransacked Amerasia's offices and Larsen's home. Wiretapping bugs were installed, the telephones were tapped.

On June 6, 1945, six suspects were arrested: Philip J. Jaffe and Kate Louise Mitchell, the two editors of Amerasia, and Mark Julius Gayn, a freelancer for Amerasia. Gayn was a well-known journalist who u. a. worked for the Washington Post , Newsweek, and Time . The other three arrested worked for the American government: Larsen worked as a Far East expert in the middle service of the American State Department, (John) Andrew Roth had worked for Jaffe in the IPR and was a reserve lieutenant (Navy Reserve Lieut.) Des Office of Naval Intelligence . John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer + Far East expert at the Department of State, was suspected of having met Jaffe above and was also arrested. At the same time, Amerasia's offices were searched - now officially and legally - and around 1,700 documents from the State Department, the Navy, the OSS, the Office of War Information and other ministries and agencies were seized.

All six detainees argued that their intention was nothing more than to keep the public discussion on America's Asia policy alive. The case was a grand jury of the District of Washington presented. Since there was no evidence that documents had actually been handed over to agents of the Soviet Union or another state, the grand jury decided in the run-up to the hearing, on August 10, 1945, the charges against John Stewart Service, Kate Louise Mitchell and Dropping Mark (Julius) Gayn. At John Stewart Service, this decision was particularly clear and precise. With 20: 0, the grand jury decided that the allegations made against him were insufficient for a charge. In the case of Philip J. Jaffe, (John) Andrew Roth and Emmanuel Larsen, the charges were upheld, although they were no longer - as originally targeted - for espionage activities, but only for unauthorized possession or unauthorized disclosure of government documents. The prosecutor said that after an initial review of the seized material, charges of espionage could not be upheld. Before the court hearing was opened, Emmanuel Larsen's attorney learned of the FBI's illegal break-in into his home and demanded that his client be closed. Since one could now firmly expect that further illegal practices of the FBI would be brought to light in the course of a court hearing and consequently the entire court hearing would break, Philip J. Jaffe also threatened to make the illegal actions of the FBI public, a deal was arranged. On September 29, 1945, Philip J. Jaffe pleaded guilty to obtaining secret government documents and was fined $ 2,500 (which he paid on the spot). Emmanuel Larsen was fined $ 500. The charges against Andrew Roth were dropped entirely. This deal, the - rather symbolic - penalties saved the prosecutor from having to completely dissolve their charges.

Loyalty - verification of loyalty to the state

With the decision of the grand jury or the court, the matter for John Stewart Service was by no means closed, it had actually only just begun.

Verification by the State Department

Since the Amerasia Affair, Service's loyalty to the state has been constantly called into question. In 1945, 1946, 1947 his loyalty to the state was checked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not a single indication of any disloyal act could be found. In 1949 there was another review. And again, there was no evidence that Service was in any way disloyal. On October 6, 1950, presented the State Department's Loyalty Security Board (about: Department of the Foreign Ministry to check the loyalty to the state and the security of [his servants] ) again found that "reasonable grounds do not exist for was that .... Service is disloyal to the Government of the United States .... and that he does not constitute a security risk to the Department of State. ” ( “ There is no reasonable reason to believe that ... Service is not lawful to the United States Government behaves ... and it does not represent a security risk for the State Department. ” ) (see US Supreme Court: Service v. Dulles et al., June 17, 1957) And this although through the passing of various executive orders (orders) of the Truman government on loyalty to the state - such as the Executive Order 9835 (EO 9835 / "The Loyalty Order" ) of March 21, 1947, or the Executive Order 10241 of April 21, 1951 - increasingly stricter standards for assessing d he loyalty to the state were created.

Millard Tydings Committee

As if the examinations by the State Department had not yet been sufficient, the loyalty of the John Stewart Service to the state was also up for debate during the hearings of the so-called Tydings Committee. Service was again accused of sympathizing with communists. The "Subcommitte on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees" (German: "Subcommittee to review the loyalty / loyalty of State Department employees" ) of the US Senate investigated in the period from March 8, 1950 to July 17, 1950 , the allegations made by Senator Joseph McCarthy in his Wheeling speech on February 9, 1950. McCarthy had claimed that the American government, and particularly the American State Department, was infiltrated by communists and spies.

In his Wheeling speech, McCarthy had spoken of 250 State Department employees who he knew were members of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and whose names he also knew, but during the hearings of the Tydings Committee he received them Names increasingly "lost". Eventually he deviated from his original (and actually nonexistent) list of names, but then used the subcommittee hearings to bring allegations against 10 people and accuse them of espionage. He named: Dorothy Kenyon, Esther and Stephen Brunauer, Gustavo Duran, Haldore Hanson , Harlow Shapley, Frederick Schuman, Philip Jessup , Owen Lattimore and - almost as expected - John Stewart Service.

Just four of those named by McCarthy - Haldore Hanson, Philip Jessup, John Stewart Service and Owen Lattimore - were proven East Asia experts (so-called "China Hands" ) from the State Department. Their mention made it clear that McCarthy had meanwhile received massive support from the so-called “China Lobby” , while at the same time allowing himself to be instrumentalized for their goals. In the reports of the "China Hands" about the unstoppable decline of the Kuomintang regime and the simultaneous rise of the Chinese communists, the members of the "China Lobby" were unable to recognize an objective description of the political realities in their limited perspective, but instead assessed the descriptions exclusively as expressions of sympathy for the communist movement and represented the opinion

"... that the Foreign Service officers planned to slowly choke to death and destroy the government of the Republic of China and build up the Chinese Communists for postwar success."

"... that the diplomats of the Foreign Office wanted to slowly strangle and destroy the Chinese national government [Chiang Kai-sheks] to death and [at the same time] wanted to rebuild the Chinese communists for the post-war period."

- Time, October 6, 1975: Unwarranted Ordeal

On July 20, 1950, Millard Tydings submitted a final report to the US Senate. In his speech, he stated that none of the people named by McCarthy were communists, nor could it be said that they sympathized with communism, and that the security checks that had already been carried out for employees of the State Department were completely sufficient . Tydings characterized the baseless accusations made by Joseph McCarthy as

"... fraud and a hoax perpetrated on the Senate of the United States and the American people ... Perhaps the most nefarious campaign of half-truths and untruth in the history of this Republic."

"... [It all consisted of] ... hoax and [based on] fraud by the Senate and the American people ... It was perhaps [one of the] most vicious campaigns in the history of this country, [pieced together] of half-truths and lies."

- Michael J. Ybarra: Washington Gone Crazy, p. 502; s. also Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red, p. 128

Regarding John Stewart Service, he stated that “he should not be branded as disloyal and have his career destroyed for writing what appears to have been the true facts as he saw them.” ( “... he was not branded as disloyal and his career should not be destroyed, solely for the reason that he wrote down the actual circumstances as they presented themselves to him. " )

Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board

Since the Amerasia Affair , the John Stewart Service allegiance had been checked almost annually by the State Department. Then there was the Tydings Committee (of the US Senate). But Joseph McCarthy and the “ China Lobby ” continued to pursue service and did not give up. First of all, they got the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board (for example: Committee of the Civil Service Commission to review loyalty to the state) not to accept the foreign ministry's positive assessments and prompted the foreign ministry to review it again. The Civil Service Loyalty Review Board was superordinate to the other agencies that checked loyalty within the various ministries and was created in 1947 as part of the checks on loyalty of government employees initiated by President Truman's Executive Order 9835 (EO 9835). The State Department, after re-examining it on July 31, 1951, decided again that there was nothing wrong with Service 'loyalty to the state, that it did not pose a security risk, and that the results of earlier checks of Service' s loyalty to the state were also entirely correct. The "case" landed again with the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. The Loyalty Review Board then decided to hold its own hearings. On December 13, 1951, the State Department issued a press release announcing the outcome of the review by the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board:

“The Loyalty Review Board found no evidence of membership in the Communist Party or in any organization on the Attorney General's list on the part of John Stewart Service. The Loyalty Review Board did find that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States, based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and non-public character within the meaning of subparagraph d of paragraph 2 of Part V, 'Standards', of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended. "

“The Loyalty Review Board was unable to find any evidence that John Stewart Service is a member of the Communist Party or any organization on the Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations ]. The Loyalty Review Board finds [but] that there is reasonable doubt about the loyalty of Servant John Stewart Service to the United States Government for the willful and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information, both confidential and non-public "Standards" of Executive Order 9835 and its amendments [meant Executive Order 10241] were of character in the sense of Paragraph 2 Part V of paragraph d.

And further:

“The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board has requested the Secretary of State to advise the Board of the effective date of the separation of Mr. Service. This request stems from the provisions of Executive Orders 9835 and 10241 - which established the President's Loyalty Program - and the Regulations promulgated thereon. These regulations are binding on the Department of State. "

“The chairman of the Loyalty Review Board has requested the Secretary of State to inform the [Loyalty Review] Board of the exact date of Mr. Service's dismissal. This [request] is derived from Executive Orders 9835 and 10241 - on which the President's loyalty program is based - and the [other] provisions. These provisions are binding on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "

The reviews of the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission had thus shown absolutely nothing, but only once more manifested the loyalty of John Stewart Service to the state. In order to still achieve the envisaged goal - the dismissal of service - one referred to the Amerasia affair in order to be able to put forward “ reasonable doubts” ( “reasonable doubts” ) about his loyalty to the state and to demand his dismissal from the diplomatic service. In doing so, the Loyalty Review Board obviously failed to apply legal provisions that did not exist at the time of the Amerasia affair. The events of the Amerasia Affair took place in 1945. The EO 9835 and the EO 10241 had been decreed by President Harry Truman on March 21, 1947 and April 21, 1951, respectively, so only a few years later. While in the EO 9835 nor "reasonable grounds" ( "reasonable grounds" was) the speech that had to be to be able to dismiss a government employee from the civil service, the threshold was significantly reduced for dismissal in the EO 10,241th According to EO 10241, “reasonable doubts” ( “well-founded doubts” ) about the loyalty of an employee to the state were sufficient to be able to dismiss him. Something as "old-fashioned" as concrete evidence was no longer required. Apart from the fact that the vague, ultimately incomprehensible term "reasonable doubt" opened the door to arbitrary dismissals, the application of laws that were only enacted after the - alleged - criminal offense was a clear violation of the non-retroactivity principle " Nulla poena sine lege ” ( “ No punishment without law ” ), a fundamental right of justice .

Dismissed from the diplomatic service

The then American Secretary of State Dean Acheson dismissed Service from the diplomatic service on December 14, 1951, without even having taken a single look at the files, but above all without having given service the opportunity to comment on the allegations made against him Service. As the legal basis for his decision, Acheson named Executive Order No. 9835 and Executive Order No. 10241 , as well as Section 103 of Public Law 188 (82nd Congress). The latter law was also known as the "McCarran Rider" ( "McCarran Clause" ), named after its main initiator, Senator Patrick McCarran . The “McCarran Rider” of July 1946 authorized the Secretary of State “ in his absolute discretion, to terminate the employment of any officer. . . of the Foreign Service. . . Whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. " ( " ... entirely at his own discretion ... to terminate the employment relationship with any foreign service employee whenever he wishes to terminate such a termination in the interests of the United States considers necessary or advisable. " ) (Quoted from US Supreme Court, Service v. Dulles, 1957)

After discharge

John Stewart Service later described the post- firing period in a CNN interview: “Because of all the public fuss, it was extremely difficult to get a job. ... I [also] had great difficulties renting an apartment in New York ... All the companies I knew and which I could consider as an employer, these companies naturally considered what their shareholders would say about it [ if they would hire me]. The import and export companies I have dealt with [in the past] then said, “We are very sorry. We think you are an excellent man, but we don't dare to hire you. " It was the same with the various institutions of the UN. The UN was also under fire at the same time [yes]. They were accused of being too “soft” (“slack”) towards communism, of having communists in their ranks ... etc., etc. ... Finally, an Englishman who lived in New York wrote to me and bid get me a job. [At the time] I was happy to get any job at all. This Englishman sold ... mainly steam traps. ( Condensate drain ). ... And so I learned a lot about steam traps and worked as a seller for these products for several years. "

Rehabilitation by the Supreme Court

His case eventually went to the Supreme Court. By decision of the United States Supreme Court of June 17, 1957 ( Service v. Dulles, 354 US 363 ) ......

Suspended by the State Department

In 1957, Service returned to active service at the State Department. He was now rehabilitated, but the Supreme Court judgment could not prevent him from being sidelined by the State Department. Important tasks were no longer assigned to him. Initially assigned to work in the Department of Transportation at the State Department, in 1959 he was assigned a position at the US Consulate in Liverpool , England . John Service realized that he would never again be given the opportunity to work as a foreign service officer (diplomat). In 1962 he left the Foreign Ministry.

New beginning

He began studying political science at the University of California , Berkeley, and received his Master of Arts (MA) degree in 1964 . He then worked as a curator for the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley . He led the establishment of a specialist library specializing in the political, economic and social developments in communist China, was editor of the books of the Center for Chinese Studies and the University of California Press . In 1974 he published his book Lost Chance in China: The World War II Dispatches of JS Service .

In 1971, John Stewart Service and two other former "China Hands" , John Paton Davies and John K. Fairbank , both also victims of the McCarthy agitation, were invited by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with the reorientation of China policy . In his welcoming address, then Chairman James William Fulbright said:

“It is a very strange turn of fate that you gentlemen, who reported honestly about conditions, were so persecuted because you were honest about it. This is a strange thing to occur in what is called a civilized country. "

“It is a strange turn of fate that you, gentlemen, who reported you honestly and impartially about [existing] circumstances, were persecuted [precisely] because you honestly reported about them. It is a strange thing that something like this can happen in a civilized state. "

literature

• Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (1970) The Amerasia papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China. US United States Government Printing Office .
• Service, John S. (1971) The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations. Center for Chinese Studies, University of California.
• Joseph W. Esherick, ed. (1974) Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service. New York: Random House.
• Kahn, EJ (1975) The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them. Penguin Books. ISBN 0140043012 .
• Fried, Richard M. (1990) Nightmare in Red. The McCarthy Era in Perspective. Oxford University Press.
• Klehr, Harvey (1996) The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism. University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0807822450 .
• Ybarra, Michael, J. (2004) Washington gone crazy. Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American Communist Hunt.
• Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon (2005) Mao: The Unknown Story. Stud. ISBN 0679422714 .

Web links

• CNN interview with John Stewart Service
• Time July 1, 1957 "On a Loyalty Case"
• Time August 2, 1971 "The Old China Hands"
• Obituary + photo
• Obituary from Oberlin College
• John Stewart Service and Charles Edward Rhetts Papers from the Truman Library
• Decision: US Supreme Court: Service v. Dulles et al. June 17, 1957