Ministry of State Security (China)

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China People's RepublicPeople's Republic of China Ministry of State Security
中華人民共和國 國家 安全 部 / 中华人民共和国 国家 安全 部
Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China.svg
legal form People's Republic of China
Supervisory authority (s) State Council of the People's Republic of China
Headquarters Beijing
Minister for State Security Chen Wenqing
Employee unknown

The Ministry of State Security ( Chinese  中華人民共和國 國家 安全 部  /  中华人民共和国 国家 安全 部 , Pinyin Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guójiā Ānquánbù  - "Ministry of the People's Republic of China for State Security") is responsible for security matters in the People's Republic of China . In Europe , the name of the ministry is mostly mentioned in connection with the topics of network censorship and human rights .

The Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China has an intelligence department . It is also known as the secret police because of its role as a domestic intelligence service and in monitoring dissidents . According to the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure, it has the same rights as the police when national security is at risk. The minister is Chen Wenqing .

assignment

According to Liu Fuzhi , former General Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Minister of Security, the Ministry of State Security's job is to “ensure the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents , spies and counter-revolutionary activities that are being done to sabotage or defeat China's socialist system ”. Without a doubt, one of the main tasks of the ministry is to collect foreign news from destinations in numerous countries. It is said that many agents operate in Hong Kong , Macau and Taiwan , as well as others have integrated themselves into the numerous Chinese communities overseas . At one point, nearly 120 agents who were unofficially employed in the United States , Canada , Western and Northern Europe, and Japan as businessmen , bankers , scholars, and journalists were recalled to China.

organization

offices

  • First office: Domestic Department
  • Second office: main foreign department
  • Third office: Hong Kong Main Department , Macau , Taiwan
  • Fourth office: technology
  • Fifth office: international information
  • Sixth office: counterintelligence
  • Seventh office: circulation
  • Eighth office: research
  • Ninth office: overflow and surveillance defense
  • Tenth Office: Scientific and Technological Information
  • Training office
  • Monitoring and Evaluation Section ( 監察 與 審計 科  /  监察 与 审计 科 , jiānchà yǔ shěnjì kē )

Other offices

  • General office ( 辦公廳  /  办公厅 , bàngōng tīng )
  • Political Department ( 政治部 , zhèngzhì bù )
  • Party Commission ( 黨委  /  党委 , dǎngwěi )

guide

The service has been headed since 1983 by the following ministers who report directly to the State Council :

reception

Activities from or in Germany (espionage)

According to the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Baden-Württemberg (LfV) from 2018, the Chinese intelligence service (CND) raises awareness and warns against massive attempts at initiation in social networks . The CND tries to skim off information through the virtual space, also to acquire intelligence sources. In the counter-espionage of the Federal and State Office for the Protection of the Constitution , as well as in other Western partner services, there were frequent references to numerous attempts to be recruited by the Chinese Intelligence Service (CND). For these activities, the CND set up fake profiles, for example on LinkedIn and Facebook , and disguised themselves as members of direct search agencies, consulting firms , think tanks or as scientists . The CND focused on people who had something to do with China, especially if they (had) stayed in China or were able to speak Chinese. Often they were “employees of German and European authorities, diplomats, Bundeswehr officers, scientists, employees of the central banks, independent political advisors with access to ministries and authorities, as well as students and employees of German foundations”. The disguised CND employee demanded a “curriculum vitae and the creation of a report or an irrelevant analysis” from target persons after initial contact and paid for it. In the second step, the CND recruiter deceived "an allegedly important customer in China ... is interested in the field of work or the activity of the victim". Thus, the target person is invited and reimbursed to enter China, the alleged customer will never appear. The "target person [in China] is asked to pass on sensitive internal information from their work area for a fee". If successful, personal communication is shifted to WhatsApp and Skype , for example .

According to the presentation by the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Hesse, describes the "working method of the Chinese intelligence service", and Chinese consulates and media agencies offer "... in Germany ... good opportunities for the covert deployment of intelligence personnel". Significant contacts are established with "... people in associations, scientific institutes, companies and other institutions". Relationships with these people are "... often maintained over years ..." and "are strengthened through repeated invitations and favors", resulting in "a network for information gathering based on amicable relationships". Furthermore, “… working or temporarily staying Chinese scientists, postgraduate students and other knowledge carriers ” are requested to serve as espionage assistants in Germany in order to “pass on knowledge for the benefit of the homeland, even illegally”.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Supreme Court of the People's Republic of China, accessed April 8, 2019 .
  2. ↑ Geng Huichang. (English) August 31, 2007, accessed April 16, 2009 .
  3. ↑ Geng Huichang 耿惠昌. Retrieved April 8, 2019 .
  4. ↑ Chen Wenqing 陈文清. Retrieved April 8, 2019 .
  5. ↑ Initiation attempts by Chinese intelligence services in social networks. Counter-espionage / Material security, 2/2018. In: www.verfassungsschutz-bw.de. State Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Baden-Württemberg , 2018, accessed on August 2, 2020 .
  6. ^ Counter- espionage - The intelligence services of the People's Republic of China. How the Chinese Intelligence Service works. In: lfv.hessen.de. State Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Hesse , accessed on August 2, 2020 .