The only world power: America's strategy of domination

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Zbigniew Brzeziński (1977)

The Only World Power: America's Strategy of Domination ( The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives , 1997) is the title of a geopolitical monograph by Zbigniew Brzeziński . The aim of this book is to “ develop a comprehensive and self-contained geostrategy with regard to Eurasia ”. The United States as the “first, only real and last world power ” after the collapse of the Soviet Union must secure its supremacy on the “great chessboard” of Eurasia in the short and medium term in order to enable a new world order in the long term .

Brzezinski's geostrategy is part of the “classic geopolitics” in the tradition of Halford Mackinder .

The main ideas of the work are also contained in Brzezinski's draft “A Geostrategy for Eurasia” (1997).

Introduction - superpower politics

In the introduction, Brzezinski briefly outlines his overall concept. The US's global supremacy depends on how it can cope with the complex power relations on the Eurasian continent. A stable continental equilibrium with the United States as political arbiter should enable the gradual achievement of the overarching goal: the ultimate goal is a "world community".

"American politics ... should ultimately be based on the vision of a better world: the vision of creating a world community based on effective cooperation in line with long-term trends and the fundamental interests of humanity. But until then, the order is not to allow any Eurasian challenger to emerge who could bring the Eurasian continent under his rule and thus also pose a threat to America. "(P. 16)

A new type of hegemony (pp. 17–52)

Brzezinski first compares the supremacy of the USA with previously existing hegemony:

“Hegemony is as old as humanity. However, the current global supremacy of the US differs from all previous historical examples in its sudden occurrence, its worldwide extent and the way in which it is exercised. ”(P. 17)

The short way to global domination

In this subchapter (pp. 17–26) Brzezinski describes the USA's path to global supremacy: it was unusually short and led gradually from the Spanish-American war to two world wars and the cold war to the breakup of the Soviet Union . In the opening credits of the subchapter, Brzezinski sums up the individual steps presented in more detail:

"Due to the dynamism of international processes, America has transformed itself in the course of a single century from a relatively isolated country in the western hemisphere into a state of unprecedented extent and power." (P. 17)

The only world power

As the first and only truly global and probably last world power, according to Brzezinski, the USA is unparalleled:

  • The power of the Roman Empire was based on military organization and cultural attractiveness.
  • China relied on efficient administration, shared ethnic identity and an awareness of cultural superiority.
  • The Mongol empire came into being through military tactics and assimilation to the culture of the conquered countries.
  • The British Empire relied on trading establishments, a superior military organization and its universally respected cultural superiority.

In contrast to the earlier Eurasian empires, the power of the United States is world-dominant for the first time , with Eurasia being dominated for the first time by a non-Eurasian power: “The entire (Eurasian) continent is littered with American vassals and tributary states, some of which are all too happy to be more solid Washington would be bound. "(P. 41)

Brzezinski sees the USA as superior to all other powers in four areas: militarily, economically, technologically and culturally. In the interplay of these criteria he sees the explanation for the fact that the USA is the "only global superpower in the broad sense". (see p. 44).

The US global system of order

Due to the special domestic political factors of the USA - the pluralistic forces of democracy and the role of public opinion - according to Brzezinski, the inclusion of other countries in their system of order is more important than it was for earlier hegemony, which were aristocratic, hierarchical and authoritarian. The influence on dependent foreign elites is therefore rather indirect. It lies above all in the cultural field and in the effect of democratic principles and institutions. The influence is increasing through communication systems, the entertainment industry and mass culture. Added to this is the effect of political role models and their PR techniques as well as the role model effect of competitive entrepreneurship.

America's supremacy has produced a new international order which, Brzezinski said, institutionalized many features of the American political order in the realm of international politics:

  • The NATO as a collective security system including integrated command and force structures gives the United States even in intra-European affairs an important voice. Japan remains (for the time being at least) basically an American protectorate.
  • The USA exerts influence through regional economic cooperation ( APEC , NAFTA ) and specialized institutions for global cooperation ( World Bank , IMF , World Trade Organization ). “Officially, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank represent global interests and have worldwide responsibility. In reality, however, they are dominated by the United States, which launched them with the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. "
  • The US promotes procedures that aim at consensus-based decision-making, even when the US leads the way, and prefers democratic membership within the most important alliances. They promote a rudimentary worldwide constitutional and legal structure (starting with the International Court of Justice IGJ up to a special tribunal to punish Bosnian war crimes).

Brzezinski sums up the difference in organization and political style compared to previous empires:

“Unlike previous empires, this vast and complex global system is not organized hierarchically. America stands at the center of an interlocking universe in which power is wielded through constant negotiation, dialogue, diffusion, and the pursuit of official consensus, even when that power ultimately comes from a single source, Washington, DC. This is also the place where power poker takes place, according to American rules. "

According to Brzezinski, foreign governments try to influence American politics through lobbyists, ethnic groups and interest groups. In his opinion, the Jewish , Greek and Armenian lobbies stand out as the best organized.

According to Brzezinski's portrayal of the Cold War, the order system described emerged as part of an effort to “keep the Soviet Union in check”.

The Eurasian chessboard (pp. 53–88)

In Brzezinski's geostrategic conception, the hegemony of the USA depends on the extent to which the USA can assert itself in Eurasia, the generally superior and geopolitically "axial" continent:

Eurasia

“Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global supremacy will continue in the future.” (P. 16) “This huge, strangely shaped Eurasian chessboard - which stretches from Lisbon to Vladivostok - is the scene of the global play. ”(p. 58)

According to Brzezniski, without the supremacy of the USA there would be anarchy worldwide. In order to prevent this, the USA must assert itself in three geographical zones:

“If the middle area can be drawn more and more into the expanding sphere of influence of the West (where America has the preponderance), if the southern region does not come under the rule of a single actor and a possible unification of the countries in the Far East does not result in the expulsion of America from its own If there are sea bases off the East Asian coast, the USA should be able to assert itself. ”(P. 58)

America's pre-eminence in Eurasia would, according to Brzezinski's conclusion, dwindle dramatically if the states in the central region (the territory of the former Soviet Union) rejected the West, formed a political entity and took control of the South (Central Asia) or the big one Eastern teammates (China) formed an alliance. A union of Japan and China or a policy of the states of Western Europe that would drive the USA from its bases on the western periphery would be just as dangerous.

According to Brzezinski, the means of enforcing US politics in the current situation must be political maneuvering, diplomacy , coalition building , co-determination and the judicious use of “political assets”.

Geopolitics and geostrategy

In Brezinski's geostrategic concept, geographical location is still the determining factor for the foreign policy priorities of a nation state. Territorial disputes, however, usually no longer resulted from requests for enlargement, but rather had their cause in dissatisfaction that the “ethnic brothers” were being discriminated against in the neighboring country.

According to Mackinder, the  pivot area is  critical to global dominance

Following on from the Heartland Theory Halford Mackinder and geopolitics Albrecht Haushofer is in Brzezinski's understanding of the geopolitical question is no longer, could be of whatever part of Eurasia from the entire continent dominated today, nor whether a land power was more important as a naval power. Geopolitics is no longer about regional, but global dimensions, although dominance on the Eurasian continent is still the prerequisite for global supremacy.

The first two basic steps of the strategy recommended by Brezinski are

  • to decipher the goals of the political elites of the “ geostrategically dynamic states ” of Eurasia and to envisage the “ geopolitically critical ” and “ catalytic” Eurasian states, which because of their geographic location and / or their very existence either on or on the more active geostrategic actors the regional conditions act like "catalysts".
  • To formulate a specific US policy that is able to balance, co-determine and / or get these relationships under control in order to safeguard and strengthen indispensable US interests and to design a more comprehensive geostrategy that connects all policy fields.

Brzezinski sums up the "imperative of imperial geostrategy": tactically smart handling of dynamic states and careful handling of catalytic ones . He explains what is meant by referring to political conditions of the past with three imperatives:

“If one uses terminology that reminds one of the more brutal age of the old world empires, the three great imperatives of imperial geostrategy are: to prevent collusion between the vassals and to maintain their dependence on security issues, to keep the tributary states docile and to close to protect and to ensure that the 'barbarian' peoples do not unite. "(p. 65f.)

Geostrategic actors and geostrategic pivots

France , Germany , Russia , China and India are major geostrategic actors , while Great Britain , Japan , Indonesia are very important but not major actors. The Ukraine , Azerbaijan , South Korea , the Turkey and Iran make geopolitical linchpins crucial. Turkey and Iran are "geostrategic active within their limited range of possibilities." The most important and most dynamic geostrategic actors on Eurasia's western periphery are France and especially Germany "as the economic engine of the region and future leading power of the European Union (EU)." However, because of its geographic location, Germany is sticking to the "option of a special bilateral agreement with Russia" firmly.

Great Britain sees Brzezinski as a "retired geostrategic actor who is resting on his magnificent laurel and largely staying out of the great European adventure in which France and Germany are pulling the strings."

Ukraine has a special meaning in the play of forces, since according to Brzezinski it contributes to the transformation of Russia “through its very existence”.

“Without Ukraine, Russia is no longer a Eurasian Empire. It can still strive for imperial status, but would then become a predominantly Asian empire, which in all likelihood would be drawn into crippling conflicts with the rebellious states of Central Asia , which do not accept the loss of their recently acquired statehood and which are favored by the other Islamic states in the South would receive support. "

Serious decisions and potential challenges

With regard to "serious decisions", Brzezinski outlined the following policy areas in 1996:

  • The USA must constructively support the partnership with an equal Europe. A stronger and more independent Europe will lead to a reorganization of NATO, in which the supremacy but also the responsibility of the USA within the alliance will be weakened. The special relationship with the United Kingdom, which hinders the unity of Europe, cannot be continued. An eastward expansion of the EU and NATO is foreseen:

"As there is growing consensus that the nations of Central Europe should be admitted to both the EU and NATO, attention is turning to the future status of the Baltic republics, and perhaps soon that of Ukraine."

  • Economic support for Russia is double-edged as it strengthens Russia's "imperial potential". Instead of the desired democratization and Europeanization, the desire could arise to regain the former great power role. A " Balkanization " of the central Urasian area through ethnic and religious conflicts , especially through anti-American fundamentalism , must be prevented.
  • China's role as a regional power must be recognized, spheres of interest must be mutually agreed. The US's trilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea could be affected by the concessions made to China.
  • Conceivable new Eurasian coalitions could endanger the interests of the USA: a coalition between China, Russia and perhaps Iran; a "Sino-Japanese axis"; a German-Russian agreement, a French-Russian entente or even a European-Russian understanding.

Brzezinski saw the possibilities of influence as limited:

“The current global system of the USA, within which the danger of war is off the table, will in all probability only remain stable in those parts of the world in which America's supremacy, guided by a long-term geostrategy, is based on comparable and related socio-political systems that run through each other multilateral structures dominated by America are connected. "

The democratic bridgehead (pp. 89–129)

For Brzezinski, Europe is the natural ally of the USA and the "Eurasian bridgehead" because of the shared values:

“A successful political association would bring together about 400 million people under one democratic roof who enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of the United States. Such a Europe would inevitably have to become a world power. In addition, Europe serves as a springboard for the progressive expansion of democratic conditions deep into the Euro-Asian region. Europe's eastward expansion would consolidate the victory of democracy in the 1990s. ”(P. 89)

Through NATO, Brzezinski sees the expansion of the European scope also as an extension of the United States' direct sphere of influence. According to Brzezinski, however, a united Europe that would potentially be a world power is still a mere vision, as it was shown in the Bosnian conflict.

“The fact is plain and simple that Western Europe and increasingly also Central Europe remain largely an American protectorate, whose allied states are reminiscent of vassals and tributaries of yore. This is not a healthy condition, either for America or for the European nations. ”(P. 92)

In addition, according to Brzezinski's view, the European idea is losing traction because the original impulses fizzled out in the mid 1990s. The social system, which is weakening economic power, draws political attention to domestic politics. Only the authorities of the EU are promoting integration, as are the political elites of France and Germany, albeit with different ideas. His overall impression is rather sobering:

"In general, today's Western Europe looks like a series of tormented, disjointed, comfortable, yet socially dissatisfied and troubled societies that no longer have a vision of the future."

Grandeur and redemption

In Brzezinski's view, France hopes for her “rebirth” through Europe, and Germany for her “redemption”. Accordingly, he characterizes the French and German self-image in Europe with two formulas

  • "For France, Europe is the means to regain its former greatness."
  • “For Germany, redemption + security = Europe + America. This formula outlines its attitude and politics, making it both Europe's model boy and America's stronger supporter in Europe. Germany sees its ardent advocacy for Europe as a historical cleansing, as a restoration of its moral and political reputation. By atoning for Europe, Germany is restoring its greatness, while at the same time taking on a mission that does not automatically mobilize European resentments and fears against the Germans. If the Germans pursue their own national interest, they run the risk of offending the other Europeans; however, if they promote the common interest of Europe, this earns them the support and respect of other Europeans. "

According to Brzezinski, expressions of the French obsession to be a world power are the possession of nuclear weapons , the seat on the Security Council and the efforts of the French governments to continue to be present as a security power in most of the French-speaking countries in Africa. According to Brzezinski, France's geopolitical sphere of security and influence includes the Iberian Peninsula, the northern coasts of the western Mediterranean, and Germany all the way to eastern Central Europe.

“This results in two major dilemmas for France: How can an American commitment to security be maintained for Europe ... and in doing so, the American presence can be constantly reduced; How can the Franco-German partnership as the economic and political engine of European unification be preserved and thereby prevent German leadership in Europe? "

Germany would accept a French leadership role in a united Europe independent (of America), but it recognizes that France is not the world power that could give Europe the same security as the US, because “France is nothing more and nothing less than a European Medium caliber power. ”According to Brzezinski, German reunification was an additional incentive for France to integrate Germany into the binding framework of political union. In addition, Germany's reunification has significantly changed the “actual parameters of European politics”.

“For Russia as for France it meant a geopolitical defeat. The unified Germany was no longer just France's junior political partner, it automatically became the undisputed first power in Western Europe and - especially because of its considerable contributions to support the most important international institutions - even partially a world power. "

As a result, France has returned to NATO. With its special relations with Russia and its necessary approval of eastward expansion, France increased the pressure on the USA after Brzezniski to take into account the French proposals for a reform of NATO.

Germany accepted the French leadership role because the Franco-German reconciliation was the prerequisite for the creation of a European community and Germany historically and morally rehabilitated. In view of the Soviet threat, however, loyalty to America was also vital. According to Brzezinski, these prerequisites no longer existed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The connection to America now offered the reunified Germany the umbrella for a leadership role in Central Europe.

In Brzezinski's view, Germany's zone of interest includes France and the post-communist states of Central Europe including the Baltic republics, Belarus and the Ukraine, and even extends as far as Russia. It is the area where German culture was previously broadcast in Eastern Europe. The decisive breakthrough was the German-Polish reconciliation. Brzezinski compares the German-Polish reconciliation in its geopolitical significance in Central Europe with the earlier effects of the Franco-German reconciliation on Western Europe. Thanks to Poland, the German influence was able to radiate to the north - to the Baltic states - and to the east - to Ukraine and Belarus.

The so-called Weimar Triangle created a “geopolitical axis” on the European continent. Germany's commitment to eastward expansion made the acceptance of German leadership in Central Europe easier. But at the same time this would have resulted in differences to the European interests of the neighbors:

“Germany's conception of a future for Europe thus differed from that of its most important European allies: The British spoke out in favor of a larger Europe because they saw enlargement as a means of watering down Europe's unity; the French feared that such an expansion would strengthen Germany's role, so they advocated more limited integration. Germany stood up for both and thus achieved a reputation of its own in Central Europe. "(P. 109)

America's central goal

Brzezinski's conclusion from the situation described is that the US must be committed to European unification. Europe should be accepted as a real global partner. Decision-making power and responsibility would have to be shared between Europe and the USA. In the short term, the USA should tactically support Germany's leadership role and meet France's desire for structural reform of NATO and strengthen the role of the Western European Union in the command structure and decision-making of NATO. The USA must act particularly on Germany in order to promote the further east expansion of Europe, whereby Brzezinski has the Baltic States and Ukraine in particular in view.

His assessment of Europe's own dynamism is rather critical:

"Left to their own devices, Europeans run the risk of being completely absorbed by their social problems." (P. 111)

“The crisis of political credibility and economic growth… is deeply rooted in the expansion of the welfare state system, which encompasses all areas of society , which takes personal responsibility down and favors protectionism and narrow-mindedness. The result is a cultural lethargy, a combination of escapist hedonism and spiritual emptiness - 'which radical nationalists or dogmatic ideologues could use for their own ends. "(P. 111)

If the integration process stagnates, according to Brzezinski, the German idea of ​​a European order could take on more nationalistic traits, which would lead to the loss of the bridgehead function. For America, however, the expansion and consolidation of the EU is the most valuable solution, but "this requires massive impetus from the USA". According to Brzezinski, the same applies to NATO, without which Europe “would almost instantly disintegrate politically into its individual states”. In the course of the agreement, NATO will have to be changed “on the basis of a one-plus-one (USA + EU) formula”.

Enlargement of the EU

Without the French "sense of mission", the southern flank of Europe would also be more unstable. Brzezinski sees France above all as a "decisive" partner in the fundamental task of permanently integrating Germany into Europe.

“The dominant position of Germany can only be tolerated by Western Europeans as long as it is subordinate to the supremacy of the USA. That is why Germany needs France, Europe needs the Franco-German axis. "

With regard to eastward expansion, Brzezinski clearly emphasizes his idea of ​​the relationship with Russia and Germany: "The pursuit of eastward expansion is not based on an animosity towards Russia or fear of it, nor on the desire to isolate this state." Cooperation with Germany and “joint leadership” are essential to encourage the other NATO allies to approve of the step towards enlargement.

If the United States and Germany jointly encourage the other NATO allies to approve of the move, and either with Russia, it should be willing to compromise (see Chapter 4), negotiate an effective agreement, or their decision with the correct conviction that If the design of Europe cannot be subordinated to Moscow's objections, then nothing stands in the way of enlargement. The required unanimous consent of all NATO members will only come about under American-German pressure, but no NATO member will be able to refuse its consent if America and Germany jointly insist on it. (P. 121)

For Brzezinski, a halt in NATO's eastward expansion would be “the end of a comprehensive American policy for all of Eurasia”. This failure would "discredit American leadership, it would destroy the plan for an expanding Europe, demoralize Central Europeans and possibly rekindle Russia's currently dormant or withering geopolitical desires in Central Europe."

As Europe continues to expand, no power outside the existing transatlantic system should have a veto right against the participation of a suitable European state in the European system - and therefore in its transatlantic security system. In addition, no European country that meets the requirements should be excluded a priori from possible membership in the EU or NATO.

Europe's historic timetable

Brzezinski expected that the first new members from Central Europe would join NATO by 1999 and the EU in 2002 or 2003. By 2005 the Baltic states would join, maybe Sweden and Finland as well. Between 2005 and 2010 "Ukraine should be ready to negotiate with both the EU and NATO, especially if the country has since made significant progress in its domestic reforms and has proven itself more clearly as a Central European state".

NATO expansion 1949 to 2004, in 2008 Croatia and Albania were added to the 3rd eastward expansion

For comparison with Brzezinski's strategic prognosis, the actual enlargement of the European Union and NATO's eastward expansion : in 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were admitted to NATO, in 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. On May 1, 2004, the states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus joined the European Union. On January 1, 2007, following an EU decision, Bulgaria and Romania were also admitted to the European Union under strict conditions. On the relationship with Russia and possible complications in the development of enlargement, Brzezinski writes:

“It depends very much on whether the scenario outlined above can develop peacefully or whether it is drawn into increasing tensions with Russia. The Russians should be continually reassured that the door to Europe is open to them, as well as that of their country's eventual participation in an expanded transatlantic security system and perhaps in the more distant future in a new trans-Eurasian security structure. In order to give credibility to these assertions, cooperation and exchange between Russia and Europe should be deliberately promoted in all areas. "

The black hole (pp. 130–180)

In 1991, according to Brzezinski, a “black hole” arose in the middle of Eurasia, in which no new Eurasian empire was allowed to emerge “that could prevent America from realizing its geostrategic goal of designing a larger Euro-Atlantic system into which Russia would then be permanently and securely included leaves."

Countries bordering Russia in 2014: red: under Russian influence, green; outside of Russian influence, yellow: attempt to evade Russian influence (Ukraine).

Russia's new geopolitical framework

The geopolitical turmoil caused by the loss of the Caucasus bordering Turkey , the secession of Central Asia with its natural resources and especially the independence of the Ukraine " essentially called into question the Russian claim to be the God-chosen standard bearer of a common Pan-Slavic identity."

The shrinking geopolitical sphere of influence, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact , the aspirations of the former satellite states of Central Europe, above all Poland, to NATO and the European Union, worried Russia. The loss of Ukraine was particularly painful, forcing “the Russians” to rethink their own political and ethnic identity. It represents a serious geopolitical obstacle for Brzezniski , since Russia can only become a Eurasian empire with Ukraine and Russia has also been robbed of its dominant position on the Black Sea.

In Brzezinski's view, without Ukraine, every attempt by Moscow to rebuild the Eurasian Empire threatens to involve Russia in protracted conflicts with the growing nationally and religiously motivated non-Slavs.

The peoples of the neighboring states in the south have become increasingly nationalistic and Islam-oriented, especially since they are supported by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia . In the Far East, "China's economic power is preparing to fundamentally reverse the historical equation between the two countries, with the empty spaces of Siberia almost beckoning Chinese settlers."

Geostrategic wishes

Brzezinski sees three options for historical schools of thought, all of which are related to Russia's status vis-à-vis the United States:

  1. global condominium with the US (Yeltsin's initial " Westerner concept");
  2. economic integration of the “ near abroad ” under the leadership of Moscow or restoration of imperial power in order to “stand up to Europe and the USA” (later critical attitude of Yeltsin);
  3. an anti-USA coalition (from the mid-1990s).

Ad 1: The illusion of an equal global political partnership “(nurtured) the idea that Central Europe would somehow remain or even want to remain a region of particular political proximity to Russia. It was thought that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON would not result in their former members turning to NATO, not even to the EU. "But" America felt no inclination to share its world power with Russia, it would also be completely unrealistic been. The new Russia was simply too weak, its economy too shabby in three quarters of a century of communist rule, and the country too socially backward to be a real partner on a global scale. ”“ Furthermore, some of the United States' central interests went out of national interest Geostrategic issues - in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East - the American and Russian efforts are by no means in the same direction. ”“ Blinded by the delusion of sharing the status of a world power with the USA, the Moscow political elite found it difficult to keep up accept the fact that Russia no longer occupies a privileged geopolitical position in the area of ​​the former Soviet Union itself or with regard to the former satellite states in Central Europe. "" In the increasing tendency of the USA to attach the highest priority to American-Ukrainian relations since 1994 at the latest and Ukraine your new nationa To help preserve freedom, many in Moscow - even the so-called Westerners - saw a policy directed against the vital Russian interests of finally bringing Ukraine back into the bosom of the community ( sic ). "

To 2: The line of thought of the “near abroad” essentially represents the “absolutely reasonable demand that Russia must first and foremost concentrate on relations with the newly independent states, especially since these all thanks to a Soviet policy that had promoted economic dependencies among them, are still tied to Russia. ”According to Brzezinski, the emphasis on neighboring countries also had“ imperial undertones ”. In September 1995, President Yeltsin said: “The main goal of Russia's policy towards the CIS is to create an economically and politically integrated federation of states that is able to maintain its traditional place in the world community (...) to make Russia the leader To consolidate strength in the fabric of new interstate political and economic relations on the territory of the former Soviet Union. ”Therefore, political and military relations between Russia and the CIS should also be strengthened.

“ Eurasianism ” goes beyond the economic and political components to define Russia's mission: Russia has its own Eurasian identity “in the legacy of Russia's glorious past, which once ruled the vast land mass between Central Europe and the Pacific coast , the legacy of an empire that Moscow had forged together through permanent expansion to the east over four centuries. "This view can be found earlier, for example in Nikolai Sergejewitsch Trubetzkoy :" With its destruction of the spiritual foundations and the national uniqueness of Russian life, After the spread of the materialistic worldview, which in fact already dominated Europe and America, communism was in reality a veiled version of Europeanism. (...) Our task is to create a completely new culture, our own culture, which will not resemble European civilization (...) when Russia is no longer an imitation of European culture (...) when it finally finds itself again: Russia -Eurasia, which sees itself as the legacy of Genghis Khan and is aware of its great legacy. ”Regarding the response in the former republics of the USSR , Brzezinski notes:“ Especially in Ukraine, Moscow's ideas of integration met with massive opposition. Their political leadership quickly realized that such integration could ultimately lead to the loss of national sovereignty, given Russia's reservations about the legitimacy of Ukrainian independence. In addition, Russia's inept handling of the new Ukrainian state - its unwillingness to recognize its borders, its denial of Ukrainian rights to Crimea, its insistence on exclusively extraterritorial control over the port of Sevastopol - the newly awakened Ukrainian nationalism had an unmistakably anti-Russian edge awarded. “Ukraine was supported in its striving for independence from the USA and Germany. "In July 1996 the American Defense Minister declared: The importance of independent Ukraine for the security and stability of the whole of Europe cannot be overestimated, and in September the German Chancellor - despite his strong support for Boris Yeltsin - went even further with the assurance that that Ukraine's firm place in Europe can no longer be questioned by anyone, and that no one can dispute Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity. ”Other states followed the example of Ukraine. The majority of Russia's population did not support imperial programs either. Brzezinski's conclusion is: “In short, a policy that gave priority to neighboring countries had to prove inadequate in the end because Russia was not politically strong enough to impose its will on the new states and because it was not economically attractive enough either was to motivate them to work more closely together voluntarily. Russian pressure only caused them to orient themselves even more towards the outside world, first and foremost towards the west, in some cases also towards China and the most important Islamic states in the south. "

To 3: The idea of ​​the alliance against the supremacy of the USA in Eurasia arose from the failure of the first two concepts. The rapprochement between Russia and China in 1996 was a step towards this goal. Brzezinski believes a closer alliance is unlikely, since China's interest lies more in Western markets and investments. “In the end, the alliance would perhaps even condemn all of its participants, whether two or three, to continued isolation and mutual backwardness.” In addition, in such a coalition Russia would only be a junior partner of China for the benefit of China, it would become a buffer between Europe and China.

The dilemma of the only alternative

According to Brzezinski, Russia's only geostrategic option is a transatlantic Europe of an enlarged EU and NATO. “Russia is far too weak as a partner for the US, but it is still too strong to simply be their patient. It could become a problem unless America creates an atmosphere in which Russians are quicker to believe that the best choice for their country is an increasingly organic relationship with a transatlantic Europe. ”“ As a result, Russia needs its imperial Forsake the past and must not constantly change its attitude with regard to Europe's expanding political and security ties to America. The most important thing in this context is that Russia recognizes and respects the independence of Ukraine, its borders and its own national identity without any ifs or buts. ”“ For the West and especially for America, it is meanwhile to pursue a policy that addresses the dilemma the only alternative continues. The political and economic stabilization of the young post-Soviet states is an essential factor to force Russia to a historically new self-image. "

Central Asia Political Map 2005

Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine are particularly important: “Azerbaijan can give the West access to the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, which is rich in oil sources. Conversely, a subjugated Azerbaijan would mean that Central Asia would be sealed off from the outside world and could thus be politically exposed to Russian pressure for reintegration. "

Uzbekistan is the main obstacle to Russia's control of the region and is therefore crucial to the other Central Asian states.

Most important for Brzezinski is Ukraine.

“As the EU and NATO expand eastward, Ukraine will eventually have a choice of whether to become part of one of these organizations. It can be assumed that, in order to strengthen her independence, she would like to join both once their catchment area borders on her territory and she has carried out the internal reforms necessary for membership. "

Brzezinski sees the decade between 2005 and 2015 as a time frame for the “gradual integration” of Ukraine. If Russia accepts this, it will decide to become part of Europe itself. If Russia refuses, this means that it will "turn its back on Europe in favor of a Eurasian identity and existence." The way of development towards Europe or away from Europe will be of the highest importance for Russia, the path towards Europe appears to Brzezinski mandatory.

“This process will accelerate once a geopolitical context is created that drives Russia in this direction while eliminating other temptations. The faster Russia moves towards Europe, the faster the black hole in the heart of Eurasia will fill with a society that is becoming more and more modern and democratic. In fact, the dilemma for Russia is no longer making a geopolitical choice, because it is essentially about survival. "

The Eurasian Balkans (pp. 181–218)

Eurasia's “ Balkans ” include Kazakhstan , Kyrgyzstan , Tajikistan , Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan , Azerbaijan, Armenia , Georgia and Afghanistan , as well as the more “viable” geostrategic actors Turkey and Iran

Eurasiageopolitical.jpg

According to Brzezinski, many countries in this “power vacuum” are internally unstable because of territorial, ethnic and religious divisions. This situation challenges the neighbors, but each opposes the efforts of the others to gain supremacy in the region.

"It is this well-known phenomenon of the power vacuum with its inherent pull that justifies the name Eurasian Balkans."

According to Brzezinski's analysis, this region is geopolitically important because of the transport routes, especially the pipelines, but also because of the conflicting goals of neighboring countries, but above all because the region “could develop into an economic fillet” because of its mineral resources.

The ethnic cauldron

The three Caucasian republics are more likely to be threatened from outside, the five new Central Asian states more from internal disagreement. The cause is the strategic demarcation of the Soviet republics, which paid no attention to ethnic and religious contexts.

  • According to Brzezinski, Azerbaijan's vulnerability has ramifications for the entire region because its location makes it a geopolitical hub. “In a sense, it is the vital cork that controls access to the bottle with the mineral resources of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. An independent, Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan with pipelines connecting it with the ethnically related and politically supporting Turkey, denied Russia a monopoly position in access to the region and thus deprived it of its decisive political leverage on the politics of the new Central Asian states. "Azerbaijan is therefore exposed to pressure from Russia in the north, but also from Iran in the south.
  • Georgia is ethnically inhomogeneous, hence the secession wishes that Russia supported in order to force Georgia into the CIS and to tolerate military bases.
  • “Kazakhstan is the shield and Uzbekistan the soul of the national awakening of the various peoples in the region. Due to its size and geographical location, Kazakhstan protects the others from direct Russian pressure, as only Kazakhstan borders on Russia. ”Due to the predominantly Russian population in the north, the country threatens a split, due to the Kazakh minority in Uzbekistan, a conflict between the two countries.
  • Uzbekistan is ethnically more homogeneous, more nationally conscious and more deeply rooted in history, which arouses fears among the rulers of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and even Kazakhstan that "Uzbekistan's leadership role in the region could grow into regional supremacy."
  • Turkmenistan with its natural gas reserves is ethnically relatively homogeneous, geographically protected and oriented towards Uzbekistan and Iran.
  • Kyrgyzstan is more mixed and wedged between China and Kazakhstan, on which its sovereignty will depend in the future.
  • Tajikistan is a tribal society, with a large part of the Tajiks living outside the country, especially in northern Afghanistan.
  • "The current mess in Afghanistan is also a Soviet legacy, even though the country was never part of the Soviet Union." It is divided by occupation, guerrilla warfare and ethnic rifts. "The jihad against the Russian occupiers made religion the dominant factor in the country's political life and has treated the already sharp political differences with dogmatic zeal."
  • The Turkey and Iran are unpredictable in their geopolitical orientation. “A destabilization of these two states would very likely throw the whole region into chaos.” “If Turkey or Iran or both were destabilized, the internal problems of the region would no longer be manageable and even regional supremacy by the Russians could be possible then it may no longer be prevented. ”According to Brzezinski, Turkey is being pushed into three irreconcilable geostrategic directions by modernists, Islamists and nationalists. There is also the problem with the Kurds' desire for statehood. The fundamentalist regime in Iran, on the other hand, stands between the desire for Islamic influence on the Central Asian republics and cooperation with Russia against the dominance of the USA and against a threat to national integrity from an independent Azerbaijan.

Competition with many participants

In Brzezinski's conception, three states are fighting for supremacy: Russia, Turkey and Iran. China could become the protagonist, Ukraine, Pakistan, India and the USA are indirectly involved.

Turkic peoples, areas of distribution

Russia sees Turkey as a threat to its security, while Turkey sees itself conversely as “the liberator of the Turkic peoples it leads from Russian bondage”. Turkey and Iran are rivals, especially since they represent different political concepts. Russia not only strives for influence, but regards the "entire area of ​​the former Soviet Union as a zone of special geostrategic interest (...) from which political - and even economic - influence from outside should be kept away."

The Iran rather focuses on Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, but wants to revive Islam in Central Asia.

The new states serve as a buffer for the People's Republic of China . It is interested in access to the mineral resources and wishes to keep the Turkmen minority in peace.

"China's general geopolitical interest tends to collide with Russia's striving for a dominant role and is thus complementary to the Turkish and Iranian objectives."

The Ukraine wants to reduce its dependence on Russia and, therefore, closely binds to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Support from the neighboring countries and Turkey is intended to reduce Russia's influence.

Pakistan competes with Iran for influence in Afghanistan and Tajikestan.

India wants to reduce China's influence and therefore supports Iranian intentions in Afghanistan and a stronger Russian presence.

“The US is far away, but has a strong interest in maintaining geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia. As an increasingly important, albeit not directly intervening player who is not only interested in the extraction of natural resources in the region, but also wants to prevent Russia from dominating this geopolitical area alone, you are looming in the background. In addition to its more far-reaching geostrategic goals in Eurasia, America also represents its own growing economic interest, as does that of Europe and the Far East, in unimpeded access to this region, which has hitherto been closed to the West. "

Access to the region was previously routed through Russia. “If the most important oil pipelines in the region continue to run through Russian territory to the Russian sales market on the Black Sea in Novorossiysk, the political consequences will be felt, even without the Russians flexing their muscles. The region will remain a political branch and Moscow will be able to decide how the region's new wealth is to be distributed. "

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political leadership in Moscow annoyed the realization “that foreign interests, who had the necessary means to invest, to extract and exploit natural resources, were able to exploit the economic potential of these areas, which until recently was only accessible to Russia judged. "

Russia used the CIS to keep the new states in their geopolitical concept, to prevent Russia's territory from bypassing oil pipelines and to maintain a military presence. "Moscow's policy is apparently still based on the fact that its post-imperial network of relations with Central Asia will gradually deprive the new, still weak states of their sovereignty and subordinate them to the command center of the integrated CIS." "In pursuing this goal, spokesmen for the Russian government invoke ... often on the example of the European Union. In fact, however, Russia's policy towards the Central Asian states and the Caucasus republics is much more reminiscent of the Francophone African community - where the French military contingents and budget subsidies determine the politics and economic conduct of the French-speaking post-colonial states. "

Significant is the "tactical cooperation with Iran in contentious matters such as the distribution of concessions for deep-sea drilling in the Caspian Sea." The aim is to force Baku to conform to Moscow's wishes. "A submissive Azerbaijan would also make it easier for Moscow to maintain its dominant position to consolidate in Georgia and Armenia. "

Almost all states located in the Eurasian Balkans are more interested in connecting with the West in order to attract capital and develop economically and are critical of Russia's efforts to integrate them into the CIS. "For the United States, which is pursuing a policy of weakening Russia in Asia, this position is extremely attractive."

USA waiting

According to Brzezinski in 1997, America must prevent a power from gaining control over this region to which the world community must have access. Russia's efforts to determine access alone is detrimental to regional stability. But Russia must be involved as a partner, since its economic participation stabilizes the region, contributes to Russia's well-being and gives meaning to the CIS. Russia must give up its anachronistic plans in favor of cooperation.

The US must mainly support Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. "The role of Kiev unquestionably confirms the thesis that Ukraine is the critical point when it comes to Russia's own future development." Kazakhstan needs "careful international support and sustained economic aid." The US has one with Turkey, Iran and China common interest. Influenced by a western-oriented Turkey, the Caucasus republics would aspire to Europe instead of being tied to Russia. "A gradual improvement in US-Iranian relations would greatly expand global access to the region, particularly averting the imminent threat to Azerbaijan's survival." China's backing for Pakistan's influence on Afghanistan facilitates international access to Turkmenistan. "It is also of crucial importance to what extent the United States makes its relations with Russia dependent on whether Moscow respects the independence of the new states."

With the current choice between delicate regional balance and conflict, "the primary goal of any comprehensive American geostrategy for Eurasia ... must be to establish and consolidate that regional balance".

The Far Eastern Anchor (pp. 219–277)

Presentation of the geopolitical situation in East Asia

The geopolitical stage in East Asia is "metastable". The unprecedented economic miracle conceals the growing political uncertainties, intensifies hegemonic ambitions and increases social tensions. Structures of multilateral cooperation are largely missing.

The potential for conflict lies in Taiwan's special status , its claim against neighboring countries on the Spratly Islands and against Japan on the Senkaku Islands , in North Korea's instability in its claim against Russia on the Kuril Islands and in border problems with neighboring countries. Added to this is the unbalanced distribution of power in the region. China is the dominant economic and military power to which Thailand , Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia are adapting. Australia , Singapore and Indonesia are working more closely together, concerned about how the US can still keep the peace. America's role as a security guarantor is becoming increasingly dependent on cooperation with Japan, which is, however, still looking for a more clearly defined and autonomous role in world politics. Russia has lost considerable influence, which is why Central Asia has become the subject of international competition.

China - regional power, but not a world power

China's economic dynamism collides with the rigid bureaucratic communist dictatorship. Controlled democratization requires skill and pragmatism from the Chinese leadership. The strong influence of nationalism and modern communication systems, both of which work for a unified Chinese state, reduces the likelihood of the extreme case of China's internal disruption.

Economic considerations determine China's interests in the South China Sea (oil storage) and in Central Asia (raw materials) and create a regional sphere of influence. China advocates Northeast Asian economic cooperation including Japan and Korea. In addition, there is the influence of the overseas Chinese: "The more China gains in power and reputation, the more likely the wealthy overseas Chinese will embrace Beijing's aspirations and thus become a powerful vanguard on China's path to becoming a great power."

A China developed into a great power would meet in the West with Russia's cooperation with India in Central Asia and Pakistan in order to ward off its influence. “In the south, the strongest resistance would come from Vietnam and Indonesia (which would probably have the backing of Australia). In the East, America, presumably supported by Japan, would oppose any attempt by China to gain supremacy in Korea and to forcibly incorporate Taiwan, especially since such an act would reduce the US political presence in the Far East to a potentially insecure and remote base in Japan . "

"America is in the eyes of China the currently dominant world power, whose mere presence in the region, based on its dominant position in Japan, curbs China's influence." Brzezinski quotes an analyst in the research department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry: "The strategic goal of the United States is to extend their hegemony to the whole world, and they cannot accept that a great power emerges in Europe or Asia that threatens their leadership position. "Brzinski concludes:" Thus America becomes unwanted, simply by its national identity and geography Situation, China's adversary rather than its natural ally. "

Disputed Territories in the East China Sea

“Accordingly, it is the task of Chinese politics - according to Sun Tsu's strategic insight - to 'use America's power to overcome American hegemony in a peaceful way, without unleashing any latent regional desires of Japan. To this end, China's geostrategy must pursue two goals at the same time, as Deng Xiaoping made clear in a somewhat claused manner in August 1994: “First, counteract hegemony and power politics and ensure world peace; second, to build a new international political and economic order. ”The former is clearly aimed at the United States and seeks to weaken American supremacy while carefully avoiding a military clash that would end China's economic boom; The second demand aims to revise the distribution of power on earth, capitalizing on the displeasure some key states harbor against the current international pecking order, in which the United States ranks at the top, supported by Europe (or Germany) in the far west and from Japan in the far east of Eurasia. "

China must therefore pursue a regional geostrategy that seeks to avoid serious conflicts with its immediate neighbors, even if it continues to strive for supremacy in the region. Therefore, China is trying to "tactically improve" Sino-Russian relations. “It is unlikely, however, that China would seriously consider a long-term and comprehensive alliance with Russia against America. Such an alliance would mean that the US-Japanese partnership, which China is slowly trying to weaken, would gain strength and scope, and would also isolate China from relevant sources of capital and modern technology. "

“As in Sino-Russian relations, it is advisable for China to avoid any direct confrontation with India, even if it continues to maintain its close military cooperation with Pakistan and Burma. A policy of open hostility would have the negative effect of complicating China's tactically advisable agreement with Russia, while also driving India into a more cooperative relationship with America. "

The central goal of China is “to weaken America's power in the region to such an extent that a weakened America will need a regionally dominant China as an ally and ultimately even a world power China as a partner. This goal should be pursued and achieved in a way that neither provokes an expansion of the US-Japanese alliance for defense purposes, nor does Japan's power replace that of the US in the region. In order to achieve this central goal, China seeks to prevent the consolidation and expansion of the American-Japanese security partnership in the short term. "

In China's strategic calculation, however, American hegemony cannot last long. Although some Chinese, especially in military circles, tend to view America as China's bitter enemy, the prevailing assumption in Beijing is that the US is becoming isolated in the region because of its reliance on Japan. This would make them even more dependent on the island state, which also applies to the contradictions in the American-Japanese relationship and American fears of Japanese militarism. This development will enable China to play America and Japan off against each other, as it did earlier in the case of the US and the Soviet Union. Beijing believes the time will come when America realizes that in order to remain an influential power in Asia Pacific, it has no choice but to turn to its natural partner in mainland Asia.

Japan - not regional, but international

The development of the US-Japanese relationship is therefore of crucial importance for China's geopolitical future. American policy on the Far East has been based on Japan since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Initially only an American occupation area, Japan has become the basis for the US politico-military presence in the Asia- Pacific region and an indispensable ally worldwide, but at the same time it has become a protected zone. The emergence of China now raises the question of whether - and for what purpose - the close American-Japanese relationship can endure in the changing regional context. Japan's role in an anti-China alliance would be clear; but what should Japan's role be if one is to take account of China's rise in any way, even at the cost of losing America's hegemony in the region? Like China, Japan is a nation-state with an unwavering belief in its uniqueness and specialty.

The devastating defeat in World War II caused the Japanese people to concentrate exclusively on economic reconstruction without developing any further self-image.

"Japan's current position - on the one hand a globally respected economic giant, on the other hand a geopolitical extension of American power - is unlikely to be acceptable in the long term for future generations of Japanese who are no longer traumatized and shamed by the experience of World War II."

The most important bases of the USA in Japan

Japan is politically isolated in the region. In contrast to Europe, there is no comparable “Asia”. "Although democracy has prevailed in various Asian countries in recent years, Japan is more of an outsider in the Asia-Pacific region due to its insular past and also because of its current democratic system." Many Asians see Japan as "not a truly Asian country, just as the West is sometimes amazed at the extent to which Japan has adopted Western traits. ”In addition, Japan will continue to rely on the military protection and international patronage of the USA in the future.

According to Shigeru Yoshida's doctrine , Japan has in the past concentrated on its economic development, stayed out of international conflicts and follows the leadership of the USA. Japanese diplomacy should be directed towards international cooperation without ideological orientation. In addition, there was the fiction of a “semi-neutrality”. Despite a lively discussion of reorientation since the mid-1990s, the recommendations at the level of official politics were relatively sober. "The general public, and undoubtedly influential business circles, instinctively feel that neither option (pacifist or armament) is a real political alternative and that both would essentially only endanger Japan's prosperity." The four main groups of Japanese foreign policy are advocates of one "America first" but with an emphasis on closer Japanese-Chinese relations, the business-oriented global mercantilists, the cosmopolitan pragmatists of a more independent international commitment (from the mid-1990s) and the global political visionaries, who only contribute idealistic rhetoric about Japan's international responsibility. “Ultimately, however, all four have one goal in common and they share the same concern: to use the special relationship with the USA to gain international recognition for Japan, while avoiding hostilities in Asia and not prematurely jeopardizing the US security umbrella “All four directions agree on one key regional issue: that more multilateral Asia-Pacific cooperation is in Japan's interest. Such cooperation could, over time, bear fruit in three ways: it can involve China (and also subtly contain it); it can persuade the US to remain present in Asia even if its supremacy wanes, and it can help to reduce anti-Japanese resentment and thus strengthen Japan's influence. "

“There is also agreement among the representatives of the four points of view mentioned above that a cautious effort to improve relations with China is clearly preferable to any attempt by America to curb its power directly. The idea of ​​a US-led defense strategy against China is not well received by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and neither is the idea of ​​an informal coalition limited to the island states of Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia as a counterweight to China. According to the Japanese view, any effort of this kind would not only require a substantial American military presence indefinitely in both Japan and Korea, but - since geopolitical interests dangerously overlap with those of the US-Japanese alliance - would probably eventually move to Meaning of a self-fulfilling prophecy, a collision with China after itself. The consequence of this would be that Japan's emancipation would be made more difficult and the economic prosperity of the Far East threatened. ”“ If the US withdrew from the Far East and Taiwan and Korea came under Chinese rule, Japan would be at the mercy of China for better or for worse. This is not an attractive prospect, except perhaps for a few extremists. Since Russia has been marginalized geopolitically and has always enjoyed little respect in Japan, there is therefore no alternative to the basic consensus that ties to America remain Japan's central lifeline. Without them, Japan can neither secure its oil supply nor protect itself against a single Chinese (and perhaps soon a Korean) atomic bomb. Basically, Japanese politics can only be about using the relationship with the USA for the best possible benefit of the country. "

America's adaptation to the geopolitical situation

“It should be the job of American politics to ensure that Japan makes such a choice and that China's rise to dominant position in the region does not preclude a solid three-way balance of power in East Asia. The endeavor to get along with both Japan and China and to maintain a sustainable triangular relationship that also includes America will put American diplomatic skills and political imagination to the test. "

Geostrategic conclusions are not to form a coalition to prevent China from becoming a world power. So America should stop pushing Japan to take greater responsibility in the Asia-Pacific region. "Efforts in this direction only inhibit the development of a stable relationship between Japan and China, while isolating Japan even further in the region." China should be treated as a major player on the international stage.

“In any case, Greater China could exert geopolitical influence in some areas of Eurasia that is compatible with America's soaring geostrategic interest in a stable but politically pluralistic Eurasia. For example, China's growing interest in Central Asia inevitably restricts Russia's freedom of action when attempting to regain control of the region in some form of political reintegration. "

The US should also not oppose China's regional plans. Because of Taiwan, however, it would have to intervene, “not for the sake of an independent Taiwan (...), but because of its own geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. This is an important difference. The United States per se has no particular interest in a separate Taiwan. In fact, their official position was (and that shouldn't change) that there is only one China. But how China is reunifying can affect America's vital interests, and the Chinese must be clear about that. The Taiwan problem also gives America a legitimate reason to negotiate human rights issues with China without being accused of interfering in China's domestic affairs. It is absolutely appropriate to keep repeating to Beijing that reunification will only come about when the Chinese people are materially better off and democratic reforms have taken place. Only a China that is ready to become a confederation based on the principle of "one country, different systems" will be attractive to Taiwan and be able to assimilate it. Because of Taiwan, it is definitely in China's own interest to give more respect to human rights and in this context America should definitely raise the issue. "

Korea, the geopolitical hub in Northeast Asia, could again become the bone of contention between America and China, and its future will have an immediate impact on US-Japan relations. As long as Korea is divided and prone to war between the unstable North Korea and the increasingly wealthy South, US forces will have to remain stationed on the peninsula. Any unilateral US withdrawal would likely not only trigger a new war, but also herald the end of the American military presence in Japan. It is difficult to imagine that the Japanese would expect much more US troops on Japanese soil after the Americans have given up South Korea. A rapid arming of Japan would be the most likely consequence, with a destabilizing effect for the entire region.

In the meantime, a real reconciliation between Japan and Korea would be instrumental in creating a more stable regional environment conducive to reunification of the divided country. A real reconciliation between Japan and Korea would mitigate the various international complications that could arise from Korean reunification and lead to an increasingly cooperative and binding political relationship. The US could play a crucial role in bringing about such a reconciliation. The many individual steps that first brought about Franco-German reconciliation and later that between Germany and Poland (for example from academic exchanges to joint military associations) could also be undertaken here. A comprehensive Japanese-Korean partnership that would have a positive impact on regional stability would, in turn, facilitate a permanent US presence in the Far East, even after Korean reunification.

“A disoriented Japan, vacillating between rearmament or a special agreement with China, meant the end of America's role in the Asia-Pacific region and prevented the creation of a regionally stable triangular agreement between America, Japan and China; this would also mean that the US plan to establish a political balance in Eurasia would be invalid. "

“Only in a close alliance with Japan will the USA be able to balance China's regional aspirations and curb their more arbitrary excesses. On this basis alone, a complicated, tripartite agreement can come about - one that takes into account America's world power, China's overweight in the region, and Japan's international leadership. "

“Japan should be the indispensable and priority partner for America in building global cooperation, who will work with it on the new program of world politics. In the traditional sphere of power politics, a regionally outstanding China should become America's Far Eastern anchor and thereby help promote a Eurasian balance of power, whereby Greater China's role in eastern Eurasia corresponds to that of an expanding Europe in Eurasia's west. "

Reviews and reception

Hans-Dietrich Genscher assessed Brzezinski's analysis in the foreword in 1997 as an "American answer that stimulates thought, approval, but also contradiction." Brzezinski's openly expressed conviction that the global presence of the USA is not only in America, but also in the global interest, is correct and confirmed by the European experiences of the 20th century. The USA continues to be the "indispensable" nation. Europeans should keep asking themselves whether there really is “too much America” or rather “too little Europe”. Genscher sees Brzezinski's strategy as an attempt to create new structures in world politics through dialogue and rapprochement (with China and Russia), which is not possible without the participation of the USA in cooperation with a strengthened Europe. But Genscher also points out that striving for supremacy always creates opposing forces.

The former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote in his review on October 31, 1997 in Die Zeit that the title alone made "a highly provocative American self-confidence" abundantly clear. Brzezinski's global horizon is praised, but he underestimates " Black Africa , Latin America and the highly significant religions of Islam and Hinduism as well as Confucianism in their global weights". China's future role is greatly underestimated. Despite many correct partial analyzes, Brzezinski's book neglects the economic dynamics of important states as well as future population growth and the conflicts that will become inevitable with it. Likewise, the future effects of electronic globalization would not be sufficiently appreciated. Schmidt warns against adopting Brzezinski's objective or the conviction that “what is good for the USA is eo ipso good for peace and the welfare of the world.” For the “continental European citizens (should) America's claim to dominance raised by Brzezinski should be an additional incentive for the further expansion of the European Union towards a self-determined Europe. "

In his review for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Volker Rühe described the book as a “bold and probably also provocative, at the same time excellent and valuable contribution” to a new “way of thinking in the categories of dialogue and exchange, regional and global cooperation, networking of business and politics ". In his opinion, the work should be studied in "Science, the media and, last but not least, governments". Rühe analyzes the author's intention to maintain supremacy in Eurasia, is not an end in itself, but an essential prerequisite for global stability. In Brzezinski's opinion, America must commit itself to creating a permanent framework for global geopolitical cooperation. Brzezinski wanted to preserve the position of power of the United States in order to let it merge in an institutionalized, worldwide cooperation in the long term.

Oliver Thränert from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung also finds in his review that the book is “already worth reading”. It is knowledgeable, often historically substantiated, never boring and always follows the guideline of the American national interest, which is somewhat unusual for the German reader. In his opinion, the strategy developed by Brzeziński is “coherent and truly forward-looking”, but also “in many ways woodcut”, which reduces its value for science.

Chris Luenen, head of the geopolitical program at the Global Policy Institute in London, advocated in a guest article in Die Zeit (from 2014) that Europe should turn away from the US strategy based on Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard , as neither US policy towards the Ukraine and Russia are still America's grand strategy as such in the interests of Europe or world peace. It is also not in conformity with the realities of a rapidly changing world. “It is often argued that Europe, and especially Germany, has to choose between a pro-Atlantic and a pro-Russian / Eurasian orientation. This is not the case at all. Europe should not shape its foreign policy on the basis of emotional images of friends and foes, but on that of a sober interest policy. "

Spykman: Rimland and Heartland

Sabine Feiner, lecturer at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Regensburg, sees Brzeznski's geostrategy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Halford Mackinder (" Heartland theory ") and Nicholas J. Spykmans ("Rimland") in her dissertation . The power-political component, which is rooted in imperialism and social Darwinism of the 19th century, Brzezinski transcends through the vision of a higher justification in which he identifies the national interest of the USA with the interest of the world. Although the focus is on the world, the national US American perspective remains the decisive starting point for consideration. To pursue world politics in the tradition of Bismarck seems to Feiner anachronistic, also the vocabulary ("tributary", "vassals", "hegemon") is inappropriate. She sees the moral dimension of his portrayal based on a trust in the historical power of the USA, whose fatefulness is not questioned but understood as providence: “The moral dimension and the associated obligation to world leadership in Brzezinski becomes clear when he takes this position attempted to portray it not as the result of an intended US policy, but as a historical coincidence. […] With the interpretation that the US's global political engagement is not the result of its national interests, but has been assigned to it by a higher authority, “history”, understood as providence, Brzezinski gives the US position a moral exaggeration, like it can be found in the American tradition of exceptionalism in general. ”In his review , Heinz Brill stated that Feiner's work was a bit too theory-heavy . The emergence, development and evaluation of Brzezinski's “global political concept” were, however, extremely successful. "The work is a pioneering achievement for the German-speaking area."

The publicist Hauke ​​Ritz took the view that Brzezinski's premises of the geopolitical analyzes in The Grand Chessboard were wrong, despite their intrinsic logic and their high persuasive power. Eurasia is not a chessboard. “Much more important than the question of whether the 21st century will be American, European or Chinese is the question on which premises we want to base the life of the human species in the 21st century. The USA have already submitted their proposals with Guantánamo and the Green Zone in Baghdad. It is now Europe's turn. Europe has the strength and the ability to bury US plans for world conquest. And Europe should do this in the interests of civilization too. "

Emmanuel Todd analyzed Brzezinski's geopolitical strategy in his World Power USA: An Obituary (2002). Todd considers Brzezinski to be the most astute strategy theorist "despite his apparent disinterest in economic issues." The imperial rule of America is no longer in keeping with the times, because due to the size, complexity and rapid change in the world, permanent supremacy of a single state is no longer accepted. The US's dependence on other countries has meanwhile grown significantly. America tries to cover up its decline with a "theatrical military actionism". In reality, it is about securing resources. The fight against terrorism, against Iraq and against the "axis of evil" is only a pretext, a sign of weakness. Europe and Russia, Japan and China are growing into decisive strategic actors who relativize the supremacy of the USA. He sees another flaw in Brzezinski's analysis in the complete elimination of Israel. With regard to Ukraine, Todd is more likely to agree with Samuel P. Huntington , who considers its cultural tendency towards Russia to be stronger. “… [M] angels having a dynamic of their own, she (Ukraine) cannot escape Russian influence without falling under that of another power. The American sphere is too far away and materially too little present to balance the Russian weight. Europe with Germany as its core is a real economic power, but not dominant in military and political terms. If Europe is striving for an influential position in Ukraine, it is not in its interest to turn it into a satellite, since Europe needs Russia as an antipole to the USA if it wants to emancipate itself from American guardianship. "

Brezinski's draft as the basis for US foreign policy

In Russia Brzezinski was perceived as an influential political advisor. Its geopolitical strategy was seen in Moscow as a blueprint for the USA's path to world domination. NATO's eastward expansion and the policy towards Ukraine were seen as confirmation of this strategy.

expenditure

The page numbers in the text refer to the following edition:

  • Zbigniew Brzeziński: The only world power: America's strategy of domination . 4th edition. S. Fischer Verlag, 2001, ISBN 978-3-596-14358-0 .

Other editions:

  • Zbigniew Brzeziński: The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives . Basic Books, New York 1997, ISBN 3-88679-303-6 .
  • Zbigniew Brzeziński: The only world power: America's strategy of domination . 1st edition. Kopp Verlag, Rottenburg 2015, ISBN 978-3-86445-249-9 (269 pages).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: A Geostrategy for Eurasia . In: Foreign Affairs . September 1, 1997 ( foreignaffairs.com [accessed December 23, 2016]).
  2. ^ A b c Zbigniew Brzeziński: The only world power: America's strategy of domination . 4th edition. S. Fischer Verlag, 2001, ISBN 978-3-596-14358-0 .
  3. ↑ "America stands unchallenged in the four decisive domains of global power: its worldwide military presence is unparalleled, economically speaking it remains the engine of global growth, even if Japan and Germany may pose a challenge in some areas (although neither of the two countries, of course the other characteristics of a world power); it maintains its technological edge in the groundbreaking areas of innovation, and despite a few mistakes, its culture continues to enjoy unsurpassed approval worldwide, especially among young people. All of this gives the United States of America a political clout that no other state can even begin to match. It is the interaction of these four criteria that makes America the only global superpower in the broadest sense. ”(P. 44)
  4. ↑ “A huge, sparsely populated, currently politically unstable and organizationally disintegrating middle space extends between the western and eastern fringes , which was formerly occupied by a powerful competitor of the USA - an adversary who was once committed to America To push out Eurasia. South of this large central Urasian plateau lies a politically anarchic region, but rich in energy reserves, which could become very important for both the European and the East Asian states and which has a populous state in the extreme south that is striving for regional hegemony. "(P. 57f., Emphasis placed by Gabel 1960)
  5. ^ A new type of hegemony . In: Die Zeit , No. 45/1997
  6. ↑ Volker Rühe : Stability through a new balance . In: FAZ , November 26, 1997
  7. ↑ Oliver Thränert: Politics and Society Online. In: Friedrich Ebert Foundation . 1998, accessed November 5, 2013 .
  8. ^ Leadership Archives - Global Policy Institute. (No longer available online.) In: Global Policy Institute. Archived from the original on December 25, 2016 ; Retrieved December 23, 2016 (American English). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.gpilondon.com
  9. ^ Global Policy Institute - London Metropolitan University. In: Global Policy Institute. Retrieved December 23, 2016 (American English).
  10. ↑ Chris Luenen: Europe has to readjust its relations with the USA. In: Zeit Online . June 6, 2014, accessed July 18, 2014 .
  11. ↑ Sabine Feiner: World Order through US Leadership? The conception of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski . West German Publishing House, Wiesbaden 2000.
  12. ↑ Either America leads, or the world sinks into chaos: - WORLD. In: THE WORLD. Retrieved December 23, 2016 .
  13. ↑ Hauke ​​Ritz: The world as a chessboard. The new Cold War by Obama adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski . In: hinter.de. August 26, 2008; Abridged version in sheets for German and international politics . Issue 7, 2008, pp. 53-69
  14. ↑ Joseph Laurence Black: Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts Or Bearing Arms . Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, ISBN 0-8476-9866-1 , p. 11 ff.