Attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1797)

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1797)
Attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1797
Attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1797
date July 22-25, 1797
place Santa Cruz de Tenerife ( Tenerife , Canary Islands )
output British surrender
Parties to the conflict

Great BritainKingdom of Great Britain (Sea War Flag) Great Britain

Spain 1785Spain Spain

Commander

Great BritainKingdom of Great Britain (service flag at sea) Horatio Nelson

Spain 1785Spain Antonio Gutiérrez

Troop strength
4 ships of the line,
3 frigates,
1 cutter,
1 bombard,
393 cannons,
2,000 ship crews and marines. Participants in the landing operations of 900 and 1,000 seamen and marines, respectively
84 cannons,
7 mortars,
1,300 soldiers and militiamen
387 artillerymen
losses

153 dead
110 wounded
1 cutter

23 dead,
38 wounded

The attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife was an amphibious operation during the First Coalition War . The fighting lasted from July 22nd to 25th, 1797. They took place on the coast, in the bay in front of and in the urban area of Santa Cruz de Tenerife on the island of Tenerife . By land company wanted the UK to the possession of the Canary Islands secure and thus the ship connections between Spain and the Spanish colonies in America and Asia interfere and secure their own connections to Asia and America. The Royal Navy had to capitulate after losing battles.

Previous attacks on Santa Cruz de Tenerife by the British and British fleets

The attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife in 1797 was the third major attack by an English or British fleet on the port and city. The goals and consequences of the previous attacks differ from those of the attack in 1797.

Attack 1657

In the naval battle of Santa Cruz (1657) , in which 33 ships were involved on the English side, the fleet of the Commonwealth of England under the command of Admiral Robert Blake had the goal of eleven ships of the Spanish silver fleet , which were in front of Santa Cruz de Tenerife Anchors lay, to be captured or sunk. A landing was not attempted by the English. This action is considered a victory by both the English and Spanish sides.

Attack 1706

In the attack on the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife in 1706 during the War of the Spanish Succession , 13 ships armed with 800 cannons were involved on the English side. They were under the command of Admiral John Jennings . (He is also often referred to as Juan Genings in Spanish literature .) The aim of the action was not necessarily to conquer Tenerife for the United Kingdom, but rather the island in recognition of the British-backed Austrian heir to the throne, who later became Emperor Charles VI . , to move. However, the Royal Navy was unsuccessful. The Spaniards were able to repel an attempted invasion by the Royal Navy. The damage on the part of the Spaniards was small in relation to the losses of the British Navy.

prehistory

Sea battle at Cape St. Vincent

In February 1797 the British Mediterranean Fleet, under the command of Admiral John Jervis, defeated the Spanish fleet in the naval battle of Cape St. Vincent . The rest of the fleet was able to escape to the port of Cádiz . As a result, the Admiralty ordered a blockade in front of the Bay of Cadiz to keep the Spanish fleet there. On April 12, 1797, the then Rear Admiral of the Blue ( Rear Admiral of the British Mediterranean Fleet) Nelson presented his superior Admiral Jervis in a letter with a plan to conquer the Canary Islands' most important port at that time, Santa Cruz de Tenerife. In addition to the navy, 3,700 soldiers who had been stationed on Elba until then were to be deployed for this purpose . Admiral Jervis apparently initially did not respond to the proposal.

Capture of the frigate "Príncipe Fernando"

The frigate Príncipe Fernando was en route from the island of Mauritius to Spain on October 23, 1796 . During a meeting with the American frigate Washington , the captain learned of the state of war between Spain and Great Britain. He decided to seek refuge in the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, where the ship arrived on January 23, 1797 and anchored there in the bay. On the night of April 17-18, 1797, the British frigates HMS Terpsichore and HMS Dido approached the bay of Santa Cruz de Tenerife. The ships were under the command of Captain Richard Bowen. Six boats with a total of 80 men were launched. The prize squad got on board the Príncipe Fernando unnoticed in the dark and overwhelmed the 17 crew members present. The Príncipe Fernando left the bay under sail and pulled by boats. The rifle shots that fell on board the ship during the fight had alerted the crews of the bank fortifications and of a ship also lying in the bay, the frigate Princesa . The gunfire from the Spanish side, which lasted two hours, had no consequences for the British Navy.

Capture of the French corvette "La Mutine"

The French corvette La Mutine had been on its way to India from Brest since the beginning of May 1797 . The cargo, consisting of gold, silver, precious stones and fine fabrics, was intended as a gift from the French government to various Indian princes to support them in their revolt against the British. The ship was armed with twelve cannons and two howitzers and had a crew of 150 men. On May 27, 1797, the two British frigates crossed the HMS Minerve and HMS Lively off Santa Cruz. A boat with a parliamentarian went ashore and made an offer to exchange Spanish prisoners who were on board the British ships for British citizens who were in Tenerife. Since General Antonio Gutiérrez (the full name is Antonio Gutiérrez de Otero y Santayana), the commander of the Spanish troops in the Canary Islands, had to assume that there were no Spanish prisoners on board the British ships, he rejected the offer of the British . It seemed obvious to him that the MP had only been sent to spy on the port fortifications. The British ships then moved out of sight of the coast. On the night of May 28th to 29th, 1797, around 3:00 a.m., seamen of the Royal Navy boarded the French ship from eight rowing boats. Since it was a public holiday, most of the French garrison was on land. The troops of the bank fortifications and the crews of the other ships lying in the bay, alerted by the shots on board the ship, shot at La Mutine and caused some damage there. Nevertheless, the British sailors were able to leave the bay with the damaged ship. The French sailors who remained on land later played an important role in the defense of the island.

Combat operations in July 1797

On July 14, 1797 Nelson received from Admiral Sir John Jervis, the commander in chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet, the order to take possession of the city of Santa Cruz de Tenerife by a sudden and powerful raid and to confiscate the cargo of the ship El Principe d'Asturias . The Philippine Company's ship is on its way from Manila to Cádiz and has valuable cargo on board that is owned by the Crown of Spain. Whether it was a simple act of piracy , that is, a financial gain for the British crown and a loss of the Spanish crown, or a permanent occupation of the Canary Islands in the way that the occupation of Gibraltar and other bases was planned , is ultimately insignificant, since neither one nor the other succeeded. Although it appears from the wording of the original order that this is just another act of piracy being planned, the clarifications given by Admiral Jervis at Nelson's request give many indications that a permanent occupation of the Canary Islands in the manner of the occupation emerges Gibraltar or other bases was planned. The main aim of the action was evidently not - as in earlier actions in the bay of Santa Cruz de Tenerife - to capture ships and their cargo and thus inflict damage to the enemy, but rather the British rule over the Canary Islands by taking the most important port and thereby to complicate the ship connections between Spain and the Spanish colonies in America and Asia and to secure the own connections to Asia and America.

The fleet consisted of the following ships: the ships of the line HMS Theseus as the flagship under the command of Captain Ralph Willett Miller, the HMS Culloden under the command of Captain Thomas Troubridge, HMS Zealous under the command of Captain Samuel Hood and the frigates HMS Seahorse under the Command of Captain Thomas Fremantle, HMS Emerald under the command of Captain Thomas Waller and HMS Terpsichore under the command of Captain Richard Bowen and the cutter Fox , under the command of Lieutenant John Gibson and the Bombarde Rayo , captured off Cádiz , under the command of Lieutenant Henry Crompton. The liner HMS Leander, under the command of Captain Thomas B. Thompson, did not join the squadron until July 24th, coming from Lisbon .

First attack on the Castillo del Paso Alto fortifications

strategy

The attack strategy had been worked out by Nelson in close consultation with his captains. One of these advisors was Captain Richard Bowen, who led the pirate raid to capture the frigate Príncipe Fernando . The plan was to go ashore with around 1,000 people unseen at night a little northeast of the fortification of Castillo del Paso Alto (Castillo del Santo Cristo de Paso Alto) and to occupy the height behind the complex. The Castillo was then to be attacked and conquered from the militarily unprotected land side. The second step was to ask the military leadership in Santa Cruz to surrender. Nelson had written a letter dated July 20, 1797 to the governor or the chief military officer of Santa Cruz ("To the Governor or Commanding Officer of Santa Cruz"). Among other things, this ultimatum calls for the surrender of the ship “El Principe d'Asturias”. Apart from the fact that this is neither an English nor a Spanish spelling (correct Spanish spelling: "El Príncipe de Asturias"), there was no ship with this name. In 1797 the future King Ferdinand VII was Prince of Asturias. A ship named "Príncipe Fernando" had already been captured by the British Navy as explained above, so it could no longer be released. This letter, which was written in such a way that it was intended to intimidate the Spaniards, contained in five articles the conditions of surrender, in which apparently not only a short-term occupation of the port, the city and the island was assumed.

procedure

Around 4:30 a.m. on the night of July 21-22, around 1,000 British people, including 250 Marines under the command of Captain Troubridge, attempted to disembark from the frigates in row boats northeast of Santa Cruz. Nelson had already determined the composition of the landing force on July 17, 1797. Due to the strong offshore wind and the current, the British sailors were unable to reach the beach in front of the Valle Secco as planned . The landing forces were discovered. Although the boats were still out of range of the cannons, the crew of the Castillo del Paso Alto fired several shots to alert the troops in the city of Santa Cruz. When the attackers discovered that their plan to take the height behind the Castillo del Paso Alto unseen had failed, they returned to the ships.

Second attack on the Castillo del Paso Alto fortifications

Today's view of the coastal area where the attack took place

strategy

The plan for the second attack was similar to that of the first attempt - however, the surprise effect no longer played a role in this case. The landing should take place in daylight on the beach in front of the Barranco El Bufadero . This point is a little further northeast of the urban area of ​​Santa Cruz de Tenerife than the beach of Valle Secco . The area of El Bufadero was mostly out of reach of the guns of the Castillo del Paso Alto . In this new attack, too, the plan was to conquer the fortification from the land side, which is unprotected by military installations. Another option was to go further into the island and destroy the wooden aqueduct that supplied Santa Cruz de Tenerife with drinking water from the Anaga Mountains . This plan had already been set out in Nelson's letter to Jervis of April 12, 1797. In addition, according to the British, a landing north of Santa Cruz gave the opportunity to take the inland, militarily unfortified island capital La Laguna and from there to conquer the port of Santa Cruz.

procedure

In the second attempt, the approximately 1,000 British under the command of Captain Troubridge were able to land from the frigates in row boats northeast of Santa Cruz on the beach in front of the Barranco El Bufadero . However , the attackers could not reach the height behind the Castillo del Paso Alto . The coast consists of bare craggy rocks, which are separated by deep gorges (barrancos). The Barranco del Valle Secco proved to be a particular obstacle . When the British arrived on the northeast side of the Barranco, the plateau of La Jurada , they found that they were awaited by Canarian militiamen on the opposite side of the Barranco. A crossing of the Barranco was not possible for the British because of the free field of fire. General Gutiérrez had also alerted the militia troops in La Laguna, which were supposed to cut off the British route to the island's capital. It is unknown whether the British sent scouts in the direction. So the British troops stopped on the plains of La Jurada and waited. The weather came to the rescue for the Spaniards. A scorching sun caused several British people to collapse. Then there was also the fact that they had to see how the Spanish militias on the other side of the Barranco were supplied with water, fruit and other food by the water carriers from Santa Cruz. But they themselves had no supply in terms of water or food. The British were forced to withdraw on the evening of July 22nd and return to the ships in their boats.

Attack on the Castillo San Cristóbal and the city

strategy

The third attempt to conquer the port, the city of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and with it the Canary Islands, should be made in a direct attack on the city and the Castillo San Cristóbal , the central fortification of the city. For this purpose, the troops, meanwhile reinforced by the crew of the HMS Leander , should land unseen at the pier at night. Whether the plan really provided for the entire force to land secretly on the pier is controversial. It would have taken a long time to moor a large number of rowing boats one after the other at the pier, and to get more than 1,000 people out via a single flight of stairs, and one would have had to assume that the action would have been noticed by the defenders despite the prevailing darkness .

Another assumption is that it was planned to land a large part of the troops north of the pier at Playa de la Alameda and south of the pier on different beaches, in order to then land on Plaza de la Pila (today: Plaza Candelaria ) meet in order to then call together the Castillo de San Cristóbal , in which the commander-in-chief of the Canarian troops, General Gutiérres, was to surrender or to take it by storm. Rear Admiral Nelson personally took command of the entire landing operation.

Actions before the attack

During July 24th, the British ships of the line and the crew of the port fortifications fought violently, but they did not cause damage on either side. The bombardment of the Castillo del Paso Alto by the Bombarde Rayo was also recognized by the Spanish defenders as a diversionary maneuver, although this caused - albeit minor - damage. Expecting a direct attack by the British on the port of Santa Cruz, General Antonio Gutiérrez withdrew almost all of his troops from the fortifications outside the city during the day and concentrated them in the port and on the right, southwest of the city located side of the Barranco de los Santos . These troop movements could not be observed from the sea.

Course of the fighting on the coast

Richard Westall (1765–1836): Nelson is wounded in the attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife

On the night of July 24th to 25th, 1797 around 1:00 a.m., about 700 men in row boats, 180 men on the cutter Fox and 70 to 80 men on a Spanish ship that had sailed from Gran the day before approached Canaria had been brought to Tenerife, the city of Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Rear Admiral Nelson and Captain Richard Bowen were also in the first boats to reach the breakwater or beach of the Alameda in complete darkness . They were discovered by the defenders and immediately shot at from several sides. Nelson was seriously injured in the right arm. At the same time the cutter Fox was hit below the waterline and sank. The boat that brought Nelson back to his flagship could accommodate some of the seafarers who had been on the Fox . More rowing boats landed at the Caleta de la Aduana . Other boats landed at the mouth of the Barranquillo de Aceite . About 30 boats landed at Playa de Las Carnicerías .

Course of the fighting in the city

The British were able to capture some cannons on the pier head and render them harmless, but they were driven back onto their boats by fire from the Castillo San Cristóbal . Captain Bowen was also killed in the shelling. While the landing of the British at the pier was a complete failure, some boats landed a little further to the northeast at Playa de la Alameda . However, after they had reached the country, the crews were shot at and most of them were captured. Captain Thomas Troubridge succeeded in bringing together a proper formation with about 80 men who had landed at Caleta de la Aduana . However, the troops were only able to engage in close combat with their bayonets , as the powder had become damp due to the strong waves. The formation reached the west side of the Plaza del Pilar . There Captain Thomas Troubridge had two merchants arrested, one of whom spoke English. These were sent to General Gutiérrez together with a non-commissioned officer to ask him to surrender. But the latter refused to speak to the British because he did not consider them to be sufficiently legitimized to conduct negotiations. General Gutiérrez had the attackers, who were waiting for an answer on the southwestern side of the Plaza del Pilar , pushed away by militias with rifles and artillery through side streets to the west in the direction of the Dominican monastery (Convento dominico de la consolación).

Santa Cruz de Tenerife July 25, 1797

About 260 men of the British troops under the command of Captains Samuel Hood and Ralph Willett Miller, who had disembarked at Playa de Las Carnecerías , were fired upon by a squad of defenders in the square in front of the Concepción church . These had heard the English-speaking soldiers in the dark and cut off their way to the Plaza del Pilar , but also back to the beach. This group of attackers therefore also moved in the direction of the Dominican monastery. The two groups, together about 340 men, united and occupied the monastery. The prior and another monk were sent to General Gutiérrez by Captain Troubridge to urge the defenders of Santa Cruz de Tenerife to lay down their arms and surrender immediately. A refusal would have terrible consequences for the residents of the city. They also have a large number of Spanish prisoners to give sufficient weight to the demands. General Gutiérrez did not respond to this request. After it had gotten light, the British barricaded in the monastery signaled from the bell wall that they asked their ships for help. The 15 boats that were then launched were immediately shot at from the head of the pier and the Castillo San Cristóbal . Some boats sank, the rest returned to the ships. The process was observed by the troops trapped in the monastery. Since the British officers could not count on any help and also assumed that they were surrounded by 800 or more Spanish soldiers and militiamen with artillery guns, they gave up their resistance and offered negotiations to surrender. This time captain Samuel Hood and the commandant of the marines Thomas Oldfield acted as emissaries.

surrender

In the deed of surrender, British troops were given free withdrawal with all their weapons. If enough of their boats were not saved, enough others should be made available to them. In return, the British undertook not to attack the city or any of the Canary Islands. The prisoners on both sides should be released. The charter was signed by Samuel Hood and Antonio Gutiérrez and ratified by Thomas Troubridge as Commander of the British Forces. The contract was presented to Nelson, who was on his flagship Theseus, by Captain Hood and the English-speaking Spanish captain Carlos Adán. Nelson agreed to the agreement. From 9:00 a.m. on July 25, 1797, a parade took place on the Plaza de la Pilar: The British troops marched fully armed through a set up "form of honor" of the Spanish troops in the direction of the pier, in order for the most part to be crossed by the Spanish To embark the provided boats. The Spaniards generously provided them with food and wine. Some of the injured were taken to the local hospital for proper treatment. They too were then taken to their ships. An almost amicable exchange of letters took place between Rear Admiral Nelson and General Gutiérrez over the next few days. Gutiérrez asked Nelson to deliver a letter to the Spanish court in the port of Cadiz. In this letter Gutiérrez gives a detailed description of the fighting. While Gutiérrez was supplying Nelson with wine, the latter sent a barrel of beer and cheese in return. On July 27, around 3:00 p.m., the British ships lifted their anchor to head north, to participate again in the siege of the Spanish fleet in the port of Cádiz and to deliver the letter from Gutiérrez.

Consequences of the military action

Coat of arms of the city of Santa Cruz de Tenerife

In a letter of July 27, 1797 to his superior, Rear Admiral Nelson made a detailed list of the losses on the British side. He comes up with the following numbers: 28 seamen and 16 marines killed, 90 seamen and 15 marines wounded, 97 seamen and marines drowned, 5 seamen and marines missing. In addition there are seven named officers killed and five injured. Neither for the career of Rear Admiral Nelson nor for that of his captains, this unsuccessful action on land - in the long term - had negative consequences. The general military situation between Great Britain and France / Spain was not affected by this action. The use of the ports of the Canary Islands played no role in the further course of the war. In a letter of August 8, 1797 to the court in Madrid, General Gutiérrez also made a detailed list of the losses on the Spanish side. He came up with the following figures: 23 dead, including two officers, 38 injured, including three officers. General Gutiérrez was made Knight of the Order of Alcántara in recognition of his contribution to the defense of the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife . In various letters he advocated the injured, widows and orphans of the attack. The El Tigre cannon , believed to have injured Rear Admiral Nelson in such a way that his right arm had to be amputated, is today (March 2012) in the Castillo de San Cristóbal Museum (Santa Cruz de Tenerife) under the Plaza de España displayed. The town of Santa Cruz de Tenerife was declared a very loyal, noble and victorious city of Santa Cruz de Santiago de Tenerife by royal decree of August 28, 1803 by King Carlos IV . With this, the place achieved the status of an independent city and thus independence from La Laguna , with the right to form its own city council. The coat of arms shows - even today - three lions, which symbolize the three repulsed attacks by Blake, Jennings and Nelson.

swell

  • Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845 (English).
  • Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benitez, Daniel García Pulido (eds.): Fuentes Documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Ministerio de Defensa, Museo Militar Regional de Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1997 (Spanish, English).
  • Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benítez, Daniel García Pulido (eds.): Addenda Fuentes documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 2008, ISBN 978-84-612-4825-4 (Spanish, English).

literature

  • Luis Cola Benítez, Daniel García Pulido: La historia del 25 de julio de 1797 a la luz de las fuentes documentales . Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio de 1797, Ediciones del Umbral, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1999, ISBN 84-930522-3-X (Spanish).
  • Luis Cola Benítez: 1797. Cinco días de julio . Ediciones Idea, San Cristóbal de La Laguna 2005, ISBN 84-96570-59-2 , p. 140 (Spanish).
  • Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494 - 1803 . 2nd Edition. tape I . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-063-9 (Spanish).
  • Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494 - 1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 (Spanish).
  • Juan Carlos Cardell Cristellys: Cronología de los prolegómenos en la Gesta del 25 de Julio de 1797 . tape 1 . Ediciones Idea, Tenerife 2004, ISBN 84-96407-79-9 (Spanish).
  • Joel Hayward: For God and Glory . Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 2003, ISBN 1-59114-351-9 (English).
  • Marta Galán Cuartero; Jesús M. Fernández Rodríguez: Las puertas atlánticas: Piratas y corsarios en Canarias (siglos XV - XIX) . Consejería de educación, cultura y deportes del gobierno de Canarias, Dirección general de ordenación e innovación educativa, o. O. (Santa Cruz de Tenerife) 2007, p. 74 (Spanish, this book is material for teaching history in Spanish schools).

Web links

Commons : Horatio Nelson  - album with pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. Luis Cola Benítez, Daniel García Pulido: La historia del 25 de julio de 1797 a la luz de las fuentes documentales . Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio de 1797, Ediciones del Umbral, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1999, ISBN 84-930522-3-X , p. 92 .
  2. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845, p. 416 (English).
  3. ATAQUE DE NELSON A TENERIFE (22-25 de julio de 1797) ( Memento of September 4, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
  4. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 328 (Spanish). Cioranescu assumes 1669 defenders, including 110 French (the crew of the Corvette Mutine), although he also counts the militias who expected the British attack off La Laguna, but which did not take place.
  5. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845, p. 424 (English). These are the numbers Nelson reported to his superior Admiral Jervis.
  6. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 329 (Spanish). Cioranescu expects the British to suffer significantly higher losses. He reckons 778 dead at sea and 128 on land, including 7 officers
  7. Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benitez, Daniel García Pulido (eds.): Fuentes Documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Ministerio de Defensa, Museo Militar Regional de Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1997, p. 48 (Spanish). These are the figures that General Gutiérrez sent to the Spanish court on August 3, 1797. The figures in the literature fluctuate around small values, since apparently some of the injured only died of their injuries after a few days.
  8. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 278 (Spanish).
  9. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 284 (Spanish).
  10. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845 (English). P. 378ff.
  11. NN: Apresamiento de la fragata "Príncipe Fernando" en Tenerife (18 de abril de 1797). (No longer available online.) In: Guerra contra Inglaterra (1796–1802). www.ingenierosdelrey.com, archived from the original on July 29, 2012 ; Retrieved February 20, 2012 (Spanish).
  12. ^ NN: Ataque a Santa Cruz de Tenerife (25 de julio de 1797). (No longer available online.) In: Guerra contra Inglaterra (1796–1802). www.ingenierosdelrey.com, archived from the original on January 5, 2009 ; Retrieved February 20, 2012 (Spanish).
  13. Juan Carlos Cardell Cristelly: Cronología de los prolegómenos en la Gesta del 25 de Julio de 1797 . tape 1 . Ediciones Idea, Tenerife 2004, ISBN 84-96407-79-9 , p. 183 ff . (Spanish).
  14. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845, p. 413 (English). "Taking possession of the Town of Santa Cruz, by a sudden and vigorous assault"
  15. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 301 (Spanish).
  16. Luis Cola Benítez, Daniel García Pulido: La historia del 25 de julio de 1797 a la luz de las fuentes documentales . Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio de 1797, Ediciones del Umbral, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1999, ISBN 84-930522-3-X , p. 77 ff . (Spanish).
  17. a b NN: Ataque a Santa Cruz de Tenerife (25 de julio de 1797). (No longer available online.) In: Guerra contra Inglaterra (1796–1802). www.ingenierosdelrey.com, archived from the original on January 5, 2009 ; Retrieved February 20, 2012 (Spanish).
  18. It is noticeable that a large number of the captains taking part in the action, if they were not already killed in this action, made a career as admirals and were usually ennobled. The biographies of these people as well as more detailed descriptions of most of the ships that took part in this campaign can be found in the English language Wikipedia.
  19. Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benitez, Daniel García Pilito (eds.): Fuentes Documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Ministerio de Defensa, Museo Militar Regional de Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1997, p. 307 ff . (Spanish).
  20. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845, p. 415 (English).
  21. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 298 (Spanish).
  22. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 313 (Spanish).
  23. Luis Cola Benítez: ¿Nelson en el muelle de Santa Cruz? Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio de 1797, November 2, 1994, accessed February 26, 2012 (Spanish).
  24. Alejandro Cioranescu: Historia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1494-1803 . tape II . Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1998, ISBN 84-7985-064-7 , p. 323 (Spanish).
  25. a b Luis Cola Benítez: Cronología de una gesta. Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio de 1797, July 21, 1994, accessed February 26, 2012 (Spanish).
  26. Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benitez, Daniel García Pulido (eds.): Fuentes Documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Ministerio de Defensa, Museo Militar Regional de Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1997, p. 29 f . (Spanish).
  27. Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benitez, Daniel García Pulido (eds.): Fuentes Documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Ministerio de Defensa, Museo Militar Regional de Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1997, p. 38 ff . (Spanish).
  28. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845, p. 421 (English).
  29. Nicholas Harris (Ed.): The Dispatches and Letters of Viceadmiral Lord Viscount Nelson . Second Volume, 1795-1797. Henry Colburne, London 1845, p. 424 (English).
  30. Pedro Ontoria Oquillas, Luis Cola Benitez, Daniel García Pulido (eds.): Fuentes Documentales del 25 de julio de 1797 . Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Ministerio de Defensa, Museo Militar Regional de Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1997, p. 62 ff . (Spanish).
  31. ^ NN: El escudo de Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Tertulia de Amigos del 25 de Julio de 1797, Retrieved March 10, 2012 (Spanish).