Sicily expedition
| date | 415 to 413 BC Chr. |
|---|---|
| place | Syracuse in Sicily |
| output | Catastrophic defeat of Athens |
| consequences | Disintegration of the Attic League |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
|
Athens |
Syracuse, Sparta, Corinth |
| Commander | |
|
Nikias †, Lamachos †, Demosthenes †, Eurymedon †, Menandros , Euthydemos †, ( Alkibiades ) |
Hermocrates , Sikanos, Agatharchos; |
| Troop strength | |
| 134 and 73 trieres ; 5,100 and 5,000 hoplites , plus riders, archers , peltasts , rowers |
over 100 trireme; Hoplites, marksmen, peltasts, horsemen |
| losses | |
|
Total loss of the fleet and army, 7,000 prisoners |
? |
Sybota - Potidaia - Spartolus - Stratos - Naupactus - Plataea - Olpai - Tanagra - Pylos - Sphacteria - Corinth - Megara - Delion - Amphipolis - Mantinea - Melos - Syracuse - Miletus - Syme - Eretria - Kynossema - Abydos - Kyzikos - Ephesus - Chalcedon - Byzantium - Andros - Notion - Mytilene - Arginus - Aigospotamoi
The Athenians' expedition to Sicily from 415 to 413 BC BC was a temporary extension of the Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BC) to Sicily . The siege of Syracuse by an Athenian force remained in vain. It ended in a crushing defeat for Athens - a tragic climax of the war that marked the beginning of the end for Athens.
The most important source for the event is the historical work of the Greek historian Thucydides (VI. And VII. Book). Furthermore, reference should be made to Diodor and Plutarch and - as sociocultural sources - to the plays The Birds by Aristophanes and The Trojans by Euripides .
Thucydides, who was a contemporary witness of the expedition , summarized its meaning with the following words:
- One can say that this event was the most important of all in this war, in my opinion even of all who we know from the tradition of the Hellenes , the greatest glory for the victors, the greatest misfortune for the lost: all along the line conquered and suffering, none of which was minor, they had lost in literal annihilation infantry and ships and everything in general, and few of so many returned home. (Book VII, chap. 87, translated by GP Landmann)
prehistory
In 416 BC The Peace of Nicias , which had interrupted the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta for the time being, entered its fifth year. In Athens, however, there were forces that had rejected peace from the start. Among these, the ambitious and charismatic statesman Alkibiades played a crucial role. Now there was an opportunity to realize these ambitions, because in the autumn of 416 BC. BC envoys from the Sicilian city of Segesta asked Athens for assistance in the conflict with Syracuse . They argued that once powerful Syracuse ruled all of Sicily, it would soon come to the aid of Sparta , its Doric cousin in the Peloponnese , and go to war against Athens. An intervention by Athens is therefore a preventive war . They also promised to finance the costs of the war ; There is plenty of money available.
Athens sent an embassy to Segesta to make sure that the money was available. This was duped: The Segestians borrowed jewelry and crockery from neighboring cities and presented this at all entertainments for the ambassadors, who found gold and silver in abundance every evening without suspecting that the crockery was always the same. When the ambassadors in the spring of 415 BC When they returned to Athens BC, they reported on the wealth of Segesta.
The popular assembly was then called. The politician and strategist Nikias warned against the planned campaign, since there were already enough enemies and Sicily was big and too far away; the risk is therefore not calculable. Alcibiades, who rejected the Peace of Nicias and expected fame and power from a Sicily expedition, pleaded for the campaign and convinced the Athenians with a passionate speech. Nicias wanted to bring the people's assembly to their senses once again: one would have to equip a fleet that was too huge and an army that was too large if one wanted to be successful. He was dismayed to find that the assembly was not deterred by this - an expedition was actually being equipped that was larger than the specifications of Alcibiades. The numbers of the expedition alone are quite impressive for the time: 134 trireme (100 of them from Athens, the rest of them allies), 5100 hoplites (of which 1500 Athenians), 480 archers, 700 slingers, 30 horsemen (the only real weak point, since the Strength of the cavalry of Syracuse was known); furthermore 30 freighters and 100 barges with grain, plus bakers, stonemasons, builders and siege equipment. Many merchant ships joined the fleet. Nikias (against his will), Alcibiades and Lamachos , an experienced general and war advocate, were entrusted with the leadership .
The general enthusiasm of the Athenians for the company was great, but besides Nikias there were other skeptics , e.g. B. Socrates or the astronomer Meton , of whom Plutarch reports that he set his own house on fire and reached so that he was thought to be crazy and his son was exempted from participating in the expedition.
During the Peloponnesian War, Athens already had 427 and 425 BC. BC intervened against Syracuse in Sicily with moderate success. Nevertheless, it had aroused the interest of the Athenians in rule over the island. Sicily, part of Magna Graecia , was considered the New World by the Greeks . The island had experienced a brilliant economic boom over the past 200 years and was rich in resources, especially grain. Parts of the island, especially the west, belonged to Carthage's sphere of influence .
At the time of colonization by the Greeks, Sicans , Sicelians and Elymers lived on the island. Segesta, for example, was a city of the Elymians, but had still had it since 480 BC. An auxiliary agreement with Athens.
At that time Syracuse was the largest city in Sicily, in terms of size and population comparable to Athens (40,000 inhabitants). The form of government was a democracy , although tyranny had a longer tradition. As a daughter city of the Dorian Corinth , with which it had close trade relations, Syracuse was a natural ally of Sparta, the arch enemy of Athens.
The passage
The departure of the fleet in the summer of 415 BC Chr. Was overshadowed by the Hermen crime: the night before casting off, Hermes statues, which were also regarded as a symbol of Attic democracy , were mutilated all over Athens . Alcibiades was accused of the act; a process was postponed, however, in order not to delay the expedition. However, this increased the chances of a condemnation of Alcibiades in his absence, which also happened soon afterwards.
The fleet first crossed over to Italy, where the Greek cities refused to accept them for fear of being drawn into the war. Ships sent ahead to Segesta returned to the fleet and reported that the promised money was not available. After a few deliberations, during which Nikias urged in vain to return to Athens soon, it was decided to look for allies in Sicily for an attack on Syracuse. Meanwhile, Alkibiades was called back to Athens to face a trial of the Hermen crime. On the way back to Athens, however, Alkibiades escaped to Sparta , which he was to advise in the following years in the fight against his hometown.
The Athenian fleet meanwhile sailed along the coast of Sicily, gained a few allies such as the Ionian Poleis Naxos and Katane , conquered the Sican city of Hykkara , which was enemies with Segesta, and devoted itself to the slave trade as the summer passed. At Syracuse there was the first field battle with the Syracuse army, which the Athenians won. However, since the lack of cavalry turned out to be severe, it was decided to winter in Katane and Naxos and wait for reinforcements. Syracuse sent a request for help to Corinth and Sparta, where the refugee Alkibiades incited the Spartans and advised them not only to stand by Syracuse, but also to occupy Dekeleia near Athens. Sparta did not send an army, but did send the experienced general Gylippus . Only Corinth decided to send a fleet.
Athens meanwhile sent the expeditionary army 250 horsemen for reinforcement and money to recruit 400 more. The expedition, which had started so promisingly, should now tie up more and more resources in Athens.
The siege
In the spring of 414 BC The Athenians took the initiative again (for the last time) and attacked the siege of Syracuse. With a coup d'etat they managed to take the strategically important Epipolai ( high field ) north of the city. This was the prerequisite for surrounding the city with a siege ring and cutting it off from the rest of the mainland. Since you also had sea sovereignty thanks to the strong fleet, you would have all the advantages on your side.
Immediately a fort was built on the northern steep slope of the high field (Labdalon) and another one closer to the city, the so-called ring because of its shape . In addition, siege walls began to be erected in both directions, starting from the ring. The Syracusans tried to thwart this. Twice they built counter walls perpendicular to the intended line of the Athenian walls; both were destroyed by the Athenians. There were several skirmishes; the Athenian general Lamachos was killed, with Nikias now the sole commander.
Meanwhile the Athenian fleet took the port. It had been three days since the siege began and construction on the walls was progressing rapidly. These were double walls: two walls with a space in between, so that the besiegers were additionally protected against attempts at relief from the interior. The distance between the walls was gradually widened the closer one got to the harbor, in order to finally enclose a large part (1,000 m) of the beach belonging to the harbor basin. So the whole Athenian fleet found space within the walled area.
The Syracusans saw no more hope and considered surrender. But that did not happen, because shortly before the last piece of the northern wall could be completed (the stones for it were already ready) and thus the closure would have been complete, Gylippos arrived. The Spartan general had first gone to Himera in northern Sicily and raised an army of 3,000.
Gylippos attacked Labdalon and captured the fort there. The Syracusans began building a counter wall from the city to Labdalon, using the stones that the Athenians had brought for their wall. The Athenians had to prevent this and there was a battle in which Gylippus was victorious so that the Syracusans could finish their wall. The closure of the Athenian ring around Syracuse was thus definitely thwarted, a preliminary decision had been made.
The siege of the besiegers
Nikias, who did not trust oral messengers to describe the seriousness of the situation emphatically enough, sent a letter to Athens in which he stated that the besiegers had now become besieged themselves. Indeed, since the walling of the city was incomplete, the Syracusans could move freely between the city and the rest of the country, while the Athenians were restricted to the area within their siege walls and the port. Now it is they themselves who are suffering from a lack of food and water. He asked for permission to return home or substantial reinforcements. Athens decided on the latter and appointed two officers on site, Menandros and Euthydemus , to be strategists in order to give Nicias a hand. In addition, the experienced strategists Demosthenes and Eurymedon in Athens were commissioned to prepare an aid expedition.
Syracuse received reinforcements from Sparta, Corinth and the rest of Sicily (all of Sicily meanwhile sided with Syracuse); the Syracuse fleet was also being upgraded as the winter passed.
In the spring of 413 BC The Syracusan fleet, reinforced with 25 Corinthian triremes, dared a battle against the (traditionally superior) Athenian fleet in the port, which the Athenians had won. On the Athenian side, the two newly appointed strategists Menandros and Euthydemos were particularly keen to fight before the expected reinforcements arrived. The cautious Nikias had wanted to avoid the battle and was ultimately proved right, because during this sea battle Gylippus captured three Athens outposts ( plemmyrion ) with the Syracuse army , which controlled the port entrance - a loss that would later be fatal for the Athenians.
In the meantime, the Syracusans made improvements to their triremes - they reinforced the bow with additional struts to enable bow- on-bow ramming. You have to know that the usual trireme tactic was to ram the opponent in the side with the ram, but never in the bow (the latter was called “helmsman's folly”). For lateral ramming, however, space was required for maneuvering, which was lacking in the Syracuse harbor basin. Thanks to the reinforced bow, the Syracusans could now dare the frontal ramming; later this advantage was momentous.
While the Syracusans were preparing a third battle, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with reinforcements for the Athenians: 73 trireme with 5,000 hoplites and many Peltasts . Nikias and his troops now drew courage again.
The Athenians made a night attack on the high field in the hope of being able to complete the northern wall. This attack ended in chaos - night fighting was uncommon back then - and an Athenian defeat.
The end
When Demosthenes recommended returning to Athens, it was Nicias who hesitated. He feared being held responsible for this failure:
- He was well aware that the Athenians would never approve if they left without a referendum. […] Also many of the soldiers present here, yes most of them, who were now moaning about the hardship they had to endure, would, when they got home, raise the reverse shouting about bribery and shameful betrayal of the generals. That is why he himself, who knows the way the Athenians are, instead of suffering unjustly death in Athens with disgrace and disgrace, would rather fall before the enemy [...]. (Book VII, Chap. 48, translated by GP Landmann)
He was also convinced that the situation of the Syracusans was even worse than that of the Athenians.
Only when the Syracusans received further reinforcements shortly afterwards, Nikias agreed and they secretly prepared for the journey home. However, when everything was ready for departure, a lunar eclipse occurred . The Athenians, especially Nicias, saw this as a bad omen and, on the advice of their seers , decided to wait three times nine days.
The Syracusans learned of the Athenians' secret plans to escape, felt encouraged and decided not to let them escape. They blocked the over 1 km wide port mouth with transverse ships. When the Athenians ran out of food, they tried to break through. Except for the beach, they gave up their walls and manned their remaining triremes; only the sick remained on the bank.
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A battle broke out in the approx. 4 km × 2.5 km large harbor basin, whereby the approx. 200 triremes involved - with 200 men per trireme, i.e. 40,000 fighting or rowing - had hardly any room to maneuver; often several ships got wedged together and went down. The Athenians failed to break the barrier, so they had to retreat to the beach.
Demosthenes suggested making another attempt the next morning with the 60 remaining trireme (the Syracusans also had only 50 ships left). Nicias agreed, but the ship's crews were demoralized and refused to obey.
It was therefore decided to attempt a breakout by land and to break through into the interior of the country, which was ruled by the neutral Sikels , that same night . However, the Syracusans spread the rumor that the roads were already blocked by their troops, whereupon the Athenians postponed the departure to the day after next. This delay gave the Syracusans time to occupy bottlenecks and erect barriers.
When the Athenians finally set out (leaving the sick behind), there were supposedly still 40,000 men able to march. However, their number rapidly diminished. They were constantly attacked by riders and archers, suffered from a lack of water and food and sometimes had to fight their way every meter of the way. The original goal, the interior of the country, turned out to be unattainable after two days because the Syracusans had occupied and walled up a bottleneck . After several unsuccessful attempts by the Athenians to overcome this, Nikias and Demosthenes decided to march south, because the way to the allied Katane in the north was also blocked.
After four days the rearguard under Demosthenes lost touch during a night march and was cut off from the main force. These 6,000 men were encircled on the Kakyparis River (now Cassibile , 14 km south of Syracuse). They surrendered after they had been promised protection.
Nikias and the rest of the army marched another day. They were placed on the Assinaros River. A bloody battle ensued, in which the exhausted Athenians were defeated. Thucydides describes the event in sober words:
- The Athenians hurried forward to the Assinarus, partly chased by the all-round attack of many horsemen and the rest of the crowd; they noticed that it would be easier for them when they were first over the river, partly also because of their exhaustion and desire to drink. When they got there, they plunged into it in a disorganized order, everyone wanted to be the first over there, and the enemies who pushed in made the transition difficult. Then forced to pull together, they fell on top of each other and kicked each other, some perishing immediately because of the spears and luggage, others getting stuck in the mud and being washed away. On the other bank the Syracusans lined up (it was a steep slope) and shot at the Athenians from above, most of whom drank eagerly and got in their own way in the bend of the river. The Peloponnesians descended to meet them and slaughtered almost all of them in the river. The water spoiled immediately and was drunk anyway, muddy and bloody as it was, and the crowd fought over it. (Book VII, chap. 84. translated by GP Landmann)
Nicias surrendered to Gylippus with the request to spare the remaining Athenians. Gylippus followed suit; the rest of the army was taken prisoner. However, a large part of the army (Thucydides does not give a number) managed to escape during the march. Both Nicias and Demosthenes were executed by the Syracusans - against the will of Gylippus, who would have liked to have brought the two Athenian generals to Sparta as trophies , especially Demosthenes, who had inflicted a momentous defeat on Sparta ten years earlier in the Battle of Sphakteria .
The prisoners, 7,000 in all, were crammed into a quarry near Syracuse, where those who were not sold as slaves died in dire conditions.
Consequences of the Sicilian expedition
In Athens the news of the destruction of the expeditionary army met with disbelief, even returning survivors were initially not believed. As the truth was gradually discovered, the indignation at the politicians and fortune tellers who had advised the expedition quickly gave way to despair. The loss of the fleet was the easiest to get over - the ships of that time did not have a long lifespan anyway - even if it was a setback, especially since the supply of wood to Athens was problematic at the time. However, the loss of human life weighed more heavily, especially after the previous loss-making events (death from the plague and the previous expeditions and battles). Athens' loss of reputation within the Attic League and throughout Greece was also enormous. Previously neutral city-states were now ready to take sides against Athens. In addition, in the last phase of the expedition, Sparta had established itself in the fortress Dekeleia in Attica and thus tied up Athenian resources. Athens had overestimated its power. The Peloponnesian War lasted nine more years, but the defeat of Athens was now in sight.
A certain irony of this event is that - according to Thucydides - the great Athenian strategist Pericles warned his compatriots at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War :
- I still have many other hopes that we will win if you decide not to expand your kingdom while you are at war and do not voluntarily seek more dangers. I fear our own mistakes far more than the attacks of our opponents. (Book I, chapter 144, translated by GP Landmann)
In doing so, it must be taken into account what Thucydides himself noted as limiting the authenticity of the speeches in his work, whereby he was most likely to have been present himself at the war speech of Pericles.
It is also remarkable that Athens' greatest defeat in the Peloponnesian War came about without the participation of a Spartan army: Sparta was only represented by Gylippus.
swell
- Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War. Translated by GP Landmann. Düsseldorf 2002, ISBN 3-7608-4103-1
- Diodorus Siculus : Bibliotheca historica: Book 13 begins with the Sicily expedition.
- Plutarch: Great Greeks and Romans. Munich 1984, ISBN 3-423-05989-3 (the biographies of Alkibiades and Nikias deal in detail with the expedition to Sicily)
literature
- Donald Kagan : The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition. Ithaca NY 1988, ISBN 0-8014-1367-2 (best and most comprehensive description of the Sicily expedition)
- Donald Kagan : The Peloponnesian War. Athens and Sparta in savage conflict 431-404 BC. London 2003, ISBN 0-00-711505-9 , pp. 253ff. (interesting presentation for a wider audience)
- Raimund Schulz: Athens and Sparta. Series history compact. Antiquity. Darmstadt 2003, ISBN 3-534-15493-2 , pp. 108–121 (concise but good summary)
- Karl-Wilhelm Welwei : Classical Athens. Democracy and Power Politics in the 5th and 4th Centuries. Darmstadt 1999, ISBN 3-89678-117-0 , pp. 200ff. (Standard work on the history of classical Athens with numerous references to modern research literature)
- John Warry: Warfare in the Classical World. Norman (Oklahoma) 1995, ISBN 0-8061-2794-5 , pp. 41, 49 (brief overview of the siege, also details on siege technology, hoplite fighting, trier ramming tactics, etc.)
