Transition at Kehl
Kehl Fortress in 1788
| date | June 24, 1796 to June 29, 1796 |
|---|---|
| place | Throat |
| output | French cross the Rhine |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
First Coalition War (1792–1797)
Verdun - Thionville - Valmy - Lille - Mainz (1792) - Jemappes - Namur - Neerektiven - Mainz (1793) - Famars - Valenciennes (1793) - Arlon (1793) - Hondschoote - Meribel - Avesnes-le-Sec - Pirmasens - Toulon - Fontenay-le-Comte - Cholet - Lucon - Trouillas - Menin - Wattignies - Biesingen - Kaiserslautern (1793) - First Battle of Weissenburg (1793) - Second Battle of Weissenburg (1793) - Boulou - Tourcoing - Tournay - 13th Prairial - Fleurus - Vosges - Aldenhoven - San-Lorenzo de la Muga - Genoa - Hyeres - Handschuhsheim - Mainz (1795) - Loano - Montenotte - Millesimo - Dego - Mondovi - Lodi - Borghetto - Castiglione - Mantua - Siegburg - Altenkirchen - Wetzlar - Kircheib - Kehl - Kalteiche - Malsch - Neresheim - Deining - Amberg - Würzburg - Rovereto - Bassano - Limburg - Biberach I - Emmendingen - Schliengen - Arcole - Fall von Kehl - Rivoli (1797) - St. Vincent - Diersheim - Santa Cruz - Neuwied - Camperduin
The transition at Kehl on June 24, 1796 was a military action by revolutionary France in the course of the first revolutionary war . The main French army crossed the Rhine to advance towards the Danube . By June 29, 1796, the surrounding area was also secured.
prehistory
After the relief of Mainz , an armistice was concluded between France and Austria . After the armistice, French troops stopped near Düsseldorf on the right bank of the Rhine, while in Baden they withdrew to the left side of the Rhine. This armistice was terminated by the Austrians on May 21, 1796.
Austrian positions
Austria intended to retry its plans to conquer Alsace . 84,000 men were already standing by near Kaiserslautern , Baumholder and other places to push the opposing wing corps of Moreau and Jourdan 's armies back behind the Moselle and Saar and then to turn against the Landau fortress . But Bonaparte's successes in Italy made the army there strengthened. General Count Wurmser was ordered to march there with 25,000 men. The intended offensive was therefore given up and limited to the defense of the Upper and Middle Rhine, for which 149,000 men including 40,000 horsemen remained under the orders of Archduke Karl . The troops standing on the left bank of the Rhine gradually withdrew against Mainz and Mannheim and then took a line-up between the Sieg and the Neckar . There were 57,000 men from Mannheim to Waldhut.
French planning
The French government also had offensive thoughts. Moreau was ordered to cross the Upper Rhine with his army of 79,600 men, Jourdan with 77,790 men to cross the Middle Rhine. There were only 17,500 horsemen in both armies. According to the French plan of operations, these two crossings were to be combined in such a way that Jourdan's maneuver should serve as an introduction to Moreau's crossing and facilitate its advance against the upper Neckar .
While Jourdan led his left wing on June 1st by General Kleber , advancing from Düsseldorf against Siegburg and Altenkirchen , which passed by Neuwied in the middle of June 7th and marched the right wing under Marceau against Mainz , Moreau rallied his forces in front of Mannheim.
Mock attacks by Jourdan
Jourdan met little resistance and advanced inexorably to the lower Lahn , where 60,000 French were united on June 12th. The Archduke believed that he had to set barriers to his further advance, set out with all deployable troops and faced the French on the 14th with 63,000 men. He crossed the Lahn next day at Wetzlar and slammed the there geeilte Division Lefebvre . He pursued the French, who were now giving way, to the Sieg and the Rhine, which made Moreau's transition much easier. In the meantime, through repeated attacks on the entrenched position of an Austrian corps in front of Mannheim, General Count Latour, who was in command there, suspected that a second Rhine crossing would take place here.
Moreau's intention, however, was to cross the Rhine at Kehl , where all preparations were made in silence. In order to keep the secret, the brigades , which were gradually moving towards Strasbourg , received the information that they had orders to march into Italy, which was deliberately not kept secret.
General Desaix , however, was sent ahead to take command of the troops that were gathering near Strasbourg and to risk the crossing on the night of June 24th. The troops marching out of the Mannheim area were immediately supplemented by other troops from the left wing, so that the strength of the main corps remained unchanged for a few days. On the evening of June 23, all city gates in Strasbourg were closed, 70 vehicles were kept ready on the Ill and manned with troops. The troops that had arrived here amounted to 27,000 men, of which the Beaupuy division at Gambsheim , the Ferino division at Kehl. Smaller Rhine crossings were arranged above and below these points. Lively cannonades were to be entertained in the early morning all along the line between Strasbourg and Basel . If the French achieved the purpose of deceiving them about the true point of transition through these institutions, they really contributed to making the execution essentially easier.
To defend the Upper Rhine, the 57,000 men were distributed as follows:
- General Fröhlich with 10,000 men between Hüningen and Saßbach
- Prince Condé with 6000 men between Saßbach and Ichenheim
- FZM Stain with 7200 Swabian district troops between Ichenheim and the Rench
- General Sztaray with 8,800 men between the Rench and Philippsburg
- FZM Latour with 25,000 men from Philippsburg to Mannheim.
All the corps had posted innumerable posts on the stretch of river assigned to them. Their commanders were completely independent of each other in the event of a real transition, so quick support could not be counted on, as one had to wait for the orders of Latour's headquarters in Mannheim beforehand. Before the Archduke could correct his predecessor's mistake, the transition had already taken place.
Transition on June 24th
On June 24th at 2 a.m. the Ferino division boarded the vehicles and began the transition. The islands closest to the right bank were manned by Swabian outposts and connected to the bank by gangways. They hadn't noticed anything about the embarkation. In this way, 3600 men on 36 vehicles were able to land at many points almost simultaneously and drive out the outposts without difficulty. A redoubt with 3 cannons was stormed on the island of Erlenkopf . The flight of the crew was in such a hurry that they forgot to throw off the gangways behind them. The French had those 3 cannons drafted immediately and now advanced further. During this time the vehicles were in continuous operation. So at 6 o'clock a flying ferry was in operation, shortly afterwards the redoubt in the churchyard, where the fort used to stand, was stormed, Kehl was conquered and the enemy was thrown for the second time out of the wolf redoubt lying in the plain. In Kehl and the Redouten there were only 2 battalions, the other Swabian troops held 16 places occupied, 6 battalions and 4 squadrons were in reserve in the camp near Willstädt. FZM Stain received the reports of the transition at 4 a.m. But he did not leave for Kehl with the reserve until 7 o'clock and marched in two columns on both banks of the Kinzig . When these two columns arrived before Neumühl and Sundheim , they found a very superior enemy who immediately attacked and drove the Swabians back to Willstädt with the loss of 37 officers, 693 men and 14 artillery pieces. However, the Swabian outposts occupied Neumühl again, as the French did not pursue far. In the course of the day, the transfer of troops was continued, and work was also done on the construction of a ship bridge , which only became usable on June 25th at noon. At this time the entire infantry of the two divisions was already at Kehl. The planned transition of the Beaupuy division near Gambsheim could not take place because the water level near Gambsheim was too high. The division had to return to Strasbourg and crossed over there. In the afternoon the artillery and cavalry crossed the ship bridge. French troops kept arriving from the camp near Mannheim. The Chief General Moreau and Reynier , Chief of the General Staff, also arrived. At the news of the French crossing at Kehl, some divisions of the Sztaray and Condé corps moved closer, but no decisive movement took place.
Orders were expected, but since the divisions remaining before Mannheim under General Gouvion Saint Cyr continued their attacks, Latour believed that a transition was still planned here and delayed marching against Kehl until March 26th.
June 26th
On June 26th General Desaix and his 27,000 men attacked in six columns on both banks of the Kinzig. Three divisions attacked the weak corps of FZM Stain in the front and flank and after a brief resistance against Offenburg pushed it back. When one of these columns advanced from the village of Kork, it was attacked with impetuosity by the Ansbach cuirassier regiment and driven back again. General Beaupuy received eight sword blows and his adjutant Drouot was so badly injured that he died two days later. Only when the cuirassiers penetrated the village did they meet organized resistance from the French, who shot out of all the windows and forced the riders to turn back.But before they reached the open field, they were attacked by the French cavalry rushing to them and lost Hunted to Willstädt. The three other columns had the task of stopping the advance of Prince Condé's army of emigrants. Due to the great superiority of the French, the emigrants were forced to turn to Offenburg. On the 27th, Stain stayed in front of Offenburg, Condé stood on his left, 300 Austrians on the right near Oppenweiler , Sztaray with 4,000 men near Memprechtshofen on the Rench.
Moreau now wanted to gain more ground and in the afternoon advanced in six columns: one against Altenheim, four columns against Stain's position, the last against Urloffen . Since some of these columns did not move fast enough, the overall effect was lost and all the operations did not have the desired effect. The FZM Stain moved back into the Kinzig valley, Condé to Lahr , the Austrians behind Renchen and Oberkirch .
The Swabian district troops were in such bad shape that their withdrawal had to be covered by a detachment of Austrians and emigrants who settled in Gengenbach .
June 28th
On the 28th, Moreau had the Condé corps observed by a division. In the Kinzig valley he only allowed a division of light infantry to advance and turned with the remaining troops, whose strength is unknown, against the Austrians standing behind the Rench. Sztaray had set up the majority of his cavalry on the plain near Renchen and anticipated the attack by the French here. However, after the two battalions in Oberkirch had been driven out, the Austrian cavalry and the detachment near Memprechtshofen also retreated. Seven guns were lost. As early as the evening of June 26th, Latour reached Rastatt with 6 battalions and 22 squadrons . He stopped here without supporting Sztaray or giving him orders to retreat.
On June 29, Moreau had gathered 60,000 men from his entire army on the right bank of the Rhine. Fröhlich's corps and the emigrants could easily be pushed up to Waldhut, nothing more was to be feared from the Swabians, just as little was Sztarray. So Moreau had all options: to penetrate into the Rhine valley or into the Kinzig valley. His superiority ensured him success everywhere.
consequences
But be it that the direction, the goal of the operation was not precisely determined or that Moreau lacked confidence, in short, nothing significant was done until July 4th, when Moreau finally decided against after several days of exploration and consultation with his generals March Rastatt. Through these delays the strategic advantages of the masterfully executed transition at Kehl were almost all lost and little was missing, so Moreau would have been forced to retreat much more quickly.