Simferopol massacre

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The Simferopol massacre (also known as the Christmas massacre or Simferopol mass murder ) is the mass murder of Ashkenazi Jews , Krimchaks (Turkic-speaking Crimean Jews) and " Gypsies ", which was carried out by Sonderkommando 11b and the staff unit of Einsatzgruppe D of the security service of the Reichsführer SS with the support of the Wehrmacht in December 1941 in Simferopol in the occupied Crimeacommitted. The mass murder killed around 13,000 people, including probably around 10,600 Jews, 1,500 Crimchaks and 600 to 1,000 Roma. The massacre is an outstanding example of the close cooperation between military commanders and those in charge of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) in the genocide of Jews ( Holocaust ) and "Gypsies" ( Porajmos ). Today a memorial at the crime scene commemorates the men, women and children who were murdered here within a few days.

Story of the massacre

Military administration of the city and mass shootings

Raid by German military officers and soldiers in Simferopol, January 1942

Simferopol, the largest city in the Crimea , was captured on November 1, 1941 by the 11th Army , under its commander-in-chief General Erich von Manstein . His Army High Command (AOK 11) took quarters in the small village of Sarabus, today's Hwardijske , Russian: Gwardeiskoje (Гвардейское), which is about ten kilometers north of Simferopol. In the city itself, which played an important strategic role as the main traffic junction and supply base, the local command office of Simferopol (OK I / 853) started work on November 5th. The field and local command offices were not only responsible for looking after troops passing through and guarding military facilities, but also for recording, managing and monitoring the civilian population. Responsibility for feeding the population, regulating trade and commerce, and the employment of civilians lay with the Agriculture Department of the Krim Economic Command (Wi Kdo Krim) of the Eastern Economic Organization , to which Hermann Göring was subordinate. The commandant offices of the Crimea reported to the rear military administration of the 11th Army ( Korück 553), the head of which, Lieutenant General Heinrich Doehla , reported directly to von Manstein, while the daily business of the Korück 553 was carried out by the senior quartermaster division of the 11th Army (AOK 11 / OQu) ran by Colonel Friedrich Wilhelm Hauck . From a tactical point of view, Hauck was also subordinate to the motorized field gendarmerie division (FGA 683) assigned to the 11th Army . The operational personnel of the FGA, i.e. the military police troops, were partly distributed among the individual field and local commanderships and were then subordinate to their commanders. Like his colleagues, the local commandant of Simferopol, Captain Kleiner, was forced to carry out his extensive duties by deploying local administrative staff and recruiting auxiliary policemen and militiamen to strengthen the field gendarmerie.

The population of Simferopol had fallen from 156,000 in 1939 to around 120,000 in November 1941. Before the war , more than 20,000 Jews, mostly Ashkenazim , lived in the city; when the Germans invaded there were around 13,000 Ashkenazi Jews and 1,500 Crimean chaks , members of a small ethnic group with a Tatar language and Jewish-rabbinical faith, who were called by the Germans were treated as "racial" Jews. After long and bizarre clarifications between the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) and the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RMO), the Karaites , an ethnic group also influenced by Tatar but non-rabbinical Jewish beliefs, were classified as not descending from Jews but from Mongolian Khazars - and therefore not pursued.

Already in the first days of November, the local command office in Simferopol prepared the “ solution to the Jewish question ”: The Jews of the city were recorded, identified by armbands and liquidated from December 9th to 13th by the special command SK 11b of Einsatzgruppe D of the security police and the SD . The Wehrmacht contributed staff from the motorized secret field police (GFP 647) and the field gendarmerie. The Jews were rounded up in the city from December 11 to 13, loaded onto trucks and shot in an anti-tank ditch about ten kilometers outside of Simferopol . On December 9th, the city's Crimchaks were murdered there. Eyewitness reports on the mass shootings, which were referred to as "Judenaktion" or, in camouflage language, "resettlement", are available in the form of interrogation protocols from both the Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen trial and from the investigation files of the German judicial authorities. The historian Andrej Angrick wrote a description of the mass shootings in Simferopol with extensive references .

The Simferopol massacre was the largest of the numerous murders by Einsatzgruppe D in the Crimea. With the event report EM 150 of January 2, 1942, Simferopol and other cities in the Crimea were reported as " Jew-free ". A week later, the event report EM 153 of January 9, 1942, specified that Simferopol was free of Jews and Crimchaks. However, Jews in hiding were also targeted in later raids in Simferopol. For example, in the big "Action to record unreliable elements" on January 11, 1942, in which the SD's Sonderkommando Sk 11b was supported by the army of 20 secret field policemen, 55 field gendarmes and 2,320 soldiers and apprehended 1,250 suspicious civilians. The task force D reported in the event report EM 170 from February 19, 1942 that in Simferopol in the time from 9.1. - 15.2. over 300 Jews were captured and executed; the number of those executed in Simferopol had risen to almost 10,000 Jews.

Although almost all of the approx. 35,000 Ashkenazi Jews, approx. 3,000 Crimean chaks and 114 mountain Jews who remained in Crimea were ultimately killed by the murder squads of the SD, it is not entirely clear how many people perished in the mass shootings in Simferopol in the first half of December 1941. Assuming that all Jewish, Crimean Chak and 1,000 Roma residents of Simferopol were shot during the Christmas massacre, the result would be 15,500 civilians. In his Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (EdH), the historian Israel Gutman names 12,500 Jews and 1,500 Crimean chaks as the number of victims. In its judgment in the criminal case against Paul Zapp and others - as head of Sonderkommando 11a for the "group shooting" in Simferopol, Zapp had contributed personnel - the district court Munich I spoke of "at least 5,000" Jewish victims. The historian Norbert Kunz believes that it was the majority of the Crimean Chaks and around 5,000 Ashkenazi Jews and that this number had doubled by the end of February. The Soviet Extraordinary State Commission determined 10,600 Jewish and 1,500 Crimean Chakian victims, which in total corresponds to the 12,000 "Jewish" victims in a report by Werner Otto von Hentig . The affidavit of a member of the Pioneer Battalion 70 from the year 1949 comes from the Hamburg process of the British occupying power against Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, in which he estimates the number of Jews shot at 12,000 due to official contact with the Jewish council of the city and personal contacts with Jewish citizens . In the event report EM 157 of January 19, 1942, the temporary unrest in the population is reported with regard to Einsatzgruppe D under the heading “General situation and mood”, which the “preparations for the resettlement of the 12-13,000 Jews initiated at the beginning of December” , Crimeanchaks and Gypsies ”. Unless explicitly localized, the event reports usually relate to the entire operational area of ​​the task force. Since a significantly higher number of shootings was reported in the above-mentioned event reports EM 150 and EM 153, it is not explicitly said, but it can be assumed that the number of “resettlements” mentioned here reflects the number of victims of the Simferopol massacre.

11th Army role

On November 20, 1941, the commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, issued an order that corresponded to the Reichenau order praised by Hitler . Von Manstein affirmed that the “Jewish-Bolshevik system” had to be exterminated once and for all, and demanded that his troops nip in the bud all uprisings, which were mostly instigated by Jews. The order shows the author's obvious approval of Hitler's ideological war aims. It also contains von Manstein's approval of the economic plundering of the country through the food strategy in the war against the Soviet Union : “The food situation in the homeland makes it necessary that the troops are largely fed from the country and that as large stocks as possible are made available to the homeland become. A large part of the population will have to starve, especially in the hostile cities. Nevertheless, out of a misunderstood humanity, nothing that the homeland gives up under privation may be distributed to prisoners and the population - unless they are in the service of the German Wehrmacht. "The above passages reflect the ruthless course of the Wehrmacht in the lightning war phase, the had to be questioned in the famine winter of 1941/1942, because the civilian population was inevitably made an enemy and military success was at risk. Manstein's order of November 20, 1941 "supported the soldiers of the units subordinate to him in the conviction that the mass killings of Jews were a natural part of the war and that the army had to help with the massacres".

Task Force D had planned the liquidation of the Jews for March 1942. But AOK 11 pushed for an earlier date. The reason for this hurry was probably the catastrophic food situation in the Crimea. After all, the Sevastopol fortress in western Crimea had not yet been conquered and the east, the Kerch peninsula , was easily accessible from the eastern mainland, where the Red Army had retreated. If the 11th Army tried to recapture them, hunger riots in the cities could have put them in a very dangerous situation. When the Red Army withdrew from Crimea, which produced a surplus of food in peacetime, food and means of production had been removed or destroyed so as not to let them fall into the hands of the enemy. The destruction of the railway lines and the growing partisan activity reduced the supply via the railway so drastically that the attack on Sevastopol planned for late November 1941 had to be postponed due to a lack of ammunition. As a result of the catastrophic food situation, the Agriculture Department of the Economic Command (Wi Kdo Krim) of the Economic Organization East already on December 1, 1941 , demanded the removal of all prisoners from the Crimea, the immediate solution of the Jewish question, the evacuation of the unemployed industrial population from the cities of Kerch, Simferopol and Sevastopol to northern areas of Ukraine, the relocation of all Romanian troops from the Crimea to other areas, and the evacuation of a large part of the troops after the fall of Sevastopol.

In this situation, says the historian Oldenburg, the AOK 11 did not demand the early "solution to the Jewish question" out of racist-ideological motives, but primarily out of the inhumane military calculation of saving food and thereby reducing the security risk in the rear army area. Kiril Feferman, who has analyzed not only German documents but also numerous Soviet and Jewish sources on the food situation in the Crimea, does not completely deny the AOK 11's demand that it is a military calculation. However, it is based on an overly pessimistic assessment of the situation, which also arose because the occupying power did not succeed in forcing the population of the large cities to give up the food they had hoarded after the withdrawal of the Red Army.

Oldenburg describes the further procedure in the SD and AOK 11 procedure as follows: Since Dr. Werner Braune , leader of the Sk 11b of Einsatzgruppe D in Simferopol, did not have enough of his own resources to carry out the executions before Christmas, the senior quartermaster in AOK 11, Colonel Hauck (AOK 11 / OQu) “provided him with a large number of trucks Drivers, supplies, ammunition and a number of field gendarmes as well as members of the GPF 647 are available for these actions. "The execution resolution was passed on December 6th at the latest, because in his activity report, entry for December 6th, the field gendarmerie staff officer noted: "11 Campaign. Committed to the SD for Jewish action. ”Among the Wehrmacht members“ there were the field gendarmes of OK I / 853 stationed in Simferopol, who were instructed to carry out the preparatory measures for the execution .... At the execution site itself, the field gendarmes were used as blocking posts, ie at the shootings they were not involved themselves; these were carried out by the forces of Sk 11b and GFP 647. ”With regard to the involvement of military policemen in the massacre, Oldenburg only mentions the statements of GFP member Jean Breuer as direct evidence, who was only present on one day of the execution.

Werner Otto von Hentig , father of the well-known educator and publicist Hartmut von Hentig , was a representative of the Foreign Office (VAA) at AOK 11 in 1941 and 1942 and reported to the Foreign Office on the Crimean theater of war. He openly criticized the brutal occupation policy, the treatment of prisoners of war , the shooting of hostages and the murder of the Jews. “... I did not go into the consequences of the shooting of Jews, which amounted to 12,000 here in Simferopol alone. The effects of such slaughter are by no means limited to the victims themselves; they affect the entire population of the occupied territory because, of course, no one thought it was possible that we would kill women and children. But they also affect the morale of the troops and continue to affect our economic position. Of course, completely apart from the effects in other countries ... "

Convictions

The extermination of the Jews of Simferopol fell within the “scope” of Einsatzgruppe D , which was responsible for the areas occupied by the 11th Army and murdered a total of over 90,000 people. The leader of this task force was SS group leader Otto Ohlendorf . According to his affidavit of September 3, 1947, one of the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen was to “cleanse the conquered territories of Jews, communist functionaries and agents. The latter task was to be solved by killing all recorded, racially and politically undesirable elements that were described as endangering security. ”He and the chief of his special command (Sk 11b), Sturm-Bannführer Dr. Werner brown were in Nuremberg as part of the Einsatzgruppen process condemned to death , and by the train executed . Ohlendorf's adjutant SS-Obersturmbannführer Heinz Hermann Schubert , who could be proven to have actually participated in the mass murder in Simferopol, was initially sentenced to death, but then - in the run-up to the West German rearmament - released in 1952 in the context of mitigating sentences and issuing prison sentences.

Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was acquitted after the war in the last allied war crimes trial in 1949 of the charge of active participation in crimes of the SD. He was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, among other things, for neglecting his duty of supervision as commander-in-chief and thus allowing genocide, for tolerating deportations , for allowing the shooting and mistreatment of prisoners of war and for allowing political commissioners to be extradited to the SD (" commissioner order ") . Manstein was released from prison in 1953.

Despite their involvement in war crimes , the Secret Field Police was not classified as a criminal organization in the Nuremberg Trials . The head of GFP 647, Dr. Albert Hermann, when questioned by the German judiciary, claimed that his unit in Crimea did not take part in the persecution and murder of Jews. As an example of a Federal German case, the setting of which caused "serious concern" with Alfred Streim , head of the Central Office of the State Judicial Administration for the investigation of National Socialist crimes , the latter cites the case against five former NCOs of the GPF 647, in which they participated admit and portray at the execution.

An investigation by the Munich public prosecutor's office against the commander of the field gendarmerie department FGA 683, Maximilian Maier, and the bosses of his first and third company, which had been opened in 1962, concerned, among other things, participation in the mass executions at Simferopol. Since the allegations of arresting Jews, guarding them and transferring them to the SD, placing motor vehicles for transporting Jews and carrying out barriers at the execution site could not be adequately documented despite years of investigations, the proceedings were discontinued in 1966.

Which field gendarmes were involved in the Simferopol massacre and whether they also carried out shootings was discussed again in the "Eggebrecht case" in 2009/2010 . As Friedrich Geiger's argument shows, the FGA 683 provided field gendarmes for the rear army area. However, since these were assigned to the local and field command offices in widely changing configurations and the command offices also had their own field gendarmes, an exact identification of individual units or unit parts is now much more difficult.

"Gypsy Action"

The head of Einsatzgruppe D, SS-Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf , stated in front of the Nuremberg judges that Jews and Roma represented a threat to the Wehrmacht in the same way, since they both acted as "spies" "in all wars" be. He therefore organized very early - without being able to invoke an explicit order - the extermination of the Roma in the Crimea, parallel to that of the Jews and Crimeanchaks. A large part of the population of the Roma quarter of Simferopol was also the victim of a mass shooting in December 1941. Oversight of these "gypsy action" Einsatzgruppe D led Ohlendorf aide obersturmführer Heinz Hermann Schubert . The 11th Army provided trucks, field gendarmerie and other military units.

Based on eyewitness reports, the Ukrainian historian Mikhail Tyaglyy writes that the "Gypsy Action" took place on December 9, 1941, the same day as the annihilation of the Crimean population of Simferopol. The number of Roma victims in the city in December 1941 and January 1942 amounted to a total of 800 to 1,000 people, he quotes a contemporary witness. From the population figures of the statistics office of the Simferopol city council given by Mikhail Tyaglyy, the number of 600 victims can be determined, which corresponds to the statement by Michael Zimmermann "about 25 vehicles" with 25 people each.

In contrast to the program of extermination of the Jews, which is controlled and consistently implemented from above, Mikhail Tyaglyy sees more room for discretion on the part of the SD officials on site in the persecution of the Roma. This was also due to the fact that the Roma of the Crimea were linguistically and culturally strongly influenced by their Tatar neighbors, partly of Muslim faith and increasingly in possession of ID cards that identified them ethnically as Tatars. The German occupying power therefore had problems distinguishing the Roma from the Tartars, who made up around 20% of the population in Crimea and initially mostly sympathized with the German occupying power. For their part, the Tatars showed solidarity at least towards the Muslim Roma and saved them from being recognized as "Gypsies". In Simferopol, for example, numerous Roma are said to have escaped the "Gypsy Action" in December 1941, and the Crimean Tatar Muslim Committee is said to have prevented further shootings of Roma by intervening with the German commanders.

The Russian-language newspapers in Crimea were full of anti-Semitic propaganda during the German occupation but never reported on the “Gypsy question”. Jews were also denounced many times by the population - but not Roma. The unpopularity of the Jews in the Crimea dates back to the cession of land for Jewish agricultural settlements which the OZET (Russian: ОЗЕТ, Общество землеустройства еврейских трудящихся - Society for land settlement of the working Jews) of the Communist Party in the years 1924-1938 with the support of agro- Joint , a US aid organization for Jewish fellow believers.

The incident report of January 2, 1942 documents the following shootings by Einsatzgruppe D in the Crimea for mid-December to mid-January: 17,645 Jews, 2,504 Crimean chaks, 824 gypsies and 212 communists and partisans. The event report of April 8th reported that “Jews, Crimchaks and Gypsies” “except for a few small troops that occasionally appear in the north of Crimea are no longer available”. Martin Holler, who prepared an expert report for the Documentation and Cultural Center of German Sinti and Roma on the genocide of the Roma in the occupied Soviet Union , estimates that around 30% of the Roma in Crimea escaped the SD's killing machinery. These are the 1109 “Gypsies” who, according to Soviet documents, were deported in 1944 on Stalin's orders, together with the Tatars and other “traitor peoples” who had fraternized with Germany.

Memorial to the victims of the massacre

Soviet memorial stone for the victims of the Simferopol massacre (Dec. 1941)
Memorial stone for the Jewish and Crimean Chak victims of the Simferopol massacre (Dec. 1941)

About ten kilometers away from Simferopol on the left of the road to Feodosija with the coordinates N45 0.751 - E34 12.484 is the area where the SD, with the support of the Wehrmacht, brought the Jewish, Crimean and Roma population of Simferopol - men, women and children - into shot between December 9 and 13, 1941. First you reach a memorial from the Soviet era. A huge block of stone bears a tablet with the following text: Russian ЗДЕСЬ В 1941–1943 Г.Г. НЕМЕЦКО-ФАШИСТСКИМИ ЗАХВАТЧИКАМИ ЗВЕРСКИ СОВЕРШЕН МАССОВЫЙ РАССТРЕЛ СОВЕТСКИХ ГРАЖДАН. In German: "Here, between 1941 and 1943, German-fascist aggressors brutally committed mass shootings of Soviet citizens." This inscription reminds of all groups of victims with the wording "Soviet citizens". A little further north is an extension of the memorial dedicated to the two largest groups of victims of the Simferopol massacre, the Jews and the Crimchaks, which was inaugurated on October 8, 2002. A few meters behind it begins the former anti-tank ditch, which became a mass grave for many thousands of innocent victims . Its enormous extent is marked by small white concrete pyramids in the area lined with grass and bushes.

The memorial stele made of black marble is inscribed in the manner of a gravestone. The top line contains the abbreviation Hebrew used on Jewish gravestones פ״נ, which "rests here" (or in the present case "rests here": פה נטמנים) means. The bottom line shows the usualת.נ.צ.ב.ה.d. H. "May their souls be bound into the bond of life" (תיהיו נשמתם צרורות בצרור החיים). On theפ״נ a Russian text in cursive follows right-justified:

row Copy of text in block letters German translation
01 Господи, My God,
02 Укрой под сенью крыл твоих hide in the shadow of your wings
03 всех ушедших. kill all.
04 Увяжи в узел жизни их души. Bind their souls in the covenant of life.
05 Даруй утешение скорбящим .... Give comfort to the bereaved ...
06 (Пс. 23.91.130) (Psalms 23, 91, 130)

The visitor is advised to speak three psalms: Psalm 23 is a psalm that expresses the absolute trust of the prayer in the one God who protects and accompanies people on their journey through life with all its imponderables. Psalm 91 is the consolation psalm that encourages trust in God. Psalm 130 is a penitential psalm that belongs to the traditional prayers for the dead.

The following text is again in Russian and says who is resting here: ЕВРЕЯМ И КРЫМЧАКАМ РАССТРЕЛЯННЫМ ФАШИСТСКИМИ ОККУПАНТАМИ В ДЕКАБРЕ 1941 Г. In German: "Jews and Krimtschaks, shot by the fascist occupiers in December 1941" In the penultimate line there is another Hebrew abbreviation:הי״דd. H. "May the Lord avenge their blood."השם ינקום דמם)

literature

  • Johannes Hürter : News from the "Second Crimean War" (1941/42). Werner Otto von Hentig as representative of the Foreign Office in the 11th Army. In: Christian Hartmann , Johannes Hürter, Peter Lieb , Dieter Pohl: The German War in the East 1941–1945, facets of crossing borders. Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59138-5 , pp. 369-392.
  • Norbert Kunz: The Crimea under German rule 1941-1944, Germanization utopia and the reality of occupation. WBG, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-18813-6 .
  • Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 .
  • Andrej Angrick : Occupation Policy and Mass Murder. Task Force D in the southern Soviet Union 1941–1943. Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-930908-91-3 .
  • Oliver von Wrochem : Erich von Manstein: War of extermination and history politics. Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, ISBN 3-506-72977-2 .
  • EdH = Israel Gutman (Haupthrsg.), Ed. Of the German edition: Eberhard Jäckel, Peter Longerich, Julius H. Schoeps: Enzyklopädie des Holocaust. The persecution and murder of the European Jews. Piper, Munich 1998, ISBN 3-492-22700-7 , pp. 1317-1318.
  • Michael Zimmermann: Race Utopia and Genocide - The National Socialist Solution to the Gypsy Question. Christians, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-7672-1270-6 .
  • Mikail Tyaglyy: Nazi Occupation Policies and the Mass Murder of the Roma in Ukraine. In: Anton-Wiss-Wendt (Ed.): The Nazi Genocide of the Roma: Reassessment and Commemoration. Berghahn Books, 2013, ISBN 978-0-85745-842-1 , pp. 120–152.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , p. 189.
  2. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , p. 59.
  3. EdH pp. 1317–1318, World War II events, November 1, 1941, USSR ( Memento of the original from December 5, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.holocaust-chronologie.de
  4. ^ Hannelore Müller-Sommerfeld: Favor and tragedy of a privilege - Karaites in Eastern Europe in the 20th century. In: Judaica, Contributions to Understanding Judaism. Zurich / Tübingen, 67th year, 2011, pp. 48–96, especially p. 84.
  5. ^ Norbert Kunz: “The Jews are Completely Destroyed” - The Fate of Jewish Minorities in the Crimea in World War II. In: The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Sources and Perspectives. Conference Presentations, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2013, pp. 121–142. ushmm.org (PDF; 1.2 MB)
  6. Kiril Feferman: Nazi Germany and the Karaites in 1938–1944: between racial theory and Realpolitik , Nationalities Papers 2011, vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 277–294.
  7. Dr. Gustav Kraitschek: Race Studies . Burgverlag, Vienna 1923, p. 133 .
  8. Hans FK Günther: Rassenkunde of the Jewish people . JF Lehmann, Munich 1930, p. 188-189 .
  9. EdH, pp. 1317–1318, World War II events, November 1, 1941, USSR ( Memento of the original from December 5, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.holocaust-chronologie.de
  10. EdH, p. 1318, World War Events, December 11-13, 1941, Occupied Soviet Territories ( Memento of the original from February 24, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.holocaust-chronologie.de
  11. SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Werner Braune, Commander of the SK 11b Sonderkommando, statements on his visit together with SS-Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf at the Simferopol shooting site, Section 3 on p. 215 (English): mazal.org
  12. ^ SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Jonas, member of the Sonderkommando Sk 11b, testimony to the Simferopol massacre (English): ns-archiv.de
  13. Excerpt from the Kühn interrogation protocol from July 21, 1964 (STA Munich, StAnw 21767/4, Bl. 750-753) quoted by Friedrich Geiger: Comments on the "Eggebrecht case" , online publication Hamburg 2010, URL: fbkultur. uni-hamburg.de , p. 11 and p. 13. (PDF; 2.1 MB)
  14. ^ Andrej Angrick : Occupation Policy and Mass Murder. Task Force D in the southern Soviet Union 1941–1943. Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-930908-91-3 , pp. 335-345.
  15. Bundesarchiv Berlin BA R 58/219, p. 378.
  16. Bundesarchiv Berlin BA R58 / 220, p. 64.
  17. ^ Andrej Angrick: Occupation Policy and Mass Murder. Task Force D in the southern Soviet Union 1941–1943. Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-930908-91-3 , p. 496f.
  18. Bundesarchiv Berlin BA R58 / 220, p. 384.
  19. EdH p. 1318, World War II events, December 11-13, 1941, Occupied Soviet Territories ( Memento of the original from February 24, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.holocaust-chronologie.de
  20. Procedure 727, in CF Rüter and DW de Mildt (editor), Justice and Nazi Crimes Volume XXXIII, Amsterdam University Press 2005, ISBN 90-5356-551-5 , pp. 449-450.
  21. ^ Norbert Kunz: "The Jews are Completely Destroyed" - The Fate of Jewish Minorities in the Crimea in World War II. In: The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Sources and Perspectives. Conference Presentations, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2013, p. 127/128 ushmm.org (PDF; 1.2 MB)
  22. Mikhail Tyaglyy: Места массового уничтожения евреев Крыма в период нацистской оккупации полуострова (1941-1944) (Sites of mass murder of the Jews during the Nazi occupation Crimean of the peninsula, 1941-1944), БЕЦ (Jewish Welfare Center) "Хесед Шимон" , Simferopol 2005, p. 63.
  23. Johannes Hürter: News from the "Second Crimean War" (1941/42). Werner Otto von Hentig as representative of the Foreign Office in the 11th Army. In: Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, Peter Lieb, Dieter Pohl: The German War in the East 1941–1945, facets of crossing borders. Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59138-5 , p. 385.
  24. Gratitude owed to Stephen Tyas (discoverer of the Höfle-Telegram ) for sharing Affidavit of Johann Gaffal , The National Archives , Kew / UK; reference WO 235/594; trial exhibit 553.
  25. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BA R58 / 220, pp. 209–210.
  26. Document VEJ 7/118
  27. Reichenau command: http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/untermenschen/reichenau-befehl.php#anweisung
  28. ^ Copy of the order in the collection of documents by Gerd R. Übersär, Wolfgang Wette (ed.): Enterprise Barbarossa. The German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941: reports, analyzes, documents. Schöningh, Paderborn 1984, p. 343/344, and VEJ 7/118.
  29. Oliver von Wrochem: Erich von Manstein. War of Extermination and the Politics of History. Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 62.
  30. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , p. 84.
  31. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , pp. 75–87.
  32. Kiril Feferman: The Food Factor as a Possible Catalyst for Holocaust-Related Decisions: The Crimea and the North Caucasus. In: Was in History. 2008, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 72-91. wih.sagepub.com
  33. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , p. 82.
  34. Friedrich Geiger: Comments on the "Eggebrecht case" critical of the source. Online publication Hamburg 2010, URL: fbkultur.uni-hamburg.de , p. 8. (PDF; 2.1 MB)
  35. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , p. 167/168.
  36. Johannes Hürter: News from the "Second Crimean War" (1941/42). Werner Otto von Hentig as representative of the Foreign Office in the 11th Army. In: Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, Peter Lieb, Dieter Pohl: The German War in the East 1941–1945, facets of crossing borders. Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59138-5 , p. 385 / completely printed as document VEJ 7/156.
  37. Wolfgang Benz (Ed.): Dimension of the genocide. The number of Jewish victims of National Socialism. Munich 1991, ISBN 3-486-54631-7 , p. 543.
  38. ^ SS-Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, affidavit in the Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen-Prozess ns-archiv.de
  39. ^ Manfred Oldenburg: Ideology and military calculation. The occupation policy of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union in 1942. Böhlau, Cologne / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-412-14503-3 , p. 38.
  40. ^ Alfred Streim : Clean Wehrmacht? The prosecution of war and Nazi crimes in the Federal Republic and the GDR. In: Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann (ed.): War of destruction. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941–1944. Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 1995, pp. 569–597, here spec. Pp. 581-583. (Source: ZStL 213 AR-Z 493/67)
  41. Friedrich Geiger: Comments on the "Eggebrecht case" critical of the source. Online publication Hamburg 2010, p. 14, URL: fbkultur.uni-hamburg.de , (PDF; 2.1 MB)
  42. Boris von Haken: Trellis at the murder trench. In: The time. December 17, 2009 zeit.de
  43. Boris von Haken: Erdückende sources. In: The time. January 14, 2010 zeit.de
  44. Claudia Maurer Zenck: Eggebrecht's military time in the Crimea. Online publication Hamburg 2010, URL: fbkultur.uni-hamburg.de (PDF; 1.5 MB)
  45. Friedrich Geiger: Comments on the "Eggebrecht case" critical of the source. Online publication Hamburg 2010, URL: fbkultur.uni-hamburg.de , (PDF; 2.1 MB)
  46. ^ Michael Zimmermann: Racial Utopia and Genocide - The National Socialist Solution to the Gypsy Question. Christians, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-7672-1270-6 , pp. 264-265.
  47. Books and articles by Mikhail Tyaglyy at academia.edu holocaust-kiev.academia.edu
  48. Mikhail Tyaglyy: Were the "Chingené" Victims of the Holocaust? Nazi Policy toward the Crimean Roma, 1941-1944. In: Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 23 no. 1 (2009), pp. 26-53, spec. P. 36.
  49. Mikhail Tyaglyy: Were the "Chingené" Victims of the Holocaust? Nazi Policy toward the Crimean Roma, 1941-1944. In: Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 23, no. 1 (2009), pp. 26-53, spec. P. 38.
  50. ^ Michael Zimmermann: Racial Utopia and Genocide - The National Socialist Solution to the Gypsy Question. Christians, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-7672-1270-6 , p. 264.
  51. Mikhail Tyaglyy: Were the "Chingené" Victims of the Holocaust? Nazi Policy toward the Crimean Roma, 1941-1944. In: Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 23, no. 1 (2009), pp. 26-53, spec. Pp. 36-39.
  52. Mikhail Tyaglyy: The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine in German Propaganda in the Crimea, 1941-1944. In: Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 18, no. 3 (2004), pp. 421-459.
  53. Event report EM 150 (January 2, 1942) in the Federal Archives Berlin BA R58 / 219, p. 378.
  54. ^ Event report EM 190 (April 8, 1942) in the Federal Archives Berlin BA R58 / 221, p. 267.
  55. Martin Holler: The National Socialist Genocide of the Roma in the Occupied Soviet Union (1941–1944). Documentation and Cultural Center of German Sinti and Roma, Heidelberg 2009, ISBN 978-3-929446-25-8 , pp. 90–91.
  56. Short report from the inauguration of the new memorial (Russian) crimea.ru
  57. ↑ Photo report from the opening ceremony of the new memorial (Russian) photo.unian.net