Castor (ship, 1977)

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Castor p1
Ship data
flag Cyprus RepublicRepublic of Cyprus Cyprus
other ship names

Great (1977–1985)

Ship type Oil tankers
Callsign 5BSJ
home port Limassol
Owner Kingserve Trading & Supply
Shipping company Athenian Sea Carrier
Shipyard Korea Shipbuilding & Engineering Corporation, Busan , South Korea
Build number SNA 3003
Whereabouts Scrapped in 2002
Ship dimensions and crew
length
183.50 m ( Lüa )
172.20 m ( Lpp )
width 25.91 m
Side height 14.32 m
Draft Max. 10.70 m
measurement 18,565 GT
 
crew 26th
Machine system
machine 1 × Hitachi Zosen diesel engine
Machine
performanceTemplate: Infobox ship / maintenance / service format
8,653 kW (11,765 hp)
Service
speed
15 kn (28 km / h)
Transport capacities
Load capacity 30,577 dwt
Others
Classifications American Bureau of Shipping
IMO no. 7423641

The Castor was an oil tanker built in South Korea in 1977 .

description

The ship was built in 1977 under the hull number SNA 3003 by the Korea Shipbuilding & Engineering Corporation in Busan , South Korea. Built as a single-hull ship came as Prima going. Since August 1985 the ship - now called Castor - has been operated under the flag of Cyprus .

It was driven by a Hitachi Zosen diesel engine with 8,653  kW power , which acted on a propeller . The cruising speed of the ship was 15  kn .

The ship had eight holds with three tanks each . The manifold for loading and unloading the ship was located at the level of cargo hold 5. Two cargo booms were installed here that were used to take over the hose.

The superstructures were in the rear of the ship.

Accident in the Mediterranean

In December 2000, the ship was in the western Mediterranean with around 29,500 t of petrol on board, en route from Constanța in Romania to Lagos in Nigeria . Bad weather prevailed since December 26th, sometimes with wind force 10 with corresponding sea ​​conditions . On the night of December 30th to 31st, when the ship was between Spain and Algeria ( ), four cracks formed on deck at the level of the hold, which extended almost the entire width of the ship. The three tanks in the hold were damaged in the accident . The captain wanted to call at Nador as a port of refuge, but this was forbidden by the Moroccan authorities. Then the ship drove on towards Cartagena . But even here no permission was given to call at the port as an emergency port.

On January 3, 2001, the shipping company commissioned the Greek rescue company Tsavliris to rescue the ship. This first sent a salvage tug that was located near the damaged vessel . The salvage tug towed the ship at its stern . This prevented excessive forces being exerted on the bow area, which could possibly have led to further structural damage in the area of ​​the cracks. In addition, none of the crew members had to pass through the cracks on deck.

The tug was supposed to tow the ship into the Gulf of Almería off the Spanish coast. There, the cargo should have been pumped out of the damaged tanker under the protection of the coast. However, the Spanish authorities forbade this and, like the Moroccan authorities before, demanded that the tow tractor keep a large safe distance from the Spanish coast. As a result, Gibraltar was no longer a possible port of refuge and other countries bordering the Mediterranean did not issue permits for the towing association to enter their own coastal waters. Only Cyprus, as the flag state, indicated its willingness to provide the ship with an emergency port. Cyprus could only be reached after a long haul voyage, during which there was a risk of the ship breaking apart.

For safety reasons, the crew finally left the tanker on January 5, 2001. The cracks had previously been temporarily sealed with cement.

In the second calendar week of the year, the cracks were properly sealed. Extreme caution had to be taken to avoid the formation of sparks, which could have triggered an explosion of the gas mixture on board. In addition, the tanks were filled with inert gas to avoid the formation of explosive gas mixtures.

On January 21, the contents of the damaged tanks 4 were finally transferred to another tanker at sea. Since Spain continued not to give permission to call at a port, the tug and escort ships started moving east. At the beginning of February, the tow train, which was between Malta and Tunisia , got caught in a severe storm. The Tunisian authorities finally allowed the tugboat to take shelter from Kelibia . Finally, on February 12, the remaining tanks of the Castor were also pumped empty. The ship was then towed to Piraeus . There the ship was examined to determine the cause of the damage. It was found that the sheets replaced in 1997 in the area of ​​the cracks were not coated or not sufficiently coated, so that they were partly heavily rusted, which had ultimately led to the formation of the cracks under the stress on the ship in the sea. The use of the ship, which was primarily used to transport petrol, which is highly corrosive, had contributed to the formation of rust. The tanks 4 also served as ballast tanks . The formation of rust was increased by the salt water. And finally, the area of ​​operation of the ship, which was often in warm climates, contributed to the formation of rust due to the high temperatures in the empty spaces of the tanks.

The ship was repaired in Piraeus but was scrapped the following year in Alang , India .

consequences

The wandering of the Castor in the Mediterranean led to the adoption of the IMO resolutions "A.949 (23) Guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance" and "A.950 (23) Maritime Assistance Services (MAS)".

The Turkey took the disaster as an opportunity to inspect tankers stronger in their territorial waters.

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d Investigation into the damage sustained by the MV Castor on December 30, 2000 ( Memento from March 15, 2003 in the Internet Archive ), Final Report, American Bureau of Shipping, October 17, 2001 (PDF, 1.5 MB) .
  2. ^ A b c Hyper-accelerated corrosion likely caused Castor problems , MarineLog, April 10, 2001. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  3. ^ A b Castor , Center for Tankship Excellence. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  4. a b c d e The "CASTOR" Case and Its Ramifications , Tsavliris Salvage Group, March 1, 2001. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  5. ^ The Castor Is (Finally) Empty , MarineLink, February 9, 2001. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  6. Navires en difficulté et recours aux lieux de refuge , Service de l'Inspection Generale de l'Environnement (IGE), Inspection Generale des Services des Affaires Maritimes (IGSAM), Conseil Général des Pont et Chaussées (CGPC), June 19, 2003 (PDF, 378 kB). Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  7. M / T CASTOR - Maritime Salvage , Coordination marée noire, March 2001. Accessed June 20, 2018.
  8. ABS releases Castor report , MarineLog, October 18, 2001. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  9. Castor's Downfall: Hyper-Accelerated Corrosion , Maritime Reporter, May 2001. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  10. Wenzhi Yang: A study on the legal problems related to places of refuge , Dissertation, 2006, World Maritime University (PDF, 469 kB). Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  11. Christopher F. Murray: Any Port in a Storm? The Right of Entry for Reasons of Force Majeure or Distress in the Wake of the Erika and the Castor , Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 63, No. 5/2002, pp. 1465-1506 ISSN  0048-1572 (PDF, 2.4 MB). Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  12. ^ "Places of refuge" - addressing the problem of providing places of refuge to vessels in distress , International Maritime Organization. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  13. ^ Places of Refuge , European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  14. John CK Daly: The Irresistable Force & The Immovable Object: Russia, Turkey, Oil & The Straits , The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, June 20, 2001. Retrieved June 20, 2018.
  15. Castor , Cedre. Retrieved June 20, 2018.