Canada in the War in Afghanistan

Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan (source: Canadian Department of National Defence).

Canada did not have a significant role in the first few months of the invasion of Afghanistan that began on October 7, 2001, and the first contingents of regular Canadian troops arrived in Afghanistan only in January–February 2002. Canada took on a larger role starting in 2006 after the Canadian troops were redeployed to Kandahar province. Roughly 2,500 Canadian Forces personnel are currently deployed in Afghanistan as part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Background

In September 2001, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton advised Governor General Adrienne Clarkson to authorize more than 100 Canadian Forces members serving on military exchange programs in the United States and other countries to participate in U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The operations were aimed at identifying and neutralizing al-Qaeda members in that country, as well as toppling the Taliban regime, which was claimed to be supporting international terrorism.

At the time of the invasion, the Canadian government defined Canada's reasons for participating in the mission Afghanistan as follows:

1. Defend Canada's national interests;
2. Ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs; and
3. Help Afghanistan rebuild.

2001–2002 initial deployment

Although not participating at all in the opening days of the invasion, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced on October 7 that Canada would contribute forces to the international force being formed to conduct a campaign against terrorism. General Ray Henault, the Chief of the Defence Staff, issued preliminary orders to several CF units, as Operation Apollo was established. The Canadian commitment was originally planned to last to October 2003.

Forty Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) operators were sent to Afghanistan in December 2001, two months after then Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton, announced that Canada would be sending troops to Afghanistan to aid the removal of the Taliban.[1]

Once the regular forces were on the ground in January–February 2002 the Canadians were used supporting the war effort until Operation Anaconda began. During the operation, a Canadian sniper team broke, and re-broke, the kill record for a long distance sniper kill set in the Vietnam War by a U.S. Marine, Staff Sergeant Carlos Hathcock. Operation Anaconda was also the first time since the Korean War that Canadian soldiers relieved American soldiers in a combat operation.

2002–2005

In March 2002, three Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry snipers fought alongside U.S. Army units during Operation Anaconda. Canadian forces also undertook Operation Harpoon in the Shah-i-Kot Valley. Other forces in the country provided garrison and security troops.

On April 18, 2002, a friendly fire incident caused Canadian casualties when an American F-16 jet dropped a laser-guided bomb on a group of Canadian soldiers. The PPCLI soldiers were conducting night-time training on a designated live-fire range, and the American pilots claim they mistook their gunfire for a Taliban insurgent attack. Four Canadians were killed and eight were wounded in the bombing (see Tarnak Farm incident).

In 2003, the Canadian Forces moved to the northern city of Kabul where it became the commanding nation of the newly formed International Security Assistance Force. In spring 2005 it was announced that the Canadian Forces would move back to the volatile Kandahar Province as the U.S. forces handed command to the Canadians in the region.

2003–2005 Operation Athena

In August 2003, Operation Athena began outside Kabul as part of ISAF, with a 1,900-strong Canadian task force providing assistance to civilian infrastructure such as well-digging and repair of local buildings.

In March 2004, Canada committed $250 million in aid to Afghanistan, and $5 million to support the 2004 Afghan election.

On 13 February 2005, Defence Minister Bill Graham announced Canada was doubling the number of troops in Afghanistan by the coming summer, from 600 troops in Kabul to 1200.

Operation Athena ended in December 2005 and the fulfilment of the stated aim of "rebuilding the democratic process" in Afghanistan.

2006 renewed commitments: Operation Archer

Operation Archer followed Athena beginning in February 2006. By the spring of 2006, Canada had a major role in southern Afghanistan, with Task Force Afghanistan being a battle group of 2,300 soldiers based at Kandahar. Canada also commanded the Multi-National Brigade for Command South, a main military force in the region. In May 2006, the Canadian government extended Canadian military commitments to Afghanistan by two years, replacing earlier plans to withdraw soldiers in 2006.

Additionally, Foreign Affairs Canada stated that the commitment was more than just military, employing a "whole of government approach", in which a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), utilizing personnel from the military, Foreign Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, would provide a dual role of security as well as reconstruction of the country and political structure.

On 28 February 2006, command of the forces in southern Afghanistan transferred from U.S. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry to Canadian Brigadier-General David Fraser in a ceremony at Kandahar Airfield.

2006–present

When the Canadian Forces returned to Kandahar after being deployed to Kabul in 2003, the Taliban began a major offensive, and the Canadians were caught in the middle. After a spring in which a record number of attacks against Canadian soldiers had been set, which included six deaths to the CF, the Taliban in Kandahar and Helmand provinces were massing.

Operation Mountain Thrust was launched in the beginning of the summer in 2006. Canadians of the 2 PPCLI Battle Group were one of the leading combatants and the first fighting when the Battle of Panjwaii took place. Complex mud-walled compounds made the rural Panjwaii District take on an almost urban style of fighting in some places. Daily firefights, artillery bombardments, and allied airstrikes turned the tides of the battle in favour of the Canadians. After Operation Mountain Thrust came to an end, Taliban fighters flooded back into the Panjwaii District in numbers that had not been seen yet in a single area in the "post Anaconda" war.

The Canadian Forces came under NATO command at the end of July, and the 1 RCR Battle Group replaced the PPCLI. Canadians launched Operation Medusa in September in an attempt to clear the areas of Taliban fighters from Panjwaii once and for all. The fighting of Operation Medusa led the way to the second, and most fierce Battle of Panjwaii in which daily gun-battles, ambushes, and mortar and rocket attacks were targeting the Canadian troops. The Taliban had massed with an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 fighters. The Taliban were reluctant to give up the area, and after being surrounded by the Canadian Forces, they dug in and fought a more conventional style battle. After weeks of fighting, the Taliban had been cleared from the Panjwaii area and Canadian reconstruction efforts in the area began.

On 15 September, 2006, the Canadian government committed a squadron of Leopard tanks from Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), and an additional 200 to 500 troops to Afghanistan. Canada was the first nation to deploy armour to Afghanistan.

On 1 November 2006, Dutch Major-General Ton van Loon succeeded Brigadier-General David Fraser as head of NATO Regional Command South in Afghanistan, a post which he will retain for a six month period. [2]

On 15 December 2006, the Canadians launched Operation Falcon Summit into Zhari District, to the north of Panjwaii. The operation was the Canadian involvement in the NATO-led Operation Mountain Fury. During Operation Falcon Summit, the Canadians gained control of several key villages and towns that were former Taliban havens, such as Howz-E Madad. During the first week of the operation, massive Canadian artillery and tank barrages were carried out in a successful attempt to clear pockets of Taliban resistance. The operation concluded with plans to build a new road linking Panjwaii with Kandahar's Highway 1 that runs east-west through Zhari.

In February 2007, the 2 RCR Battle Group took over to carry on with combat operations in several districts in Kandahar Province.

From 15 July 2007 to February 2008, units from CFB Valcartier near Quebec City served in Kandahar filling most positions in the OMLT and providing the protective company for the PRT. The 3rd Battalion Royal 22^e Régiment Battle Group, with supporting troops from 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and a composite tank squadron from Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) conducted operations on the ground. This rotation reflected a change in Canadian tactics, with emphasis on systematically clearing-holding-building in the districts of Panjwaii and Zhari, while also protecting Arghandab District and the Afghan–Pakistan border in the area of Spin Boldak. The focus was on intimately working with the Afghan army, police and civil administration to hold cleared areas rather than subsequently lose them to returning Taliban, as had previously occurred throughout the South and East.

In February 2008, the Van Doos contingent was replaced by force centred on a PPCLI battle group.

On 29 January 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Canada will extend its military mission in Afghanistan to 2011, only if another NATO country puts more than 1,000 soldiers in the dangerous southern province of Kandahar. The extension was approved in a parliamentary vote, supported by the Liberal opposition, but not by the other members of the opposition, on March 13, 2008. This is due to the European allies' refusal to deploy to Afghanistan's dangerous south and east, this has opened a rift with Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and others which, along with the United States, have borne the brunt of Taliban violence.

Opposition to war

Although the leaders of Canada's two largest political parties agree on the necessity of the mission to Afghanistan, it is politically controversial with the Canadian public, with the three other main political parties, with activist groups, and within the Liberal party. On August 31 2006, New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton called for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from the south of Afghanistan, to begin immediately and soon afterwards pursue peace negotiations with the Taliban insurgents. He argued that the mission lacked clear objectives and measures of success, and that the counter-insurgency operation was undermining reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Members of Canada's Muslim community, which comprises 2% of Canadians, are divided by the issue of the mission to Afghanistan. Muslim Members of Parliament Rahim Jaffer and Wajid Khan, both of the Conservative party, are for it.

Current Conservative prime minister Stephen Harper's support of the Afghanistan mission has been repeatedly criticized by other political players. In September 2006, CBC columnist Larry Zolf discussed the oft-repeated accusation that Harper is a "puppet" of Bush:

"Linking Harper to Bush has been a staple of the NDP and the left of the Liberal party since the Harper mission in Afghanistan started. Harper's defence of his war in Afghanistan is that he's not a prisoner of Bush but is simply carrying on a mission started by the Liberals. And he's right. Still, the charge that Harper is a Bush puppet is sticking, and it's hurting Harper as both he and Bush are dropping in the polls. Afghanistan is not only stopping Harper's quest for a majority government—it could even cost him the next election."

On October 28, 2006, anti-war groups from across Canada organized rallies in 40 cities and towns. Themes of the demonstrations included demands that the troops be brought home from Afghanistan and demands that the mission of the Canadian Forces in that country shift from a combat role to a peace keeping and humanitarian presence. Participation varied from city to city, ranging from several dozen to several thousand.

While the Liberals now support the Conservative-proposed extension of the mission to 2011, the New Democratic Party would make an immediate announcement of the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan, with the specific timing and speed of the actual withdrawal as deemed responsible by military commanders, whether within a few weeks or a couple of months. An October 9, 2008 NDP release stated:

"Jack Layton and the NDP want to bring our troops home from Afghanistan in six months, instead of spending $18.1 billion dollars on this war for three more years. Rather than spending this money on war, the NDP will invest in hiring more doctors and more skilled jobs training here in Canada."

The Green Party and the Bloc Québécois also oppose any extension beyond the previous 2009 withdrawal date.

Canadian public opinion

See also: International public opinion on the War in Afghanistan (2001-present)

2008

• September 2008: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 61% of Canadians oppose sending troops to Afghanistan, while only a minority 35% support it. Forming the largest group of respondents, 33% of Canadians "strongly oppose" sending troops to Afghanistan. These numbers show the highest level of opposition and the lowest level of support in the 12 times that Strategic Counsel has asked Canadians this question since May 2006.
• September 2008: Angus Reid poll: The majority of Canadians continue to oppose an extension past February 2009 of Canada's military mission in Afghanistan. 59% of Canadians disagree with their government's proposed extension of the mission past February 2009, while only a minority 34% agree with it. The vast majority of Canadians, 75%, continue to believe that Canada is shouldering too much of the burden on NATO's mission in Afghanistan, while only a small minority 14% disagree with that view.
• September 2008: Environics poll: The number of Canadians who disapprove of their country's military action in Afghanistan is at its highest point since Canada became involved in the war in 2002. The majority 56% of Canadians disapprove of their country's military action in Afghanistan, while only a minority 41% approve of it. Almost two-thirds of Canadians, 65%, say the mission is not likely to be successful, while only 28% think it is likely to be successful. The majority 54% of Canadians disagree with an extension of the mission past February 2009, while a minority 41% agree with it.
• August 2008: Harris Decima poll: The majority of Canadians believe their country is paying too high a price in blood and treasure for its military involvement in Afghanistan and do not want to stay longer in Afghanistan. 61% of Canadians believe the cost of the military mission in lives and money is unacceptable, while only 32% think it is acceptable. The majority 57% of Canadians do not want to stay longer in Afghanistan, while only a minority 33% agree with an extension.
• July 2008: Angus Reid poll: The majority of Canadians believe their government was wrong to lengthen their country’s military mission in Afghanistan. 58% of Canadians disagree with their government's proposed extension of the mission past February 2009, while only a minority 36% agree with it.
• July 2008: Ipsos Reid poll: Only a minority 29% of Canadians are "fairly content" about Canada's participation in the war in Afghanistan. The remaining 71% of Canadians are either "really upset", "really angry", or "resigned" about Canada's participation in the war. The plurality, 37% of Canadians, are "really upset but not able to do anything about it, so I keep it bottled up until I can"; 29% are "fairly content because it/they really don’t affect or matter that much to me"; 24% are "resigned pretty much not to do anything since there’s no sense making any noise because nothing ever happens as a result"; and 10% are "really angry and I’m for sure going to/already doing something about it".
• May 2008: Angus Reid poll: The majority of Canadians believe their government was wrong to lengthen their country’s military mission in Afghanistan. 54% of Canadians disagree with their government's proposed extension of the military mission past February 2009, while only a minority 41% agree with it.
• March 2008: Environics poll: The majority 54% of Canadians disapprove of their country's military action in Afghanistan, while only a minority 44% approve of it.
• March 2008: Angus Reid poll: The majority of Canadians believe their government was wrong to lengthen their country’s military mission in Afghanistan. 58% of Canadians disagree with their government's proposed extension of the military mission past February 2009, while only a minority 37% agree with it.
• February 2008: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 61% of Canadians oppose an extension past February 2009, while only a minority 35% support one.
• February 2008: Angus Reid poll: The majority 58% of Canadians disagree with an extension of the military mission past February 2009, while only a minority 36% agree with it.
• January 2008: Ipsos Reid poll: Only a minority 35% of Canadians approve of the so-called Manley Panel's recommendations for Canada's troops in Afghanistan. Ipsos Reid characterizes this result as "Canadians Receive Manley Plan Cautiously".
• January 2008: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 56% of Canadians oppose sending troops to Afghanistan, while only a minority 39% support. The overwhelming majority 78% of Canadians think the combat role should end, while only a small minority 17% think the combat role should continue. The plurality 47% of Canadians want the troops to return as soon as possible.

2007

• December 2007: Angus Reid poll: The majority 61% of Canadians disagree with an extension of the military mission past February 2009, while only a minority 28% agree with it. The majority 53% of Canadians want an early withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan even before February 2009, while only 39% disagree.
• October 2007: Environics poll: Fewer than half, 45%, of Canadians support the current mission, a plurality 43% of Canadians want Canadian troops to be brought home even before the mission is scheduled to end in February 2009, and only one in three think that the mission is likely to be successful in the end.
• October 2007: Ipsos Reid poll: Only a small minority 14% believe Canada should continue in its current role, while 40% believe Canada should switch to a training capacity, and the plurality 44% of respondents believe troops should be brought home in 2009. The remaining 2% of respondents said they did not know. Ipsos Reid, the only polling firm with results markedly different from those of all the other polls around the same time, took these results and combined the first two figures to suggest that a majority 54% of Canadians want Canada to stay in Afghanistan, while 44% do not. They chose not to, however, combine the last two figures in exactly the same way to show that an overwhelming 84% majority of Canadians believe Canada should not continue in its current role, while only a small minority 14% do. A report from a senior defence analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations reveals that the firm Ipsos Reid was under contract from the Canadian Department of National Defense over the period from September 19-21, 2006 to March 20-22, 2007. The Conference of Defence Associations itself had a five-year funding agreement with the Department of National Defence, effective from April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2012.
• September 2007: Angus Reid poll: Over two-thirds of Canadians do not want Canada to extend the Afghan mission past its scheduled end date in February 2009. The majority 68% of Canadians disagree with an extension of the military mission past February 2009, while only a minority 20% agree with one. The majority 56% of Canadians also think that Canada should leave Afghanistan early, even before the mandate ends in February 2009, while only 35% disagreed. Two-thirds, 67%, of Canadians also believe Canada is shouldering too much of the burden of NATO's mission in Afghanistan.
• August 2007: Angus Reid poll: Nearly 1 in 2 Canadians, 49%, think the NATO mission in Afghanistan has been mostly a failure. Only 22% of Canadians think it has been mostly a success.
• August 2007: Ipsos Reid poll: In a statistical tie within the poll's 3.1% margin of error, 51% of Canadians support the mission while 45% oppose it.
• July 2007: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 59% of Canadians oppose sending troops to Afghanistan, while only a minority 36% support.
• July 2007: Decima Research poll: The majority 67% of Canadians believe the number of casualties have been unacceptable, while only 25% said the number of killed and wounded was acceptable. At the time of the poll, Canada had lost 66 soldiers and one diplomat in Afghanistan.
• July 2007: Angus Reid poll: The majority 63% of Canadians disagree with an extension of the military mission past February 2009, while only a small minority 16% agree with it. A plurality 49% of Canadians think their country should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan even before their mandate ends in February 2009. The majority 58% think Canada is shouldering too much of the burden.
• July 2007: Ipsos Reid poll: In a statistical tie within the poll's 3.1% margin of error, 50% of Canadians support the mission while 45% oppose it.
• June 2007: Decima Research poll: The majority two-thirds 67% of Canadians want the military mission in Afghanistan to end in Feb. 2009, while only a small minority 26% think it should be extended past Feb. 2009.
• May 2007: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 55% of Canadians oppose the military mission in Afghanistan, while a minority 40% support it. Only 6% say they strongly support it, while 4 times as many, 24% say they strongly oppose it. There was almost two-to-one support for negotiation with Afghanistan's Taliban insurgents. A majority 63% of Canadians think that it is a net good idea to negotiate with Afghanistan's Taliban insurgents, while only a minority of 32% think it is a net bad idea.
• May 2007: Angus Reid poll: 50% of Canadians think Canada should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan before their mandate ends in February 2009. The majority 55% think Canada is shouldering too much of the burden.
• May 2007: SES Research poll: The majority two-thirds of Canadians think their country's presence in Afghanistan makes Canada more vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The majority 55% said Canada should pull out of Afghanistan if casualties continue, while 39% said casualties are an unfortunate but necessary part of the military. At the time of the poll, Canada had lost 54 soldiers and one diplomat to violence in Afghanistan.
• April 2007: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 57% of Canadians oppose the military mission in Afghanistan, while a minority 36% support it.
• April 2007: Ipsos Reid poll: Almost two-thirds of Canadians say the country's troops should be brought home from Afghanistan on schedule in February 2009. The majority 63% of Canadians want the troops brougth home on schedule by February 2009.
• April 2007: Angus Reid poll: The majority 52% of Canadians think Canada should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan before their mandate ends in February 2009. The majority 64% think Canada is shouldering too much of the burden.

Cost of the war

Financial cost of the war to Canadian taxpayers

In October 2008, Canada's independent Parliamentary Budget Officer, Kevin Page, released a detailed assessment of the price tag for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan in a report entitled the "Fiscal Impact of the Costs Incurred by the Government of Canada in support of the Mission in Afghanistan".

The report determined that the Afghan mission has to date cost Canada an estimated $7.7-billion to $10.5-billion, with $5.9-billion to $7.42-billion spent on military operations, $800-million to $2.08-billion in veterans' benefits, and slightly under $1-billion in aid. The study did not include the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for soldiers, or the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement.

The Parliamentary Budget Officer's report estimated that the total cost to Canadian taxpayers of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan will be $13.9-billion to $18.1-billion by 2011, again excluding the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for soldiers, and the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement.

This estimates the financial cost to Canadian taxpayers of an extension past February 2009 at $5.6-billion to $6.8-billion, again excluding the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for soldiers, and the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement.

Kevin Page, the parliamentary budget officer, emphasized, both in the published report and during the news conference that accompanied its release, that his report's estimates may "likely understate the costs of the military operations".

Two other recent studies have come up with even higher estimates for the financial cost of the war to Canadians.

A yet-to-be-released study by security analyst David Perry, former deputy director of Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, estimates that the Afghan war will cost Canadians to $22 billion in Defence Department expenditures alone, both in money actually spent on the mission and future payments to rebuild equipment and provide long-term care for veterans. This $22-billion estimate excludes the cost of aid to Afghanistan and the cost of the mission for all other federal departments such as the RCMP and Foreign Affairs.

The study will be included in an upcoming edition of the International Journal published by the Canadian International Council. In September, some of the study's findings were presented and discussed at a conference on maritime affairs attended by military leaders and analysts from Canada, the U.S. and several Asia-Pacific nations. According to retired Commodore Eric Lerhe, who included some of the study's figures in his presentation at the conference:

"This is an important work and bang on with the numbers."

The breakdown of the $22-billion cost estimate for the military operations in Afghanistan is as follows:

• $7-billion for the cost of waging the war. This is the incremental cost from late 2001 to 2012. It includes everything from ammunition and fuel to the salaries of reservists and contractors. It does not include the salaries of regular force military personnel.
• $11-billion for the estimated future bill for Veterans Affairs and DND for long-term health care of veterans and related benefits, including having to deal with post traumatic stress disorder among troops. Veterans Affairs Canada predicts an increase of 13,000 Canadian Forces members to its client base by 2010. Using U.S. estimates, between 10 to 25 per cent of returning veterans may experience mental health problems as a result of their overseas deployment. U.S. studies estimate that country's long-term health care and disability costs for its Iraq and Afghan veterans to be between $350-billion to $650-billion.
• $2-billion for the purchase of mission-specific equipment. That includes everything from Leopard tanks, howitzers, six Chinook helicopters, counter-mine vehicles to aerial drones. Defence officials argue that such equipment will be used on future missions beyond Afghanistan. The figure did not include the latest $95 million lease for additional aerial drones.
• $2-billion for the replacement of the military's LAV III fleet. "This fleet is going to be worn out pretty soon from the wear and tear of Afghanistan and will have to be replaced," said Mr. Perry.
• $405 million for repair and overhaul costs.

In October 2008, a study by the Rideau Institute, an independent think tank, estimated that the Afghan mission has already cost Canadians $17.2-billion to date, counting ammunition, equipment, military salaries, health care, disability and death benefits and economic aid projects. The study estimated that the mission will cost Canadians an additional $11.1-billion over the next three years if the mission is extended until the December 2011.

The Rideau Institute study estimates that the war in Afghanistan will directly cost Canadian taxpayers $20.7-billion by the end of 2011, while the loss to the Canadian economy from wounded or killed soldiers will cost Canada $7.6 billion, placing the total cost of the war to Canadians at more than $28-billion.

Repeated cost overruns

In June of 2006, the Conservative government's Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Mackay told the Commons Defence Committee that the total expenditures by Canadian taxpayers to date in the war-torn country amounted to $2.3-billion - $1.8-billion in military costs and $500-million in development costs - and that Canada would spend a total of $3.85-billion: $3.05-billion in military costs for the mission by 2009 and $810-million in development costs up to 2011.

In September of 2006, the Conservative government re-iterated the estimate of military expenses in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009 at $3.05 billion.

However, later in the fall, Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor informed ministry officials the military costs in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009 would have to be revised up to $3.9-billion, nearly a billion dollars more than the $3.05-billion estimate given by Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Mackay just a few months earlier.

In November of 2006, the military costs for the mission in Afghanistan were reported to have reached $2.2 billion, up from $1.8 billion in June, or nearly $1.6 million per day of the mission, while the development costs up to May 2006 were reported to have reached $466 million. The military costs were projected to reach about $4 billion by the planned end of the mission in February 2009 - revised up from $3.05 billion in June - while the development costs were expected to reach $1 billion by 2011 - revised up from $810-million in June. The total cost of the Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was revised up from $3.85-billion in June to around $5-billion.

It was also reported in November 2006 that the Canadian Forces had spent over $1 million on funeral services for soldiers killed in Afghanistan. At that point in time, the number of soldiers killed in Afghanistan was 42.

In January 2007, it was reported that the Defence Department estimated that it would spend almost $1 billion on operations in Afghanistan in the next fiscal year, more than doubling the spending for military operations in Afghanistan from prior years.

By the end of January 2007, the government again revised its estimate for the military component of the costs from 2001 to 2009 in Afghanistan - this time increasing another $400-million to $4.3-billion. Estimates of the total cost for the military operations from 2001 to 2009 were revised up by $1.3 billion between June 2006 and January 2007 alone.

In March 2007, it was reported that the total cost of mission from 2001 to 2009 was now projected at $5.5-billion, revised up another $600-million from November 2006. Development costs to 2011 were reported at $1.2-billion, revised up from the $1-billion in November 2006, itself a revision up from the government's figure of $810-million in June of 2006. Over $802-million was spent in the 2006-2007 fiscal year ending March 31, 2007, making it the most expensive year since the deployment began.

In comparison, Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Mackay had reported in June 2006 that a total of $1.8-billion had been expended over the course of the previous four and a half years - an average of $400-million a year. The $802-million spent on military operations in the 2006-2007 fiscal year ending March 31, 2007 effectively doubled the previous spending average.

In May of 2007, Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor told the House of Commons that the incremental cost of the military component of the mission had reached $2.6-billion.

In November 2007, Defence Minister Peter MacKay disclosed to the House of Commons defence committee that the incremental cost to National Defence of the Afghan military mission had again risen steeply and had reached a total of $3.1-billion, up from $2.6 billion in May. A spokesperson for Mr. MacKay said that the extra costs were due mainly to additional tanks and force protection expenses.

In February 2008, it was reported that the total cost of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was estimated to reach $6.3-billion by the end of February 2009.

In another estimate in February 2008, former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, president of the University of Winnipeg provided the estimate that $7.8-billion had been spent in the 6 years Canada had been in Afghanistan.

In March of 2008, the La Presse newspaper obtained government documents under the Access to Information Act that indicated that the Afghanistan mission would run $1-billion over budget in the 2007-2008 fiscal year ending March 31, 2008. The government did not deny the report, but said that it was one of a number of assessments being made. These documents indicated that the mission had cost Canadian taxpayers over $7.5-billion since 2001 - double what had been budgeted.

The Defence Department said the projected cost for military component of the Afghanistan mission through 2009 had been $4.5 billion, but was adjusted to $5 billion because of the additional equipment purchases. It said the upward revision did not count as a cost overrun. The $4.5 billion figure itself, however, was a $200-million increase over the January 2007 estimate of $4.3 million, itself a $400-million increase from the November 2006 estimate of $3.9 million, itself an $850-million increase from the June 2006 estimate of $3.05 million.

For the March 31, 2008 end of the 2007-2008 fiscal year, the Conservative government eventually reported the incremental cost of the military component of the Afghan mission to be at around $3.8-billion, up $700 million in four months from $3.1-billion in November 2007. This figure means that since Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor's figure of $2.6-billion in May 2007, over $1.2 billion was spent in incremental cost on military operations in Afghanistan in the 2007-2008 fiscal year, making it again the most expensive year since the deployment began.

Despite these numbers from his own ministers, in April 2008, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper suggested that the cost of the Afghan mission was only about $500 million a year above the military's usual costs, saying at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Bucharest "I think the cost ... probably amounts to about a billion a year, but probably half of that would be consumed anyway."

In September and October of 2008, when it became known that a report detailing the cost of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was about to be released, numerous news sources reported that the Conservative government had apparently, at some unspecified point in time, previously estimated the total cost of the six-year mission to date at under $8-billion. The drastically higher revised estimate of $8-billion does not seem to have been widely reported to the public before this however, and one report confirms that the government only revised their public estimate to just under $8 billion when they knew that the Parliamentary Budget Officer was about to report.

In October 2008, the Parliamentary Budget Officer released the "Fiscal Impact of the Costs Incurred by the Government of Canada in support of the Mission in Afghanistan" and reported that the Afghan mission has so far cost Canada an estimated $7.7-billion to $10.5-billion, comprised of $5.9-billion to $7.42-billion spent on military operations, $800-million to $2.08-billion in veterans' benefits, and under $1-billion in aid. The study did not include the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for soldiers, and the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement.

The $7.7-billion to $10.5-billion figure, that the parliamentary budget officer suggested could well be understated, places the most detailed estimate to date at 2 to 3 times the government's June 2006 total cost projection of $3.85-billion. The military component of this estimated cost to date, $5.9-billion to $7.42-billion to October 2008, is also 2 to 3 times the government's June 2006 estimate of $3.05-billion by 2009.

The Parliamentary Budget Officer's report estimated the total cost to Canadian taxpayers of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan would reach between $13.9-billion and $18.1-billion by 2011, again excluding the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for soldiers, and the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement. This places the financial cost to Canadian taxpayers for an extension past February 2009 at $5.58-billion to $6.8-billion.

The report also detailed how the Defence Department's actual spending for Afghanistan exceeded planned spending in each and every year of the mission, with budget overshoots each year ranging from never less than 29.35% to as high as 310.26%.

Concerns about the costs of the war in Afghanistan

There is growing concern inside the ranks of the military about the real cost of Canada's involvement in the Afghan conflict.

In January 2007, it was reported that Canada's navy was out of money for basic operations as the military diverted resources to the war in Afghanistan.

Peter Haydon, a retired naval officer now with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax, stated:

"Afghanistan is eating money like you wouldn't believe. The demand for money is being transferred through the whole military system. Afghanistan is a huge financial drain."

Dan Middlemiss, a political science professor who teaches defence policy at Dalhousie University in Halifax, stated:

"I think the big picture here, if I have to make one, is that Afghanistan has become so all-absorbing of time, energy and resources for everyone that there's nothing left over."

At a security and defence forum meeting in 2007, security analyst David Perry, former deputy director of Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, argued that if the real costs of the Afghan war are not "transparent there is no way of knowing their real impact on the Canadian military's future force structure."

In January 2008, the head of the army warned that the service was stretched almost to the breaking point and replacement stocks of equipment for Afghanistan had long been used up, destroyed by the enemy, or undergoing repairs. In the army's business plan, commander Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie warned that much of the force's combat vehicle fleet was in need of repair as a result of operation in the harsh Afghan terrain or from excessive use in training in Canada for the war in Afghanistan.

The general's business plan was written not long after the release of the Defence Department's 2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities which also raised concerns regarding the impact of the Afghan war. In that report, the army pointed out that:

"Afghanistan has consumed the resources of both our first and second lines of operation."

In October 2008, when Canada's parliamentary budget office released its report on the costs of the war in Afghanistan, retired Col. Michel Drapeau, a military analyst, said that he was flabbergasted by the sheer size of the costs of the mission. He described the report as "very sobering," and was concerned about the vague nature of reporting the true costs of the mission. Retired Col. Michel Drapeau stated:

"You have to wonder what decision and what figures our government and parliament were using to deploy troops."

Lack of transparency

In May of 2006, the Polaris Institute, an Ottawa-based independent think tank, estimated the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan at more than $4.1 billion for the 4.5 year period from the fall of 2001 to April 2006. By comparison, in June of 2006, the Conservative government's Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Mackay told the Commons Defence Committee that the total expenditures by Canadian taxpayers to date in the war-torn country amounted to $2.3-billion, a significantly lower figure than the estimate put forth by the Polaris Institute.

In April 2008, despite the previous month's La Presse report of a $1-billion budget overrun and his own government's numbers showing an incremental cost of over $1.2 billion for fiscal year just ended, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper suggested that the cost of the Afghan mission was only about $500 million a year above the military's usual costs, saying that "I think the cost ... probably amounts to about a billion a year, but probably half of that would be consumed anyway."However, when it became known in September 2008 that a report detailing the cost of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was about to be released, the government drastically revised the estimate of the cost of the war to date to $8 billion.

The Parliamentary Budget Officer reported in October 2008 that the Afghan mission had so far cost Canadian taxpayers an estimated $7.7-billion to $10.5-billion, excluding the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for the thousands of soldiers in Afghanistan, and the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement.

In presenting his report, "Fiscal Impact of the Costs Incurred by the Government of Canada in support of the Mission in Afghanistan", Kevin Page, Parliament's independent budget officer stated:

"There's a lack of transparency and also some inconsistency in the numbers. I think it makes it very difficult to do effective oversight when you don't have the kind of transparency and the right accounting practices."

His report suggests Canadians have been kept in the dark about the true costs of the Afghanistan mission, and he made clear that he was deliberately frustrated in his search for accurate and complete information from federal departments, prompting him to condemn the lack of openness around the mission and to emphasize that the real financial cost could actually be much higher. .

In condemning the lack of transparency, he stated:

"Budgetary transparency for Parliamentarians and Canadians needs to be improved."

"Although Canada is in the seventh year of the mission, Parliament has not been provided with estimates by successive governments on the fiscal costs incurred by all relevant departments."

"Budget and Estimates reporting to Parliament on Canada's mission in Afghanistan have not met any appropriate standard or best practice."

"When compared with international experience, Canada appears to lag behind the best practices of other jurisdictions in terms of the quality and frequency of war cost reporting to their respective legislatures."

The researcher of another study that put the military cost of the war in Afghanistan at $22-billion also condemned the lack of transparency. According to security analyst David Perry, a former deputy director of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies:

"The Liberals were much more transparent in the funding they were providing."

Cost of the proposed extension past February 2009

The latest extension, contingent on a number of conditions being met by February 2009, would extend Canada's 7-year military involvement in Afghanistan by another 2 years and 10 months past the current mandate end date of February 2009 to the end of December 2011.

The October 2008 report by Canada's independent Parliamentary Budget Officer determined that the Afghanistan mission has to date cost Canada an estimated $7.7-billion to $10.5-billion, and projected that the total cost to Canadian taxpayers of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan will be $13.9-billion to $18.1-billion by 2011. According to these numbers, an extension past February 2009 would cost Canadian taxpayers $5.6-billion to $6.8-billion, excluding the cost of diplomatic efforts, the cost of danger pay for soldiers, and the cost of billions of dollars of military equipment bought under accelerated procurement.

The October 2008 study by the Rideau Institute estimated that an extension past February 2009 to December 2011 would cost Canadian taxpayers $7.5-billion. The study estimated the full economic cost to Canadians of an extension to December 2011 at $11.1 billion.

Fatalities

See also: Canadian Forces casualties in Afghanistan

The Canadian forces have suffered 97 reported fatalities involving its soldiers in Afghanistan and in support of the mission, as of Sunday September 7, 2008. One senior Foreign Affairs official and three Canadian civilians have also been killed in Afghanistan due to hostile circumstances. Canada has suffered the third highest number of combat casualties of any nation in the Allied Force.

Canadian non-military deaths in Afghanistan

Name	Hometown	Employment	Date	Circumstance	References
Glyn Berry	United Kingdom	Senior Foreign Affairs officer	15 January 2006	Died in a suicide attack while being transported in an armoured G-wagon.	[3]
Mike Frastacky	Vancouver, British Columbia	Civilian carpenter	23 July 2006	Murdered in Nahrin.	[4] [5]
Jacqueline Kirk	Montreal, Quebec	Civilian Aid Worker	14 August 2008	Killed along with an American aid worker and their Afghan driver when the Vehicle they were riding in was ambushed by gunmen as they were travelling between Gardez and Kabul.	[6][7]
Shirley Case	Williams Lake, British Columbia	Civilian Aid Worker

Bravery awards

File:AfghanChildwithCanadianFlag2006.jpg

An Afghan child waves a Canadian flag as Canadian soldiers take a picture (source: Canadian Forces).

In December 2003, PPCLI snipers Master Corporal Graham Ragsdale, Master Corporal Tim McMeekin, Corporal Dennis Eason, Corporal Rob Furlong and Master Corporal Arron Perry were awarded the Bronze Star by the U.S. Army for their actions in combat during Operation Anaconda, March 2–11, 2002.

On October 27, 2006, Sergeant Patrick Tower of the PPCLI became the first ever recipient of the Canadian Star of Military Valour. It came as a result of actions on August 3, 2006, where he assumed command of his platoon under fire, and escorted them to safety.

Sergeant Michael Thomas Victor Denine, PPCLI, was awarded the Medal of Military Valour for his actions as part of Operation Archer. On May 17 2006, though under intense rocket-propelled grenade, machine gun and small arms fire, Sergeant Denine exited a light armoured vehicle and manned the pintle-mounted machine gun. In spite of being completely exposed to enemy fire, Sergeant Denine laid down such a volume of suppressive fire that he forced the enemy to withdraw.

On May 24 2006, while under intense enemy fire, Master Corporal Collin Ryan Fitzgerald, PPCLI, entered and re-entered a burning platoon vehicle, driving it off the roadway and allowing the other vehicles trapped in the enemy's kill zone to break free, for which he was awarded the Medal of Military Valour.

On July 13, during Operation Archer Private Jason Lamont, PPCLI, ran across open ground through concentrated enemy fire in order to deliver first aid to a wounded comrade, for which he was also awarded the Medal of Military Valour .

Major William Hilton Fletcher, PPCLI, received the Star of Military Valour . He was recognized for demonstrating extraordinary bravery during his service in Afghanistan from January to August 2006. He repeatedly exposed himself to intense fire while leading C Company, 1 PPCLI Battle Group, on foot, to assault heavily defended enemy positions.

Captain Derek Prohar, PPCLI, received the Medal of Military Valour. Assigned as liaison officer with the U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan during the battle at Sperwan Ghar, from September 5 to 12, 2006, Captain Prohar operated as the rear machine gunner on the battalion commander's vehicle. He was wounded by an improvised explosive device during an intense enemy ambush. Despite his injuries, he continued returning fire and assisted the commander with the control of the attack, which resulted in the successful seizing of key terrain.

Royal Air Force Flight Lieutenant Chris Hasler, a Canadian, was invested with the Distinguished Flying Cross personally by Queen Elizabeth II on 23 May 2007 for flying resupply missions under fire in Chinook helicopters in Afghanistan in 2006. He is the first Canadian to be decorated for bravery in the air since the Korean War.

At the end of 2006, every Canadian soldier was selected by the Canadian Press as the Canadian Newsmaker of the Year due to the war in Afghanistan.

Other missions

• Canada has assisted in the collection, storage and decommissioning of 10,000 heavy weapons left in Afghanistan including artillery, tanks and rocket launchers, used in decades of conflict in the country.
• Canada has helped clear about one third of the estimated 10 to 15 million mines in Afghanistan.
• Canada has loaned money to over 140,000 people in Afghanistan.
• Canada has helped train the Afghan police and army.

Bases

• Camp Julien in Kabul
• Camp Mirage airbase
• Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar

Diplomatic ties

On January 25, 2002, Canada officially re-established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. This was followed by the opening of Canada's embassy in Kabul in September 2003. Canada's current serving representative is Ambassador Arif Z. Lalani.

Records

Corporal Rob Furlong, PPCLI, (Operation Anaconda, Afghanistan) holds the record for the longest recorded and confirmed sniper kill at 2,430 metres (1.51 miles) using a .50 calibre (12.7 mm) McMillan TAC-50 rifle.[5]

See also

War in Afghanistan (2001–present)

Canadian Forces casualties in Afghanistan

Civilian casualties of the War in Afghanistan (2001–present)

Afghanistan War order of battle

Britain's role in the 2001-present Afghan war

International Security Assistance Force

Operation Altair

Operation Apollo

Operation Archer

Operation Athena

Operation Medusa

Provincial Reconstruction Team

Afghanada

External links

• Canada in Afghanistan: Military & Development Roles | Mapleleafweb.com
• Rebuilding Afghanistan
• Canadian American Strategic Review
• Peace Operations Monitor- Afghanistan
• MILNEWS.ca Canada in Kandahar News Page, MILNEWS.ca Background Information