Operation Cobra
Operation Cobra July 25-29, 1944
| date | July 25 to August 4, 1944 |
|---|---|
| place | Normandy , France |
| output | American victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 1st US Army ( V. Corps , VII Corps , VIII Corps , XIX Corps ) | 7th Army |
| losses | |
|
not exactly known |
not exactly known |
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The Operation Cobra was a offensive of the Allied forces in the Second World War on the Western Front in German-occupied France . It lasted from 25 July to 4 August 1944, and marked the breakout from the Normandy - bridgehead , which after the Allied landings on the coast of Normandy ( Operation Neptune was created). The operations Cobra and Neptune were part of Operation Overlord .
Operation Cobra marks the transition from material-intensive trench warfare - in which the main load was on infantry and artillery - to warfare with armored units in northern France. The successful outcome enabled the Allied forces to carry out extensive operations that ultimately led to the formation of the Falaise pocket. The German defeat in this cauldron battle caused the withdrawal of the units of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS that were still able to act via the Seine and the related abandonment of a large part of France.
In some places the event is also referred to as the breakthrough at Avranches , with the breakthrough actually taking place at Saint-Lô . After the conquest of Avranches , the Wehrmacht leadership only became aware of the scope of the operation.
prehistory
background
The plan for Operation Overlord provided for a steady expansion of the bridgehead after a successful landing with additional Allied units that were quickly followed up. Cities, ports and landing fields served as cornerstones for operations. The Allies quickly tried to move into mobile warfare in order to bring their tactical superiority in the air, on land with tanks and motorized infantry and with the help of their logistics to bear. This was to avoid a positional war like in the First World War .
A key factor in the Allies' success was the build-up of troops in the bridgehead, which had to happen faster than the Germans could mobilize their own troops. The German troop build-up had to be permanently disrupted. Thus began a race in Normandy, which became one of the most important for the course of the Allied campaign.
To combat the German supply routes, the Allied Air Force bombed the rail and road network in northern France. The Second Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF), created especially for the invasion, effectively supported the medium and heavy bombers of the USAAF and RAF with low-level attacks (see aerial warfare during Operation Overlord ).
The establishment of the Allied forces on the European continent also proceeded according to plan and, above all, faster than on the other side. In July, however, progress was hampered by the fact that the bridgehead had not yet been significantly widened, or in Montgomery's words: no further claims had been staked inland . The previous bridgehead was literally "overpopulated", the number of airfields in Allied hands was far lower than planned. Caen , a primary target on Landing Day, had not yet been captured and there was no major port in Allied hands.
The Battle of Normandy had mostly broken up into small battles, which is why the Allied units only advanced very slowly against the German defense. For example, the VIII Corps recorded losses of more than 10,000 men (dead, wounded and missing) between July 2 and 14, with a gain of space of only eleven kilometers. In the Battle of Saint-Lô , the conquest of which was a prerequisite for the planned breakout offensive, the XIX Corps lost 11,000 men in July. On July 25, the beginning of Operation Cobra, the Allies had only reached the D + 5 line, that is, they held positions that they should have reached as planned on June 11.
This was a consequence of the decision of the Commander in Chief of the German Wehrmacht on the Western Front ( OB West ), Gerd von Rundstedt . In disagreement with Erwin Rommel , who commanded Army Group B on the invasion front, he preferred the stationing of tank units in the hinterland of the possible invasion beaches. As a result, the Allies only encountered strong resistance after a successful bridgehead, especially in the area around Caen.
Allied losses were high, and air support was made difficult by the fact that Allies and Germans were very close to one another. The Allied commanders could not directly incorporate the progress they had made into the fighting and a positional war seemed to be on the way.
This revealed a lack of Allied planning for the days following the invasion. They were so busy with the problems that the invasion itself brought with it that there was no adequate concept for expanding the bridgehead. In particular, the tactical problems at the front of the 1st US Army in the west were not expected in this way.
On the German side, bringing in supplies was a task that could not be solved satisfactorily. The high command demanded the detachment of the tank units bound in the front line by advancing infantry. On the one hand, this would have made trench warfare inevitable and, on the other hand, should have loosened the mobile units for counterattacks.
On the tactical level, the German units acted efficiently, they only retreated slowly and inflicted heavy losses on the attacking allies. The unclear terrain in the west was helpful to the Wehrmacht. It consisted of spacious flat land, criss-crossed by small streets with many hedges, the bocage, as a cover. In the more open eastern area, the front line was occupied by motorized units such as the 9th, 10th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions as well as their heavy tank battalions and other tank and armored infantry units such as the Panzer Lehr Division , the 2nd SS Panzer Division . Division and parts of the 2nd Panzer Division defended. Most of the defense line was held by non-mobile infantry units whenever possible.
This meant that the infantry suffered heavy losses in grueling front-line battles and the armored units were worn out in the retreat battles. There was no longer any air support for the German ground forces. This meant that their usual rapid advance could not take place. Added to this was the success of the Allied Operation Fortitude , which tied up extensive German forces in the 15th Army in the Netherlands and in the Calais area.
planning
In order to prevent the looming trench warfare in Normandy, the Commander in Chief of the 1st US Army, Omar Bradley , began to work out an escape plan. For a few weeks he evidently worked out a concept on his own, which he presented to his immediate superior, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery , and his British counterpart, General Miles Dempsey , on July 10, 1944 . Both agreed to carry out the planned support attacks in the direction of Caen for the American breakthrough. Later on, Montgomery and Dempsey began pursuing their own British escape plan - Operation Goodwood .
Commander-in-chief Dwight D. Eisenhower assured Allied air support for the attacks, which should consist of heavy and light bombing and tactical air strikes. However, the commanders of the strategic air forces were very skeptical about sending their units into a tactical battle, as they believed that they would be unsuitable for this role and better off in their strategic task. Even so, their planes were involved in many area bombardments in Normandy, such as Operation Charnwood on July 7th, Operation Goodwood on July 18th, and Operation Cobra on July 24th and 25th.
Bradley briefed his subordinate officers on July 12th. Operation Cobra's plan consisted of three phases. First the VII Corps was supposed to fill a gap in the German front. Then strong flanks were to be built up on both sides of the gap by the breakout divisions so that a butt head consisting of three divisions could advance there. The VIII and XIX Corps were intended for local attacks on the Germans so that they could not bring supplies to the front line. If the first two phases had been successfully completed, the German resistance could no longer have been sustained and the entire Cotentin peninsula could have been taken. General J. Lawton Collins , commander of the VII Corps, suggested minor changes to the plan to move the breakthrough more south. If successful, his changes brought the possibility of a faster advance into Brittany to take the Atlantic ports there. The original plan did not assume a complete collapse of the German front in Normandy, but only consisted of an expansion of the bridgehead to initiate the war of movement behind the coastal land providing cover and the capture of important ports.
The advance should be opened by a short but heavy bombardment with medium and heavy bombers on the intended area. The expectation was that the damage caused and the shock factor would soften the German defensive. Immediately thereafter, the infantry should encounter the German lines. When the German resistance was at the height of its collapse, the three divisions should break through. The air support was the most critical point of the operation because of its dependence on the weather. Therefore, Trafford Leigh-Mallory , the commander of the air fleet, was given authority to determine the start of the operation.
Key units of the first strikes were the VII Corps with the 4th, 9th and 30th US Infantry Divisions. The three planned divisions for the outbreak were the 1st US Infantry Division and the 2nd and 3rd US Armored Divisions . The 1st US Infantry Division was temporarily equipped with vehicles by the Quartermaster of the 1st US Army.
The VIII Corps under General Troy H. Middleton had designated the 8th, 79th, 83rd and 90th US Infantry Divisions for the attack and kept the 4th US Armored Division in reserve.
More than 1,300 medium M4 tanks , 690 light M5A1 tanks and 280 M10 tank destroyers were available to these units along with hundreds of artillery pieces . Approximately 140,000 rounds of artillery ammunition of all calibers were added. The front section for the advance of the VII Corps was about four miles wide.
The aftermath of British Operation Goodwood
The Operation Goodwood , the British breakout attempt, was launched on 18 July. At a meeting with Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery on July 10, 1944, the Commander of the British Second Army , General Miles Dempsey , proposed the plan for Operation Goodwood . On the same day, Montgomery also approved Operation Cobra. The Canadian portion of Operation Goodwood was code-named Operation Atlantic .
The tactic of using heavy bombers in preparation for artillery fire was carried out as a few months earlier at the Battle of Monte Cassino . In contrast to Cobra, Goodwood relied on a massive tank deployment to achieve the tactical breakout and did not soften the German front with artillery fire. The failure of the operation, in which more than 400 Sherman tanks were destroyed on July 18, was disappointing, but ironically it made it clear that the main force of German tanks remained in the area of the British 2nd Army, far from the position of the 1st Army. The Americans therefore correctly suspected that a German counter-attack against Cobra was hardly to be expected in the first few days. If so, it would only consist of smaller battalion-strength operations.
The time before the attack
In the days that remained until the attack, the VII and VIII Corps secured the areas in which the troops were to line up for the advance. The infantry suffered heavy losses. The positions should be chosen tactically and easily identified from the air. The line along the road from Saint-Lô to Périers was ideal.
The commanders of the aviation units required a distance of at least three kilometers between the positions of their own and opposing formations. Because the casualties in previous operations were so high and any land gain had been heavily paid for, Bradley refused to give up the area and only backed away about 700 meters. In the end, the front lines of the infantry were moved back 1 to 1.3 kilometers to ensure the greatest possible safety during the bombing. The main units withdrew only about an hour before the air strikes and left observation posts behind until 20 minutes before the bombing.
The fighting
The preparatory air strike on July 24th
The day of the attack was originally set for July 18, but the bad weather repeatedly led to the date being postponed. Ultimately, the start date was July 24th. But again, the bad weather caused Leigh-Mallory to postpone another 24-hour postponement. Several heavy bombers of the 8th Air Force did not receive the recall and continued their mission. Around 335 B-17s, some of which were impaired by poor visibility, dropped 685 tons of bombs in the target area. Although particular attention had been paid to preventing the bombing of its own positions, bombs fell on the positions of American units. For this reason, Bradley had asked for a flight over the area parallel to the front line in order to minimize the risk of being hit by his own bombers (" friendly fire "). He assumed that the commanders of the air units had agreed, but only the tactical combat aircraft of the 9th Air Force reached the target parallel to the front line. The heavy bomber formations of the 8th Air Force knew nothing of the agreement and reached the front at right angles to its course. The drops that were too short hit exactly the troops intended for the first attack. More than 100 Americans were killed and around 500 injured. The 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division alone mourned 25 deaths.
After the surprise effect was lost, consideration was given to postponing the attack or even to cancel it entirely. But Bradley decided to do it. In retrospect, this decision was correct, as the Germans did nothing to strengthen their defensive positions during the 24 hours they were given . They assumed that they had stopped an American advance with their artillery fire. Units of the Panzer Lehr Division were relocated to the target area, but at the same time units of the 2nd Panzer Division were withdrawn to the British sector to the east.
The real attack begins (July 25th)
By the morning of July 25, the weather had improved and the attack was repeated at 9:40 a.m. Light and heavy bombers dropped more than 3,300 tons of bombs on the target area. Bombs fell on the American positions again, 111 soldiers were killed and 490 men were wounded. General Lesley J. McNair was also among those killed. The false drops resulted from the small target area and the wind that blew the bomb smoke into the American positions. Some aircraft crews therefore hastily thrown their load into the smoke without aiming precisely at their target. The casualties this cost were, however, probably less than the additional losses that would have arisen from the German defensive fire without the use of bombs.
The combat units quickly recovered from the bombing. Despite heavy losses in some units, only one battalion had to be replaced. All others attacked that morning, some of them a little late. But at 11:00 a.m. the attack continued as planned.
The German units had been hit hard by the bomb storm. The elite unit of the Panzer Lehr Division was almost completely wiped out. Tanks lay overturned on the streets, positions were destroyed and the survivors often wandered disoriented through the area, so that the command structure collapsed in large parts. About two thirds of the divisions fell victim to the attack.
Due to the careful groping through the defended surrounding areas, which offered excellent cover for the Germans with their hedges and trenches, the American infantry made relatively slow progress at first. Although there were few defenders, they should not be underestimated. More and more, however, the front receded to the east, so that on the first day around 3.5 kilometers of land was gained at the expense of more than 1,000 victims. On July 26, the further advance was somewhat faster and the Americans advanced more than seven kilometers to the west.
Breakthrough and eruption from July 27th to August 4th
Collins toyed with the idea that an earlier outbreak would be inevitable and reported it to the three division commanders on the morning of July 26th. This was a questionable decision, because if the attempted breakthrough too early before the German front line had softened, the units would have flooded the intended advance wedge, would have got into a traffic jam and would have used up part of their forces in it. On the other hand, if the waiting time was too long, the breakthrough would have occurred more slowly than intended. This in turn would have given the Germans the opportunity to quickly bring in supplies or even carry out a counterattack.
On July 27th, the full strength of all three divisions was thrown into battle. They broke through the front of the German units in front of the VII Corps, with American vehicles advancing against the breaking German resistance. The front line at the VIII Corps also began to crumble when the German units began to withdraw for fear of being encircled. The correctness of Collins's decision was confirmed on July 28th when the VIII Corps recorded more than 19 kilometers of land reclamation and the 4th Armored Division took the important intersection of Coutances , which was directly behind the German tactical defense zone. There the VIII Corps joined under General Patton's direction. By July 30, the 4th Panzer Division had taken Avranches , cutting off and enclosing the German resistance nests in the north of the Cotentin Peninsula . Meanwhile, the Canadians with their II Corps held the Germans in the east at their positions by engaging them in violent fighting. At that time there was no longer a single German front line that stood in the way of the 1st Army, and so their advancing units penetrated undefended territory. Four divisions of the VIII Corps advanced beyond Avranches by August 4th. The easy-to-defend land of the Bocage was now behind them, so that from then on the mobility of the American units determined the pace and direction of the battle.
Montgomery, the commander of the allied ground forces, announced on August 4th a general change in the further invasion plan. Instead of sending the 3rd US Army to Brittany to conquer the Atlantic ports, most of it was sent east in view of the German collapse. The 1st Army also operated further east and the British and Canadians continued their attacks to the east and south to trap the remaining German troops. That was the beginning of the fighting that would eventually lead to the Falaise pocket and a quick advance through northern France.
Effects of Operation Cobra
Operation Cobra brought many changes to the war situation and ended the fighting for Normandy. She initiated the rapid advance through northern France, which lasted until about mid-September 1944. The Allied advance ultimately ended not due to German resistance, but due to a lack of equipment. The Allied troops had become victims of their own success and overwhelmed the possibilities of their logistics.
Ironically, the VIII Corps could not achieve the goal of quickly capturing the Atlantic ports of Brittany during the Battle of Brittany : The Germans held Brest until the end of September, Lorient and Saint-Nazaire even until May 1945. Since then, Marseille passed the Allies in August fell intact, this was irrelevant, as Montgomery cited in his August 4th decision.
The effects of the operation were more far-reaching than previously thought, or as Bradley said: “[Cobra] had struck a more deadly blow than any of us dared imagine” (German: “[Cobra] had delivered a more fatal blow than any of us dared to introduce ” ). This was intended as a recognition of the flexibility and mobility of the Allied armies and to keep the advance going as long and as far as possible.
At noon on August 1st, 3rd Army was activated and the VIII Corps came under their command as planned. General Courtney Hodges took command of the 1st Army . General Bradley, who had previously commanded the 1st Army, took over command of the newly established 12th US Army Group, which consisted of the 1st and 3rd Army.
After the collapse of the defensive front in Normandy, German troops fled with everything they could in a hurry to take. The Allied air force took them seriously by attacking and severely damaging roads, bridges and railways. This significantly reduced the speed of retreat of the Germans. Several major units were trapped in the Falaise pocket.
With around 60,000 casualties, this defeat was one of the greatest for the Germans in World War II. The losses since the beginning of Operation Overlord thus amounted to more than 400,000 soldiers, 1,500 tanks and gun carriage vehicles . In the end, 25 divisions were virtually completely eliminated. During the breakout phase, the losses were significantly higher than in the previous static battles. The German loss of tanks in August was multiplied compared to the numbers in June and July. The German tank divisions reached the German border completely burned out and without tanks.
The personnel carousel opened on July 2, 1944 in the Wehrmacht command staff continued when the Commander-in-Chief West (OB West) General Field Marshal Günther von Kluge fell out of favor with Hitler as a result of the defeat and the failed counterattack ( Operation Liège ). Hitler was informed by the SS that von Kluge might be preparing the surrender of his units. He was replaced on August 17th by Walter Model , who in turn was replaced by Gerd von Rundstedt at the beginning of September . Von Rundstedt was allegedly dismissed from this post by Adolf Hitler on July 2nd . The dismissal followed a proposal by Rundstedts and Erwin Rommels (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B) to move the front back to a line south of Caen and to stabilize it, which would have seriously endangered Operation Cobra.
Both Erwin Rommel and Günther von Kluge were privy to at least some of the overturning plans related to the Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944 . Kluge committed suicide on August 19, 1944, shortly after he was replaced by Model. Rommel, who on October 14, 1944, suggested suicide by two generals on behalf of Hitler , also committed suicide .
By August 25th, all Allied units involved in the Battle of Normandy had reached the Seine ; on the same day the city commandant of Greater Paris surrendered . The fear of the Allied commanders of a positional war was followed by an euphoria for victory: everyone now believed that the war had practically been won. The Allies continued their rapid advance through northern France and made the short-sighted decision to forego the capture of Antwerp and its large port and to start Operation Market Garden beforehand . After Erwin Rommel, who already proposed a separate peace in the West at the beginning of July , the “new” Mayor West Gerd von Rundstedt has now also declared that it would be better to enter into peace negotiations.
literature
- Steven J. Zaloga : Operation Cobra 1944. Breakout from Normandy. Osprey Military, Oxford 2001, ISBN 1-84176-296-2 .
- William Yenne, Bill Yenne: Operation Cobra and the Great Offensive. Sixty Days That Changed the Course of World War II. Pocket Books, New York 2004, ISBN 0-7434-5882-6 .
- Christopher Pugsley: Operation Cobra. Sutton, Strout 2004, ISBN 0-7509-3015-2 .
- Percy E. Schramm: Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. 8 vols. Bernard & Graefe, Bonn 1990, ISBN 3-7637-5933-6 .
Web links
- Operation Cobra (English)
- Operation Cobra . Documentation by the National Geographic Channel
- United States Army in World War II. European Theater of Operations. The Supreme Command: Contents (TOC)
