Albert von Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein

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Albert Graf von Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein (born September 5, 1861 in Lemberg ; † June 15, 1945 in Vienna ) was an Austro-Hungarian diplomat and politician who played an important role in diplomacy before and during the First World War .

Albert Graf von Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein - Portrait of Philip Alexius de László

Life

family

Albert came from the Mensdorff-Pouilly family , a family originally from Lorraine , raised to the rank of Austrian count in 1818, which was originally only called Pouilly after an estate of the same name on the Saône , emigrated during the Revolution and took the name Mensdorff . He was the son of the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly and his wife Alexandrine von Dietrichstein .

Pre-war diplomacy

Mensdorff began in 1884 a diplomatic career came in 1886 as Attaché to the Embassy in Paris , was in 1889 in London , 1896 Counselor and of 28 April 1904 to 13 August 1914 as Ambassador of the monarchy at the Court of St. James in London. The appointment was made at the request of the British King Edward VII. His kinship with the British royal family and friendship with Edward VII and his successor George V gave him an excellent position in the diplomatic circles of the capital. This also favored the good diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain before the war. However, his obvious Anglophilia brought him resentment in Vienna, as the Austrian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand Mensdorff described as incompetent and stupid as well as the buffoon of the King of England . Nevertheless, his influence on the royal court was not enough to replace the unpopular British ambassador Fairfax Cartwright in Vienna , for example .

First World War

In the July crisis it was clear to Mensdorff that Serbia should be "defeated" and parts of its territory should be "given away" to Bulgaria and Albania . The fact that Mensdorff spoke in London of the partition of Serbia became known throughout Europe and had its disastrous effect. The German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was outraged that Vienna refused to give him information about the war aims and that statements about the dismemberment of Serbia had been “private opinions”. On July 31, 1914, it was clear to Mensdorff that the world war meant strengthening socialism and weakening monarchical powers . Even then, he foresaw the greatest catastrophe in world history .

Peace negotiations

On 15./16. March 1917, a meeting between Bethmann Hollweg and the kuk Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin took place in Vienna , in which the Mensdorff mission to peace negotiations with the Entente was one of the main topics. In order to take up every thread that could lead to an acceptable peace, Czernin wanted to send Ambassador Mensdorff to negotiations in Switzerland . He wanted to agree with the Reich Chancellor on the instructions for Mensdorff. Bethmann Hollweg was skeptical that France could be won without the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine . Mensdorff should not prematurely tie the hands of the Central Powers . Bethmann finally agreed to send a shop steward to Switzerland. Mensdorff was accepted as an emissary by the German side only with great reluctance. Because in Germany Mensdorff was considered to be very internationally minded and an enemy of Prussia . For Kaiser Wilhelm he was even a wretched, wretched Anglomaniac!

The Entente's negotiating partner at the talks in Geneva in December 1917 was the South African General Jan Christiaan Smuts , Boer descent, who later served as South African Prime Minister for many years, and at that time his country's representative in the London War Cabinet . The aim of the British government and Smuts at the time was a separate peace with Austria-Hungary to compensate for the loss of the Russian ally. Mensdorff came to Switzerland with the intention not to discuss a separate peace at all. The main condition for peace is the fullest integrity of our territory . We show solidarity with Germany on the Alsace-Lorraine question. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro , guarantees against agitation are necessary in the event of a restoration . It is not possible for the Serbian dynasty to remain. Concessions to Italy were also excluded.

The instructions Mensdorff received from Foreign Minister Czernin, which precluded concessions from the outset, especially to Italy and Serbia, were unwise, since at that time they would probably have been satisfied with such small assignments as at almost no point in the war. Above all, however, Mensdorff rejected a separation from the German ally, as did assignments to Romania in Bukovina and Transylvania . He accused the Entente of violating the principle of nationality through the secret treaty of London and of wanting to cut Austria off from the sea. Smuts was only interested in a separate peace, which Mensdorff even rejected when he offered him dynastic connections between the Habsburgs and Poland and an economic or political connection with an enlarged Serbia. The historian Zeman assesses the meeting as probably the most open exchange of views between two semi-official representatives of the respective war opponents.

Later, German diplomacy prevented Czernin from being replaced by the unloved Mensdorff, which was sought by circles of the court and the church. In 1917 he also became a member of the manor house of the Vienna Imperial Council . He was also a member of the Teutonic Order .

After the end of the monarchy

In 1919 Mensdorff resigned from civil service, but nevertheless represented the Republic of Austria in Geneva in 1920 when it was accepted into the League of Nations . In 1922 he negotiated the Geneva Protocols on a League of Nations loan for the economic and financial reconstruction of Austria.

Web links

Commons : Albert von Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ernst Rutkowski: Letters and documents on the history of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy . Volume 2: The Constitutionally Loyal Large Estate 1900-1904 . Verlag Oldenbourg, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-486-52611-1 , p. 763.
  2. Günther Kronenbitter: "War in Peace". The leadership of the Austro-Hungarian army and the great power politics of Austria-Hungary 1906–1914. Verlag Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56700-4 , p. 252.
  3. Friedrich Kießling: Against the “great” war? Relaxation in international relations 1911–1914. Verlag Oldenbourg, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-486-56635-0 , p. 123f.
  4. Winfried Baumgart (ed.): The July crisis and the outbreak of the First World War 1914. Based on the sources published by Erwin Hölzle on the origins of the First World War. International documents 1901-1914 . Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1983, ISBN 3-534-09079-9 , p. 164 (No. 102).
  5. ^ Walter Goldinger : Austria-Hungary in the July crisis, 1914 . In: Institute for Austrian Studies (Hrsg.): Austria on the eve of the First World War . Graz / Vienna 1964, pp. 48–62, here p. 58.
  6. ^ Eleonore Jenicek: Albert Graf Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein . Rough Dissertation, Vienna 1966, p. 110; and Friedrich Kießling: Against the “great” war? Relaxation in international relations 1911–1914 . Verlag Oldenbourg, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-486-56635-0 , pp. 44 and 51.
  7. Miklós Komjáthy (Ed.): Protocols of the Joint Council of Ministers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1914–1918) . Budapest 1966, p. 492ff. (Text); and André Scherer, Jacques Grunewald (eds.): L'Allemagne et lesproblemèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extraits des archives de l'Office allemand des Affaires étrangères. 4 volumes (German original documents), Paris 1962/1978, ISBN 2-85944-010-0 , volume 2, p. 32ff. (No. 20).
  8. Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): The peace appeal of Pope Benedict XV. of August 1, 1917 and the Central Powers. Diplomatic files from the German Foreign Office, the Bavarian State Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Office from the years 1915-1922 . Verlag Steiner, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 512; and Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): The peace attempts of the warring powers in the summer and autumn of 1917. Source-critical investigations, files and interrogation protocols . Verlag Steiner, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-515-02455-7 , p. 412.
  9. Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): The peace attempts of the belligerent powers in the summer and autumn of 1917. Source-critical investigations, files and interrogation protocols . Verlag Steiner, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-515-02455-7 , p. 298ff.
  10. ^ Leo Valiani: The End of Austria-Hungary . Secker & Warburg Verlag , London 1973, ISBN 0-436-55230-2 , p. 203.
  11. ^ Harry Hanak: Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War. A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion . London / New York / Toronto 1962. p. 275; and Zbynèk AB Zeman: A Diplomatic History of the First World War . London 1971. p. 157.
  12. Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): The peace attempts of the belligerent powers in the summer and autumn of 1917. Source-critical investigations, files and interrogation protocols . Verlag Steiner, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-515-02455-7 , p. 411ff.
  13. ^ A. Breycha-Vauthier:  Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein Albert Graf. In: Austrian Biographical Lexicon 1815–1950 (ÖBL). Volume 6, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 1975, ISBN 3-7001-0128-7 , p. 224.