Hippias maior

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Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

The Hippias maior or Hippias I ( ancient Greek Ἱππίας μείζων Hippías meízōn , German "the Greater Hippias" or "the Great Hippias") is an ancient literary dialogue . It is said to have come from Plato , but its authenticity has been disputed since the 19th century. The designation Hippias maior is used to distinguish it from Hippias minor , the "smaller" or "little" Hippias, a shorter and therefore called smaller dialogue, which according to the prevailing research opinion is a real work of Plato.

It is a fictional philosophical conversation. Plato's teacher Socrates discusses with the sophist Hippias von Elis , after whom the dialogue is named. The topic is the question of the definition of the " beautiful ". The term “beautiful” is understood in a broad, not only aesthetic sense, it also includes beautiful relationships and actions. Some ill-conceived attempts at definition by the philosophically untrained Hippias prove to be unsuitable, but the five proposals that Socrates then put forward fail because of the objections that he himself raises against them. In the end, a satisfactory solution is not in sight, the dialogue ends in perplexity ( aporia ). The course of the conversation shows not only the difficulty of the problem, but also the fundamental difference in the way of thinking of the two debaters. The analytical, abstracting approach of Socrates is completely alien to the pragmatist Hippias.

The philosophical quality is assessed differently in research; The assessments range from the classification as an entertaining mind game to the assumption of a hidden profundity.

Place, time and participants

Socrates (Roman bust, 1st century, Louvre , Paris)

The debate takes place in an unspecified location in Athens . The time is difficult to tell; is likely to be from the period 421-416 BC. To think in which the fictional dialogue plot of Little Hippias falls. At that time there was the Peace of Nicias , which interrupted the Peloponnesian War for a few years. Hippias announces that he will give a speech the day after tomorrow and invites Socrates to do so. Probably the public lecture ( Epideixis ) is meant, which gave rise to the debate reproduced in the Smaller Hippias . Accordingly, the conversation reproduced in Greater Hippias took place two days before the conversation illustrated in Lesser Hippias .

Only two people are involved in the dialogue, Socrates and Hippias. Hippias of Elis was a historical figure. He was a well-known sophist, that is, a teacher who gave lessons to young people from the upper class for a fee and, in particular, taught them the art of skillful, convincing public appearance. His eloquence also earned him public commissions; he served as envoy for his hometown of Elis . To what extent the author has given his dialogue figure traits of historical Hippias - a versatile personality - is unclear; perhaps in places he put the opinion of the historical model in her mouth. The variety of interests and knowledge of the sophist and his astonishing memory are praised in dialogue as well as in the Little Hippias - albeit with ironic intent; this representation seems to correspond to the impression that the historical Hippias made on his contemporaries.

content

The introductory talk

Socrates greets Hippias, who has returned to Athens after a long time. The visitor tells of his frequent legation trips and his teaching activities, which give him a high income. In his excessive self-confidence he places himself above the traditionally revered Seven Wise Men and famous philosophers like Anaxagoras . He speaks disparagingly of the wise men of the past who did not understand how to turn their knowledge into money. He attributes the fact that some of them stayed out of politics to their ineptitude. In order not to arouse envy, he refrains from publicly proclaiming his supposed superiority over the famous wise men, but before Socrates he lets his vanity run free and is reinforced by him. Only in Sparta , according to his report, did he earn nothing, because teaching by strangers is prohibited there by law. The Spartans keep the education of their youth in their own hands.

Thereupon Socrates takes the perspective of Hippias and criticizes the Spartan legislation from this point of view: It is a mistake, since it withholds the best instruction from the youth when Hippias is really so highly qualified. The letter of the law thwarted its purpose of shaping the educational system in the best possible way, and was therefore actually objectively "illegal" if one proceeded from the meaning of the legislation. Hippias reluctantly agrees to the provocative condemnation of the famous Spartan legislation and education. This arises from his own claims, as Socrates has shown, but it is incompatible with the usual high esteem for Spartan education. The contrast between his self-image and conventional, generally accepted ideas, which he is reluctant to contradict, puts Hippias into a dilemma.

The problem

Socrates takes the opportunity to ask his apparently well-educated interlocutor a question. He says that in a recent conversation he praised some things as beautiful and others as ugly. Thereupon someone mockingly embarrassed him by demanding a reason for these ratings and a definition of the term “beautiful”. According to his account, Socrates was at a loss in this situation. Therefore he decided to ask a knowledgeable person for instruction. Hippias assures that he can easily clarify this and that he also knows sound answers to far more difficult questions. Socrates explains to him that the question of definition is simply aimed at “the beautiful”, that is, not at individual beautiful things, but at that which gives beauty to everything beautiful. The noun to kalón , “the beautiful”, and the corresponding adjective and the associated adverb not only denote the aesthetically pleasing in ancient Greek, but are also often used in a broad, figurative sense, similar to the German word “beautiful” and corresponding words in other modern languages. What is meant is something that appears to be good, enjoyable or right, such as a beautiful life or a beautiful death.

The attempts at definition of Hippias

Hippias does not understand the difference between the concrete and the abstract as explained by Socrates, because abstract thinking is alien to him. He thinks something beautiful is being asked, and that is a beautiful girl for him. Socrates points out that this does not answer his friend's question, because the girl is beautiful herself, but it is not the cause of the beauty of others. A jug can also be called beautiful under certain circumstances, and that has nothing to do with the girl. Hippias reluctantly admits this, although it seems inappropriate to him to use the same word for a person and a commodity. This already shows the relativity of the use of the term, which Socrates now, quoting the philosopher Heraclitus , illustrates with another example: the most beautiful monkey is ugly in comparison with humans and the most beautiful human being appears like an ape in comparison with the gods. The beautiful girl can also be described as ugly. Its beauty does nothing to clarify the question of what is absolutely beautiful.

In order to do justice to the question, Hippias tries to find something more general and calls it gold. It is the factor that creates beauty, because everything adorned with gold appears beautiful, even if it looks otherwise ugly. Socrates objects that the sculptor Pheidias did not make the famous statue of the goddess Athena in the Parthenon , whose beauty everyone recognizes, from gold. The face, hands and feet are made of ivory, stones were used for the eyes, so the whole thing looks better than if all the parts were made of gold. Thus, beauty does not depend solely on a particular material; Even stones can be part of something beautiful. Hippias agrees and then changes his definition of beauty: something can only be beautiful if it is also suitable. When something fits, it creates beauty. Here Socrates cites the objection he expects from his critical acquaintance: wood is more suitable than gold for an object such as a mixing ladle. According to this, fig wood could possibly be more beautiful than gold if one follows Hippias' suggested definition. Hippias now sees the problem: If something relatively beautiful is inferior to something else in terms of beauty and is therefore comparatively unattractive, it cannot be absolutely beautiful.

After these failures, Hippias tries to find a completely different way out. He remembers that the concept of the beautiful is not limited to the field of aesthetics, but is also used for conditions and processes. Following this idea, he now determines as the most beautiful of all the successful life of a man who is rich and healthy, enjoys general admiration among the Greeks, reaches an old age, organizes an impressive funeral for his parents and receives a splendid burial from his children. But Socrates is dissatisfied with that too. He replies that if he suggests this to his acquaintance, who has demanded a definition of the beautiful, as a solution, he will laugh at him, maybe even curse him and beat him up because he still refuses to answer the question about the absolutely beautiful, and instead just give a concrete example. Besides, it is by no means nice for everyone to be buried; a funeral was out of the question for the gods and their children. For a hero like Achilles , death in battle is more beautiful than growing old.

Attempts at definition by Socrates

After Hippias failed with his attempts at definition, Socrates takes on the role of the proposer. In doing so, he again refers to his acquaintance, who sometimes takes pity on him and gives him suggestions when he - Socrates - turns out to be helpless because of his ignorance and inexperience in philosophical thinking. Such an impetus is the suggestion to equate the origin of all beauty with what is appropriate , decent or worthy (prépon) . This thought is now being examined. A new problem arises here. Something appropriate can simulate beauty; for example, suitable clothing can make an unattractive person look more attractive. So there are cases in which the appropriate does not create beauty, but creates the appearance of a beauty that is not really there. It makes no difference to Hippias, because being beautiful and appearing beautiful are the same for him. However, Socrates refutes this equation with the argument that beauty would then always be immediately evident for everyone, so that there could be no differences of opinion among people about its existence. It turns out that what creates a beautiful appearance cannot at the same time be what creates real beauty. This attempt at definition fails because of this.

Socrates' next suggestion is to equate the beautiful with the useful. Beautiful - in a not only aesthetic sense of the term - is what is good for something. Body organs, livestock as well as human products, activities and facilities are rated as "beautiful" in this sense of the word from the point of view of their suitability. What is considered beautiful is what can achieve something desirable. When viewed in this way, beauty is a skill. Accordingly, usability - the suitability for a specific purpose - is what gives beauty to everything that is beautiful. But this cannot be true in this generality, since there are also bad purposes; what serves them cannot be called beautiful.

The definition therefore needs an addition, which Hippias immediately adds: What is meant is not suitability for all purposes, but only for good ones. What is useful is beautiful when it produces good. This assertion, however, has a problematic consequence: the usefulness of what is useful is that it creates good. Thus, if the useful is also the beautiful, the good is a product of the beautiful. The beautiful is the cause, the good is the cause. But if it is a cause-and-effect relationship, the beautiful itself is not good, but it is the factor beyond goodness that makes the good possible, and the good itself does not belong to the beautiful, but is only its product. However, the two interlocutors cannot agree with this conclusion, because they do not want to deny the beautiful goodness or the good beauty.

Socrates now proposes defining the beautiful as that which brings joy to man. Joy shouldn't mean any kind of pleasure, only the pleasant effect of pleasant visual and acoustic perceptions. But there are also weighty objections to this idea. The need to classify beautiful activities or laws under the objects of seeing or hearing is problematic. The main difficulty, however, is the arbitrariness of picking out two types of sensory perception. In fact, pleasant impressions of a different kind, such as those conveyed by the sense of smell and taste, are not usually described as "beautiful", but only impressions through the eyes and ears. What is generally considered to be the most pleasurable of all, the erotic activity, is even carefully hidden from strangers because the sight of it is considered the ugliest of all. The separation of the optically and acoustically conveyed pleasure from the other pleasures lacks a plausible justification. The visible is not beautiful because of its visibility, otherwise the beautiful audible would be ugly, since it is not visible; nor can it be audibility that constitutes beauty. The factor that brings about beauty should therefore be something that the pleasing visual and acoustic impressions have in common and that only belong to them. In addition, it should be present as reality not only in things that are beautiful by sight and sound, but also in the visible but inaudible and in the audible but invisible. The attempt at definition fails because of this condition; once again the essence of beauty eludes determination.

The last proposal by Socrates, the eighth attempt at definition of the dialogue, is a modification of the previous one. That which is supposed to justify the separation of the pleasure conveyed by the eye and ear from all other pleasures is a special quality which is ascribed only to these two kinds of pleasure. Socrates calls them the most harmless and best kinds of pleasure. Hippias agrees. On the other hand, however, the critical acquaintance of Socrates would object that the terms “harmless” and “good” are used in the sense of “useful” and that the attempt at definition fails because of the objection that has already prevented the beautiful from being identified with the useful has been.

Perplexity at the end of the effort

After all attempts at clarification had failed, Hippias criticized Socrates' approach from his unphilosophical, pragmatic standpoint. He sees a pointless subtlety in this; the subject is torn apart and broken down into details, the separate consideration of which does not bring in anything but is empty chatter. Something completely different is beautiful and valuable: a successful speech with which you can convince the audience and achieve tangible goals for yourself. Philosophical analysis is a waste of time for Hippias. Socrates counters this by stating that his acquaintance would accuse him of the inconsistency of this position: calling a speech “beautiful” is pointless if one cannot define the term “beautiful” and therefore does not know what constitutes beauty.

The final balance that Socrates draws is sobering. A solution is not in sight. In conclusion, Socrates states that he now believes that he has understood what the saying “what is beautiful is difficult” means.

The conversation

Hippias gives the impression of a dense and at the same time self-satisfied person. He also takes seriously ironic praise of Socrates. He is not listening properly or cannot understand a simple hint; therefore he repeatedly and unwaveringly commits a mistake about which he has already been warned in clear words. His lack of attention and forgetfulness in dialogue contrast with his otherwise existing ability to concentrate, his famous memory performance, which he himself and - ironically - Socrates praised as well. He is proud of his unusual memory; he claims he can memorize a list of fifty names after hearing it once. From the perspective of Socratic philosophy, however, such memorizing of data for the purpose of impressing appears to be idle, pointless occupation and has nothing to do with real knowledge and understanding. Socrates contemptuously compares it to old women stories.

Hippias announces a public lecture on the education of the youth, which he has already given in Sparta and with which he hopes to be applauded in Athens. With this, the author of the dialogue indicates the competitive relationship between the very different educational concepts of the sophists and the Socratic-Platonic oriented philosophers. From a platonic point of view, the course of the conversation is intended to show the reader the worthlessness of an educational pursuit aimed at the mere accumulation of factual knowledge and social success. Hippias is portrayed as a prominent representative of a sophistic movement that wants to dominate the education system, although it is neither willing nor able to seriously grapple with pedagogically important issues. In this context, at the beginning of the dialogue, the author describes in detail the commercial motivation of sophistic teachers to denounce them. At the end, he again portrays Hippias as a representative of a small-minded way of life by having him explain that the highest goal is to achieve security for himself as well as for his property and his friends.

Hippias shows no tendency to abstract, philosophical thinking and is hardly capable of doing so. His concern is not to discover the truth, but to quickly find seemingly acceptable solutions that are in harmony with common points of view and therefore have a good chance of general approval. Deficiencies in his position only bother him when they are noticed by others and threatened with defeat of refutation.

The appearance of Socrates is unusually impolite for a platonic dialogue, it appears aggressive. He not only expresses himself on the matter, but also gives harsh, only poorly disguised criticism of Hippia's broad space. His biting irony reveals his impatience with the superficial and unthought-of -thought interlocutor. However, the reader is given the impression that Hippias himself caused the embarrassing exposure of his frivolity through his grandiose demeanor and his excessive overestimation of his abilities. The sophist lets his vanity run wild, but unlike Socrates, he always remains polite.

The unnamed acquaintance of Socrates, who allegedly raised the question of the beautiful, plays an important role. Again and again, Socrates anticipated the destructive criticism that this anonymus would expect of the rash utterances of Hippias. While he himself emphatically praises Hippias, he presents his attacks on him as hypothetical reactions of the anonymous thinker. So he can allow himself drastic, hurtful judgments about the incompetence of his interlocutor without appearing as the originator himself. Under these circumstances Hippias reacts uninhibited, he replies with derogatory remarks about the anonymus. When Hippias asks repeatedly who this mysterious person is, Socrates evades, but he mentions that he lives with him and is his close relative. He indicates that there were constant intensive discussions between him and that man, who was obviously well trained in philosophy. In doing so, Socrates gives the impression that he is in a student relationship with Anonymous and that he is far inferior to him; he reports that he is constantly rebuked and refuted by him for his ignorance and clumsiness.

Obviously Socrates meant himself by anonymus. He hides behind this fictitious figure. On the one hand, he can appear modest and, on the other hand, speak more bluntly than the dialogue situation and the requirement of politeness would otherwise allow.

Philosophical balance sheet

The fact that the dialogue ends in perplexity has given rise to various interpretations. In research on the history of philosophy, the question of whether or to what extent Socrates' remarks are based on elements of Platonic metaphysics that are not directly addressed, and whether the treatment of the topic should refer to the Platonic theory of ideas , is discussed in particular . In this context the question belongs whether the attempt to determine what constitutes beauty is made primarily from a logical or an ontological point of view.

According to a hypothesis by Raphaël Arteau McNeil, the views that Hippias represents in the dialogue are to be understood in the context of a materialistic worldview that he has made his own and that is reminiscent of the philosophy of Democritus . McNeil thinks that Plato wants to show that one must fail with such a way of thinking when trying to clarify questions like those raised in the dialogue. His concern is thus a criticism of materialism.

Question of authenticity and time of origin

Plato's authorship has been questioned or disputed by numerous researchers since the 19th century. In 1809, the influential Plato translator Friedrich Schleiermacher was the first to express considerable doubts about the authenticity of the dialogue , but without making a clear decision on this issue. Among other things, he suggested that for Plato the ridicule was too crude and that he could hardly be trusted to portray the prominent sophist "in such an unheard-of degree of stupidity". In the 19th century, well-known historians of philosophy such as Friedrich Ueberweg and Eduard Zeller spoke out against authenticity. The influential philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff also rejected the attribution to Plato. He said that it was the work of an imitator "who takes this and that from Plato without achieving anything whole", that there is a lack of Socratic ethos and Platonic wit.

Ernst Heitsch offers a detailed explanation of the arguments for the inauthenticity that play a role in the more recent discussion . Debra Nails, Charles Kahn and Holger Thesleff are among the opponents of authenticity in recent times .

The main arguments against the authenticity of the dialogue are:

  • Aristotle quotes the Lesser Hippias only as "Hippias", from which it is concluded that he did not know of any other work of Plato so named.
  • The Greater Hippias exhibits a number of striking similarities with real dialogues from Plato. Opponents of authenticity attribute this to the fact that the author used these works and imitated Plato, which in some cases he was only able to do inadequately.
  • Hippias is - in an indirect, but very clear way - attacked and ridiculed far more violently than it happens to Socrates' interlocutors - including Hippias - in Plato's certainly genuine dialogues.
  • If the dialogue, like Lesser Hippias, is genuine, it is the only case of two dialogues of Plato named after the same person.
  • Some uses of terms and linguistic phenomena in Greater Hippias do not appear in the certainly authentic writings of Plato or are even only documented centuries after his death.
  • In places the style is not on the level one would expect from a genuine work by Plato; some seems like a failed imitation of the style of the real works.
  • The character of the title figure is drawn differently in the Greater Hippias than in the Smaller Hippias . That speaks against the fact that the two dialogues come from the same author.

Furthermore, subjective impressions are also brought into play. Charles Kahn writes that anyone who considers the Greater Hippias to be genuine has "no sense of the art of the greatest prose writer of antiquity".

The proponents of authenticity argue that the text transmission and the ancient reception of the work do not give any indication of the inauthenticity, so the burden of proof lies on the other side. The attempt is made to show that the individual arguments against the authenticity are inconclusive. The reasons for the doubts about Plato's authorship are mainly of a subjective nature. Unusual in style and vocabulary can be explained by the fact that they are quotations from poetry or parodic imitations of the expressions of historical Hippias. A passage in the Topic of Aristotle shows that he is probably referring to the greater Hippias ; this suggests that he thought it was a work of Plato.

A detailed defense of authenticity is the 1953 investigation of the Dialogue by Marion Soreth, which met partly with approval, but partly also with decisive opposition. Based on a computer-aided style analysis, Gerard R. Ledger defends authenticity. In her thorough study published in 1998, in which she goes into detail on the history of research, Maria Teresa Liminta made a plea for authenticity from the point of view of the “Tübingen and Milan School” of the interpretation of Plato.

The discussion is still going on, with the proponents of authenticity outnumbering in recent times, but the opponents insist that a number of circumstantial evidence make a decision in favor of the authenticity hypothesis considerably more difficult.

The chronological classification of the work is closely related to the question of authenticity. The researchers who consider the Greater Hippias to be real count him among Plato's early works and place his composition in the period between the trial of Socrates, which took place in the spring of 399 BC. Took place, and Plato's first trip to Sicily, which he made around 388 BC. Began. For this purpose, content and style reasons are asserted. Some proponents of the hypothesis of inauthenticity believe that the dialogue arose during Plato's lifetime, others suspect that the author first lived in the Hellenistic era , perhaps even in Roman times.

reception

Ancient and Middle Ages

In ancient times there was no doubt about the authenticity of the Greater Hippias . In the tetralogical order of the works of Plato, which apparently in the 1st century BC Was introduced, it belongs to the seventh tetralogy. The history writer of philosophy, Diogenes Laertios , counted it among the "refuting" writings and gave "About the beautiful" as an alternative title. In doing so, he referred to a now-lost script by the Middle Platonist Thrasyllos .

The beginning of Hippias maior in the first edition, Venice 1513

The reception of the work in ancient literature is relatively sparse. Plotinus , the founder of Neoplatonism , quoted the passage in Greater Hippias where apes, humans and gods are compared in terms of their beauty.

The ancient text transmission is limited to two small fragments from a papyrus of the 2nd or 3rd century. The oldest surviving medieval manuscript of the dialogue was made in the 10th century in the Byzantine Empire . The Greater Hippias was unknown to the Latin- speaking scholarly world of the West in the Middle Ages.

Early modern age

In the west, the Greater Hippias was rediscovered in the age of Renaissance humanism . The first Latin translation was done by the Italian humanist Marsilio Ficino . He published it in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Plato translations.

The first edition of the Greek text appeared in September 1513 in Venice by Aldo Manuzio in the complete edition of Plato's works published by Markos Musuros .

Modern

The modern confrontation with the Greater Hippias is mainly characterized by the authenticity debate , with which the literary evaluation is related: some opponents of authenticity judge style and content disparagingly, supporters rate the literary and philosophical quality more favorably. But there are also voices among those who oppose authenticity who pay tribute to the author's achievement. Charles Kahn writes that the unknown author was not a “forger”, but a faithful and intelligent imitator of Plato. Franz von Kutschera , who also considers the Greater Hippias to be fake, praises “the combination of good, lively, funny dramatic design and a sense of logical distinctions”. Olof Gigon comes to the opposite assessment : The conversation flows "if not monotonous, then quite listlessly", the role of Anonymous is "pedantically exercised", in artistic terms the dialogue is far below the level of undoubtedly genuine works by Plato.

Opinions differ on the question of whether the Greater Hippias shows an intention that goes beyond mere polemics against sophistry. Schleiermacher denies the dialogue any scientific content; the author was concerned with polemics and exuberant merriment. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff also believes that it is not the beautiful but the debating itself that was primarily important to the author. William KC Guthrie , an advocate of authenticity, also adopts a humble purpose; he considers the dialogue to be a "little comedy" that is entertaining and serves to ridicule Hippias. A proponent of the contrary opinion is George Maximilian Anthony Grube; for him the Greater Hippias is a contribution to the development of logic. Franz von Kutschera shares this view, who considers the work to be “quite remarkable” in terms of the logical aspects. Even Michael Erler rated dialogue as instructive, and he thinks of the discussion of the general requirements to be placed on definitions. Hans Krämer sees a protreptic script in Greater Hippias ; as such it was of considerable value. Against the background of Plato's “ unwritten doctrine ” or doctrine of principles, a deeper meaning of the work becomes understandable, which remains hidden without this aspect. Due to the failure of the attempts at definition, a careful reader could come to the realization that a way out can only be found on the basis of a doctrine of principles which assigns the status of an aspect of the highest principle, the One , to the beautiful. Maria Teresa Liminta, who in 1998 presented an extensive analysis of the Greater Hippias , also sees a significant connection with the doctrine of principles .

Editions and translations

  • Ludwig Georgii (translator): Hippias the greater. In: Erich Loewenthal (ed.): Plato: Complete works in three volumes. Vol. 1, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 617-655.
  • Otto Apelt (translator): Plato: Hippias I / II, Ion . In: Otto Apelt (Ed.): Plato: All dialogues. Vol. 3, Meiner, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-7873-1156-4 (translation with introduction and explanations; reprint of the 3rd edition, Leipzig 1935).
  • Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Plato: Works in eight volumes. Vol. 1, 4th edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-19095-5 , pp. 453-525 (reprint of the critical edition by Maurice Croiset, 4th edition, Paris 1956, with the German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher, 2nd, improved edition, Berlin 1826).
  • Ernst Heitsch (translator): Plato: Greater Hippias (= Ernst Heitsch et al. (Hrsg.): Platon: Werke , Vol. VII 1). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2011, ISBN 978-3-525-30417-4 .
  • Rudolf Rufener (translator): Plato: Frühdialoge (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 1). Artemis, Zurich / Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 , pp. 117–159.
  • Bruno Vancamp (ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor . Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-515-06877-5 (critical edition).

literature

Overview representations

Investigations and Comments

  • Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and commentary (= Ernst Heitsch et al. (Hrsg.): Platon: Werke , Vol. VII 1). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2011, ISBN 978-3-525-30417-4 (with a contribution by Franz von Kutschera).
  • Ivor Ludlam: Hippias Major: An interpretation . Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1991, ISBN 3-515-05802-8 .
  • Ursula Wolf : The search for the good life. Plato's early dialogues . Rowohlt, Reinbek 1996, ISBN 3-499-55570-0 , pp. 77-93.
  • Paul Woodruff: Plato: Hippias Major. Translated, with Commentary and Essay . Blackwell, Oxford 1982, ISBN 0-631-13091-8 .

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 313; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 302.
  2. ↑ Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2011, p. 54.
  3. ↑ See on the historical Hippias Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 168f .; Michel Narcy: Hippias d'Élis . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Volume 3, Paris 2000, pp. 755–758; Slobodan Dušanić: Hippias the Elean: the revolutionary activities and political attitudes of a Sophist . In: Aevum 82, 2008, pp. 41-50.
  4. ↑ See Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, p. 45, note 22, p. 92 and note. 136; Slobodan Dušanić: Hippias the Elean: the revolutionary activities and political attitudes of a Sophist . In: Aevum 82, 2008, pp. 41-50. Some research opinions on the relationship between the historical Hippias and the figure appearing in the Greater Hippias and other dialogues are summarized in Ronald Bilik: Literaturbericht über Hippias von Elis 1980-1995 . In: Anzeiger für die Altertumswwissenschaft 49, 1996, Sp. 69–78.
  5. ↑ On this, see Andreas Patzer : Der Sophist Hippias als Philosophiehistoriker , Freiburg / Munich 1986, pp. 106-108.
  6. ↑ Hippias maior 281a-284c.
  7. ↑ Hippias maior 284d-286c. See Anna Schriefl: Plato's Critique of Money and Wealth , Berlin 2013, pp. 120–126.
  8. ↑ Hippias maior 286c-287e.
  9. ↑ See also William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 177f .; Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2011, p. 42f.
  10. ↑ Hippias maior 287e-289d.
  11. ↑ Hippias maior 289d-291d.
  12. ↑ Hippias maior 291d-293c.
  13. ↑ Hippias maior 293c-295a.
  14. ↑ Hippias maior 295a-296d.
  15. ↑ Hippias maior 296d-297d.
  16. ↑ Hippias maior 297e-303d.
  17. ↑ Hippias maior 303d-304a.
  18. ↑ Hippias maior 304a-b.
  19. ↑ Hippias maior 304b-e.
  20. ↑ Hippias maior 304c-e. Cf. Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2011, p. 109.
  21. ↑ Hippias maior 285e-286a.
  22. ↑ Hippias maior 286a-c.
  23. ↑ Hippias maior 304b.
  24. ↑ Hippias maior 298b; see Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, pp. 114–116.
  25. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 302.
  26. ↑ Hippias maior 288d, 290d – e.
  27. ↑ Hippias maior 291e-292d, 293c-d, 304d-e.
  28. ↑ See on the interpretation of the figure of Socrates' "Doppelganger" and on their role Thomas Alexander Szlezák : Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie , Berlin 1985, pp. 91-106; Alex G. Long: Conversation and Self-Sufficiency in Plato , Oxford 2013, pp. 46-63; Halsten Olson: Socrates Talks to Himself in Plato's Hippias Major . In: Ancient Philosophy 20, 2000, pp. 265-287.
  29. ↑ William KC Guthrie denies any reference to the Platonic theory of ideas: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 188–191. Thomas Alexander Szlezák is of the opposite opinion: Plato and the writing of philosophy , Berlin 1985, pp. 103-106. See Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 280–286; Paul Woodruff: Socrates and ontology: The evidence of the Hippias major . In: Phronesis 23, 1978, pp. 101-117; Paul Woodruff: Plato: Hippias Major , Oxford 1982, pp. 161-180; John Malcolm: On the Place of the Hippias Major in the development of Plato's thought . In: Archive for the History of Philosophy 50, 1968, pp. 189–195; Henry Teloh: The Development of Plato's Metaphysics , University Park 1981, pp. 67-99; Adelheid Haag: Hippias Maior. Interpretation of a pseudo-Platonic dialogue , Tübingen 1973, pp. 4–7; Maria Teresa Liminta: Il problema della Bellezza in Platone , Milano 1998, pp. 159–188.
  30. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 303.
  31. ↑ Raphael Arteau McNeil: Plato, you critique matérialisme: le cas de l'Hippias majeur . In: Dialogue 46, 2007, pp. 435–458.
  32. ↑ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Hippias, the larger conversation of this name. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, p. 332.
  33. ^ Friedrich Ueberweg: Investigations into the authenticity and chronological sequence of Platonic writings and the main moments in Plato's life , Vienna 1861, p. 175f .; Eduard Zeller: The philosophy of the Greeks in their historical development , part 2, department 1, 4th edition, Leipzig 1889, pp. 480-483.
  34. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. Supplements and text criticism , 4th edition, Dublin / Zurich 1969 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 328f.
  35. ↑ Ernst Heitsch: Limits of philological criticism of authenticity. Comments on the 'Great Hippias' . In: Ernst Heitsch: Gesammelte Schriften , Vol. 3, Leipzig 2003, pp. 87–124. Cf. Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, pp. 112–122.
  36. ↑ Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 168; Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 267–273; Holger Thesleff: The Date of the Pseudo-Platonic Hippias Major . In: Arctos 10, 1976, pp. 105-117, here: 105-109; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, pp. 372–374.
  37. ^ Adelheid Haag: Hippias Maior. Interpretation of a pseudo-platonic dialogue , Tübingen 1973, p. 10f.
  38. ^ For example, Ernst Heitsch argues: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, pp. 119–121. See Adelheid Haag: Hippias Maior. Interpretation of a pseudo-platonic dialogue , Tübingen 1973, p. 1f.
  39. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 301; Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 272f. Cf. on the way of interpreting the authenticity proponents Paul Woodruff: Plato: Hippias Major , Oxford 1982, p. 131f.
  40. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 301; Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 269f .; Dorothy Tarrant: The Hippias Major attributed to Plato , Cambridge 1928, pp. LXXVIII-LXXX; Dorothy Tarrant: On the Hippias Major . In: The Journal of Philology 35, 1920, pp. 319-331, here: 326-330; Dorothy Tarrant: The Authorship of the Hippias Maior . In: The Classical Quarterly 21, 1927, pp. 82-87, here: 84f .; Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, pp. 117–119, 121f.
  41. ↑ Dorothy Tarrant: The Hippias Major attributed to Plato , Cambridge 1928, pp. LXXV-LXXVIII; Dorothy Tarrant: On the Hippias Major . In: The Journal of Philology 35, 1920, pp. 319-331, here: 324-326; Dorothy Tarrant: The Authorship of the Hippias Maior . In: The Classical Quarterly 21, 1927, pp. 82-87, here: 83f .; Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 268.
  42. ↑ Ernst Heitsch: Limits of philological criticism of authenticity. Comments on the 'Great Hippias' . In: Ernst Heitsch: Gesammelte Schriften , Vol. 3, Leipzig 2003, pp. 87–124, here: 118–122; Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, pp. 112–117.
  43. ^ Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 268. On the subjective aspect, see Ernst Heitsch: Gesammelte Schriften , Vol. 3, Leipzig 2003, P. 90.
  44. ^ Paul Woodruff: Plato: Hippias Major , Oxford 1982, pp. 94-103; Robert G. Hoerber: Plato's Greater Hippias . In: Phronesis 9, 1964, pp. 143–155, here: 143f .; George MA Grube: On the Authenticity of the Hippias Maior . In: The Classical Quarterly 20, 1926, pp. 134-148; George MA Grube: The Logic and Language of the Hippias Major . In: Classical Philology 24, 1929, pp. 369-375, here: 373-375; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Plato and the writing of philosophy , Berlin 1985, p. 93, note 3.
  45. ^ Marion Soreth: The platonic dialogue Hippias maior , Munich 1953. Cf. Adelheid Haag: Hippias Maior. Interpretation of a pseudo-platonic dialogue , Tübingen 1973, pp. 5-7.
  46. ^ Gerard R. Ledger: Recounting Plato. A Computer Analysis of Plato's Style , Oxford 1989, pp. 156f.
  47. ↑ Maria Teresa Liminta: Il problema della Bellezza in Platone. Analisi e interpretazioni dell '"Ippia Maggiore" , Milano 1998, pp. 3-62.
  48. ↑ See the research overview by Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, pp. 301f. See Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 261, 267; Paul Woodruff: Plato: Hippias Major , Oxford 1982, pp. 94f .; Ivor Ludlam: Hippias Major: An Interpretation , Stuttgart 1991, pp. 11-20; for older research Dorothy Tarrant: The Hippias Major attributed to Plato , Cambridge 1928, pp. X f.
  49. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 302; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, p. 175 and note 3; Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 269f .; Paul Woodruff: Plato: Hippias Major , Oxford 1982, p. 93; Ernst Heitsch: Plato: Greater Hippias. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2011, p. 123; Holger Thesleff: The Date of the Pseudo-Platonic Hippias Major . In: Arctos 10, 1976, pp. 105-117, here: 109-116; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, pp. 372-374; Maria Teresa Liminta: Il problema della Bellezza in Platone , Milano 1998, pp. 29–32. Cf. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. Supplements and text criticism , 4th edition, Dublin / Zurich 1969 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 328f.
  50. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 3: 57-60.
  51. ↑ Compiled by Bruno Vancamp (ed.): Platon: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, p. 64f. (together with the receipts for the reception of the Little Hippias ).
  52. ↑ Plotinus, Enneads 6: 3, 11.
  53. ^ Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) , Part 1, Vol. 1 ***, Firenze 1999, pp. 92-94.
  54. ↑ On the text transmission, see Bruno Vancamp (ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, pp. 10–48, on the oldest manuscript pp. 14–16.
  55. ↑ See on this edition Bruno Vancamp (Ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, p. 50f.
  56. ↑ See on this edition Bruno Vancamp (Ed.): Plato: Hippias maior, Hippias minor , Stuttgart 1996, p. 49f.
  57. ^ For example, Hans-Jürgen Horn : Hippias Maior. Studies on the question of authenticity in dialogue , Cologne 1964, pp. 87–90, 92–95.
  58. ^ Charles Kahn: The Beautiful and the Genuine . In: Julia Annas (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , Vol. 3, Oxford 1985, pp. 261–287, here: 268.
  59. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Plato's Philosophy , Vol. 3, Paderborn 2002, p. 251.
  60. ↑ Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Platon: Frühdialoge (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 1), Zurich / Munich 1974, p. V – CV, here: LVII f.
  61. ↑ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Hippias, the larger conversation of this name. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, pp. 330–334.
  62. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. Supplements and text criticism , 4th edition, Dublin / Zurich 1969 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 328.
  63. ^ William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 176, 190f.
  64. ^ George MA Grube: The Logic and Language of the Hippias Major . In: Classical Philology 24, 1929, pp. 369-375, here: 369-373.
  65. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Plato's Philosophy , Vol. 3, Paderborn 2002, pp. 250f.
  66. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 303.
  67. ↑ Hans Krämer: Saggio introduttivo . In: Maria Teresa Liminta (ed.): Platone: Ippia Maggiore , Milano 1998, pp. 5–46, here: 25–29, 30–38.
  68. ↑ Maria Teresa Liminta: Il problema della Bellezza in Platone. Analisi e interpretazioni dell '"Ippia Maggiore" , Milano 1998, pp. 63, 129-133.
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