Battle of Sibiu
1916–1917
1916:
Transylvania ( Sibiu ) -
Turtucaia -
Dobrich -
Cobadin (1) -
Flămânda Offensive -
Cobadin (2) -
Târgu Jiu -
Argesch -
Rimnicul Sarat
1917:
Putna -
Oituz Pass (1) -
Mărăşti -
Mărăşeşti -
Oituz Pass (2)
The Battle of Sibiu ( Romanian: Bătălia de la Sibiu ) from September 26 to 29, 1916 was the first major conflict in the Romanian theater of war during the First World War . The troops of the Romanian I Army Corps attacked from two sides were defeated by the German 9th Army under General von Falkenhayn in a frontal battle. While the counterattack by German and Austrian troops blocked the Romanian troops who had broken into Transylvania from advancing north to Sibiu , the encirclement by the Bavarian Alpine Corps on the Red Tower Pass threatened Romanian retreat and decided the battle in favor of the Central Powers .
prehistory
In the course of the Brusilov Offensive , the Western Powers urged Romania, which had hitherto been neutral, to enter the war against the Central Powers. At the end of August 1916, shortly after the declaration of war, the Romanians broke into the Hungarian border province of Transylvania, which was predominantly Romanian. The Romanian 1st and 2nd Army under Generals Ioan Culcer and Grigore Crainiceanu advanced up to 80 kilometers from the south and occupied the Transylvanian metropolis of Brasov . For the Central Powers, the balance of power on the day of the declaration of war was very unfavorable: In Transylvania there were initially only 34,000 men of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces against around 420,000 Romanians. The western Romanian Army Group alone had ten times the number of troops.
The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army under Arthur Arz von Straussenburg , which was being formed, had to take over the protection of the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian 7th Army . The border between Transylvania and Romania ran across a mountain range, the continuously almost 2000 meter high Czibin Mountains ( Zibins Mountains ), which were joined to the east by the Fagaras Mountains . This 240-kilometer-wide border section was initially only defended by the newly established kuk 71st division under Major General Goldbach , which had taken command on August 27th. The kuk Infantry Regiment 82 on the right wing was entrusted with the protection of the operationally important crossings of the Törzburger and Predeal Passes. On August 29, the advance guard of the Romanian 4th Infantry Division moved into Kronstadt. The Romanian 3rd Division took Bran Castle and carefully advanced towards Zărneşti . The Romanian 1st Army under had to remain defensive on the right wing with the Alt-Lotrugruppe (2nd Division under General Manolescu with 17 battalions and 11 batteries), the center should be the Red Tower Pass and the crossings into the Zoodt Bachtal open and advance to Sibiu. The Sibiu basin of Hermannstadt had been lost to the Central Powers, and the city of Hermannstadt itself could still be protected from enemy attack. The Hungarian 51st Honved Division (under Major General Bela Tanárky) was quickly assembled north of Sibiu, but could not hold the Red Tower Pass. The Honved Regiment No. 302, arriving in Mühlbach from September 1st, had to close the road and railways southeast of the city. In front of the city the weaknesses of the Romanian army were already evident, one refrained from a conquest due to the supply problems, although it was only defended by weak Imperial and Royal Landwehr . The Romanian army was inexperienced, and the officers and men were poorly trained. A lack of logistics in the army supply and the unfavorable geographic location in the mountains made the procedure more difficult. The Romanians had the Zibins Mountains, the Red Tower Pass and the level of Fogarasch to the upper Old occupied section. Before Sibiu they had brought the entire hilly terrain up to four kilometers from the city into their hands. The Romanians had occupied the Racovița - Girelsau - Heltau line north of the Red Tower Pass in a semicircle . In the west her Orșova group (Romanian 1st and 2nd divisions) had occupied the foothills of the Zibins Mountains as far as Orlat Guraro and Poplaka. To the east, their fortified trenches and built barriers ran across the road from Sibiu to Heltau. The Romanian 4th Army advancing further east under General Averescu tried to take possession of the Burzenland , but was stopped on September 20 at the Baba Ludowa and thrown back at the Szurduk Pass.
German troop aid
The chiefs of the German Supreme Army Command , Field Marshal von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff , transferred the supreme command of the newly established German 9th Army , which was to come to the aid of the Austrians in Transylvania, to their predecessor, General of the Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn , who had been relieved of this position . The Austro-Hungarian Army Command had the order to set the 39th Honved Infantry Division (HID) on the march to Sächsisch-Regen and to pull the troops arriving later there. After the cleansing of the Petroșani basin , which had been lost to the Romanians , the freed German forces were moved to Sibiu to attack the Romanians who were holding south of the city. The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army had to delay the advance of the enemy, hold the Kokel and Maros positions and cover the right wing of the army of Falkenhayn, which was advancing to the east.
On the evening of September 17th General von Falkenhayn had arrived in Déva ; on the 19th he took over the command of the army bodies assigned to him. The Austrian VI. Corps under Field Marshal Lieutenant (FML) von Fabini (39th and 61st Honved Divisions) had already been reinforced by the German I. Reserve Corps (group of tomorrow ). The right wing of the German 9th Army was supposed to prevent the Romanians from advancing through Orsova and especially through Mehadia . If necessary, the left wing should retreat to the Kleine Kokel via Mediasch before the pressure of the enemy following the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army .
The deployment to the battle from September 22nd to 25th
The bulk of the war in Transylvania passed to the German 9th Army. General von Falkenhayn recognized the ability of the topline of the Czibin Mountains to allow the Alpine Corps to close off the pass road at the rear via Sinna. This transition ran through a gorge about 20 kilometers long, through which the rivers Alt and Zibin flow. The Alpine Corps under Lieutenant General Krafft von Delmensingen had assembled at Sinna and Poianu. The German troops managed to blow up the bridge over the Alt. Petrosény brought the vanguard to Reussmarkt , leaving behind two battalions and as many batteries , at the same time the 76th Reserve Division (Lieutenant General Elstermann ) was unloaded in Marktschelken .
General Ioan Popovici , in command of the Romanian I Corps, had commanded Sibiu since September 14th. The corps had occupied a position 55 kilometers wide, which ran south and south-east of the city along the Racoviţa-Sacadat-Caşolt estuary, the flanks on the right in Fogaraser, on the left to the Czibin Mountains. On the right stood the 13th Infantry Division (Brigadier General Ioan Oprescu) on a front length of 23 km with three regiments (infantry regiments 47, 48 and 72). On the left the 23rd Infantry Division (Brigadier General Matei Castriş, from September 9th Colonel Traian Moşoiu) from Kastenholz Caşolț stopped at a front width of 22 kilometers (Infantry Regiments 2 and 42), then the combined 1st Brigade (Infantry Regiments 44 and Grenzer Regiment 1) the connection to the eastern Lodru old group. To the east of Sibiu, the Romanian march disrupted the reconnaissance activities of the German cavalry corps Schmettow .
On September 22nd, the Romanian 13th Division attacked again. She should try to occupy the heights between Cornatielu and Porumbacu. The already weakened safeguards (19th Mountain Brigade and 1st Hussar Brigade of the Hungarian Landsturm) were pushed back further, which threatened the north flank of the 71st Honved Division. The German 89th Division , which had been brought in from Demeterfalva since September 20, was to be pushed into the gap in the front . In order to conduct the command, XXXIX. Reserve Corps brought up under Lieutenant General von Staabs . In the southeast group, which consisted of the Schmettow cavalry corps, the 3rd and 5th cavalry divisions were ordered to be unloaded to Mediaș and Elisabethstadt . The kuk VI. Corps should be formed from the 51st Honved Infantry Division (HID) and 72nd Division (143rd and 144th Brigade) as well as the German 187th Division . The XXXIX. Reserve Corps had to advance along the foot of the mountain with the 187th Division of Orlát . The 76th Reserve Division had to attack east of Sibiu in the direction of Talmesch .
On September 23, the Alpine Corps advancing over the western end of the mule tracks reached the Cindrelu section. The Schmettow Cavalry Corps had the task of securing the left flank of the 76th Reserve Division and delaying any advance of the Crainicianu army towards the west. The information about enemy troop movements in the Czibin Mountains leaked to the headquarters of General Popovici. General Culcer sought help from the left wing of the 2nd Army in the event of an enemy attack.
On September 24th, General Crainicianu proposed an offensive by the entire 2nd and northern armies. General Popovici sent reinforcements to the Satuluital against Fundul Riului and to the Lotrutal against Vioneasca. General von Falkenhayn issued the order for the attack to begin on the evening of September 24 from his army headquarters in Mühlbach. On the eve of the battle there were about 35 battalions with 54 batteries of the Central Powers against 25 battalions and 16 batteries of the Romanians.
The battle
25th of September
Lieutenant General Staabs ordered the attack on September 25th. Most of the German troops were led around the city because they wanted to protect them from harm. A Romanian attack from Schellenberg was repulsed. The Gregoriberg was withdrawn by the 51st Honved Division by the evening. Behind them the German 76th Reserve Division advanced and in the evening stood on the road that led east from Sibiu. At the Schmettow Cavalry Corps, the German 3rd Cavalry Division and two squadrons of the Austro-Hungarian 7th Cavalry Brigade took over the Alt at Kercz. Another advance of the XXXIX. Reserve corps was not reached on the first day. The Romanian 2nd Army lost the chance to protect the Romanian 1st Corps from being surrounded by a simultaneous attack. The possibility of a breakthrough for the encircled Romanians remained, because General von Falkenhayn had not yet received any reports on the situation at the Alpine Corps.
September 26th
The Alpine Corps was able to reach the road to the Red Tower Pass between Boița and Câineni. General Popovici, commander of the Romanian 1st Corps, recognized the danger of being cut off and immediately ordered smaller Romanian detachments to advance against Câineni from the south. This prevented the Bavarians from advancing north and south.
General Popovici was authorized by his superior General Culcer to withdraw his front section by section, but he should push forward energetically against his adversaries in the rear. In order to get the rear of the 1st Corps completely free, General Culcer sent larger parts of the 20th ID, which was standing on the Danube. Quickly to the north to attack the border ridge west of the Red Tower Pass from the Lotru valley. The 187th Division under Lieutenant General Sunkel snatched the Romanians, meanwhile, the places Guraro and Poplaka.
At the Romanian headquarters in Buftea nothing has been done to relieve the two divisions surrounded south of Sibiu. Popovici saw a promising opportunity to change the situation in timely intervention by the Romanian 4th ID, which, however, should not arrive in Fogaras until the evening of the 27th. Since the Romanian 23rd ID. until it was pushed back into the Michelsberg- Heltau line and to the northern edge from the west, because of the advance of German cavalry (Korps Schmettow) he took 13 ID. back to Racovitia. The kuk 51st HID. under Major General Tanárky, who had advanced to the south bank of the Cibin during the night, advanced to a knoll east of Poplaka and established himself in front of the Romanian positions. General Arz sent him an infantry regiment and three batteries of 89 ID to reinforce him. to Vízakna (Salzburg).
September 27th
On the evening of September 27, the situation of the German 9th Army in front of Sibiu was extremely tense. A victory for General Staab's troops had by no means been decided. Falkenhayn was concerned that the Alpine Corps would be able to hold its position against the Romanian attacks. The Romanian 2nd Army, instructed in defense, delayed its advance - the departure was delayed. The intervention of the 2nd Army threatened the Austro-Hungarian armed forces from the east, their intervention could take place at any time. The Romanians marched late into the night and reached the line Vistea - Fogaras - Seiburg and Katzendorf . The advance Romanian 14th Division broke through the front of the kk 16th Landsturm Mountain Brigade, which was thrown back on Déda. In order to counter both sources of danger, Falkenhayn ordered the beleaguered corps of Staab to attack the enemy more vigorously, despite their own danger.
For September 28th, the XXXIX. Reserve corps reinforced with a regiment of the 89th Division (General Georg von Lüttwitz), while the bulk of this division was left to the Austro-Hungarian Army Command. The attack by the German 187th Division wrested the Vaiare and Oncești sections from the Romanian 23rd Division. After the 6th Cavalry Brigade was thrown back, a gap in the front ten kilometers wide opened up to the 71st Division. During this crisis, the 89th Division and the incoming advance troops were pushed forward to Hundertbüchens and Retisdorf.
September 28th
Since the greatest pressure of the XXXIX. Reserve Corps on the 23rd Division, Popovici ordered the 13th Division to support. The Alpine Corps was able to hold on to the Roten-Turm Pass. The main attack by Staab's corps pushed the west wing of the Romanian 23rd Division back to Zoodt by evening. The 76th Reserve Division had Szakadat, the 51st Honved Division Glimboca and the 187th Division should reach Cornățelu . Following to the east, General Schmettow had to assert himself with his cavalry north of the Alt and the 71st Division was asked to hold the line Meschendorf – Erkedt. In order to restore the front that had collapsed, General Popovici withdrew the Romanian 13th Division to Racovitia. The new approach of the Romanians in the Maroschtal, brought the importance of the VI. Corps of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army new in mind, namely the protection of the south wing of the Austro-Hungarian 7th Army. General Arz protected the Maroschtal by concentrating the 37th Honved Division, the 39th Honved Division was transferred to the I. Reserve Corps to cover the Gôrgény Valley.
September 29th and 30th
On the south bank of the Alt, kuk gunfire inhibited the Romanian 2nd Army (Crăinicianu). The Alpine Corps, which was still fending off Romanian counter-attacks on Monte Robu, now extended to the western foothills of the Fogaras Mountains. Since help from the 2nd Army could no longer be expected, General Popovici had to decide to retreat over the mountains. The Popovici corps was crowded into a narrow space at the northern exit of the Red Tower Pass, and they were relentlessly fired into the dense army. The worn-out units of the Alpine Corps were pushed aside by the retreating Romanians. A new order from Falkenhayn to General Staabs instructed General Staabs to set up the 76th and 187th Divisions after Scorei on both sides of the Alt to push. General Crăinicianu, whose relief came too late, learned at his headquarters that the Romanian I. Corps had fought through the Fagaras Mountains to his troops and decided to withdraw his left wing.
The Romanian Army Command ordered a general withdrawal on September 30th. The Romanian 3rd Army received orders to cross the Danube south of Bucharest and to launch a relief offensive on the front against Bulgaria . The Romanian 2nd Army, which was spread out on a 67 km long front, and the Northern Army to the east had to resist with all available forces in Transylvania until the operation was successful in the south.
consequences
The retreat of the 1st Army over the snow-covered mountains of the Carpathians brought further losses, the mountain troops of the enemy remained close on their heels. General Prezan's troops tried on October 1 to build a new front near Ratosnya and in the Kelemen Mountains. The divisions which also declining Romanian 2nd Army stood on the same day in the occupied on September 29, Héviz line-Oit bogat-Sárkány-Persiani and were ordered to make the connection with the northeasterly operating northern army.
On October 5th, the rear guards of the Romanian 1st Army were caught up in the ghost forest and attacked. In the following battle of Kronstadt on 7./8. October the combined forces of the Central Powers were able to push back the Romanians again.
literature
- Rudolf Kiszling : The campaign in Transylvania from Austria-Hungary's last war 1914–1918: Volume V , Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, Vienna 1930, pp. 250–260 and 298 f.
- Manfried Rauchsteiner : The death of the double-headed eagle. Austria-Hungary and the First World War. Styria, Graz a. a. 1993, p. 415 f. ISBN 3-222-12116-8
- Erich von Falkenhayn : The campaign of the 9th Army against the Romanians and Russians 1916/17 . ES Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1921, ( online version )