Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine ( English Monroe Doctrine ) goes back to the State of the Union address of December 2, 1823, in which US President James Monroe drafted the basic lines of a long-term foreign policy for the United States before Congress . In the tradition of Jefferson , he established an irreversible independence of the states on the American double continent from the European powers. H. from the old world .

Monroe formulated the existence of two political spheres (two spheres) . He stressed the principle of non-intervention by the United States in European conflicts and called for an end to all attempts at colonization in the western hemisphere (non-colonization) . He also announced that the US would intervene in the event that the European colonial powers should ignore these political principles. The demand on the European powers not to recolonize the now independent states of Latin America was shortened to the slogan “America for the Americans” .

With his doctrine, Monroe decisively shaped the Anglo-American variant of Pan-Americanism . In 1848 under President Polk and in 1870 under President Grant , the doctrine was expanded to include the prohibition of the transfer of (including earlier) colonial property to other powers (non-transfer) , which Secretary of State John Quincy Adams wrote in a message to the then Russian Tsar ( Alexander I ) was already taken up in 1823, but Monroe did not include it in the report to the Congress.

The world political situation around 1823

In order to understand the original meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, one must consider the political situation at the time of its creation. After years of conflict, Monroe's presidency (1817-1825) went down in history as the "Era of Good Feeling"; it spanned a period in which the United States stabilized domestically and experienced a significant economic boom. Just a few years earlier, the United States had almost doubled its territory with the acquisition of the former French colonies in Louisiana (1803) and the Spanish possessions in Florida (1819), with Monroe playing a major role as negotiator in Paris in the first case . On the other hand, the USA had also waged an unsuccessful war against Great Britain (1812 to 1814), in the course of which the attempted conquest of Canada failed and Washington was burned down. The republican United States was also under great pressure, especially in terms of foreign policy : the absolutist European powers had restored their power after the unrest of the previous decades . With the re-establishment of a French king and the action of the “ Holy Alliance ” (consisting of Russia , Austria and Prussia ) against republican and liberal ideas and institutions, the republican movement seemed to be on the decline worldwide.

In contrast, there seemed to be incidents in Spain , where King Ferdinand VII had been arrested by revolutionaries and a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed. The joy of republican-minded contemporaries lasted only a short time, however, because the "Holy Alliance" reacted instantly to the revolutionary efforts and Tsar Alexander I threatened his allies with Russian troops marching into Spain if no other solution was found. The other members of the "Holy Alliance", not very enthusiastic about the idea of foreign troop contingents on their territories, then put pressure on monarchical France to send military to Spain to crush the revolution. Despite considerable reservations from the French king and his war minister , who still had the failure of Napoleon on the Iberian peninsula in mind and feared the financial burden of a military conflict, France gave in to pressure from its allies and marched into Spain (financially supported by the Alliance) .

Contrary to expectations, the poorly organized French troops succeeded in suppressing the revolution and liberating King Ferdinand in a relatively short time. Weakened by insufficient support in the population, which was sworn to the monarchy by the Spanish clergy , the last bastion of the rebels in Cadiz fell after a short siege. The intervention of France resulted in a complete victory for the monarchist forces.

Great Britain, which had spoken out against an invasion of France by Spain, feared an expansion of military operations to the former Spanish colonies in South America , given the success of the alliance . Although it did not officially recognize the independence of the South American states, it had economic interests and prosperous trade relations, which it saw endangered by intervention by Spain and the "Holy Alliance".

A second conflict on the European continent came with the Greek struggle for independence against the rule of the Ottoman Empire . After the Turkish troops had recaptured a large part of the rebellious territories from 1821 to 1822, the Greeks succeeded in pushing back the sultan's troops in partisan and field combat and further expanding their own government structures from autumn 1822. As early as 1821 they had asked the European powers and the United States to formally recognize their government, and although they had not complied with the request, the Greek struggle for independence was enthusiastically received by the population and especially in republican and democratic circles. In the USA, too, the pressure on the government to support or at least recognize the new Greek government grew.

In this situation, during talks between the British Foreign Secretary George Canning and the American envoy in London , Richard Rush , Great Britain offered the United States an alliance in August and September 1823 in which the two states shared a benevolent position on the independence of the South American republics formulate and oppose an intervention by the European powers (beyond that of Spain itself). Canning responded not least to rumors of plans for a conference of the European continental powers to proceed against the former Spanish colonies in South America and to reports about a French fleet that is just waiting to ship Spanish troops to recapture the colonies.

In addition to Spain's policy in South America, from the US point of view, Russia's actions in the north-west of the American continent required a reaction. It is true that Tsar Alexander was apparently ready to withdraw plans announced in 1821, according to which only Russian ships would be allowed to sail the North Pacific for trade purposes, the Russian-American Society , which the Tsar had a monopoly on the settlement and trade in products from all areas north of the 51st . Latitude , but continued to advance southeast and established trading posts and settlements in parts of what is now Alaska and Canada . While the United States alone did not seem strong enough to effectively put a stop to Russian expansion, cooperation with Great Britain also promised the possibility of representing US interests more successfully.

Rush, who was both flattered and positively surprised by Canning's offer, did not want to make such a far-reaching decision without the backing of his government and agreed to a corresponding declaration in the event that Great Britain recognized the young South American republics, knowing that Canning would reject this proposal. The British proposal was therefore sent to Washington and discussed by Monroe's cabinet , which also asked his predecessors Madison and Jefferson for their opinion on Britain's plans.

The emergence of the Monroe Doctrine

Canning's proposals for a joint statement included five key points:

The assumption that a reconquest of the former colonies in South America by Spain is hopeless.
The statement that recognition of the South American republics is a matter of time and circumstances.
The promise not to oppose an amicable solution between the former colonies and their mother country.
The assurance that one does not claim any territory from the earlier colonies.
The warning that one cannot be indifferent to a transfer of territorial property to other powers.

While the United States could easily agree to most of these points and had already formulated some aspects of the Declaration as policy guidelines (such as the "non-transfer" principle in 1811), Adam's concern was about the waiver of the acquisition of previous colonial possessions and the Secretary of the Navy Southards . Adams in particular spoke out in favor of a separate declaration to the “Holy Alliance” and said that this would be better for the recognition of the US American positions than simply appearing like “a dinghy in tow of the British Man-O-Wars”. However, none of those involved questioned that the United States had to react at all. The risk of a Franco-Spanish expedition to South America seemed tangible after the fall of the last rebel stronghold in mainland Spain, the Russian approach in the Pacific had preoccupied Washington for some time, and the revolution in Greece was also reflected in the political discussion. Five aspects played a prominent role in the development of the doctrine:

1. Economic reasons: Whether the recognition of the South American republics by Monroe was primarily economically motivated and characterized by the hope of building good trade relations with the young states remains a matter of dispute to this day. According to Dexter Perkins, this may have played a role in part, but at the same time trade with the Spanish colonies before their struggle for independence made up less than two percent of all trade in the USA, while that with Cuba and the Spanish mainland was significantly more important. Adams himself expressed in 1817 that he had little hope that recognition of the new states would have a positive effect on trade with South America.

By 1823, however, this assessment had fundamentally changed according to William Appleman Williams. In a letter to the ambassadors in Colombia and La Plata that year, Adams had expressly emphasized the necessity of free trade for the region and stated that in just a few years the USA would assume a dominant role in the economy of Latin America. Economic considerations also played an important role for the Monroe cabinet with a view to the north-western regions of America. With the expansion of the United States, business people hoped for new sources of raw materials and production sites (especially for skins and fishing) as well as control of trade with the Asian states and the South Seas. It was therefore particularly important here to counteract the engagement of Russia and Great Britain as well as an expansion of the territorial claims of Spain.

2. Ideological reasons: Contrary to what is often stated, John Quincy Adams was not the sole driving force behind the idea of recognizing the South American republics. Months before Adam's entry into the cabinet, President Monroe had spoken out in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with the young states and had even considered sending armed units to the coasts of South America to protect US trade in the region on the one hand and to Patriots ”of the region. At the same time, Monroe was firmly convinced that the United States had an exceptional position in the world and should publicize its ideology and political system. South America seemed to him a suitable terrain for this. In addition, he hoped that the expansion of the republican form of government would strengthen the USA in international politics. Although not inspired by the same sense of mission, Adams also saw the ideological principles of supporting South America as very important. He was also a staunch Republican and hoped for an increasing spread of republican ideas and republican constitutions, but was, in contrast to his cabinet colleague and rival in the fight for the Calhoun presidency , more cautious in dealing with the European powers. On the one hand, this could be explained by the fact that, as Secretary of State, he bore full responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States and, on the other hand, that, as a moderate candidate, he had to take a more responsible course than the more populist Calhoun.

3. External security

4. Territorial expansion: Closely linked to external security were the considerations of the US government on territorial expansion, which had more than doubled the size of the young state in the past few decades. Adams feared that the joint declaration with Great Britain would considerably limit the US's scope for action in acquiring new territories, but also in the voluntary accession of other territories. With a view to Cuba , Texas , New Mexico and the ever advancing “Western Frontier” it seemed to him unwise to enter into a corresponding obligation, especially since he saw no immediate benefit in the alliance with Great Britain (“England will also alone prevent an invasion of South America knowledge."). He was supported in the cabinet by Secretary of the Navy Southard and members of the Senate, who saw the danger of secession of individual states decrease in the event of an expansion of the USA and expected economic advantages for all states.

5. Domestic political processes / personal interests: One aspect in the emergence of the Monroe Doctrine that Ernest May has emphasized is the domestic political situation in the United States and the impending presidential election. After his second term, Monroe could not run again and the preparations for the election campaign were in full swing in 1823. After the fall of the Federalists , there was no doubt that Monroe's successor would also be a Republican . Unlike today, however, the party has not yet made a binding commitment to a single candidate. In fact, the election of 1825 was to be something special, because five candidates ran against each other, three of whom had sat in Monroe's cabinet ( Adams , Crawford and Calhoun ). The dispute between these candidates played a significant role in the development of the doctrine, which was significantly influenced and in part even formulated by Adams.

John Quincy Adams, in particular, whose father was president but also a prominent federalist, had to make a name for himself in the election campaign and counter accusations that as “ governor of England” he was unable to successfully represent the interests of the United States. At the same time, by advocating an alliance with Great Britain, Calhoun, Adam's great rival in the cabinet, tried to create a situation in which Adams, as foreign minister, had to appear responsible for the extremely unpopular cooperation with the British and thus lose supporters for the election. Adam's role as the favorite for the elections also explains why his positions prevailed against the majority vote of his rivals and even against the advice of the two previous Presidents Jefferson and Madison: Monroe wanted his term to end successfully and shied away from the conflict with his likely one Successor.

Ultimately, Monroe's decision was also influenced by Greece's struggle for independence. In the US population and in Congress since 1821 there were increasing demands to recognize and support the new Greek government. In this case, Monroe and representatives of his cabinet feared they would be drawn into a conflict with European powers. On the basis of these considerations, Monroe was finally convinced of the sense of his own declaration, which he formulated in consultation with Adams and published in his annual report to Congress.

Further development of the Monroe Doctrine

Gaddis Smith stated on the development of the Monroe Doctrine since 1823: “The Monroe Doctrine, like the word of God, meant many things to different people at different times” (“The Monroe Doctrine, like the Word of God, meant different people for different people Times many things ”). In the more than 180 years of its existence, it changed from a primarily defensive and isolationist strategy, which was primarily aimed at warding off European interference, first to legitimize US expansions and invasions in Central and South America, then to an instrument in the struggle against the National Socialist regime and its allies in the western hemisphere and finally even to a global anti-communist strategy in the Cold War .

1st phase (1845–1895)

For more than twenty years, Monroe's message of 1823 received little attention. The impact of the doctrine was initially very weak because the US did not have the military potential to enforce it. The independence struggle of the former Spanish colonies proved successful in all of South and Central America, and Washington's fears of a Franco-Spanish expedition were unfounded. Relations with Russia , which agreed to a settlement border at the 55th parallel, relaxed and the question of Greece's independence was finally answered in the London Protocol in 1830 . It was not until 1845 that President Polk took up Monroe's declaration again and protested against interference by European powers in Texas and California , formerly Mexican areas that had broken free from Mexico under the leadership of North American settlers . Texas was incorporated into the United States in 1845. The US military hegemony manifested itself with its victory over Mexico in 1848 as a result of the Mexican-American War ; They only gained economic influence after the civil war . At the enthronement of Emperor Maximilian I in Mexico in 1864, which was part of the Mexican undertaking of Napoléon III. took place (1861-1867) and which should also promote the spread and enforcement of the monarchical principle on the American continent against the republican idea, the United States was initially unable to enforce its principles because of the civil war. Immediately after the end of the Civil War in 1865, however, they resumed the fight against European influences, successfully demanded the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico and thus achieved the disempowerment of Maximilian, who was executed in Mexico in 1867.

2nd phase (1895–1929)

The next significant development of the doctrine can be seen in 1895. At the time, Venezuela and Great Britain were fighting over the borders of the colony of British Guiana . The United States forced Great Britain to refer to the negotiating table that the United States was the hegemon of the continent and would not accept interference in its area of interest. In 1904, this informal principle of the Monroe Doctrine became a political fact: a message from President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress, baptized Roosevelt-Corollary, stipulated a sole right for the United States to intervene in domestic affairs. This should include both conflicts between and within the states of South or Central America and the Caribbean, as well as conflicts between these states and non-American actors (e.g. debtors of other nations), through which the stability of the entire region and the "interests of the American states" could be endangered. While this declaration was received largely positively in Europe, as it promised investors increased security when granting loans in South America, it aroused outrage, anger and fear in the countries affected. In contrast to the Dominican Republic, where four European states still intervened with warships in 1905, this only happened afterwards through the USA.

Another amendment came into effect in 1912. With the Lodge Corollary , the US Senate prohibited any land sales in the western hemisphere to non-American states or companies that could allow these states to exert influence in the western hemisphere and thus pose a threat to the interests of the United States. If the United States had so far been looking to the east on questions of non-intervention, this time the declaration was directed against land purchases by Japanese companies, whose motherland had demonstrated its increased military potential in previous years through victories in wars against China and Russia.

The USA also helped the Monroe Doctrine to be accepted at the international level. While entry into the First World War under President Wilson still a clean break represented with the principle of non-intervention, the war became apparent after the end, that the vast majority of the US Congress and the people of the United States, the policy of isolation wanted to continue. This was also evident in the refusal to join the League of Nations , although when it was founded, the critics in the USA were accommodated with Article 21 of the League of Nations statutes, which stated: "International agreements such as arbitration treaties and agreements on certain areas, such as the Monroe Islands. Doctrines that ensure the maintenance of peace are not considered to be inconsistent with any provision of the current statute. ”Wilson also failed in an attempt to transform the doctrine into a kind of“ multilateral Pan-American treaty ”under which all member states enjoy sovereignty and territorial integrity guarantee their neighbors and resolve conflicts peacefully and on an equal footing. The doctrine was thus reinterpreted after the First World War from an originally defensive orientation in the sense of an international police function for the interests of the United States. As part of international law, the Monroe Doctrine remained controversial.

3rd phase (1929–1950)

During Herbert Hoover's presidency (1929–1933), relations with South and Central America improved significantly and the last US forces were recalled from Nicaragua and Haiti. After the Clark Memorandum of December 1928 had already denied the United States' right to intervene in other American states, Hoover's successor Franklin D. Roosevelt finally revoked his namesake's corollary in order to open up other ways of internal American cooperation within the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy of his immediate predecessor (but also of control) to tread.

Up until this point in time, the Monroe Doctrine had been organized strictly unilaterally, that is, US troops only intervened when the US saw an occasion to do so. With the rise of European fascism , Washington tried to involve the Latin American governments and find common positions with them. After the American republics had already emphasized their neutrality during the war in October 1939 and had defined a security zone several hundred miles wide in which no enemy naval movements were to be allowed, the Havana Act was an almost forgotten aspect of the Monroe Doctrine . In it, America’s states jointly formulated that they would not tolerate a transfer of colonial property in the western hemisphere, which had become conceivable through the conquests of National Socialist Germany, and that they would occupy the corresponding areas in advance. With the exception of Argentina , after the USA entered the war, all Latin American states joined the alliance against the Axis powers (Argentina only followed shortly before the end of the war).

4th phase (1950 to approx. 1986)

The Monroe Doctrine was supplemented and covered up in March 1947 with a declaration by President Truman , in which he formulated a new foreign policy principle of wanting to provide assistance to “all peoples whose freedom is threatened by militant minorities or by external pressure”. With this, the USA finally broke away from a policy that was isolationist on paper and limited to the western hemisphere, but which had already become largely obsolete due to the earlier entry into the two world wars and the new global political situation. The so-called Truman Doctrine now claimed to be able to take action anytime and anywhere where the rights of free peoples would be violated by direct threats and military coercion or by covert actions and subversive action. The doctrine formed the principle of the US containment policy towards the USSR . It was used repeatedly during the Cold War .

The announcement to defend the rights of free peoples was not based on international law. In the 1950s, the chairman of the State Department's planning committee, George F. Kennan, stated that the Latin American states were not themselves able to withstand a threat from communist forces. The USA would therefore have to intervene directly in the domestic politics of the individual states in order to support anti-communist groups and parties "without placing excessive emphasis on the type of regime it supports". With the strategy known as Kennan Corollary (1950), the United States laid the foundations for a commitment that would lead to a long series of direct or indirect interventions in the development of Latin American states over the next forty years , many of which were based on the establishment and Promoting military dictatorships, all the way up to supporting fascist regimes.

Truman's New Doctrine and Kennan's Corollary were the last major additions to the Monroe Doctrine as applied from the early 1950s to the end of the Cold War. Gaddis Smith, like other authors, see the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent elimination of the only serious threat to the United States as the end of the Monroe Doctrine. The dangers that had steadily nourished the Monroe Doctrine and its supplements did not go away overnight, but they did dissolve more and more. In the new, unipolar (or, depending on the observer, multipolar) world order, the procedure of the past decades with its military and subversive components was no longer permissible. This can be traced back to the example of Chile : The United States first criticized a non-communist regime in South America in the United Nations in 1986 . Something similar happened with Nicaragua and El Salvador , for which even a UN observer force was deployed, a process which a few years earlier would have been unthinkable and which would have been blocked by the United States under the denunciation of interference in the interests of the United States. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President Kennedy made particular reference to the Monroe Doctrine when he forced the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba. Conversely, Britain's recapture of the Falkland Islands in the 1982 war was formally a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but was benevolently tolerated by the Reagan administration at the time .

literature

William P. Cresson: The holy alliance. The European background of the Monroes doctrine , Oxford University Press, New York 1922 (also dissertation New York).
Thomas Fischer: The sovereignty of the weak. Latin America and the League of Nations, 1920–1936 (= Contributions to European Overseas History, Vol. 98). Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2012, ISBN 978-3-515-10077-9 .
Gary Hart : James Monroe (= The American Presidents Series. Ed. By Arthur M. Schlesinger , Sean Wilentz . The 5th President). Times Books, New York City 2005, ISBN 0-8050-6960-7 , pp. 99-131.
Ernest R. May: The making of the Monroe doctrine. University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1992, ISBN 0-674-54340-8 .
Heiko Meiertöns: The Doctrines of American Security Policy. Evaluation of international law and its influence on international law. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2006, ISBN 3-8329-1904-X (also dissertation at the University of Munich 2005).
Gretchen Murphy: Hemispheric imaginings. The Monroe Doctrine and narratives of US empire , University Press, Durham 2005, ISBN 0-8223-3496-8 .
Hanns-Frank Seller: The USA's way into world politics. American foreign and security policy in its basic lines . Herbert Utz Verlag, Munich 2007, ISBN 3-8316-0690-0 .
Gaddis Smith: The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine. 1945–1993 , Hill & Wang, New York 1994, ISBN 0-8090-6475-8 .

Individual evidence

↑ Gary Hart : James Monroe (= The American Presidents Series. Ed. By Arthur M. Schlesinger , Sean Wilentz . The 5th President). Times Books, New York City 2005, ISBN 0-8050-6960-7 , pp. 99-102.
↑ Gaddis Smith: The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. New York, 1995: Hill & Wang. P. 201. ISBN 978-0-8090-1568-9 .
^ ^A ^b Friedrich von Krosigk: Inter-American relations under the sign of turbulent interdependence. In: From politics and contemporary history , B 28/92, pp. 23–31, here p. 23.
↑ Olney-Corollary
↑ Woodrow Wilson: Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations (compiled with his approval by Hamilton Foley), Princeton University Press, Princeton 1923, pp. 90-94 and p. 265.
^ Ernst Sauer: Grundlehre des Völkerrechts , 2nd edition, Verlag Balduin Pick, Cologne 1948, pp. 140 ff.

This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on June 1, 2006 .

[1] Gary Hart : James Monroe (= The American Presidents Series. Ed. By Arthur M. Schlesinger , Sean Wilentz . The 5th President). Times Books, New York City 2005, ISBN 0-8050-6960-7 , pp. 99-102.

[2] Gaddis Smith: The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. New York, 1995: Hill & Wang. P. 201. ISBN 978-0-8090-1568-9 .

[Krosigk-3] A ^b Friedrich von Krosigk: Inter-American relations under the sign of turbulent interdependence. In: From politics and contemporary history , B 28/92, pp. 23–31, here p. 23.

[4] Olney-Corollary

[5] Woodrow Wilson: Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations (compiled with his approval by Hamilton Foley), Princeton University Press, Princeton 1923, pp. 90-94 and p. 265.

[6] Ernst Sauer: Grundlehre des Völkerrechts , 2nd edition, Verlag Balduin Pick, Cologne 1948, pp. 140 ff.