Committee of Inquiry into the Guilt Issues of World War I (First World War)

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At the 84th session of the Weimar National Assembly on August 20, 1919, a parliamentary committee of inquiry was set up to deal with the events that had led to the "outbreak, prolongation and loss of the First World War " after Germany with Art. 231 des Treaty of Versailles the sole war guilt had been imposed.

The committee existed for several terms (almost thirteen years) and delegated the work to four sub-committees. He suffered from increasing influence by the government, which wanted to prevent German confessions of guilt from the world public. He also met passive resistance from the civil servants and the military. In many cases, the MPs submitted to the pressure and did not intervene against officials and the military. In addition, the will of the majority shifted more and more to the side of those political forces that had no interest in unsparing public education. The results formulated by the individual sub-committees are therefore of limited value.

The actual work, as far as the file situation allowed, was mostly carried out carefully and conscientiously. The files with the course of the negotiations and the reports are accordingly of high source value. The committee of inquiry was not reinstated after the National Socialists' election victory in July 1932 .

Preparation and establishment of the committee of inquiry

The establishment of the committee of inquiry represented a compromise. Eugen Fischer-Baling , the general secretary of the committee of inquiry, saw in an article published in 1954 the “most genuine content” of the November Revolution in the “condemnation of the war fanatics, the annexationists, the propagandists of Pan-Germanism ”. This would also have been shown by the fact that important representatives such as Erich Ludendorff and Kuno von Westarp left Germany in a hurry. The engineer at the Germania shipyard in Kiel, Nicolaus Andersen, wrote in his diary on November 18, 1918:

“ Tirpitz to Switzerland in silence. The scoundrels leave. "

He repeatedly uses the expression "scoundrel" for the leaders of the Pan-Germans and the German National People's Party . Five days later, on the occasion of large articles in various daily newspapers, he wrote:

"The confirmation of the fact that we were put off by Ludendorff and Tirpitz for years with false figures and promises arouses great bitterness."

But the revolutionaries made no move to hold those responsible for the annexationist endeavors, the prolongation of the war, the missed opportunities to make a favorable peace, or for the drawing of the USA into account. Fischer-Baling attributes this to the fact that the militaristic spirit in Germany seemed to be completely wiped out: “They didn't want to kick the dead.” This view is supported by one of the leaders of the Kiel sailors' uprising , Lothar Popp . He said in an interview in 1978:

“People were so fed up with violence [...] In the department stores they threw away all the war toys. The whole world didn't want war anymore. "

However, when the refugees realized that they had no fear of revenge or punishment, they returned and, for their part, raised the safer they felt, the more serious the charges not only against the revolution and its representatives, but also against the leading authorities of the Weimar Republic. In the spring of 1919, Philipp Scheidemann called Ludendorff a "genius gambler" in a subordinate clause, which Ludendorff countered in an open letter calling for a criminal court to be set up to examine the allegations against him. In doing so, he untruthfully distanced himself from responsibility for the German request for a ceasefire and passed it on to the then newly formed government on a democratic basis .

Justice Minister Otto Landsberg of the SPD presented a bill to establish a criminal court on March 12, 1919. But although Ludendorff, Falkenhayn and others had called for this court, the right in the National Assembly spoke out against it. The governing coalition, too, has meanwhile felt itself pushed into a more defensive role and ultimately no longer considered this approach to be opportune. Fischer-Baling commented in an essay published in 1954: "The self-confidence of the revolution had already become so uncertain that it did not dare to appear as a judge." It was argued that it was more a matter of establishing the facts and that healthy public Opinion would then "eradicate the reactionary lie".

The governing coalition itself played a large part in this dwindling self-confidence. In November 1918, during and shortly after the revolution, the new leaders, especially those of the USPD , sought war guilt on the German side in order to show at home and abroad that one has completely broken with militarism. But in the further course the leaders of the MSPD saw in this perspective mainly disadvantages in the upcoming peace negotiations. The Versailles Peace Treaty , signed on June 28, 1919, gave the discussion a new twist by establishing the War Guilt Article (Article 231) as the basis for the burdens imposed. In order to evade this and to contest the contract (the term “revise” was generally used), the German government tried to present the war guilt article as factually incorrect. This led to a “state funding and a high degree of institutionalization” of war guilt and revision propaganda . For example, the Foreign Office founded or financed the Central Office for Research into the Causes of War and the Working Committee of German Associations. "Their undoubtedly apologetic (justifying) tendency contributed to the idealization of the empire and thus offered the anti-republican and anti-democratic right a welcome starting point for their agitation." A national consensus was formed in the defense of any kind of German confessions of guilt. The republican new beginning was thus missed, according to Niedhart . Revisionism was “at the expense of the domestic political constitution” ( Michael Salewski ).

Hugo Sinzheimer, rapporteur on the inquiry committee in the Reichstag

The original thrust against the war and its perpetrators expanded to include the question of guilt for Germany's defeat. This latter question had an undertone that was clearly critical of the Republic. Instead of entrusting a state court to clarify this question, it was agreed to set up an investigative committee . A corresponding resolution was passed at the 84th session of the National Assembly on August 20, 1919. This decision was made possible by Article 34 of the new constitution of the Weimar Republic . Thereafter, the committees were entitled to take in public the evidence that they or the applicants deemed necessary. The public could be excluded from the committee of inquiry with a two-thirds majority. The courts and administrative authorities were required to “comply with requests from these committees to collect evidence; the files of the authorities were to be presented on request ”. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure valid at the time were applied mutatis mutandis to the (evidence) surveys of the committees of inquiry and "the authorities they requested". The procedure of the investigative committees was not regulated by the rules of procedure of the Reichstag, but by the work plan for investigative committees of October 16, 1919, which was adopted by the National Assembly and continues to apply .

The committee was not given a name, but it could be called after the task which the rapporteur Hugo Sinzheimer formulated as follows: “Committee of inquiry into the events that led to the outbreak, the prolongation and the loss of the war”. Eugen Fischer-Baling later called him "Committee of Inquiry into the Guilt Issues of the First World War". Sometimes it was simply called the "Committee of Inquiry into Guilt". It was given the number 15. Since it was newly formed with each election period, the number also changed: in the period 1920–1924 it was given the number 12, in the period 1924 the 19, and in the period 1924–1925 the 20 .

In the resolution of the National Assembly, the committee was given the task of "establishing all the evidence:

  1. which events led to the outbreak of the war, caused its prolongation and caused its loss, in particular:
  2. what possibilities there were in the course of the war of attaining peace talks, and whether such possibilities were dealt with without due care;
  3. whether in the intercourse of the political authorities of the Reich leadership among themselves, between the political and military leadership and with the representatives of the people or their confidants, loyalty and faith were preserved;
  4. whether measures in military and economic warfare have been ordered or tolerated, whether they have violated the provisions of international law or whether they have been cruel and harsh beyond military and economic necessity. "

In his report, Sinzheimer expressed his conviction that the results of the investigation would form the basis for a judgment of the State Court of Justice in the event of personal fault and thus separate the individual guilty from the entire German people and thus be able to counter the collective guilt thesis of "hostile foreign countries".

The committee of inquiry was constituted a day later on August 21, 1919. It had the right to summon every German for questioning and to inspect all files of the authorities. Those summoned were mostly referred to as informants, they stood somewhere between the accused and witnesses. No defense lawyers were appointed. The procedure in the committee of inquiry should be adapted to that of criminal proceedings.

Carl Wilhelm Petersen, chairman of the committee of inquiry

The first chairman was the Hamburg Senator Carl Wilhelm Petersen from the German Democratic Party (DDP), later Walther Schücking , also DDP, and in the final phase Johannes Bell from the center . Ludwig Herz, who was replaced shortly afterwards by Eugen Fischer-Baling , was initially appointed managing director . The latter was temporarily also a member of the DDP.

Walther Schücking, Petersen's successor as chairman of the committee of inquiry

Members

The committee was occupied according to the distribution of seats in the National Assembly or in the Reichstag . The members and their employees therefore changed in the individual election periods.

Tasks and structure of the committee of inquiry

On October 14, 1919, the chairman, Carl Petersen, was able to present a goal, a preliminary breakdown of material and an associated work plan as the first result of the deliberations of the committee of inquiry. The focus was on the questions that had been controversially discussed in Germany since autumn 1918:

  1. Investigation of the events that led to the outbreak of war in July 1914 as a result of the assassination attempt in Sarajevo;
  2. Clarification of all possibilities to get to peace talks and clarification of the reasons that caused such possibilities or pertinent plans and resolutions on the German side to fail or if talks took place; the reasons why such discussions were unsuccessful;
  3. Providing information about acts of war that were prohibited by international law or, without being prohibited by international law, were disproportionately cruel or harsh;
  4. Clarification of the economic war measures at the front, in the occupied area, which were contrary to international law or which had to be carried out without promising any particular military advantage, and which had to bring about an unjustifiable hardship for the population concerned and their country.

Interestingly, the issue of guilt for defeat (loss of the war) formulated in the original resolution of parliament no longer appears here.

In the second meeting on September 30, 1919, four sub-committees, each with six to eight members, were set up to carry out the actual work. Each subcommittee had the full rights of an independent committee of inquiry. An office with four scientifically trained secretaries was set up under Secretary General Fischer-Baling. The secretaries had to work out the investigation methods, get the files from the archives in the ministries, make literature available and handle the mail. They were also responsible for preparing the hearing of witnesses. This gave them a considerable influence on the investigations.

Each subcommittee had to submit its results to the overall committee, which then passed them on to the Reichstag. The full committee was actually supposed to make the most important decisions, such as the selection of witnesses or experts, but mostly accepted the sub-committees without discussion and thus hardly intervened in their work. He contented himself with a coordinating role.

According to Fischer-Baling's assumption, the chairmanship of the full committee and the sub-committees was assigned to the various parties in accordance with a distribution key decided by the council of elders:

Over the course of time, the goals were concretized and partially expanded or narrowed. The subcommittees concentrated their investigations largely on individual issues in order not to let the negotiations get out of hand.

The first subcommittee turned to the immediate prehistory of the World War, but soon decided to include the further prehistory of the war, but wanted to concentrate on the broad lines in the politics of the great powers from 1870 onwards.

The second subcommittee, which had to deal with the causes and backgrounds of the failed peace opportunity, concentrated among others on the following topics: The peace campaign of American President Wilson in 1916/17, the peace mediation campaign of Pope Benedict XV. in the summer of 1917, peace feelers to France and Belgium as well as peace possibilities with Russia and Japan.

It proved difficult for the third and fourth subcommittees to separate military and economic violations of international law from one another. After the lengthy start-up phase, the two sub-committees agreed on March 8, 1920 that the third would take over "the handling of all pending investigations of violations of international law" and the fourth should clarify the "responsibility for the military and political collapse in autumn 1918". The fact that the issue of "guilt for the loss of the war", which was formulated when the committee of inquiry was established, has only now been taken up again, may be due to the increased pressure to justify the democratic and republican forces on the eve of the Kapp putsch .

Thus the third subcommittee dealt with the forced transfer of Belgian workers to Germany, the gas war, the economic war and the violation of Greece's neutrality.

From November 1920 the fourth subcommittee dealt with the issues of the origin, implementation and collapse of the offensive in 1918, the grievances in the army, as well as the economic, social and moral grievances in the home country and their repercussions on the army and navy. A month later, the question of the extent to which domestic political processes and propagandistic influences (revolutionary and annexionist) had a corrosive effect was included in the work program.

Difficulties in the work of the committees

The work was very time consuming. Many MEPs were also represented in other bodies, including outside Parliament. Then there was the politically uneasy period, especially in the first year. In June 1920, the first ordinary Reichstag was elected under the new constitution. Two elections followed four years later, and finally one each in 1928 and 1930. This caused work interruptions and delays lasting for weeks or months. The complicated task also made a lengthy formulation and delimitation of the specific questions necessary. Comprehensive reports had to be commissioned and checked. Obtaining files took a long time. In addition, the majority will shifted more and more to the side of those political forces "who had no interest in unreserved and public clarification."

The secretaries had to make the selection of literature and experts for the committees, they had to work out the investigation methods, prepare the hearing of witnesses and take over the procurement and utilization of files. They gained considerable influence on the investigations they supervised. They were essentially officials trained in the empire. In terms of their rights, they were on an equal footing with the MPs, they could make a preselection of the files, delay the publication, or classify the files as secret material, and thus prevent publication by the committee. However, Fischer-Baling has no doubt that all the material was presented to the committee members, the "official correctness [...] was far too deeply ingrained." However, this contradicts Hahlweg's results, that in a circumscribed statement by members of the second The subcommittee found that documents of particular concern had been withheld. In the fourth subcommittee, the members of the Naval War Command's war diary were also withheld (see below).

The ministries made civil servants and the military available to the committee to help parliamentarians find their way around the archives and to provide them with background information. Over time, these developed into censorship offices that prevented the publication of unpleasant details. Heinemann comes to the conclusion that “before the investigations had started, the committee was confronted with serious statements and concerns of the executive branch”, which became even more pronounced in the further course.

The effects of this mixture of revision propaganda, (inadequate) preparation of the witnesses / informants questioning by the secretaries, censored / delayed inspection of files, etc., became apparent at the first public subcommittee meetings, which took place on October 21, 1919 with the active participation of the national and international press began. It was about the second subcommittee, which was supposed to clear up the failed peace possibilities. It was headed by a representative of the German National People's Party ( Fritz Warmuth ). Among other things, the former Vice Chancellor Karl Helfferich was invited, who was given the opportunity to use the big stage to defame the Democrats and Republicans as the real culprits in the defeat in the First World War. In November 1919, Hindenburg and Ludendorff appeared before the committee. The former in particular was received with servile submission in the committee. Hindenburg exacerbated the allegations and claimed that the German army had been stabbed from behind. Heinemann speaks of a publicly effective inauguration of the stab in the back legend .

With a view to the DNVP committee chairman, Fischer-Baling commented: A worse directorial error was inconceivable than the appointment of an opponent of the revolution as the first spokesman for the revolutionary quasi-tribunal. As a result, the committees no longer met in public and received less and less attention from the population.

Investigations and results

It was to be expected that those responsible in the empire would try to cover up and deny their mistakes. The committee therefore tried to let the opponents of the time have their say and to judge the controversial statements on the basis of the files, often supported by expert reports.

While the formulated results were on various occasions the result of dubious compromises among the committee members, the investigations, reports and disputes in the sub-committees brought to light important findings, which have not yet been fully developed.

First subcommittee (outbreak of war)

Fischer-Baling sees the question of the prehistory of the war as the biggest topic of the investigation committee. However, in his opinion, this subcommittee had the lowest public performance. The ambitious goal of presenting the “first authoritative work on the prehistory of the war from the German side” could not be met. In particular, the question was whether Germany and its allies had forced the war on the Allies.

To this end, the subcommittee examined the provisions of the various alliance agreements. A summary of the results could be started despite some delays. If the subcommittee had had a year more time, the results could have been presented to the Reichstag, and according to Fischer-Baling these would have been suitable for enlightening the people. But after their election victory in July 1933, the National Socialists prevented the restoration of the entire committee and prohibited publication. Most of the documentation of the work was finally burned in the Second World War.

Only the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the “Military Armament and Mobilization” complex could lead to a resolution. Two reports could be presented: that by Hermann Lutz on German politics after the assassination attempt in Sarajevo and one on the German attitude at the Hague peace conferences.

Above all, "the ongoing intervention by the Foreign Office" delayed the committee work considerably. The office prevented the publication of four reports by well-known experts, including the legal historian Hermann Kantorowicz . After a detailed examination of the files, the latter came to the conclusion that Germany was partly to blame for the outbreak of the war. This went against the official line. Kantorowicz's report could only be published by Imanuel Geiss in 1967 .

Second Subcommittee (Missed Peace Opportunities)

Shortly after the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, the subject of unused peace opportunities during the war was hotly debated throughout the Weimar Republic. But even in this subcommittee, the Foreign Office succeeded in “transforming the committee work into a bureaucratically directed, quasi-secret investigation.” The resistance of the parliamentarians was too low. Only the complexes about the Wilson Action, the papal peace appeal, the failed German-Belgian-French contacts and the German-American peace talks of spring 1918 were brought to a conclusion.

Fischer-Baling sees the processing of Wilson's peace campaign in 1916/17 as the second largest topic of the committee of inquiry. The rapporteur was Prof. Hugo Sinzheimer . The former Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, the former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs ('Foreign Minister') Zimmermann as well as Hindenburg and Ludendorff were summoned. It became clear, according to Fischer-Baling, that the responsible politicians had recognized the peace to which Wilson wanted to clear the way as salvation, but that they could not reach for it because the army command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff did not allow it. Instead, by resuming unrestricted submarine warfare, the military leadership ensured that the United States entered the war on the Entente side and thus sealed Germany's defeat. Fischer-Baling sees the responsibility of the then Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in the fact that he did not oppose the gamble by threatening to resign. Despite these far-reaching findings, the subcommittee only agreed on the result that “an important opportunity for peace had not been dealt with with due care.” Since the committees no longer met publicly after the scandal described above, these results were hardly ever found among the population Attention.

The situation was somewhat different with the treatment of the papal peace appeal Benedict XV of the summer of 1917. According to Fischer-Baling, the relevant investigations of the committee showed that although the Pope advised haste because the mood in England, which was inclined to peace, could soon change again, Richard von Kühlmann , then State Secretary of the German Foreign Office , took his time. He was under pressure from the Supreme Army Command, which refused to accept the precondition - renouncing the annexation of Belgium. The subcommittee came to the again strongly watered-down result that errors were made in the formal treatment of that mediation attempt, which, however, was not decisive for the failure of the action. All of the major newspapers published this on September 3, 1922, triggering a major public debate. Social democratic publications in particular were dissatisfied with the result, as they saw the Pope's attempt at mediation as a great forgotten opportunity for peace and Scheidemann had not been informed of the urgency of the situation at the time. But here, too, the Foreign Office ensured that the files and negotiation minutes were not published, thus preventing a constructive, public discussion.

An investigation carried out by the officer Hans von Haeften with members of the American legation in The Hague revealed that the Entente was at peace under the threat of a German attack (after the peace of Brest-Litovsk , large units had been moved to the western front) would be ready on condition of the return of Belgium and part of Alsace-Lorraine. Haeften reported this to Ludendorff. But without informing the government, Ludendorff ordered the attack. He kept this possibility of a favorable peace secret from the government, apparently so as not to endanger his planned spring offensive. The subcommittee came to the difficult to explain decision that the fault was not on the German side, but that the American demands were unacceptable. There was also a lack of courage for a clear resolution against the efforts of the executive branch.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk had given the peace movement in Germany and Austria-Hungary a great boost because it was interpreted as a sign, especially in the labor movement, that the Central Powers would not wage a war of defense, but a war of conquest. The parliamentarians failed to analyze the extensive files prepared by the committee office. However, the MPs Ludwig Quessel (SPD) and Frhr. Werner von Rheinbaben ( DVP ) there position on the contract based on the files.

Overall, the influence of the Weimar government coalition, which - in line with its line against the Versailles Article of Guilt - wanted to prevent confessions of German guilt, becomes very clear in this subcommittee. Nevertheless, the committee's negotiations provide important and interesting material for illuminating what was going on at the time. Unfortunately, under pressure from the Foreign Office, a lot could not be published, and Fischer-Baling assumed that a lot had burned in the Second World War. However, Hahlweg succeeded in rediscovering the extensive files held by the second subcommittee in the Political Archives of the Foreign Office (at that time in Bonn).

In 1920 the German National Assembly published the special volume: Supplements to the stenographic reports on the public negotiations of the committee of inquiry. Report of the second subcommittee of the committee of inquiry on Wilson's peace operation 1916/17 .

In 1971 Werner Hahlweg edited the previously unpublished volume from the work of the investigative committee The Peace of Brest-Litowsk . In the appendix he lists the above. Files that were almost all classified as "Secret!"

In 1974 Wolfgang Steglich gave a volume on the negotiations of the 2nd subcommittee of the parliamentary committee of inquiry on the papal peace campaign of 1917. Notes and interrogation protocols. out.

Third Subcommittee (Violations of International Law)

The results of the third subcommittee, which dealt with possible violations of international law during the First World War in connection with the Leipzig trials, received more public attention . The expectations of the committee concerned the clarification of such questions as the violation of Belgian neutrality ( Rape of Belgium ), the so-called punitive actions of the German army in Loewen and Dinant , the treatment of the crews of torpedoed ships, the deportation of Belgian workers and the devastation at the withdrawals. However, in addition to clarification, the committee members also wanted to provide food for thought with regard to the criminal provisions of the Versailles Treaty , which provided for a public indictment against the former German Kaiser Wilhelm II before a special Allied court and the extradition of other alleged war criminals to the Allies deliver new, contemporary international legal regulations ”. But even this subcommittee had to struggle with the authorities, who feared that a wealth of secret details could come to light and thus increase the pressure to extradite war criminals, which had already declined.

In this subcommittee, officials even influenced the work directly by being involved in the work of the experts. In addition, the Foreign Office was able to appoint the Ministerial Director a. D. Have Johannes Kriege appointed as an expert, who, as chief adviser, was involved in the decisions and actions of the German government under investigation, almost without exception. The attempt has now been made to deny violations of international law by the German government and to pass them on to the war opponents.

The question of the violation of Belgian neutrality was delayed and ultimately not resolved. Most committee members indicated the against the prize regulations offending unrestricted submarine warfare as a legitimate response to the illegal blockade of Germany by Britain, or they saw the forcible transfer of Belgian workers to Germany by the Hague Regulations covered, while in the similar stored over of residents Alsace -Lothringen to France, clear violations of international law were found.

The fact that the third subcommittee completely lost its revolutionary origin with regard to the then recognized international martial law from which it was born can also be seen in the assessment of the destruction caused by the German army when it withdrew from France and Belgium. Although the archive documents of the committee office contained an expert opinion drawn up by the Foreign Office, which stated that such destruction was "completely senseless and useless", the parliamentarians came to the conclusion that it was a matter of measures from a purely military point of view covered by Article 23 of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations.

In 1927, the third subcommittee presented its results to the Reichstag in the form of a five-volume paper.

Fourth subcommittee (causes of the collapse)

In addition to the second subcommittee, the fourth subcommittee received the most public attention. He had the most difficult job and could finally have exposed the stab in the back legend as lying propaganda among interested parties. However, this question was only included in the investigation under pressure from the reactionary forces in the Weimar Republic (after it had already been briefly mentioned in the resolution of the National Assembly). Here, too, the Weimar government coalition tried to use the means described to maneuver between real clarification and the prevention of admission of guilt to the earlier opponents. The military authorities proved to be even more closed to the release of files than the Federal Foreign Office. They made no secret of their fundamental rejection of the parliamentary inquiry.

According to Fischer-Baling, the documents obtained clearly showed that the Supreme Army Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff repeated their demand for an armistice in October 1918 with an urgency that remained deaf to any reasonable objections of Chancellor Max von Baden . After the new government, legitimized by parliament, complied and sought an armistice, Ludendorff demanded that the fight be resumed and blamed the new government and the democratic parties for the surrender. At the same time, the Naval War Command, with Ludendorff's permission, but without asking the government, planned the great naval battle against England.

Due to the increasingly harsh climate in the Weimar Republic, the subcommittee had to ask itself a whole series of questions, e.g. For example, whether the army would actually have been so resilient at the end of October to enforce a better peace, or how an army command would have to be judged, which then without need gave up the fight at the beginning of October, or whether the government actually had no knowledge of the plan of the Naval War Command had.

General Hermann von Kuhl , one of the leading general staff officers during the First World War, was appointed chief expert on military questions. As a counterpoint, the war historian Hans Delbrück was commissioned to provide another expert opinion. The former general staff officer Colonel Bernhard Schwertfeger was also called in as a further expert. Fischer-Baling saw the finding that emerged from the reports that there was no authority over the civil and military authorities other than the emperor as a surprise. In addition, it would have been shown that no statesman would have approved the German spring offensive in March 1918 if "Ludendorff had presented the prospects to the Chancellor with the sincerity that von Kuhl demonstrated before the subcommittee." It had become clear that one was in this Location should have adopted the best peace attainable. When Kuhl came to an end with his description of the main offensive and the follow-up thrusts from spring / summer 1918, he determined, without being contradicted, that the war was lost. According to Fischer-Baling, this answered the subcommittee's great main question: The revolution had ended a war that had actually been lost and lost by the army command. The fact that the revolution and the democratic forces were later blamed for the defeat was only an attempt in retrospect to shift the responsibility onto the political opponent.

But these conclusions were controversial among the subcommittee members. Because they wanted to complete the work in the current electoral term, they finally agreed on a draft resolution presented by Deermann in the spring of 1924, which essentially followed the theses of the expert Delbrück, but in which all points against Ludendorff had been removed. But in the newly constituted Reichstag, surprisingly, the DNVP, which until then had distinguished itself by torpedoing the committee, advocated the continuation of the work of the fourth subcommittee. Albrecht Philipp from the DNVP and chairman of the fourth subcommittee justified this with the fact that the present result was tendentious and had to be corrected. The Reichswehr Ministry also filed an objection. Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Marx withdrew to legal arguments: the decision to publish all material was taken by the subcommittee after the Reichstag was dissolved in March 1924 and is therefore void. Although the subcommittee could have invoked the commissioning of the council of elders, it accepted the decision.

But in 1925, Hindenburg became President of the Republic. In contrast to the early days, Ludendorff was able to brusquely refuse his subpoena to the subcommittee without being punished or brought before him. In May 1925 the members of the subcommittee tabled a significantly modified majority resolution and two minority resolutions. Most of the MPs bowed to the increasing pressure and watered down the results in their resolutions. Regarding the military collapse of 1918, they formulated that “no statement can be made which justifies reaching a guilty verdict on either side.” In 1928, the MPs reached the verdict on the investigation complex “Heimatpolitik and overthrow movement (stab in the back)” - at least in a clear effort to objectify the stab-in-the-back debate - that "the blame for the German collapse can only be found in the mutual interaction of numerous causes." Despite the available material, the subcommittee spoke out in favor of an acquittal against the votes of the SPD and KPD members of the OHL executives.

During the winter months of 1926 the so-called Dittmann controversy arose, in which the former USPD politician sharply attacked the naval command at the time because of the planned naval advance. This led to intense debates with, among others, the corvette captain Wilhelm Canaris, who was the representative of the naval command . It was not until the beginning of March, under the time pressure of the upcoming Reichstag elections, that a resolution was passed, which, however, contained no criticism of the naval command. The military had withheld the war diary of the Naval War Command and a memorandum from Trothas (then Chief of Staff of the High Seas Fleet), which clearly demonstrated their intentions.

The subcommittee had disregarded the complexes of investigation into annexionist propaganda in World War I and the social grievances in the army, which could have acted as potential counterweights to the stab in the back. The responsible expert Martin Hobohm, whose planned report was not published, protested publicly.

Even if these results are disappointing, the rich material published still offers many interesting and important accounts of the occurrences, including the grievances in the army and the navy (see below). Heinemann qualifies the source value of the materials produced by the fourth subcommittee as "undeniably high."

End of the committee of inquiry

After the overwhelming election victory of the National Socialists in July 1932, the committee of inquiry was not reinstated. In doing so, the Nazis prevented the representatives of the people from completing the work of the First Subcommittee. The question of responsibility for the military escalation of the July crisis in 1914, which led to the outbreak of the First World War, could no longer be dealt with conclusively. The public took almost no notice of it. In the eyes of the parliamentarians, too, the committee work had outlived itself. Heinemann mainly blames the ongoing intervention of the Foreign Office for this.

Documentation and sources

Some parts of the work of the first, third and fourth subcommittees were published during the Weimar Republic.

Materials from the second subcommittee could be received and subsequently published. Many other extensive files were destroyed by the National Socialists after 1933. The minutes and thus the decisions of the National Assembly on the committee have been preserved.

The parliamentarians were interested in making their results known to the public, but the officials said v. a. that of the Federal Foreign Office, arguments that spoke against it from their point of view. So were z. B. often feared foreign policy conflicts. However, the officials often succeeded in avoiding lengthy debates from the start by declaring documents for the committee to be "secret" or "top secret".

The Reichstag published the documents as The Work of the Committee of Inquiry (WUA) of the German Constituent Assembly and the German Reichstag 1919–1930. Negotiations, reports, certificates. This happened with the assistance of v. Eugen Fischer (later he renamed himself Fischer-Baling), Berthold Widmann, Walter Bloch, edited by Walter Schücking, Johannes Bell, Georg Gradnauer, Rudolf Breitscheid, Albrecht Philipp. Row 1-4. Berlin.

Some documents that were prevented from being published by the Nazis and that were not destroyed in the turmoil of World War II were published in the 1970s and 1980s. These are specially marked below.

Row 1. The prehistory of the world war

On behalf of the First Committee of Inquiry with the participation of Eugen Fischer, ed. by Georg Gradnauer and Rudolf Breitscheid . Volume 5, 10, 11 (Volume 10, 11 edited by Clara Bohm-Schuch )

Shorthand reports on the public negotiations of the committee of inquiry. 15. Committee. [Ed. v.] The German National Assembly in 1919. 1919.

Supplements to the shorthand reports on the public negotiations of the committee of inquiry.

  1. Supplement issue 1: 1st subcommittee. On the prehistory of the world war [issue 1]. Written information from German statesmen. Edited by of the German National Assembly in 1919/20. 1920.
  2. Supplement issue 2: 1st subcommittee. On the prehistory of the world war. Book 2: Military Armaments and Mobilizations. Edited by of the German National Assembly. 1921.

5.1-2: Germany at the Hague Peace Conferences. 1929.

  1. Resolution and negotiation report.
  2. Expert opinion from the experts Wehberg, Count Montgelas, Zorn, Kriege, Thimme.

10: Report by the expert Dr. Roderich Gooss - The Austro-Serbian problem up to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia, July 28, 1914 - and the expert Hermann Wendel - The Habsburgs and the South Slav question. 1930

11: Report of the expert Hermann Lutz - European politics in the July crisis 1914. 1930.

Subsequently published outside the series: Hermann Kantorowicz, expert opinion on the war guilt question. From the estate, ed. u. a. v. Imanuel Geiss. Frankfurt 1967.

Row 2. Possibilities for Peace during World War

Only two volumes have been published in the WUA series:

  • The German National Assembly in 1919/20 (Ed.): Stenographic reports on the public negotiations of the 15th Committee of Inquiry of the Constituent National Assembly, with enclosures. (Volume I) Berlin 1920. This first volume contains the minutes of the first eleven meetings from October 21st to November 14th, 1919. Various witnesses such as Graf von Bernstorff, Bethmann Hollweg, Zimmermann etc. were involved in the peace campaigns of American President Wilson in 1916 / 17 interviewed.
  • The German National Assembly in 1919/20 (Ed.): Stenographic reports on the public negotiations of the 15th Committee of Inquiry of the Constituent National Assembly, with enclosures. (Volume II) Berlin 1920. This second volume contains the minutes of the following meetings (12-15) from November 15, 1919 to April 14, 1920; as well as attachments from files relating to Wilson's peace campaign.

Outside the WUA series:

  • The negotiations of the 2nd subcommittee of the parliamentary committee of inquiry on the papal peace operation of 1917. Notes and interrogation protocols. Edit and ed. v. Wolfgang Steglich. Wiesbaden 1974.
  • Edit v. Werner Hahlweg: Sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. First row. Volume 8: The Peace of Brest-Litovsk. An unpublished volume from the work of the investigative committee of the German National Constituent Assembly and the German Reichstag. Düsseldorf 1971.
  • In the above literature information (Werner Hahlweg) there is a reference to the unpublished volumes of this subcommittee on pages 707–714. There are 37 files and 7 individual items, almost all of which are declared "Secret!" Hahlweg cites the source: Political Archive [of the Foreign Office]. Parliamentary committee of inquiry. Files relating to: 2nd Subcommittee: Peace Possibilities Summer and Autumn 1917. Nos. 43–52. Hahlweg classifies this material as "informative, so far little-noticed source material".

Row 3. International law in the world war

On behalf of the Third Committee of Inquiry with the participation of v. Eugen Fischer u. Berthold Widmann ed. v. Johannes Bell. Volume 1-4. 1927

  1. Introduction. Panel. The introduction of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations in the German army. The destruction in northern France on the occasion of the retreats of the German army in 1917 and 1918. The deportation of residents of Alsace-Lorraine to France. The forced transfer of Belgian workers to Germany.
  2. Violation of Greece's neutrality. The Belgian People's War. Violations of the Geneva Convention. Violations of the X Hague Agreement.
  3. 1-2: Violations of prisoner-of-war law
  4. The gas war. The air war. The submarine war. The economic war

Row 4. The causes of the German collapse in 1918

Fourth row in the work of the committee of inquiry. With the participation of Eugen Fischer, Walter Bloch on behalf of the Fourth Subcommittee, ed. v. Albrecht Philipp. Volumes 1-12. 1925-29.

1st department. The military collapse. Volume 1-3

1: Resolutions of the 4th subcommittee and negotiation report. 1925 2: Expert opinion from the expert Colonel a. D. Bernhard Schwertfeger. 1925 3: Expert opinion from General d. Inf. A. D. von Kuhl u. Privy Councilor Prof. Dr. H. Delbrück. 1925

2nd department. The inner breakdown. Volumes 4-12

Volumes 4-6: General Causes and Events

4: Resolution and negotiation report: The general causes and events of the internal breakdown. 1st chapter. 1928

5: Negotiation report: The general causes and processes of the internal breakdown. Part 2. 1928

6: Expert opinion from the experts von Kuhl, Schwertfeger, Delbrück, Katzenstein, Herz, Volkmann on the "stab in the back" question. 1928

Volumes 7-8: Reichstag

7.1: Resolution and negotiation report: "The German Reichstag in World War I". 1928

7.2: Negotiation report: "The German Reichstag in World War I". 1928

8: Report by the expert Prof. D. Dr. Dr. Joh. Viktor Bredt, MdR The German Reichstag in World War II. 1926

Volumes 9-10: Marine

9.1: Resolution and negotiation report: Navy and collapse. 1928

9.2: Negotiation report: Navy and collapse. 1928

10.1: Expert opinion from the experts Alboldt, Stumpf, v. Trotha on the naval operations in 1917 and 1918. 1928

10.2: Diary of the sailor Richard Stumpf. 1928

Volume 11: Social Abuses of the Army

11.1: Report by the expert Dr. Hobohm: Social maladministration as a partial cause of the German collapse of 1918. 1929

11.2: Expert opinion by Volkmann: Social abuses by the army as a contributory cause of the German collapse of 1918. 1929

Volume 12: Annexation Issues

12.1: Expert opinion by Volkmann: The annexation issues of the world war. 1929.

12.2: no longer published; should Dr. Bring Martin Hobohm's annexation report (against the Pan-Germans).

Assessments

Fischer-Baling summed up "the revolutionary producer spirit [was] more effective in the second subcommittee, less in the first and fourth, and almost not at all in the third".

The Weimar government coalition had left the civil servants in their positions. This exercised passive resistance to an open and relentless reappraisal. There had been no radical reforms in the military either. Important documents such as the war diary of the naval war command were withheld from the committee.

Even more catastrophic was the fact that the Weimar governing coalition wanted to prevent a German admission of guilt to the world public. “The 'war innocence legend' was supposed to act as an emotional bracket for the diverging political and social forces of the young republic. But this prevented the necessary historical break with the past. This made a decisive contribution to the political as well as the 'moral continuity' ( Heinrich-August Winkler ) between the Wilhelmine Empire and the Weimar Republic. ”Since the members of the committees often complied with this requirement, an open and honest processing of the questions was difficult and partially impossible. Such a reappraisal could, however, have strengthened the democratic and republican forces at home and laid a foundation for a European peace order.

The committee missed the great opportunity to contribute to the consolidation of democracy and peace in Europe by giving in to political pressure on various occasions and not taking action against the civil service and the military. Fischer-Baling stated: "The great tool of the committee [...] as a means to consolidate democracy against the re-emerging militarism" was not used.

reception

The formulated results of the individual sub-committees represent certain compromise formulas of the Weimar government coalition and its officials arrested during the imperial era. They are therefore of limited value. The actual work, as far as the file situation allowed, was mostly carried out carefully and conscientiously. The files with the course of the negotiations are accordingly of great value and deserve to be made more comprehensive.

At that time, the Foreign Office prohibited the publication of the report by the legal historian Hermann Kantorowicz . After a detailed examination of the files, the latter came to the conclusion that Germany was partly to blame for the outbreak of the war. Kantorowicz 'report was published in 1967 by Imanuel Geiss and played an important role in the historians' dispute over Fritz Fischer ( Fischer controversy ).

An opinion in the fourth subcommittee, which Emil Alboldt, founder and chairman of the Deckoffizierbundes in the Weimar Republic had presented on the occasion of the negotiations on the Imperial Navy, was published in 1928 as a special edition with an introduction by Walther Schücking .

Richard Stumpf's diary , which was published by the investigative committee for the first time in full but with anonymized names, was distributed in excerpts in the form of a small brochure by member of the investigative committee Wilhelm Dittmann . In the 1960s it was published by the American / Austrian history professor Daniel Horn in English and in full length with the restoration of the anonymized names.

Wilhelm Deist cited Richard Stumpf's diary at various points in his historical work, for the first time in 1966 in his work “The Politics of the Naval War Command and the Rebellion of the Fleet at the End of October 1918”. Deist points out in his work that the extensive material spread in the work of the Committee of Inquiry (WUA) has by no means been sufficiently taken into account in its abundance. He specifically refers to double volumes 9 and 10 of the fourth series, which deal exclusively with naval issues.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Stumpf diary has also been shown in the teaching exhibition of the Mürwik Naval School and dealt with in naval history lessons.

In 1970 Martin Schumacher published the memoirs and documents of Johann Bredt , who had prepared two reports for the investigative committee, on the role of the Reichstag and the violation of Belgian neutrality.

literature

  • Michael Dreyer , Oliver Lembcke: The German discussion about the war guilt question 1918/19. (= Contributions to political science. Volume 8). Berlin 1993
  • Eugen Fischer-Baling : The committee of inquiry into the guilt questions of the first world war. In: Alfred Herrmann (Ed.): From history and politics. Festschrift for Ludwig Bergstrasse . Düsseldorf 1954, pp. 117-137.
  • Werner Hahlweg : The Peace of Brest-Litowsk. An unpublished volume from the work of the investigative committee of the German National Constituent Assembly and the German Reichstag. (= Sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Volume 8). Düsseldorf 1971.
  • Ulrich Heinemann: The Repressed Defeat. Political public sphere and question of war guilt in the Weimar Republic (= critical studies on historical science . Volume 59). Göttingen 1983. (digitized version)
  • Eduard Heilfron (Ed.): The German National Assembly in 1919 in its work for the construction of the new German people's state. Berlin 1921.
  • Wolfgang Jäger : Historical research and political culture in Germany (= critical studies on historical science . Volume 61). Göttingen 1983.
  • Gottfried Niedhart : German History 1918–1933. Politics in the Weimar Republic and the victory of the right. Stuttgart 1994.
  • Albrecht Philipp (Ed.): The causes of the German collapse in 1918. (= The work of the investigative committee of the German National Constituent Assembly and the German Reichstag 1919–1928. Fourth row. Volume 1). Berlin 1925.
  • Markus Pöhlmann : committee of inquiry, parliamentary. In: Gerhard Hirschfeld , Gerd Krumeich , Irina Rens in connection with Markus Pöhlmann (Ed.): Encyclopedia First World War. Extended and updated study edition. Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-506-76578-9 , p. 938 f.
  • Michael Salewski : The Weimar Revision Syndrome. In: From Politics and Contemporary History. (B2 / 80, January 12, 1980), pp. 14-25.
  • Jens Schnauber: The parliamentary investigation into the "causes of the German collapse in 1918" . Seminar paper at the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, 1998.
  • Martin Schumacher (Ed.): Memories and documents by Joh. Victor Bredt 1914 to 1933. (= sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Third row: The Weimar Republic. Volume 1). Düsseldorf 1970.
  • Wolfgang Steglich (Ed.): The negotiations of the 2nd subcommittee of the parliamentary committee of inquiry on the papal peace campaign of 1917. Notes and interrogation protocols. Wiesbaden 1974.
  • Hagen Schulze : Weimar: Germany 1917–1933. (= The Germans and their nation. Volume 4). Berlin 1982.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Eugen Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry for the questions of guilt of the First World War. In: Alfred Herrmann (Ed.): From history and politics. Festschrift for Ludwig Bergstrasse. Düsseldorf 1954, p. 117.
  2. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 118.
  3. ^ Klaus Kuhl: Kiel and the revolution of 1918. The diary of a shipyard engineer, written in the years 1917–1919. Edition and text analysis. Berlin 2018 (Kieler Werkstücke vol. 51) pp. 238, 240.
  4. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 118.
  5. ^ Lothar Popp - leader of the Kiel sailors' uprising in 1918 in a dispute with a 68er. Available at: kurkuhl.de .
  6. ↑ Ulrich Heinemann: The Repressed Defeat. Political public sphere and question of war guilt in the Weimar Republic (= critical studies on historical science . Volume 59). Göttingen 1983, p. 23. (digitized version)
  7. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 118.
  8. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 118.
  9. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 118.
  10. ^ Michael Dreyer, Oliver Lembcke : The German discussion about the war guilt question 1918/19. (= Contributions to political science. Volume 8). Berlin 1993, p. 223.
  11. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 155.
  12. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 155.
  13. ↑ Gottfried Niedhart: German History 1918–1933. Politics in the Weimar Republic and the victory of the right. Stuttgart 1994, p. 46.
  14. ^ Michael Salewski: The Weimar revision syndrome. In: From Politics and Contemporary History. B2 / 80, January 12, 1980, p. 22.
  15. ^ G. Anschütz: Constitution of the German Reich of August 11, 1919. Commentary. 12th edition. Art. 34, p. 199.
  16. ↑ Eduard Heilfron (Ed.): The German National Assembly in 1919 in its work for the construction of the new German people's state. Volume 8, Berlin 1921, p. 150.
  17. ↑ Werner Hahlweg (ed.): The peace of Brest-Litowsk. An unpublished volume from the work of the investigative committee of the German National Constituent Assembly and the German Reichstag. (= Sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Volume 8). Düsseldorf 1971, p. XIII.
  18. ↑ E. Heilfron: The German National Assembly in 1919. 1921, pp. 150–153.
  19. ^ Negotiations of the German Reichstag: 84th session of the National Assembly on August 20, 1919. p. 2798.
  20. ^ E. Heilfron: The German National Assembly in 1919. 1921, p. 150 f.
  21. ^ Negotiations of the German Reichstag: 84th session of the National Assembly on August 20, 1919. p. 2698.
  22. ^ Negotiations of the German Reichstag: 84th session of the National Assembly on August 20, 1919. p. 2700.
  23. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry ... 1954, p. 123.
  24. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 118.
  25. ↑ Ulrich Heinemann: The Repressed Defeat. Political Public and War Guilt Question in the Weimar Republic. Göttingen 1983. Appendix: List of the members and employees of the parliamentary committee of inquiry into questions of guilt during the world war. Pp. 260-267.
  26. ↑ Negotiations of the German Reichstag, Constituent National Assembly, File No. 1187: Oral report of the 15th Committee of October 14, 1919. P. 1218. ff.
  27. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 156 f.
  28. ^ The bill was adopted at the 100th session of the National Assembly on October 16, 1919; see Reichstag minutes p. 3161 ff.
  29. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, p. XV.
  30. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 158.
  31. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 119.
  32. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 119.
  33. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 204.
  34. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, p. XXIV f.
  35. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 177.
  36. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 192.
  37. ↑ Albrecht Philipp (Ed.): The causes of the German collapse in 1918. (= The work of the investigative committee of the German National Constituent Assembly and the German Reichstag 1919–1928. Fourth row. Volume 1). Berlin 1925, p. 40.
  38. ↑ Jens Schnauber: The parliamentary investigation of the "causes of the German collapse in 1918". Seminar paper at the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, 1998, p. 9.
  39. ↑ Markus Pöhlmann : committee of inquiry, parliamentary. In: Gerhard Hirschfeld , Gerd Krumeich , Irina Rens in connection with Markus Pöhlmann (Ed.): Encyclopedia First World War. Extended and updated study edition. Paderborn 2009, p. 939. (partly online at Google Books)
  40. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 158.
  41. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, p. XXVI.
  42. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 124.
  43. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, p. XXX.
  44. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 158.
  45. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, pp. 160-165.
  46. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 124.
  47. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 124.
  48. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 135.
  49. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 204.
  50. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 136.
  51. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 217.
  52. ↑ Hermann Kantorowicz: Expert opinion on the war guilt issue 1914. Edited from the estate. by Imanuel Geiss. Frankfurt 1967.
  53. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 217.
  54. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The investigation committee ... 1954, p. 124 f.
  55. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry ... 1954, p. 127 f.
  56. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 173.
  57. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 172 f.
  58. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 174 ff.
  59. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, pp. XXV-XXIX.
  60. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, p. XXXII.
  61. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 133.
  62. ^ Peace treaty between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers of June 28, 1919. Art. 227-230
  63. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 192.
  64. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 193.
  65. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry ... 1954, p. 134.
  66. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 194 f.
  67. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry ... 1954, p. 123.
  68. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 199.
  69. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 178.
  70. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 129.
  71. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 129.
  72. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry ... 1954, p. 130.
  73. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 131.
  74. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 182 ff.
  75. ↑ A. Philipp (Ed.): The causes of the German collapse ... 1925, p. 25.
  76. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 189.
  77. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 189.
  78. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 190.
  79. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 190.
  80. ↑ U. Heinemann: The repressed defeat. 1983, p. 217.
  81. ↑ See also: Winfried Baumgart : List of books on German history. Tools, manuals, sources. 18th edition. Stuttgart 2010, pp. 173-177.
  82. ↑ The existence of booklet 2 described by Winfried Baumgart (Baumgart, book directory, p. 173 f.) Could not be verified so far.
  83. ↑ Winfried Baumgart gives the following information: [Of which only published:] [Special volume:] Supplements to the stenographic reports on the public negotiations of the committee of inquiry. Report of the second subcommittee of the committee of inquiry on Wilson's peace operation 1916/17. [Ed. v.] The German National Assembly in 1919/20. 1920 (Baumgart, book directory, p. 173 f.) This is only about section II in the following second volume.
  84. ^ W. Hahlweg: The peace of Brest-Litowsk. 1971, p. XXXIII.
  85. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The committee of inquiry ... 1954, p. 123.
  86. ^ Gerhard Hirschfeld: The First World War in German and International Historiography. Federal Agency for Political Education, 2004. Accessible at bpb.de.
  87. ↑ E. Fischer-Baling: The Investigation Committee ... 1954, p. 122.
  88. ↑ Hermann Kantorowicz: Expert opinion on the war guilt issue 1914. Edited from the estate. by Imanuel Geiss . Frankfurt 1967.
  89. ^ Emil Alboldt: The tragedy of the old German navy. Berlin 1928.
  90. ↑ Richard Stumpf: Why the Fleet Broke Up - War Diary of a Christian Worker. Edited by W. Dittmann. JHW Dietz successor publisher, Berlin 1927.
  91. ^ Daniel Horn (Ed.): War, Mutiny and Revolution in the German Navy - The World War I Diary of Seaman Richard Stumpf. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey (USA) 1967.
  92. ^ W. Deist: The politics of the naval warfare and the rebellion of the fleet at the end of October 1918. In: H. Rothfels, T. Eschenburg (ed.): Quarterly books for contemporary history. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart, 4th issue, 1966. (Accessible at: ifz-muenchen.de )
  93. ↑ Martin Schumacher (ed.): Memories and documents by Joh. Victor Bredt 1914 to 1933. (= sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Third row: The Weimar Republic. Volume 1). Düsseldorf 1970.