Zwickau mine disaster in 1960
The Zwickau mine accident in 1960 at the Karl Marx hard coal works was the worst mine accident in the GDR . On February 22, 1960, at 8:20 a.m., a firedamp and coal dust explosion occurred in the 1st Department , which set off a mine fire. As a result, 123 miners were killed directly and indirectly .
Situation and situation before the accident
The 1st department of the Karl Marx plant was located on the northeastern border of the mine field and marked a separation with the neighboring plant to the east. There the mining in the Tiefen Planitzer seam was already finished in the years 1954/55. In 1960 two struts were in operation in the 1st division, the 816 cIII mining, which was carried out towards the shaft and would shortly expire, and the 816 cIII mining, which was carried out in the lower section of the Tiefen Planitz seam. As a connection for the expiring shortly 816 CIII cleardown was located in the middle section of the depths Planitzer seam, over the pneumatic stowing of 819 e -Abbaues and from about 3 m by a powerful intermediate means 819 separately, c cleardown in the device. For this purpose, a connection, the 819 c -Wetterberg, had already been created between the head and foot sections and the Strebgasse had been driven parallel to the field.
The neighboring Old Man of the Martin-Hoop-work was by hand offset been carried out, which the emergence of Schleich bettors favored and a possible fire damp source showed.
The 1st department was a substation and was connected to the main floor via blind shafts 6, 7 and 8 . It was about 1000 meters deep . The mining method of the 1st division was longwall mining with carving and blow-off. The coal collisions were drilled and shot, then the coal was loaded with shovels ("Weiberarsch") onto the mining conveyor ( tank conveyor ) and transported on this to the footpath. The broken coals of the 819 wing were conveyed to the 820 filling bunker via the 819 foot section and the 818 c dropping site. This is where the flow met that of the 816 wing. The coal was withdrawn from the filling bunker into the 820 cross passage and transported from there to the filling location of the blind shaft 8. In the blind shaft 8, the coal was lifted to the fourth level, the main conveying level, and fed from there to the shaft 1 . Almost 1/4 (460 to 2000 t) of the daily output of the plant came from the 1st department.
Self-rescuers for the miners were available in sufficient numbers (two per miner) and were stored in boxes in the miners' immediate work environment in accordance with the safety guidelines of the time.
Morgenstern VI
To the north of the 1st department, a few hundred meters away, there was the Morgenstern VI weather shaft, which was started in 1943 but closed in 1945 due to the war and therefore unfinished . Since the Brückenberg-Steinkohlenbauverein had belonged to the Morgenstern union as an operations department since 1920, the technical management of the company had planned a joint solution for the weather management in the northern part of the combined mine field . When funds for the completion of this shaft were available again after the war , the dismantling had already progressed so far that its completion and connection to the mine building would no longer have been economical. With some probability this shaft, as an extending weather shaft, would have improved weather management so that the accumulation of firedamp would have been much less likely.
course
On the morning of February 22, 1960, 178 miners had entered the 1st department. These were distributed over the two running struts, the device of the 819c strut as well as bunkers, blind shafts and filling locations. In addition, several were still shooting Hauer , with their mates go to the shooting locations sailed .
As the accident investigation carried out later showed, the initial ignition was caused by improper shooting work in the so-called runway in the 819 cI footpath. Here was already in the previous layer surge been drilled, both the carbon bank and the deaf lying . The gunner "X" filled all the holes, but only shot the coal so that it would not mix with the dead rock . After the coal has been conveyed away, the lying rock bank should then be shot.
This blast acted as the initial spark for the suspected fire weather accumulation. The resulting firedamp explosion whirled up the coal dust and caused it to explode. As a result of the two explosions, there were fires at the 820 filling bunker and a solid wood pillar at the foot of the filling bunker in the 820 cross passage. The fire spots were in the incoming fresh weather stream and were therefore distributed throughout the entire department, then they moved over the blind shaft 7 to the main weather floor , the III. Sole, and from there to shaft III , the main weather shaft of the plant.
The explosion suddenly consumed almost all of the oxygen in the 1st division and the miners in the 819 wing died immediately without even having a chance to use the self-rescuers. Almost all of the miners of the 816 wing were able to save themselves via blind shaft 7 with self-rescuers in place. Eight mountain apprentices who were busy with renovation work on the weathering floor , partly suffocated with self-rescuers due to lack of oxygen.
Rescue work
The first reports of an explosion reached the main dispatcher of the plant at 8:20 a.m., who immediately set the rescue chain in motion. At 8.35 am, the chief of the mine rescue team, who was underground at the time of the explosion, reported the fire on the solid wooden pillar of the western filling point bypass of blind shaft 32. The alarmed works mine rescue team was ready at 8.40 am; the first two groups pulled in at 8:45 a.m.
An operational command was formed and further mine rescue services were requested. These came from the neighboring works of the Saxon coal mining area, the Wismut , from the ore mining of the GDR ( tin and lead ore Freiberg , copper shale Mansfeld ) and the Borna lignite mining. By the evening of February 22nd, there were 460 mine guards in Zwickau who were relieving themselves while working underground. A mine rescue team from the Czechoslovak hard coal district of Ostrava reinforced the forces deployed on Wednesday.
On February 22nd, the mine fighters had the following assignments: to investigate the situation, rescue miners, fight fires and rescue the dead in the accessible areas.
Fighting the fire turned out to be incredibly difficult because two sources of fire had to be fought at the same time, there was not enough extinguishing water available and in addition to the already high temperature underground, there was also the waste heat from the fire and the evaporated extinguishing water.
On February 22, around 5 p.m., two men were rescued at the 817 mountain bunker head. As it turned out later, these were the last survivors. On the afternoon of February 23, 17 dead were recovered. 55 miners had saved themselves or had been rescued by the mine rescue team and 106 men were still missing. The 106 missing people were all located in the area behind the two fire sources, which was not accessible. The other operations of the mine rescue team therefore concentrated on fire fighting in order to be able to establish access to the locked areas. With the help of special equipment from the Czech mine rescue service, panels were erected and sealed with latex foam to cut off the fresh air supply to the fire, a method that was new at the time.
On the evening of February 27, 1960, the government commission that had been formed in the meantime decided to give up the 1st department and to contain it in order to smother the fire. At this point, there was no longer any hope for the missing miners. In the meantime, 51 dead had been recovered and 72 men were still missing.
Investigations into the cause of the accident
As early as 1960 it was decided to completely open up the 1st department again in order to determine the cause of the accident. The Ministry of State Security was responsible for investigations in the event of major accidents, and it used the time until the opening to train its own employees for work underground and to enable them to use respiratory equipment for the mine rescue service.
It was also decided not to resume dismantling in the 1st department. The only purpose of the processing was to determine the cause of the accident. The fire dams were regularly driven over and sampled.
The old man of the Martin-Hoop-Werk was also sealed off from his side with wall dams, otherwise creeping weather could have kept the fire alive.
Before opening, the fire area should be flushed with inert gas in order to smother any remaining embers.
Opening of the 1st department
On February 26, 1961, a year after the accident, the 1st Division began to flush out the mine workings . From 6:00 a.m., a total of 31,615 m³ of a nitrogen-argon mixture was passed through the dammed mine field for 24 hours. 132 miners with appropriate equipment were available for the work.
On February 28, 1961, the dam was opened in the 821 cross passage. The mine rescue team systematically repaired the pipelines and other infrastructure and pushed further and further into the fire area. More weatherproof dams were built so that the secured areas can be entered without breathing apparatus.
In every mine rescue team there was an MfS employee who secured traces of found situations analogous to crime scenes and documented them photographically and in writing. If a corpse was found, the work was stopped and employees of the murder investigation commission of the criminal police and the MfS first carried out a forensic investigation.
On March 13, 1961, the apron was secured to such an extent that the actual clearing work could begin.
Where the timber construction had burned, cracks had fallen. In addition, the strut as well as the head and foot sections were deformed due to the long standing time. These areas had to be dealt with and expanded. Finally, the dam in the 816-Wetterberg could be opened, which enabled continuous weather management and the need for special ventilation could be dispensed with.
By September 1, 1961, 9 dead had been found and rescued - in the 820 cross passage and in the 816 foot route. The 816 wing was thus cleared and the new opening of a weather connection between the 816 trunk axis and the 816 Wetterberg enabled the entire 816 wing to be thrown off , thus simplifying weather management. 63 dead were still to be found; these could only be in the 819 wing.
Right at the beginning of the 819 head section there was a severe break that could not be overcome. Therefore, the rescue teams worked their way over the 818 c fall location to the 819 foot section, from there to the 819 c weather mountain and the 819 e strut, then from there back to the 819 head section in the direction of the break. A total of 66 bodies were found. The dead that were not found were suspected to be among the broken masses.
The corpses found were placed in airtight coffins on site and brought to the surface. For the mine rescue people Disinfection locks were set up their discarded clothes were in sealed Hunten discharged and disinfected there and washed. Because of the psychological and physical strain, the mine fighters received medical and psychological support both underground and underground.
This work was completed on May 12, 1962. The 819 wing was then dropped.
Sadness
The government of the GDR declared state mourning for February 27, 1960. At 12 noon, work rested for two minutes across the country, flags were half-masted and all the bells were ringing in Zwickau. A memorial plaque with the names of the dead and missing miners was set up on the city's central event square, Stalinplatz (today Platz der Völkerfreundschaft), which thousands passed by to lay wreaths or flowers and to express their condolences. Dance and carnival events had been canceled, shops and restaurants were closed between 10.30 a.m. and 1 p.m.
The state mourning ceremony took place in Lindenhof , for which Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl gave the funeral speech. In addition to the members and representatives of the Karl-Marx-Werk, other government representatives and mourners took part.
The dead recovered up to then were buried in their hometowns, as were the dead recovered and identified a year later after the opening of the 1st department. For the 11 unidentified and the 6 not recovered dead, a common tombstone was erected in 1963 in the Zwickau main cemetery. Since 1990, every year on February 22nd, the miners have been commemorating their comrades here. On the 60th anniversary of the disaster in 2020, all bells in the city rang after a memorial service in the Moritzkirche.
Memorial at the main cemetery in Zwickau
Memorial plaque on the winding machine building Shaft I
Silent Remembrance on the 60th Anniversary, 2020
consequences
In evaluating the disaster, various measures were taken to improve security. Among other things, the self-rescuers now had to be constantly carried on the man. At the time of the accident in 1960, a total of 356 rescuers were stationed in the 1st division, 132 of them in the 819 wing, 104 in the 816 wing and 120 at various central points, each in boxes.
See also
literature
- Karl-Heinz Baraniak, Klaus Hertel, Thomas Klemm, Wolfgang Ulbricht, Silvia Teichert, Wilfried Stoye: The mine disaster in the VEB coal plant "Karl Marx" Zwickau on February 22, 1960 . Ed .: Zwickau Coal Mining Association eV / City of Zwickau. Zschiesche GmbH, Wilkau-Haßlau 2010, ISBN 978-3-9813511-0-1 .
- Hans Häber: The explosion . 8:20 a.m. at a depth of 1,000 meters: The mining accident of February 22nd, 1960 in Zwickau: contemporary witnesses, documents, and fate experts. A non-fiction book about a tragic fate and the rumor of the "suicide" of the shooter Y. Band 1 + 2 . DENKart, Gorzów 2011, ISBN 978-3-00-030673-0 (2nd volume with a detailed collection of sources from the BStU documentation).
- Thomas Klemm: The catastrophe of February 22nd, 1960 . The novel about the mine disaster in the VEB coal works "Karl Marx" Zwickau. Grimma 2008.
- Collective of authors: From the Brückenbergschächten to the VEB Steinkohlenwerk Karl Marx Zwickau 1859–1959 . Printing works progress, Erfurt 1960, p. 200 (operating history. Epilogue to the catastrophe).
- Author collective: The coal mining in the Zwickau area . Ed .: Steinkohlenbergbauverein Zwickau eV Förster & Borries, Zwickau 2000, ISBN 3-00-006207-6 , p. 148, 395, 396 .
Movies
- Kerstin Mauersberger, Jürgen Ast: Death in the Shaft - Zwickau 1960. Report from the series Forgotten Catastrophes , MDR 2002 (the film shows uncommented authentic material mixed with mine rescue training films and other recordings, in some cases facts are not reproduced correctly)
Individual evidence
- ↑ Süddeutsche Zeitung: 60 years ago: Mine accident in the GDR claimed 123 lives. In: sueddeutsche.de. Süddeutsche.de, accessed on February 20, 2020 .
Web links
Remarks
- ↑ The authors of The Pit Catastrophe in the VEB Steinkohlenwerk "Karl Marx" Zwickau from February 22, 1960 consistently write "Sprengmeister". In the original minutes of the Ministry of State Security cited in the same book, the term “gunner” is used. Häber writes about the "shooter". In all three cases the same people are mentioned. In the contemporary textbook “G. Lathan: Drilling and shooting in the mining industry . tape II . Fachbuchverlag, Leipzig 1958, p. 58 ff . “The terms shooting master, shooting tiller and authorized shooting are used, plus chief shooting master and shooting climber. Furthermore, the demolition master (above ground) is separated from the shooting master (underground). (P. 59) Since it cannot be proven for the group of people considered here (“X”, “Y” and “Z”) that they had taken up the “profession of a shooting master” (p. 58), the following is the contemporary Designation shooter may be used as a minimum qualification.
- ↑ The term coal bank is the name for the coal-bearing part of a coal seam . (Source: Carl Friedrich Alexander Hartmann: Vademecum for the practical miner. )
- ↑ The operations management was formed at 8.45 a.m. and consisted of 15 people: Köhler (main director VVB Steinkohle), Eilhauer (works director KMW), Gibbels (deputy head of the supreme mining authority), Zwiekirsch (head of the mining authority), Lichtenberger (mining authority). ), Gronau (techn. Ltr. VVB Steinkohle), Westhäuser, Denner (both main mine rescue services), Schumann (director of the mining clinic Zw.), Simon (company doctor), Wirth (SED city management), Müller (SED company organization), Proske ( Chairman BGL) and Zahn (District Board FDGB). The command remained in place until March 3, 1960 at 6 p.m.
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