Power or powerlessness of subjectivity?

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Power or powerlessness of subjectivity? was an investigation that the philosopher and ethicist Hans Jonas undertook in connection with his work on The Principle of Responsibility - Attempting an Ethics for Technological Civilization . The necessity of this investigation arose for him from the fact that every form of ethics as a guide to correct action is precisely the ability to act - i. H. the possibility of subjective will formation and will- based influence on the physical world - presupposes. The subject of the investigation is the old controversial question of whether and, if so, in what way spirit and matter can interact with one another ( body-soul problem ).

A denial of the possibility of subjectively motivated actions in the realm of the material world, as is regularly put forward from the direction of the natural sciences with reference to the absolute validity of the laws of nature , would, according to Jonas, inevitably lead any ethics to absurdity even in the run-up to their formulation. Logically, it is this denial that Jonas critically examines first for its justification, and then in a second step to question the extent to which it is necessary in order to keep the deterministic postulates of the natural sciences in their validity.

(Unless otherwise stated, information on pages and endnotes is from the Suhrkamp paperback edition of Power or Powerlessness of Subjectivity from 1987. )

The book

starting point

As an introduction to his work, Jonas chooses a letter from Emil Heinrich du Bois-Reymond to Eduard Hallmann from 1842 , in which the following confession can be found:

" Brücke and I have conspired to assert the truth that no other forces are active in the organism than the common physical-chemical ones; that, where these have not yet been sufficient to explain, either by means of the physical-mathematical method one must search for their type of effectiveness in the specific case, or that new forces must be assumed which, of equal dignity with the physico-chemical, inherent in the matter, can always be traced back to only repulsive or attractive components. "

As a result, Jonas criticizes the contradictions of this "conspiracy", which pledges to want to enforce the realization that there can be no such thing as "knowledge" or "obligation". An argument that comes back later in a sharper, because more general form (see below: Critique from the consequences - Reductio ad absurdum ). Jonas sees another, later quotation from du Bois-Reymond, namely his famous “ ignoramus et ignorabimus ” from 1872 , and thus the admission, as the ultimately inevitable end point of any confrontation with the body-soul problem that moves exclusively within the scientific norms of knowledge the “ignorance” of certain questions such as the connection between body and soul (p. 15 and En. 5).

According to Jonas, however, this “ agnosticism ” alone is not enough to counter the statements of the natural sciences , which naturally rule out any possibility of the subjective being effective in the material world , and thus to preserve the basis for something like “philosophy” and “ethics”. As a goal of his investigation, he therefore formulates the clarification of distorting and hindering conceptual confusion in the psycho-physical problem area, in order to then undertake the attempt to think the relationship between the subjectivity capable of action and the validity of natural laws in a compatible manner (p. 17). Since Jonas assumes an exchange of whatever kind between the spiritual and the material world, and ultimately regards this as being based on the essence of spirit and matter, his work could be even stricter (in contrast to the strict dualism of Descartes or those who follow him Occasionalists ) refer to as a “mediating” dualistic approach ( interactionistic dualism ).

The consideration takes place primarily from the point of view of logic and only in a second regard from those of scientific research (see p. 46).

Arguments of Scientific Determinism

Jonas identifies the argument of incompatibility as essential arguments that are fundamentally put forward by the natural sciences against a possible subject dependence of the physical, and to which ultimately any criticism based on special research results (cf., for example, the current criticism from the direction of neurophysiology ) can be traced back and the argument of the subjective as an epiphenomenon of the material world , the latter essentially being a consequence of the former (p. 35).

The incompatibility argument

The incompatibility argument (cf. also incompatibilism ) is based on the nature of the physical, which is axiomatically thought to be entirely subject to the validity of the laws of nature and in particular to the conservation laws (mainly developed by Hermann von Helmholtz ) . There can be no subjectively motivated actions, since such a process would introduce new effective variables into the closed physical system that did not previously appear in the existing sum. The result would be a steady influx of anti- entropic energy - an effect which, as it constantly occurs billions of times, cannot go unnoticed. However, it will overlook the fact that, on the other hand, the influence of the physical on the mind - think of the perception - in turn logically necessary one from river means and thus causes a kind of compensation ( see below. , P.25, En. 7). Instead, the psychic element in action is declared to be the pure "accompanying music" of the physical process, which in turn has no purpose, since the physical exists and progresses entirely by itself - the psyche as a pointless deception of purpose (p. 26) .

Criticism of the incompatibility argument

First of all, it is stated that the laws of nature with their absolute validity in turn represent an idealized fiction that is not verifiable , but falsifiable . So it is always amenable to examination by thinking. The author then explains that the incompatibility argument initially only establishes the incompatibility without resolving it unilaterally in favor of the “norm” (= laws of nature) or the “concept” (= subjectivity with power) that is incompatible with it. If you wanted to decide which of the two sides is to be adapted to the other solely on the basis of the incompatibility, you would also have to ask:

1) Which is more evident : the norm or the term?

and

2) What are the consequences of both of them if their respective opponents were valid?

For question 1) the laws of nature are supported by the fact that they are confirmed anew every day within their system. On the other hand, the direct evidence of human experience speaks in favor of subjectivity, which is fundamentally even more undeniable than the perception of the physical world with its phenomena and laws. Regarding the second question, it is stated that the deterministic rigor of the laws of nature represents an ideal and makes nature as pure as mathematics (p. 29). An undertaking that increases the current level of knowledge about the eternal law and does not allow any anomalies. But while the absolute validity of the laws of nature, as we know them, would completely destroy the psychic in its sense, the acceptance of psychic purposes in the physical process would not have to mean the complete abolition of natural laws in the material world, but only their modification .

The epiphenomenon argument

Starting from the argument of incompatibility and the postulate of the absolute unlimitedness of physical determination, the thesis of subjectivity as a mere epiphenomenon of the physical turns the line of argument around by, starting from the nature of the psychic, denies it any causal force (p. 35).

Priority of matter over spirit

This is justified with the priority of matter over spirit , which the latter can always only be an appendage of the former - there is matter without spirit, but not spirit without matter (p. 35). In addition, matter also determines the work of the spirit - it is therefore conditional in a comprehensive sense. Since the subjective is only an expression of the respective physical state in every respect, it cannot (apart from its lack of influence in the material realm) acquire any self-causation, influence itself and work ahead. The impression of making progress in thinking, for example, would only have the entertainment value of an illusion (pp. 36/37).

In particular, it is this powerlessness of the spirit in the spirit that has recently been increasingly asserted and experimentally substantiated by neurophysiology (see below ).

Occam's law of thrift

The fact that, even according to this view, an open question remains - namely, how this semblance of subjectivity could be formed from physical being - is justified by the epiphenomenalists with the fact that this is at least one less unsolved question than with the counter-view, which adds another question, captured by du Bois-Reymonds "ignoramus et ignorabimus", by claiming that the mind is also conversely able to work back on the material plane. In such a case, Ockham's razor should be preferred to the more economical ones , i.e. H. theory burdened with less open questions (pp. 38/39).

Descartes and the simulability of human life

Descartes' argument , the freedom of the human mind that (unlike the animal) from its lack simulatability infers place at a time when the technical abilities of humans to simulate increasingly complex systems and cognitive continue to develop rapidly models, its refutation. The - currently still rudimentary - simulation of intelligent purpose behavior already contains the evidence ( argumentum a minore ad maius ) that a “mechanical” simulation of the human mind would be possible - if only our skill would allow it. What is simulated in this way could then, however, not be subject to any rules that do not also apply to its simulation (i.e. its factual duplicate) - at least that is what Ockham's law of thrift requires.

Critique of the epiphenomenon argument

Jonas identified mortality (the spirit evaporates while the body is preserved in its elements) and evolution (initially pure material occurrence which later produces the spirit) as the strongest evidence for the epiphenomenon argument .

On the other hand, he brings up the following arguments in particular (pp. 44–46):

  • But the - undeniable - empirical priority of matter does not allow the conclusion that anything that emerges from it is mere appearance, i.e. H. would be a zero .
  • It seems contradictory how something like subjectivity, i.e. something that is only an effect and not a new beginning, can emerge from matter - existing in causal connections .
  • If only matter really exists, then subjectivity must also be able to be explained in a purely material way; consequently, the mechanical simulation of human life would only be a real duplicate if it produced subjectivity in turn.
Immanent criticism

The following inconsistencies are criticized within the theory of materialistic monism :

a) Within the logic of this theory, subjectivity is necessarily a creatio ex nihilo , i.e. H. a creation out of nothing - according to Jonas (p. 47/48) the first ontological riddle with which the theory of epiphenomenalism for the sake of physics, in which nothing should otherwise never arise from nothing, comes to terms .
b) What is created by the physical ex nihilo must necessarily also remain without consequence for the physical course of things that it merely accompanies - according to Jonas (p. 48/49) the second ontological riddle with which the epiphenomenon theory of consciousness saves physics , in which nothing else should remain without consequences, comes to terms .
c) The assumption of “external” powerlessness (ie powerlessness in the “foreign”, physical area) implies at the same time powerlessness inside (ie powerlessness of the spirit also in “own”, subjective area). Otherwise the mind could develop independently of the physical and thus cause contradictions between the subjective and the objective world, so the "camouflage" or the "appearance of power" could be exposed ("I want one thing and my arm does the other" (p . 50)). Thus, the mental life resembles the projection of a film on a screen, in that, like the film, it only fakes the appearance of a process, while this is actually built up from a series of individual images, each of which, for itself and without reference to one another, emerges from the projection source , that is, the physical, to feed. The progression of thinking becomes an empty illusion, caused by the sequence of physical states on the level of being - according to Jonas (p. 53) the existence of such a "delusion in itself" [...] is the absolute metaphysical riddle that the Accepts epiphenomenon thesis for the sake of physics .
By asserting the free emergence of the subjective out of nothing and the absolute lack of consequences of what is created in this way, the thesis of the epiphenomenon thus contradicts the rules of causality and conservation that it intends to protect.
Apart from that, the causal zero effort of becoming and the causal zero value of what has become, as absolute exceptional phenomena in the sense of Ockham's thrift, require proof (pp. 58/59).
d) Finally, the question arises to whom this appearance of being actually appears, even if the “screen” from the cinema example is also mere appearance. In this context, Jonas speaks of the logical riddle of a deception that also fakes the deceived or a dream that first creates its dreamer and is still dreamed by him , and on the other hand cites Descartes' cogito ergo sum , which says that, himself if everything is only appearance, to which it appears cannot itself be a mere appearance, since the alternative would be an infinite regress (p. 56, En. 13). Even if this problem should be due to a semantic nature and insufficient human logic, it is a strong indication against the purely scientific approach, as the thought figure of the epiphenomenon poses unsolvable questions to the mind. Something difficult to understand (= the effectiveness of the subjective in a cosmos determined by natural law) is replaced by something incomprehensible (= the appearance of the self-appearing phenomenon) (p. 57).
Criticism from the consequences - Reductio ad absurdum

Outwardly, the epiphenomenon theory collides with the logical consequences resulting from its own application ( reductio ad absurdum ). Whereby it is not so much the absurdity of a deceitful being (p. 60 ff.) That stands in the way of its validity - after all, nothing prevents the universe from being absurd - but the fact that it becomes itself by thinking degraded to an epiphenomenon when the theory destroying theory itself pronounces the death sentence (pp. 62/63).

Positive criticism - attempt to solve the psychophysical problem

In the second part of his investigation, Jonas tries to use models to demonstrate that the validity of the laws of nature and an effective subjectivity can definitely be thought of together - that is, the suicide of reason , as epiphenomenalism means, would not have been necessary (p. 67 ). The point is not to find the solution to the psycho-physical problem, but to conceive a speculative model as it could theoretically be.

The trigger principle

In order to make it clear that the impairment to be expected from the admission of psychological causes in the physical area can theoretically be so minimal that there is enough room for natural law determinism to persist, Jonas describes two thought experiments on the trigger principle in which infinitesimal effects can have macroscopic consequences.

First thought experiment
First thought experiment: the cone

A perfect geometric cone , standing on its tip, is in an absolutely unstable equilibrium . The smallest external influence will overturn him. But as long as it still stands, the question is open (= indeterminate) which of the potentially absolutely equivalent, infinite number of triggers x, x ′, x ″ etc. actually unfolds and - within the framework of natural law determinisms - the original ones State of the cone changed from a 0 to a 1 , a 1 ′, a 1 ″, etc. The occurrence between t 0 and t 1 is in itself subject - after a trigger has been realized - again entirely to the natural law determinisms.

Second thought experiment: efferent neural pathways
Second thought experiment

Given is the control center of an efferent nerve pathway with the trigger points A, B, C ... Depending on which trigger point is activated, the control center sends the command a, b, c ... to the motility , which then takes action α, β, γ ... executes. As with the cone, it will not be possible afterwards to determine why exactly this trigger point was activated, although the process itself took place completely within the natural law determinisms.

Modeling

Jonas now suggests accepting the subjective as the trigger. However, since the trigger according to quantum physics is given a minimum size based on natural laws, the problem of adding anti-entropic energy to the system would remain (p. 76). However, this is countered by the fact that at the same time there is a constant outflow from the material in the direction of the psychic, since the physical world acts on the spirit on a sensual level. Jonas calls this the passive-active dual character of the psychic . Even if, due to their vanishingly small size, neither of the two energy transactions can be detected, it remains within the range of the theoretically possible that there is a functioning equilibrium between incoming and outgoing energy in this way.

Jonas' deliberately simplified model, based on the concept of osmosis , looks something like this:

model

A porous wall separates the spirit world from the material world. The open points mark the position of potential triggers at time t 0 , while the filled in points mark the existing triggers at time t 1 . In each case there are 4 potential triggers in the physical system, but nevertheless an exchange between psyche and physis has taken place, whereby the individual crossing of the border means a radical transformation, since in the psychic area every relationship of equivalence, even the SENSE of quantitative assignment as such, ceases to exist ( P. 78). The process that takes place in the psyche is subject solely to its own laws of intentionality (p. 79). Jonas assumes the brain is the most likely place for the “wall” (or more generally: the passage from one sphere to another).

Descartes, whose concept of dualism forms the actual starting point for the mind-body problem and the subsequent division of philosophical thought into the directions of thought of idealism , materialism and a strict dualism, had already tried with his thesis of the pineal gland as an organic place psychophysical interaction, to take into account the empirical impression of a mutual influence of the two spheres - but obviously without lasting success, which is why the Cartesian dualism has to be described as "unsolved".

Jonas' model also explicitly does not claim to be "truthful". The decisive factor is his "logical" success of a speculative model-like reconciliation of idealism with materialism. The actual reasoning behind this “model building attempt” is roughly as follows: “Regardless of how, when and where the exchange takes place: Just because we don't have the means to verify the interaction between spirit and matter doesn't mean that that there is no such thing; rather, the purely materialistic alternative leads to illogical results. "

One approach, which, however, automatically with the epistemological model of Karl Popper collides consequently statements that may indeed be potentially verified whose falsification is excluded, in scientific [sic] respects are less significant than those that are exclusively falsifiable.

Quantum physical considerations

In an addendum, Jonas outlines the results of a dialogue he had with Professor Kurt Friedrichs from the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences at New York University on quantum physics questions in connection with his approach:

  • The "incompatibility argument" applies unreservedly in the context of classical, mechanistic physics. The causality requirements are inevitable, no matter how small the effect in question is assumed. In this respect, the proposed model, being inspired by classical mechanics, is not tenable. The solution can only be found in quantum mechanics, and there in an exchange that is different in kind from that between purely physical entities .
  • The quantum physical complementarity is not suitable for the underlying concept of the psycho-physical interaction, since the double characteristic established in it (for example that of electrons as particles and waves ) is strictly distinct, while body and soul are extremely related and interact.
a) The mind should have found a way to use quantum mechanical randomness for its free, i.e. H. to make orderly activity usable (skeptical about this Daniel Dennett in his book Elbow Room ),
b) The brain would have to be an organ in which quantum effects occur, and
c) These quantum mechanical phenomena would have to experience such an amplification in the brain that they - as an exception - affect the macrophysical level. To this end, Jonas reverts to the trigger principle described above , for which he gives two further examples with Schrödinger's cat and the Geiger counter . The indeterminacy in quantum mechanics says: 2/3 of the cat lives and 1/3 of it is dead (after 1 hour). So the individual cat is not guaranteed to be dead (probability = 100%) after exactly 40 minutes; Quantum mechanics does not provide this deterministic statement - in contrast to classical physics. So the future is "open" in the sense that it is not clearly determined. Several possibilities are conceivable, i. In other words, freedom that humans perceive as subjectivity (intentions, inclinations, interests (p. 79)) is possible (made possible by quantum mechanics) - in the macroscopic area in which the (human) spirit works.

A side effect of this quantum-physical approach is that the above -mentioned full simulation or duplication of human existence is possibly completely excluded due to the uncertainty relation, regardless of the level of technical skills.

Critical appraisal

Although Jonas always makes it clear that he does not intend to solve the body-soul problem with this book, but only to refute those materialistic-scientific theories that deny subjectivity any power in the material domain, his approach is nevertheless an eloquent sign that that despite the prevailing materialistic monism, dualistic theories are still conceivable and also represented (cf. also Karl Popper and John Carew Eccles in their joint book Das Ich und seine Kirchen ).

The speculative switch to quantum physical effects is almost as old as the uncertainty relation itself (cf. for example the dialogue between Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung regarding the mind-body problem!). Quantum physical considerations can be found in connection with the question of the origin of the mind and the like. a. also with Roger Penrose and John R. Searle (whose argumentation in Chapter 8 of Mind: A Brief Introduction from 2004 shows clear parallels to Jonas when it comes to the question of freedom of the will from physical determination - despite fundamental rejection of dualism).

However, the narrow aim of the book also means that there is no discussion of current theories on the philosophy of mind . Essentially, it turns against epiphenomenalism and against a scientific-deterministic materialism. The eliminative materialism of Patricia and Paul Churchland , however, remains unconsidered despite his subject denial, which is probably due to Jonas' death in 1993 .

The current discussion

The current discussion on free will - initiated u. a. by statements by Gerhard Roth , Wolf Singer and Wolfgang Prinz - is essentially based on findings from neurophysiological research, according to which physical stimuli (especially in the area of ​​the cerebral cortex ) can not only trigger reflex physical movements, but also give the test subjects the feeling to undertake or have undertaken this movement out of one's own drive and will (cf. in particular the neurophysiological experiments by Alvaro Pascual-Leone ).

However, this research basically describes only an extreme form of a known phenomenon, namely that the material world can influence the psyche - this does not say anything about the possibility of influencing in the opposite direction, i.e. H. as long as not every voluntary lifting z. If, for example, the right arm can be traced back to an artificial stimulation of the corresponding brain area that cannot be attributed to the subjective - be it by an experimenter or some other physical-causal process - there is enough space for the work of the spirit in Jonas' sense.

Another study carried out by Benjamin Libet shows that, in the case of arbitrary actions, the moment of conscious decision-making about the execution of the action is preceded by a corresponding readiness potential in the brain. However, it is controversial to what extent Libet's experimental setup allows any conclusions to be drawn about the freedom or determination of volitional decisions.

Ernst Tugendhat's reaction to the above is an interesting comparison to Jonas' approach . neurophysiological research and the exclusive explanatory competence of natural science derived from it with regard to the possibility of free will in humans, in which Tugendhat represents a compatibilist approach, which, however, is less about a conclusive explanation for the compatibilist interaction of determination and free will in the exercise of the will- (im The opposite of freedom of action is fixed, rather than the weakness of incompatibilities, which cannot ultimately exclude this interaction.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Ernst Tugendhat: Freedom and Determinism . audiothek.philo.at. Accessed August 31, 2019.