Continental block

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The continental bloc was a foreign policy concept of the German Reich during the Second World War . The core idea was the creation of an anti- Great Britain alliance between Germany and the European continental powers and Japan . The driving force behind this planning was Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop .

background

Ribbentrop was already convinced during his work as ambassador in London that Great Britain would fight on the side of Germany's opponents if a European war broke out. From 1938 onwards, Hitler too was confronted with the failure of his conception of England: the desired alliance with the island empire, which was to give Germany a free hand to conquer the Soviet Union , could not be achieved; instead Great Britain declared war on the Reich after the invasion of Poland on September 3, 1939. While Hitler still hoped to come to a peace agreement with the British when the opportunity arose, Ribbentrop developed the vision of a bloc formation of the great powers against Great Britain. In contrast to Hitler's “ living space ” motif, he did not see the Soviet Union as a future enemy, but on the contrary as the central pillar of this “continental bloc”. The expansionist ambitions of these powers were to be directed south to British colonial possessions in Africa and Asia .

First steps: autumn 1939

After the invasion of Poland by Soviet troops on September 17th, explorations began regarding closer cooperation between Germany and its “ steel pact ” partners Italy , the Soviet Union and Japan, with which the “ Anti-Comintern Pact ” had been loosely linked since 1936 . Ribbentrop assumed that this bloc would exert concentrated political and military pressure against the position of Great Britain in the Near and Middle East as well as in East Asia , and he hoped to be able to persuade the British to give up the fight because of this superiority. This plan was seconded by the chief of the Wehrmacht command staff , Alfred Jodl , who viewed the island empire as Germany's main enemy and, in a study from the beginning of 1940, described it as "desirable" to weaken it , "the Russian forces in this direction [meaning Iran ] ... distract " . At that time, however, the realization of such a block was extremely unrealistic:

Attempts to improve relations with Japan or to mediate a compromise between the Soviet Union and Japan got stuck during this phase and were put on hold for the time being. Hitler's plans were directed towards the campaign in the west , which was scheduled for the spring , with which he hoped to defeat France and Great Britain or else to force peace.

After the collapse of France: summer 1940

After the armistice with France on June 22, only Great Britain remained as an opponent of the war, which, contrary to Hitler's wishes, continued to show no ambitions to conclude peace. In this situation, Jodl submitted another memorandum on June 30th, in which he recommended that the British Empire should not be attacked head-on, but on its periphery in order to protect one's own forces. Cooperation with other states that have an interest in the disintegration of the Empire should be sought - in addition to Italy, Japan and the USSR, Spain was now also mentioned , with whose help the British base Gibraltar was to be conquered. The commander of the submarines , Admiral Karl Dönitz , also called for all forces to be concentrated on the fight against Great Britain. Hitler refused because he feared that an expansion of the naval war would provoke the USA to enter the war . In addition, the formation of such a bloc would have resulted in a "wrong" front position from Hitler's point of view, because his foreign policy program envisaged the conquest of the Soviet Union with the help - or at least with tolerance - of Great Britain; the block strategy, on the other hand, meant the opposite case.

As early as June 16, the Spanish dictator Franco had made Spain's entry into the war dependent on far-reaching conditions, ranging from the demand for extensive material support to claims on French colonial property. Agreements were not made, instead preparations were made for the invasion of England .

The last attempt: September to November 1940

After the intensified air war against the British Isles had not led to the hoped-for result, namely German air supremacy , by September and the plan of invasion had to be postponed indefinitely, Hitler was confronted with the double failure of his alliance concept: neither did England give up the fight nor could it be militarily forced to make peace. In this situation Hitler decided to fall back on the idea of ​​the "continental bloc" after all.

The visit of the Spanish Foreign Minister (and Franco's brother-in-law ) Súñer in September 1940 ushered in the series of negotiations. Although no binding agreements have been reached here either, joint action against Gibraltar and the occupation of Morocco by Spain have been discussed. A meeting between Hitler and Franco was scheduled for an early date.

Relations with Japan had relaxed increasingly in the course of 1940; not least because of the German renunciation of the East Asian colonial possessions of the defeated Western European states. When Prince Konoe took over the government in July, the pro-German party finally prevailed and soon worked towards intensifying relations with Germany - but it was only when Hitler had to give up his England alliance that rapprochement took place. September the “ Three Power Pact ” was concluded with Italy . This pact was not directed against the British Empire, but was primarily intended to keep the United States in check.

The talks with Spain and France

The fighting between French and British armed forces on July 3 at Mers-el-Kébir and from September 23 to 25 at Dakar seemed to open up the possibility of including France in the anti-British bloc. In preparation for corresponding agreements, Hitler succeeded in reducing the Italian demands directed at France to Mussolini at the meeting on October 4 at the Brenner Pass . The Vichy regime was offered relief on the peace conditions still to be negotiated. On the way to the planned conference with Franco, Hitler met the French Prime Minister Laval , one of the strongest supporters of the collaboration , in Montoire-sur-le-Loir on October 22nd , and Marshall Pétain on October 24th . Despite the general willingness of Vichy France to cooperate with Germany, there were no binding agreements regarding an anti-British approach, since on the one hand the tightening of the German occupation regime (expulsion of Lorraine , hindered traffic along the demarcation line , etc.) created tensions, on the other hand the French created tensions not a declaration of war on Great Britain, but only ready to defend their colonies.

Between the talks in Montoire, the long-planned meeting between Hitler and Franco took place on October 23 in the French border town of Hendaye in the Pyrenees . Hitler demanded that Spain join both the "Three Power Pact" and the "Steel Pact", the entry into the war at the turn of the year and the provision of bases. In return, he promised the future transfer of French colonial property under certain conditions. Franco did not flatly reject a possible entry into the war, but did not accept any binding commitments.

Instructions nos. 18 and 19

A summary of the results of the conversation was given by Hitler in his "Instruction No. 18" of November 12, 1940. France is described in the directive as a “non-belligerent power” that has to defend its possessions itself and tolerate German military operations on its territory. A medium-term entry into the war on the part of Germany is not ruled out.

The possibility of Spain entering the war soon, however, was judged so optimistically in the directive that concrete preparatory measures for capturing Gibraltar (" Operation Felix "), defending the Canary Islands and repelling Allied landing attempts have already been ordered. The following directives - No. 18a of November 27 and No. 19, which is only available in an undated draft - deal in detail with the Spanish theater of war. It was assumed that only a small number of German forces would be needed to support the Spanish troops. Military control of the access to the Mediterranean at Gibraltar seemed all the more imperative at this point, as the Italian fleet suffered heavy losses from the British air raid on Taranto on the night of November 11th to 12th.

The inclusion of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, in Ribbentrop's original “continental bloc” conception, the most important cornerstone of the anti-British bloc, was in Hitler's programmatic objectives merely the future “living space” of Germany. Accordingly, he saw cooperation with the USSR against England only as a temporary, pragmatically motivated option, which he pursued quite half-heartedly for only a few weeks in the autumn of 1940. Even before Molotov's visit from November 12th, suggested by Ribbentrop , he expressed himself skeptically to Mussolini about the chances of success of this venture. In fact, Stalin's response to the invitation to four-power talks was evasive; Of greater importance for him was a bilateral clarification of the German-Soviet spheres of influence. Recognizing Hitler's predicament, Stalin saw a favorable opportunity to expand his sphere of power and influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe . In this sense, Molotov demanded the recognition of the Soviet claim to Finland and the southern Bukuwina, which belongs to Romania, as well as the approval of the establishment of Soviet military bases at the entrances to the Black Sea . The draft of a four-power pact handed over to Molotov by Ribbentrop on November 13th - the core of the "continental bloc" idea - granted the Soviet Union the Middle East as an "area of ​​influence" - although India was not mentioned - and promised to regulate the use of the Dardanelles by Soviet naval forces . Stalin responded to these proposals on November 25th with an extensive repetition of his claims, supplemented by demands on Japan for the surrender of Sakhalin and the northern Kuril Islands as well as a joint military action against Turkey if it does not agree to the establishment of Soviet bases. These demands were assessed as unacceptable by the Tripartite Pact Powers and accordingly rejected - which ultimately meant the end of the "continental bloc" concept.

Conclusion

The “continental bloc” concept, viewed by Ribbentrop as a real foreign policy option, was never more than a stopgap solution for Hitler. His efforts to come to an agreement with Great Britain always stood in the foreground. The brief phase of foreign policy activity in the autumn of 1940 arose mainly because Germany did not have sufficient funds to defeat England directly, while at the same time the Italians lost control of the Mediterranean. Even if it looked at times as if the block "from Madrid to Tokyo" dreamed up by Ribbentrop was about to be completed, its realization, among other reasons (Spain's military powerlessness, Japan's multi-track policy), mainly due to Hitler's program, was out of the question . As early as November 4th, he spoke again to the Wehrmacht High Command about the imminent "elimination of Russia" , and only one month after Molotov's departure, after Franco had finally refused Spain's entry into the war, the order for the " Barbarossa case " was issued .

literature

  • Hildebrand, Klaus: German Foreign Policy 1933–1945. Calculus or dogma? , 5th edition Stuttgart a. a. 1990, ISBN 3-17-009756-3 .
  • Hillgruber, Andreas: Hitler's Strategy. Politics and Warfare 1940–1941 , 2nd edition Munich 1982, ISBN 3-7637-5249-8 .
  • Hubatsch, Walther: Hitler's instructions for warfare 1939–1945 , Frankfurt a. M. 1962.
  • Michalka, Wolfgang (Ed.): The Second World War. Analyzes, basics, research balance sheet , Munich 1989, ISBN 3-932131-38-X .
  • Ploetz history of the world wars, Freiburg 1980, ISBN 3-89836-236-1 .