European Union asylum policy

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Asylum applications in Europe in 2013 per million inhabitants

The asylum policy of the European Union consists in the attempt to implement a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the member states for the implementation of asylum procedures and the accommodation and care of asylum seekers. It aims to harmonize the asylum systems of the EU member states so that asylum seekers are treated equally in all member states. It also enables the fingerprints of asylum seekers to be compared using the EURODAC database .

The EU states implement the common asylum policy very differently, which became particularly clear during the refugee crisis from 2015 .

term

Asylum (from Greek σῦλος sylos , home or origin) is the temporary granting of protection and basic livelihood security for politically persecuted people who had to flee because of their religion, nationality, membership of a political group or opinion. According to European law, asylum is also granted to people who cannot return to their home country for the time being due to civil war or some other threat to their physical integrity ( subsidiary protection ).

History of the European asylum and refugee policy

1957 to 1999

The roots of European asylum and refugee policy date from the time of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, even if harmonization of national asylum policies or a uniform asylum policy was not initially intended. The process of developing a European internal market went hand in hand with the beginning of the standardization of asylum policy. Particularly great progress was made in the 1980s through ever closer police cooperation and ultimately through the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the European Act of 1986, since the security risks resulting from the opening of the internal market can only be met by a more uniform policy could be compensated. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty is seen as a major step forward in terms of asylum and refugee policy, as it is the first time that these are treated as “matters of common interest”. Since decisions in this area had to be made unanimously, the decision-making authority remained with the member states.

However, the member states ceded decision-making authority to the EU in 1997 in the course of the Amsterdam Treaty , which came into force on May 1, 1999, as refugee and asylum policy was transferred from the third, intergovernmental, to the supranational first pillar. The “stay in / opt out” rule gave individual member states the opportunity to implement the changes only partially (Ireland, Great Britain) or not at all (Denmark).

On September 1, 1997, the Dublin Convention , signed on June 15, 1990, entered into force. It assigned responsibility for the asylum procedure to the state into which the asylum seeker can be shown to have entered first.

1999 until today

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the member states have been making even more intensive efforts to communitize their asylum policy, which is why the 2004 Hague Program drafted a two-stage plan to harmonize it across the EU.

After defining the legal framework for a common EU asylum policy in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 , the European heads of state and government decided on the Tampere program a) in Tampere, Finland . This should underpin the previous asylum and refugee policy through a collective asylum system and a communitized migration policy and consequently develop the EU into an “ area of ​​freedom, security and justice ”. This is based on the idea of ​​creating a uniform shelter in which all refugees are treated equally and each member state meets the same level of protection. In concrete terms, this means that after completion of the first phase of the program, each member state has anchored minimum legal standards, in particular all the provisions of the Geneva Refugee Convention and the principle of non-refoulement .

In 2001 after the Kosovo crisis , the Directive 2001/55 / EC (mass influx Directive) created that provides a mechanism for temporary protection of displaced persons and a solidarity mechanism for the Member States in the event that the European Council by resolution a "mass influx" finds . This guideline was implemented in national laws, for example in Germany by § 24 AufenthG , but has never been applied (as of December 2015).

The 2004 Hague Program decision largely reaffirmed the guidelines on which the Tampere program is based. However, the impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was unmistakable, as evidenced by security considerations related to illegal immigrants and the protection of the EU's external borders. The Hague program also emphasized the significance of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Geneva Convention on Refugees.

In the first phase of European asylum and refugee policy, which has been concluded since 2006, the basis for standardization was created with the help of three directives and two regulations :

  • The Qualification Directive ( Directive 2004/83 / EC ) is intended to ensure that (subsidiary) protection is also offered to those refugees who are not entitled to asylum under the Geneva Convention , but who cannot be sent back to their country on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights (so "subsidiary protection"), whereby this protection is based on the international law principle of "non-refoulement", which, according to Article 33 of the Geneva Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, states that refugees may not be deported to where they are at risk Life and limb threatens,
  • the Asylum Reception Directive ( Directive 2003/9 / EC ) contains minimum standards for the reception and care of asylum seekers,
  • the Asylum Procedure Directive ( Directive 2005/85 / EC ) sets the minimum standards for the asylum procedure.
  • The Dublin Regulations ( Dublin Convention , Dublin II , Dublin III ) regulate questions of jurisdiction, according to which an asylum seeker must submit his asylum application in the Member State he first entered,
  • the Regulation (EU) no. 603/2013 ( Eurodac Regulation ) for comparison of fingerprints to prevent asylum seekers applied for asylum in several Member States.

In the second phase - after assessing the legal acts of the 1st phase - of the Hague program, the protection standards should be increased across the EU and a so-called burden sharing should be introduced. The EU Commission's Green Paper of June 6, 2007 and its strategy paper of June 17, 2008 once again reinforced the pan-European approach of a common asylum and refugee policy. The Commission made clear the will to guarantee refugees a fair trial in every EU Member State. This should prevent disproportionate distribution in EU countries and secondary movements. A standardized asylum procedure and a uniform legal status for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection should be implemented by 2012.

The second phase will focus on burden-sharing within the EU and closer cooperation with third countries to curb push factors .

  • The new version of the Asylum Procedures Directive ( Directive 2013/32 / EU ) introduces common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection.
  • The Directive 2013/33 / EU (Reception Directive) sets standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. It replaces the Asylum Adoption Directive 2003/9 / EC, whereby those provisions of Directive 2003/9 / EC that have remained unchanged in terms of content must continue to be implemented.

The successor to the Hague Program is the Stockholm Program for the years 2010 to 2014.

As early as 2010, the EU Commission examined the political, financial, legal and practical options for redistributing asylum seekers between European countries.

criticism

Before 2015

The asylum and refugee policy of the European Union has often been criticized. Non-governmental organizations and institutions complained that they were not committed to protecting but protecting from refugees.

In 2009, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees expressed concern about the way European countries deal with refugees and migrants and suggested a conference on this topic. The human rights organization Pro Asyl , together with other organizations ( Amnesty international , AWO, Caritas and others), called for a "fundamental change in EU refugee policy" in July 2009. Amnesty International reported several times in its “Amnesty Journal” on the situation of refugees in the Mediterranean region (see also Immigration to the EU via the Mediterranean ). Finally, Human Rights Watch published a report in September 2009 on dealing with refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Libya.

In 2011, for example, the European Court of Justice ruled that the living conditions for refugees in a Greek camp were “inhuman and degrading”, that the Greek asylum procedure had “deficiencies” and that the state of Belgium should not have sent an Afghan plaintiff back there, even though the asylum seeker there was the EU first had entered.

In the course of the refugee crisis from 2015

After member states began to refrain from registering refugees who had entered the EU in the course of the refugee crisis in Europe from 2015 in order to prevent them from being sent back to them if they were to travel on to other EU states, the Dublin Agreement was in fact not applicable more effective. The EU's coordinated asylum and refugee policy had collapsed. Migration researcher Tim Hatton , who investigated the consequences, found that such an uncoordinated refugee policy over time leads to refugees receiving less protection. Because in this case the individual states would tend to lower their respective level of protection compared to other states so that refugees move on.

Janne Haaland Matlary concluded that in the public debate in the wake of the refugee crisis in 2015, which was dominated by non-governmental organizations and lawyers, no Western European politician had the courage to declare the European asylum system with its right of access for every asylum seeker to be untenable. The politically responsible seemed numb under the impression of the judges' assessments and they no longer wanted to tackle the problem, but only tried to appear as ethical as possible than the next colleague. Matlary clarified the dilemma of EU asylum policy as a pull factor - while labor migration to the EU is hardly needed, the asylum law would still allow potential migrants to stay in the EU. Even if an application for protection is rejected, the risk of deportation is low. Since those responsible in the EU did not dare to tighten the asylum law, but the high number of people seeking protection were no longer justifiable, they decided to "outsource" border security to third countries. To this end, corresponding agreements were concluded with Turkey in 2016 , with Libya in 2017 and finally with other political groups south of Libya. According to Matlary, the EU has surrendered itself to a form of blackmail by these states and groups simply because those responsible did not want to close their own Schengen external borders. Only "despised" outsiders like Hungary would have closed their borders themselves, while the rest of them preferred to outsource the question against payment.

Reform proposals

EU distribution key

Positions of the national governments on the planned EU distribution key for refugees (2015):
EU immigration quota plan map.svg
Original point of view
2015-09-22 EU JHA Council majority vote to relocate 120,000 refugees.svg
Voting behavior
  • advocacy
  • Rejection
  • abstention
  • Exceptions in asylum policy
  • As early as 2012, in its report on increased EU internal solidarity in the asylum area , the European Parliament asked the Commission to introduce an EU-wide distribution key for asylum seekers. Only with the refugee crisis was this political demand for an EU distribution key adopted by national governments. The distribution key should take into account, among other things, the size of the population, economic strength, individual factors such as family reunification and language skills. The proposals presented by EU Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos go in this direction . Further proposals are aimed at leaving refugees the choice of the state responsible for their asylum procedure and merely dividing the financial responsibility between the states according to a suitable key. Such a step would mean at least a partial departure from the Dublin Convention (currently Dublin III ).

    In view of the refugee crisis , the EU Commission announced at the beginning of September 2015 that it would adopt an emergency plan for refugees from Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan within a few days.

    A distribution of refugees on a voluntary basis is possible through several mechanisms. For example, relocation within the EU on the basis of paragraph 3 of Art. 78 TFEU , resettlement programs to control entry from third countries and, following a qualified majority decision of the European Council, activation of Directive 2001/55 / ​​EC (mass influx Directive) . However, these mechanisms do not include any obligation for the Member States to participate.

    Hot spots

    In spring 2015, the European Commission proposed a concept of initial reception and registration centers, known as hotspots , as part of its European Agenda for Migration . They are to be set up mainly in Greece and Italy. The purpose is to identify the arriving refugees directly at the EU's external border , to register them and to take their fingerprints. They should be based on close cooperation between the European Asylum Support Office  (EASO), the EU Border Agency ( Frontex ), the European Police Office ( Europol ) and the EU Agency for Judicial Cooperation ( Eurojust ) with the local authorities. From these centers onwards, the temporary redistribution mechanisms should take effect, as the Commission had repeatedly proposed.

    At the EU special summit on September 23, 2015, it was agreed to set up 11 working hotspots - six in Italy, five in Greece - by the end of November. The first three hotspots were planned for the Greek islands, which are just off the Turkish coast. Although the on-site preparations had been going on since July 2015, only two were in operation by the end of November, in Lampedusa and Lesbos.

    At the beginning of 2016, three more camps were put into operation in Italy (Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani), another one (Taranto) in mid-2016, but Porto Empedocle was no longer active, although not all 1500 initial reception places were operational at the beginning of 2017. In mid-2017, under pressure from the EU and because of the renewed Mediterranean route, there was talk of an additional six new camps.

    The operating hotspots in Greece have mainly been used since spring 2016 to implement the EU-Turkey Agreement , in particular as deportation centers for certain migrants to Turkey.

    The initial admission hotspots are:

    Italy (planned 2200 places):
    • Pozzallo , Sicily (300 places, from the beginning of 2016)
    • Porto Empedocle , Sicily (300 spaces, beginning of 2016, only in operation for a short time)
    • Trapani , Sicily (400 places, from the beginning of 2016)
    • Lampedusa (politically in Sicily; 500 places, from November 2015)
    • Augusta (300 places, planned)
    • Taranto (400 seats, from mid-2016)

    Coordination office: Catania , Sicily

    Greece (planned 7,000 places):
    • Samos (1200 places, from February 2016)
    • Moria , Lesbos (1200 places, from November 2015)
    • Chios (approx. 1100 seats, from February 2016)
    • Kos (from June 2016)
    • Leros (approx. 900 places, from February 2016)


    Coordination office: Piraeus

    Safe routes to Europe

    In view of the high number of refugees and the high number of deaths among boat refugees while crossing the Mediterranean, the EU is often accused of inaction on the refugee issue. On the one hand, better sea rescue is required, on the other hand, humanitarian organizations are demanding safe, regular routes to Europe. For example, the spokesman for Amnesty International Italy, Gianni Rufini, suggested setting up centers in North African cities from which asylum applications could be sought. Comparable concepts are already under political discussion under the terms “asylum centers”, “reception camps” or “reception centers in North Africa”. Such an approach, which is advocated by the German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière but criticized by the German parties Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen and Die Linke , was examined by the EU Commission in spring 2015. The creation of huge refugee camps in North Africa would be the possible consequence.

    One possibility of applying for asylum outside of the national borders was already represented in 2004 by the then German Interior Minister Otto Schily , who took up the original British proposal. The proposal was rejected by the EU Commission at the time. Such a possibility has not yet been foreseen by the EU states; Switzerland does, however, have a visa for humanitarian reasons (see for example the section “Embassy asylum” in the article on German asylum law ). Quota refugees are treated quite differently : They do not go through an asylum or other recognition procedure in Germany, but receive a residence permit for humanitarian reasons as soon as they arrive.

    In April 2015, the EU Commission announced that it was working on a new migration strategy that would provide for closer cooperation with the North African states and could include, for example, an expansion of resettlement programs.

    The special EU summit on April 23, 2015 was based on a previously published ten-point plan. Its “Point 7” includes a “pilot project” that largely corresponds to a resettlement program.

    At the beginning of October 2015 it became known that the EU was planning to set up six new refugee camps for up to two million people in Turkey . In the eastern Aegean, Greek and Turkish patrols coordinated by the EU border protection agency Frontex should then act against smugglers and return refugees to Turkey. In return, the EU states should undertake to take in some of the refugees. These plans resulted in the EU-Turkey Agreement of March 18, 2016 .

    Destruction of tug boats

    In April 2015, the EU Commission presented a ten-point plan as a reaction to the refugee tragedies in the Mediterranean. Among other things, this envisaged increasing the financial resources for sea rescue and the number of ships and destroying tug boats. The human rights organization Amnesty International (AI) pointed out that refugees in Libya are "regularly robbed, tortured, kidnapped and sexually abused". AI called for better sea rescue and an increased reception of refugees by the EU.

    On May 11, 2015, EU foreign affairs representative Federica Mogherini campaigned in front of the UN Security Council for a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on the Destruction of Tug Boats.

    EU list of safe countries of origin

    For years, attempts were unsuccessful to define a common list of safe countries of origin . In 2008 the European Court of Justice ruled that the EU Council of Ministers could not rule on such a list without the European Parliament; In doing so, he declared Art. 29 Paragraphs 1 and 2 and Art. 36 Paragraph 3 of Directive 2005/85 / EC to be null and void for reasons of competence. In July 2015, supported by the refugee crisis , the project to arrive at a common assessment of the safe countries of origin was taken up again. So far (as of September 9, 2015) twelve EU countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom) keep a list of safe countries of origin. According to newspaper reports from autumn 2015, according to the EU Commission's plans, the Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) and Turkey should first be declared safe countries of origin in order to make immigration from there more difficult. The classification of the Western Balkan states as safe countries of origin took place in Germany in 2016 in parliament, the classification of the Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) has been politically demanded since 2016 by parties such as CDU, CSU, AfD, FDP and SPD, but was not given a parliamentary one in the Federal Council Majority, as the political parties Greens and Left Party prevented this.

    In 2016, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) published a statement on the effects of an EU list of safe countries of origin with regard to fundamental rights. In it she listed certain guarantees that are to be guaranteed in this context for people from these states.

    Political demands 2016

    According to media reports, following their EU summit in Brussels in February 2016, the EU states called in their final declaration "on the regime of ruler Bashar al-Assad and his allies to immediately end attacks on moderate opposition groups".

    There were also changes in 2016 in the area of ​​plans for cooperation between authorities. For example, on October 13, 2016, the European interior ministers adopted a proposal from the European Commission to introduce a European travel document . This document aims to facilitate the return of third-country nationals who are staying illegally in the EU.

    Further developments

    In June 2016, the Council of the European Union decided to support the establishment of a Libyan coast guard as part of Operation SOPHIA (formerly EUNAVFOR MED) . According to media reports, the number of Libyans trained for the coast guard by the EU was initially 100 by mid-2017, with another 300 to follow. With regard to the repatriation of the refugees to Libya by the Libyan coast guard, the German government stated several times that the non-refoulement principle under international law does not apply to this situation.

    In August 2017, the Libyan government declared an area off the coast, which extends far beyond Libyan territorial waters into international territory, a " Search and Rescue Zone" (SAR zone) and requested aid organizations not to navigate to this zone.

    The media denounced entanglement between units of the coast guard and the militias who operate the internment camps of the unity government, and sometimes also with people smugglers.

    At the EU-Africa summit at the end of 2017, a task force made up of representatives from the EU, the African Union and the United Nations was set up to improve the humanitarian situation of refugees and migrants in Africa and above all in Libya:

    • Access for international aid organizations to camps under the Libyan unity government.
    • Expansion of voluntary return. The African Union agreed to organize non-bureaucratic returns from Libya.
    • Improved information exchange and awareness campaigns.
    • Exchange of legal migration to Europe
    • Support stabilization efforts. The EU and its member states agreed on the European External Investment Plan, which aims to support and encourage private investment in Africa. With a fund volume of 3.35 billion euros, investments of up to 44 billion euros are to be mobilized. By strengthening the African economy, African young people should be motivated to stay in their home countries.

    The repatriation should take place as follows: The UN refugee agency should first identify politically persecuted people and migrant workers. Politically persecuted persons should first be brought to safety in the neighboring countries Niger and Chad and then distributed to countries willing to accept them. Migrant workers should return to their countries of origin under the responsibility of the African Union and with the support of the International Organization for Migration , with the EU providing funds for reintegration assistance.

    Legal migration channels for work and training in EU countries were also agreed. The then Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) spoke of bringing several hundred thousand young Africans to Europe for training every year. Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) said that she does not think in terms of hundreds of thousands and that she does not want to commit to numbers.

    By April 2018, 20,000 migrants had been returned to their home countries with EU funds. 137 human traffickers were arrested and handed over to the Italian judiciary. Libyan authorities have now closed 20 of the 53 internment camps. EU countries will take in 50,000 migrants by 2019 as part of the resettlement program, Germany has agreed to take over 10,000 migrants.

    In 2020, the EU countries took very different measures during the COVID-19 pandemic , including border closings , the suspension or restriction of asylum procedures, the relocation of refugees to other accommodation, temporary measures to secure access to the health system and relocation Measures for refugee minors. Integration programs and other education and support programs were partially interrupted or restricted. Some refugees were used for voluntary work.

    See also

    Web links

    Swell:

    Additional:

    Individual evidence

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