Functionalism (psychology)

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The functionalism in psychology is a created since the second half of the 19th century in the US research direction different from the hitherto usual concept of the psychology of consciousness sought withdraw. The older ideas of psychology were called “structuralism” from the newly emerged perspective. Structuralism was understood in a reproachful way not only as the division of various contents of consciousness in the sense of the older elemental psychology , but also as the deductive character of the earlier property psychology . Rather, functionalism as an inductively determined doctrine is understood to mean the intellectual activity mediated by the sense organs. According to the empirically oriented teaching, these objects of thought are therefore not realities, but only functions (relationships) of other conditions . (a) The overall effects emanating from the consciousness “as such” (William James 1892) in continuous interaction with the environment - and in adjustment (“adjustment”) to external conditions should enable and improve the understanding of consciousness. The psychologically understood concept of functionalism is therefore not based on any fundamental definition of "function". It only describes the effects and functional tendencies that are programmatically associated with consciousness as a whole. Psychological phenomena should be understood as direct accompanying and secondary effects of physical processes. The analogy to (mechanical) devices and their performance ( performance psychology ), which correspond to the basic human needs of self and species conservation, was followed. Already René Descartes (1596-1650) these physical processes (had machine paradigm ) called automaton (res extensa). (a) Indeed, functionalist theory gave rise to a number of anthropological, sociological, ethnological and educational impulses. (a), (a)

Founder and representative

The philosophical foundation of functionalism is based on the teachings of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and John Dewey (1859–1952). These theories, known as pragmatism, found attention in wider circles, because their action-oriented orientation resulted in observable results in the closer examination of conscious phenomena, and evidence for the correctness of the assumptions about the nature of mental performance was inferred from these objective changes. (a)

The psychologically oriented work of William James (1842–1910) and James Rowland Angell (1869–1949) deepened these views. As an indication of the views of W. James, reference is made to his series of lectures on pragmatism. The conceptions specifically related to consciousness saw parts of a psychological reflex arc in the nerve cells of the cerebrum . In terms of pragmatism, special emphasis was placed on the motor reflex response ("output") and less on the sensory side ("input"). (c)

Other representatives of functionalism in the USA are James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934), James McKeen Cattell (1860–1944), Granville Stanley Hall (1846–1924), George Trumbull Ladd (1842–1921) and in Switzerland Édouard Claparède (1873-1940). (b)

Psychological viewpoints

Since the term function is used in many ways in → physiology, administration and organization, as well as in mathematics , functionalism has also been interpreted in a correspondingly versatile manner in psychological terms. (c) Functionalism stands in certain contrast to the teaching of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), which in turn was advocated in America by Edward Bradford Titchener (1867–1927). In particular, introspection was rejected by the functionalists from a methodological point of view, since, in their opinion, subjective facts do not allow the acquisition of objective facts, see also → consciousness psychology.

Intellectual historical position

From a philosophical point of view, empirically oriented functionalism can also be called functional materialism , since it tries to describe psychological and mental states as the effects of exclusively material conditions . If this exclusivity did not correspond to the thinking of William James, it was recognizable as a basic feature of the empirical science. If a structuralism was rejected, one did not proceed from an ordered set of functions, but only from a summation. Otherwise, however, the spiritual life in its unity would not only be described as a structured set of individual functions, but at the same time also as a set of upward effects . The founders of American functionalism, however, largely rejected a structured context of psychological reality, as it was assumed by the followers of elemental psychology. The mind-body problem was considered to be sufficiently determinable from the physical side. Psychological functionalism can therefore also be seen as a forerunner of behaviorism , psychophysics and psychophysiology . In contrast to the scientific approach to the mind-body problem that has been common in the western world since around 1850, today's philosophically oriented → functionalism only asserts the thesis that mental states are functional states, as Carl Stumpf already called for in 1906 . (b) The bond with an at least hypothetically required organ change - as classical German psychiatry assumed for endogenous psychosis , for example , is thus abandoned. The upheaval towards scientific thinking in Germany from 1850 onwards is associated with the name of Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–1868). His psychiatric paradigm was: "The mentally ill are brain-sick".

“Physiology regards psychic life as a special form of life in the organism; it sees functions of certain organs in the psychic acts and seeks to understand them precisely from their structure. "

- Wilhelm Griesinger : The pathology and therapy of mental illnesses. 1st edition published by Adolph Krabbe, Stuttgart 1845; S. 1, § 2.

Thus the psychological functions were regarded as dependent on healthy or diseased brain structures according to the type of physiology .

Examples

As an example of a functionalist theory, the James Lange theory should be mentioned here. It finds its pointed expression in the sentence by James: "We don't cry because we are sad, but we are sad because we cry." The physically observable course of a mental reaction is rated as a determining part of the mental activity . (d)

The activity of the autonomic nervous system can also be viewed as a more automatic and organ-related control activity in contrast to the animal nervous system .

Functionalism understood sociologically

Suggestions for the development of a functionalist theory of the social context came from the biological organism model. It describes the functional structure of an organism, consisting of individual cells, which in turn are rebuilt into organs. This had become clear as a functional principle in → physiology. This model was followed in the assumption of an analogy between organism and society as represented by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902). Further suggestions came from Émile Durkheim's (1858–1917) conception of solidarity and from Vilfredo Pareto's (1848–1923) concept of the system. (d) The sociological theoretical approaches established by Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) and Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) have in common that, in contrast to the psychological representatives of the theory, they assumed a structural context in society as a prerequisite for a functionalist approach . The assumption that reality is structured in the end results on the one hand from the logically compelling recognition of "higher" and on the other hand rather "basic" (lower) functions. The theory of the upward effects also indicates this fact. Radcliffe-Brown rejected the close association with basic needs of self and species conservation. Overall, these ideas contributed to the development of sociological systems theory .

Reception and criticism

Jaspers

Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) characterizes functionalism as the antagonism between mechanism on the one hand and flexible, varied tasks on the other. While the mechanism is based on an automatic performance principle that always relates to the same tasks, the multitude and complexity of constantly new tasks require an increasingly differentiated willingness to react on the part of the organism. While the basic neurological scheme of the reflex arc corresponds to the mechanism in the sense of the → machine paradigm, the basic psychological scheme of willingness to perform is more understandable on the basis of a holistic view of the organism. This holistic principles correspond to Jaspers the association psychology that Aktpsychologie and wholeness psychology in a mutually complementary perspective. They could be understood as a logical consequence of empiricism and functionalism, even if they for their part fall back on elementary units, especially when assuming quasi-automatic association mechanisms in which one conscious idea unconsciously emerges from another. According to Jaspers, the aforementioned psychological research directions pursue the goal of explaining and understanding the composite function of consciousness. (b)

The meaningful connection of psychological units and elements as well as sensations and feelings, words and objects is the special human moment in contrast to the associative automatisms that can also occur in animals such as parrots , which are probably able to speak linguistically Associating sounds without, however, resulting in “higher” meaningful performance. Both association connections and act connections, seen in mutual interweaving, bring about the creation of “higher” units that are to be viewed as wholes. Jaspers sees as permanent terms borrowed from neurology and neurophysiology , which have proven to be fruitful for psychology through the influence of functionalism: a) → psychological reflex arc as the transfer of the basic neurological scheme of the reflex arc to psychology; b) Neuropsychology as a border area between neurology and psychology, in which neurological ideas of localizable services prove to be predominant for the understanding of higher psychological tasks and their disorders. B. is assumed in the understanding of functional or organic disorders such as aphasia , apraxia , agnosia , ataxia ; c) Also other basic terms of neurophysiology, as they are important for psychology, such as fatigue as a quantitative decrease in function in the time sequence, exercise as an improvement in mnestic performance similar to conditioning , and the antagonistic terms of excitation and paralysis , with excitation being psychological can be described as psychomotor "excitement", the paralysis, on the other hand, is to be understood as psychogenic (non-organic) paralysis, for example in hysteria . The expression “paralysis” or “as if paralyzed” also characterizes apathy e.g. B. in shocking experiences. Furthermore, the neurophysiological terms of facilitation and summation are used as psychologically relevant terms. (c) Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) used the terms sum of excitation and facilitation to describe psychological states. The broad field of achievement psychology is the main area of experimental psychology . (d)

Arendt

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) criticizes the experience-based belief in progress as a scientific dogma as it has developed in the sciences in Europe since the 17th century. She explains this with the concept of functionalism. (a)

Excursus 1 : If one defines functions as psychic processes according to the suggestion of → Carl Stumpf (1848–1936) concerning → act psychology and if one also sees the two poles of the functions given by the initial and target situation as phenomena within the psychic process, so the “function” presents itself as the interdependence of two different phenomena. (c) The conceptual meaning of “function” approaches that in mathematics. Here the relationship of dependency between two variable quantities (variables) or groups of quantities is characterized by the fact that a given variable determines another or the change in one variable determines a change in the. others. (e)

It is understandable when Hannah Arendt says, using the example of error and deception, that behind every broken appearance another appearance takes its place. She also explains this using the example of “disappointment” . This word is known to have a positive and a negative meaning. In addition to the negative meaning related to the loss of a date and to the deception, there is a positive value of “disappointment”, i. H. the retrieval of another date. The negative variant of this experience has contributed to the expression of “mere appearance” or even of only “apparent facts”. In contrast to “mere appearance” or even “false appearance”, one speaks in a positive sense of “true being”. (b)

Excursus 2 : The dependency of one phenomenon on another is understandable if a “higher” connection arises. The statement: "Iron is heavy" is recognized as meaningful if an "umbrella term" (here: weight or "heaviness") can be assigned to the element iron ( analytical judgment ). Other metals are also "heavy". If one looks for a state of affairs that one does not even know, such as researching unknown causes , which one believes to find as objectivity or as a thing in itself based on the assumed fundamental conviction ( analytical judgment a priori ), then this is also based on hierarchical ones Priorities. (Kant KrV B 13, B 128 ff., B 565 ff.)

Here, as Hannah Arendt thinks, a “higher” degree of reality or a “deeper” reason is usually assumed, in that the appearance is viewed as fleeting compared to the “true being”. She calls this belief " metaphysical hierarchy". Arendt considers the way of thinking to be the basis of the belief in progress, which tries to penetrate more and more "deeper" into the variety of functions in nature. The assumption, which she describes as the priority of invisible being over appearance (sensory world), could also turn out to be a great error and thus call into question the belief in progress. (c)

In the individual exterior of a living being, Hannah Arendt sees its “actual appearance” (based on Adolf Portmann ), designed to show itself and to be seen. With the urge of all living things to appear, this appearance has its task in itself. The self-referential function of presenting itself as an individual creates its own "surface value", detached from the biological functions of life support. Arendt relies in particular on Merleau-Ponty for these considerations .

The “metaphysical hierarchy”, however, is reversible. Hannah Arendt contrasts the fundamental conviction of the existence of a “higher” reality or a “deeper” ground with the concept of the “value of the surface”. This emphasizes the importance of the appearance. Functionalism no longer pushed the (observable) phenomena off as “secondary qualities”, but viewed them as essential conditions for understanding the life process in biology, sociology and psychology. Arendt relies on Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Adolf Portmann . Yet Arendt believes that functionalism has retained the old dichotomy between mere appearance and true being in a “different way”. (d),

literature

  • Carl Stumpf : Appearances and Mental Functions . Dep. Kgl.-Prussia. Akad. Wiss. Berlin, 1906.
  • Max Wertheimer : [1925] Three papers on Gestalt theory . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1963.
  • EG Boring: [1933] The physical dimensions of consciousness . New York: Appleton.
  • H.-G. Schütte: The empirical content of functionalism . 1971

Remarks

  1. Nevertheless, reference is made to the definition of the term »function« by Carl Stumpf, as explained in excursus 1 to Chap. Arendt is given. Carl Stumpf was friends with William James. The link between functionalism and the concept of subjectively determinable consciousness ( qualia ) distinguishes it from later behaviorism, which declares the concept of consciousness to be dispensable. (Watson 1919)
  2. Here the proximity to Darwinism and the term used here of the struggle for survival becomes clear, cf. also the central importance of adaptation ( evolution theory , evolutionary adaptation , the educational importance of socialization ). The positions of "adaptation" and Darwinian orientation are also adopted from American behaviorism.
  3. ↑ What is missing here is a more precise explanation by H. Arendt of the way in which the dichotomy between mere appearance and true being was retained in functionalism. It can be assumed that this alludes to the difficulties in defining the “concept of function” indicated in the opening credits and to the rather subjective tendency for progress implicitly associated with it, cf. Note 1. It is also likely that she is aiming at the priority principle, which she has questioned, of “basic human needs for self-preservation and the preservation of species”. Elsewhere, Arendt has dealt more closely with the assessment of these “basic needs” in comparison to the openness to requirements for a variety of other functions. Here is u. a. to refer to her preoccupation with the writer and well-known colleague at the Berliner Ensemble am Schiffbauerdamm Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956). His works such as Baal (1918), The Threepenny Opera (1928) and Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny (1927-29) are illuminating in this context. Arendt considers the “wonderful weightlessness” that these basic needs can be met to be beneficial for poetry writing. However, it turns out to be a dead end, as it is expressed in the "case of the city of Mahagonny" and is indicative of the development in the poet's consciousness.
    Leaves each of two different species of the
    maple genus . The diversity of forms leads to the question of whether it is (life) necessary in a functional sense or whether it is contingent and thus harbors the possibility of functional diversity.

    The variety of forms of animal and plant life, especially in connection with species diversity, suggests an equally wide-ranging variety of functional relationships. The natural features of the plant and animal species are also functionally diverse. Birds' plumage is not only used for thermal insulation, not only for airworthiness, not only for representing sexual differentiation, but also for the individual and species-specific appearance. The objectively observable effects or functions contrast with the more subjectively interpretable diverse forms of appearance. According to Arendt, a fundamental priority of objective observations can be assumed rather than doubtful. This particularly raises the question of the objectivistic appearance. The extinction of species is associated with a lack of attention to these facts. It seems evident that such a development can be prevented by a change in awareness. The close Darwinian orientation of functionalism to the superficial needs of self and species preservation would therefore need to be supplemented. However, the question arises as to whether, for example, the preservation of biodiversity in a more comprehensive sense also serves to preserve the human species.

    Arendt refers to Kant in her lectures on judgment . He does not limit himself to the question of the cause of human existence. He asked the question of the purpose by pointing out: ... "the purpose of the existence of nature itself must be sought beyond nature". (KU § 67, B 299) In order not to degrade nature through questions of mediocrity, it is necessary that humans become aware that they are part of nature themselves. This results in a guardian function, which arises from the knowledge of the mutual dependence of man and nature. See also the problem of heterogony .

    - The model of the ›apparatus‹, as it has been taken up again and again since Descartes, by representatives of occassionalism and the clock simile used by them , has been discussed again in recent times. This took place in connection with the term “ occasional apparatus ” used by Eugen Bleuler (1857–1939) . Bleuler used the term to interpret the physical symptoms that occur in hysteria as the result of an act of will determined by certain "opportunities". This also pointed out the variety of possible functions.

Sources :
on note 1: “Watson 1919”;
to note 2: Stw. "Darwinism" (e)  ;
on note 3 Stw. "Bertolt Brecht";
to note 3: Stw. "Diversity of animal and vegetable life" (e) ;
to note 3: Stw. “Avoid mutual degradation of man and nature”;
to note 3: Stw. "Objectivistic appearance";
to note 3: Stw. "Occasional phone".

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e Heinrich Schmidt : Philosophical dictionary (= Kröner's pocket edition. 13). 21st edition, revised by Georgi Schischkoff . Alfred Kröner, Stuttgart 1982, ISBN 3-520-01321-5 : (a) p. 207 f. to lemma “function”; (b) p. 208 on the lemma “functional psychology”; (c) p. 207 f. to lemma “function”; (d) S 207 f. like (c); (d) S 207 f. like (c).




  2. William James : Psychology . Holt, New York, 1892; S. 1 to Stw. "Description and explanation of consciousness as such".
  3. a b c d e Peter R. Hofstätter (Ed.): Psychology . The Fischer Lexicon, Fischer-Taschenbuch, Frankfurt a. M. 1972, ISBN 3-436-01159-2 : (a) p. 71, 206 on stw. "The body world that functions automatically according to physical laws (res extensa)"; (b) p. 72 f. to Stw. “Functionalism, J. Dewey”; (c) p. 72 f. to Stw. "Functionalism, W. James"; (d) p. 72 on the “James Lange theory”; (e) p. 72 on head. “Darwinism, life support”.




  4. a b c d Markus Antonius Wirtz. (Ed.): Dorsch - Lexicon of Psychology . 18th edition, Verlag Hogrefe, Bern, 2014; P. 594 on Lemma: ".functionalism"; online text updated since 2014 .
  5. ^ A b Philip G. Zimbardo , Richard J. Gerrig: Psychology . Pearson, Hallbergmoos near Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-8273-7275-8 ; P. 9 f. to Stw. "Functionalism".
  6. ^ A b c Karl-Heinz Hillmann : Dictionary of Sociology (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 410). 4th, revised and expanded edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1994, ISBN 3-520-41004-4 , p. 252 on Lemma: “Functionalism”.
  7. a b c d Karl Jaspers : General Psychopathology . 9th edition, Springer, Berlin 1973, ISBN 3-540-03340-8 : (a) p. 130 ff. On “Performance Psychology”; (b) p. 135 ff. on stw. “Association, Nude and Gestalt Psychology”; (c) p. 134. re. “appropriate terms”; (d) p. 138 ff. on tax. “Experimental Psychology”.



  8. a b c Wilhelm Karl Arnold et al. (Ed.): Lexicon of Psychology . Bechtermünz, Augsburg 1996, ISBN 3-86047-508-8 : (a) Sp. 651 on Lemma. "Functionalism"; (b) Col. 49 f. to Lemma. "Nude Psychology"; (c) Col. 49 f. like (b).


  9. ^ A b Carl Stumpf : Appearances and psychological functions . Dep. Kgl.-Prussia. Akad. Wiss. Berlin, 1906.
  10. ^ Klaus Dörner : Citizens and Irre . On the social history and sociology of science in psychiatry. (1969) Fischer Taschenbuch, Bücher des Wissens, Frankfurt / M 1975, ISBN 3-436-02101-6 ; P. 314, 334 on resident "Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–1868) first psychiatric paradigm from around 1850".
  11. Wilhelm Griesinger : The pathology and therapy of mental illnesses . for doctors and students / 1st edition published by Adolph Krabbe, Stuttgart 1845; P. 3 f., § 3 to Stw. “The brain as the seat of pathological mental activities” Heading on p. 4 “The mentally ill are brain sick”.
  12. Erwin H. Ackerknecht : Brief history of psychiatry . 3rd edition, Enke, Stuttgart 1985, ISBN 3-432-80043-6 ; P. 64 on the “Griesinger Paradigm of Psychiatry”.
  13. ^ Sigmund Freud : Collected works. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt / M 1999, ISBN 3-596-50300-0 (cassette): (1) Vol. I, “Studies on hysteria - early writings on the theory of neuroses” pp. 74, 337 on tax. “Excitation sum”; (2) Vol. II / III "The Interpretation of Dreams - About the Dream" p. 544 to Stw.

  14. a b c d e Hannah Arendt : From the life of the spirit . Vol. I. Thinking [1971] R. Piper & Co., Munich 1979, ISBN 3-492-02486-6 : (a) p. 36 chap. 3, Para. 2 on Stw. "Belief in progress"; (b) p. 36 chap. 3, Para. 1 to Stw. "Disappointment"; (c) pp. 33–36 on “metaphysical hierarchy”; (d) p. 36 ff. on tax “Surface value”; (e) p. 37 to district “Diversity of animal and plant life”.




  15. ^ Hermann Krings et al. (Ed.): Handbook of basic philosophical concepts . A self-presentation of contemporary philosophy in 150 key words. Kösel, Munich 1973, ISBN 3-466-40055-4 ; P. 403 on tax. "Universals" (Lemma "Recognize").
  16. ^ Maurice Merleau-Ponty : Le visible et l'invisible . Ed .: Claude Lefort, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, pp. 34, 63 f.
  17. Adolf Portmann : The animal as a social being . German Übers., Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1953; engl. Original text pp. 64, 127.
  18. ^ Adolf Portmann: Animal Forms and Patterns , New York, 1967, p. 19.
  19. ^ John B. Watson : Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist . Routledge, London 1980, ISBN 0-904014-44-4 (reprint of the Philadelphia edition, 1919); Preface.
  20. ^ Hannah Arendt : Walter Benjamin - Bertolt Brecht . Two essays. Series Piper 12, Munich 1971; P. 91 to the district “wonderful weightlessness”.
  21. Hannah Arendt : Judging . Texts on Kant's Political Philosophy. New edition of the German translation, R. Piper, Munich 1985, ISBN 3-492-02824-1 , engl. Title Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, 1982, ed. with an interpretative essay by Ronald Beiner; P. 23 f. to Stw. "Avoid mutual degradation of man and nature".
  22. Jürgen Habermas : Knowledge and Interest . In: Technology and Science as »Ideology«. 4th edition, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt, Edition 287, 1970 ( 1 1968), [1965 Merkur]; Pp. 151 f., 154 to the tax "objectivist appearance".
  23. ^ Thure von Uexküll : Basic questions of psychosomatic medicine. Rowohlt Taschenbuch, Reinbek near Hamburg 1963; Pp. 86–88 on “Occasional Apparatus”.