István Tisza

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

István (Stephan) Tisza Count of Borosjenő and Szeged [ ˈiʃtvaːn ˈtisɒ ], Hungarian Szegedi és borosjenői gróf Tisza István (born April 22, 1861 in Budapest ; †  October 31, 1918 ibid), served as Prime Minister of Hungary from 1903 to 1905 and from 1913 to 1917 a leading politician of Austria-Hungary and played an important role in the July crisis that led to the outbreak of the First World War .

Count István Tisza

Domestic politics

Before the war

Tisza - Portrait of Gyula Benczúr
Tisza with his wife (1904)
Ethnographic map of the countries of the Hungarian crown
Tisza (in front, with glasses and walking stick) on a visit to the front during World War I (1915)

Tisza was a Calvinist , his family came from the lower nobility of Transylvania . The liberals (or the left-wing center) had ruled Hungary since the 1860s. István's father Kálmán Tisza formed a new Liberal Party from this in 1875 , became the Hungarian Prime Minister in the same year and remained so until 1890. István practically “inherited” the party from him. It represented a policy oriented towards the interests of the upper Magyar social classes and was neither interested in democratization nor in equal rights for the other nationalities in the countries of the Hungarian crown, although these made up about half of the population.

As a member of the Hungarian Reichstag and liberal party leader, Tisza worked in 1902/1903 on the draft of the “Nine Program”, which called for the king's power to be tied to the Reichstag. The question of the Hungarian service and command language in the Austro-Hungarian Army was mentioned, but initially excluded from the list of demands. Otherwise, in the opinion of the Christian socialist Viennese publicist Friedrich Funder , who was close to the heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand , the program allowed all chauvinist postulates.

During his first term as Prime Minister, November 3, 1903 to June 18, 1905, Tisza had the parliamentary opposition fought with violence. Tisza told Funder: "Every Romanian who wears long trousers is a traitor".

In 1909, the former Hungarian Prime Minister Baron Dezső Bánffy granted Funder an interview in which Tisza was also mentioned. According to Funder, Bánffy said, among other things, that this “clever, headstrong and proud man is a terrible risk for Hungary.” Tisza is “as dangerous as an open razor”. For example, he will only make the necessary reform of the electoral law a sham because he himself belongs to the ruling class. That prediction later became a reality. According to Funder, Tisza was a "defiant, stoic fighter" at the time.

On June 5, 1912, a member of the Reichstag carried out an assassination attempt on Tisza. On January 2, 1913 dueled Tisza by saber with the reformists and later republican Prime Minister Karolyi . Both were slightly injured.

On June 10, 1913, Tisza, who had been voted out in 1905, returned to the head of the Hungarian government when his predecessor László Lukács resigned because of questionable campaign funding after a Budapest court had not seen an insult to honor in the criticism of the opposition MP Zoltan Desy, who had been defeated by Lukács. Tisza and Lukács had founded the National Labor Party and received 201 seats with it. With a reform of the rules of procedure, Tisza managed to end the obstruction of his opponents in the Reichstag.

On August 20, 1913, he dueled with the opposition MP György (Georg) Pallavicini (1881-1946), who is said to have accused Tisza of influencing witnesses in the defamation process of Lukács against Desy. Both duelists were also injured. In the ruling parliamentary group, it was claimed that the opposition not only wanted to criticize the Prime Minister's measures, but also wanted to question his character.

The rigorous Magyarization policy pursued by his father and other predecessors , which was particularly successful among the Slovak population and the Hungarian Germans , caused the Magyar population to grow to just over half. Between 1880 and 1910 the percentage of citizens of Hungary (excluding Croatia ) who professed to be Magyars rose from 44.9 to 54.6 percent. With the help of the reactionary right to vote, which only allowed the privileged part of the population to vote - in 1913 only 7.7% of the total population were eligible to vote (or were allowed to hold public offices) - the reactionary structure of the multi-ethnic state of Hungary was cemented.

In war

During the war, the army leadership's aversion to anything Serbian resulted in particular suspicion of the Serbs living in Croatia . The Army High Command approached Tisza with the request to transfer political power in Croatia to the Austro-Hungarian Army , as it was believed that the civil authorities were not acting tough enough against treason . Tisza refused: Thanks to several threats to resign, the civil administration remained in office.

In 1916 the Romanian member of the Reichstag Iuliu Maniu worked on a program of demands by the Romanians of Transylvania to the Budapest government. Tisza then intervened at the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry and obtained Manius' immediate conscription into the army , as Maniu himself could see from his military record in Vienna in November 1918.

Emperor Karl I took office just a few hours ago when Tisza visited him on November 22, 1916 in Schönbrunn Palace . It was very urgent for the Prime Minister to commit Charles to the coronation of the king in Budapest (and the associated recognition of Hungary's historical rights). (Franz Ferdinand had planned to delay this coronation in order to be able to implement major reforms in the structure of the dual monarchy.) The coronation took place on December 30, 1916.

The Romanian invasion of Transylvania in World War I, which could only be stopped with German help, damaged Tisza's prestige for a long time: “The magic was broken”.

Tisza's resignation as Prime Minister on May 23, 1917 (actual resignation on June 15, 1917) was, according to Brook-Shepherd, the culmination of a personal struggle between Tisza and his ruler. Karl wanted to introduce universal suffrage step by step in Hungary, but despite his statesmanlike size, Tisza was politically almost a man of the Middle Ages and had rejected “radical suffrage”. Only 12% of the 20 million residents were eligible to vote. After Tisza's forced departure, however, a vacuum of integrity and authority emerged in Budapest.

Even after the fall of his government in May 1917, Tisza remained the strongest man in Hungary as the leader of the parliamentary majority. The Wekerle government followed the line of its predecessor in all essential areas, in particular nationality policy. Wekerle's position on the South Slav question was Tisza's position. Tisza was not against the expansion of the dual monarchy for moral or anti-imperialist reasons. His misgivings were the precarious balance between the two halves of the empire, which in his opinion had already been shaken enough. Not least in order to consolidate this again and to divert internal problems to the outside world, the Balkan War (which turned into a world war) was started by Austria-Hungary.

Foreign policy

Under Prime Minister Tisza and Stephan Burián , in the Council of Ministers for Common Affairs in Vienna alternating between the Imperial and Royal Finance Minister and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Hungary achieved greater influence on Austria-Hungary's foreign policy than ever before. Hungary's influence in Europe was as great as it was at the end of the Middle Ages.

Dualism and decision to go to war

Tisza's political thinking and phraseology were determined more than any other Hungarian politician of his time by the dualistic structure of the monarchy. He was on July 7, 1914 other reasons against starting the war, because he feared a victory could lead to the annexation of Serbia lead and thus strengthen the Slavic element in Austria-Hungary at the expense of the Magyars. Only when the Joint Council of Ministers decided on July 19, 1914 in the course of the July crisis not to annex any major Serbian areas (which would have endangered the dualistic structure of the monarchy), did Tisza agree to the war he had advocated.

According to Tisza, the Hungarian nation-state could only secure its own survival as long as it remained a co-determining factor of a strong, powerful, respected and active great power on the Danube . When Tisza referred to Hungary as a nation-state , however, he argued far removed from ethnographic reality. Even with an otherwise sober statesman, this would lead to illusionistic conclusions . Although he considered the annexation of larger areas of Serbia to be a danger to the internal structure of the monarchy, he demanded the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia with a purely Slavic population and later as compensation for Transleithania in the event of an Austropolian solution (annexation of Congress Poland to Cisleithania ) When the monarchy was to receive Romanian territories instead of Poland , a large part of Wallachia was incorporated .

“In both cases he ignored the realistic element of his political opinion, namely that the slightest increase in the nationalities of Hungary jeopardized the internal equilibrium to the highest degree, only anxious to immediately achieve a territorial and numerical increase in Austria through a similar increase within the dualistic state structure of the Kingdom of Hungary. This was political illusionism ”.

Fear of trialism

The Austrian Prime Minister Heinrich Clam-Martinic knew in 1917 that federal plans for the entire monarchy, especially as long as Tisza was at the head of the Budapest government, were outside the realm of political possibilities.

Above all, Tisza wanted to avoid the expansion of the dualism into trialism , because this would have reduced the influence of the already smaller partner Hungary on the overall politics of the monarchy. In foreign policy in particular, Hungary had an influence that went beyond its actual power and importance thanks to its skilful policy and its greater internal political stability than the other half of the empire, and had almost determined it in recent years.

The fact that the Hungarian Prime Minister, apart from a few insignificant border improvements, originally did not seek any direct annexations for his half of the empire (unique for a warring continental power in the First World War!) Was due to the territorial saturation of his country. In the settlement with Austria in 1867, all territorial claims of the Hungarians, based on historical rights and claims, had been met. Any annexing of appreciably large, foreign-language areas would inevitably have endangered the precarious Magyar domination in Hungary and was therefore not in the interests of their conservative leadership.

At the beginning of October 1918, Tisza still had “the courage of his conviction” when he condemned the efforts of the southern Slavs to found their own state “in an unrestrained speech” in Sarajevo. He called the peoples' right to self-determination a hollow phrase. On October 17th he criticized the Czechs in the Budapest parliament with the words "The Czech question is nothing more than the desire of the Czechs to steal."

Tiszas Hungary from a German perspective

Kaiser Wilhelm II and the German Foreign Office judged the two halves of the empire according to how they managed to cope with their nationalities, i.e. to suppress them more or less effectively. The Hungarians were obviously more consistent in this, which explains the German preference for Hungary, especially the German Emperor's esteem for Tisza and his powerful policies (in contrast to the Austrian policies of Berchtold and Stürgkh ).

On 12./13. In June 1914 this assessment led to a controversy between Wilhelm II and Franz Ferdinand when the German Emperor visited the heir to the throne in his Konopischt Castle in Bohemia . When Wilhelm praised Tisza, the Archduke responded sharply, according to German files, that Tisza was “a dictator in Hungary and would like to be one in Vienna too”, that he worked “for an independent Hungarian army”. If one can claim that foreign policy has failed, then Tisza is to be blamed for treating the Romanians in Hungary badly.

The German ambassador in Vienna, Tschirschky , reported to Berlin in May 1914 that Franz Ferdinand wanted to dismiss Tisza immediately after his accession to the throne. Tisza is said to have known of this intention and in return threatened a national revolution. After the fatal assassination attempt on Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, Tisza was one of the many who hypothetically circulated as an instigator or conspirator. Ludwig Windischgrätz stated that when the news of the murder of Franz Ferdinand had arrived in Budapest, "there was only undisguised joy in the Tisza's party".

Even more than the military failures of the monarchy, the allies were concerned about the alleged withdrawal of the Austrian half of the empire from the Hungarian one, especially with regard to foreign policy, and the possible separation of the two halves of the empire, which would have meant the end of the great power status of the Danube monarchy.

From the German point of view, Austria's bureaucratic administration, with no public or parliamentary support, no understanding of widespread nationalism, left the Austrian statesmen in a vulnerable position. Hungary, on the other hand, thanks to the strength of Tisza, with its parliamentary majority in its back, appeared almost on a par with Germany. In reality, Austria had plagued itself with the diverging interests of its nationalities in its Reichsrat , elected since 1907 by means of universal (male) suffrage, until 1914 , while Hungary could be governed "powerfully" without democratic suffrage and without equal rights for nationalities.

On the other hand, Ambassador Tschirschky reported to Berlin in September 1916: The Hungarian government, with Count Tisza at its head, was pursuing tight Magyar policies; In spite of all the high-pitched phrases, she did not know any great points of view, and she lacks any understanding of the common need and the common high goals of the state as a whole. Field Marshal Conrad was also of this opinion in his memoirs written in 1921–1925.

death

István Tisza was one of the few victims of the Hungarian aster revolution at the end of October 1918. It is reported that Tisza refused to escape through the window on October 31, despite being warned of an attack. “I'm not jumping anywhere. As I lived, so will I die, ”he replied. Around five o'clock in the afternoon, eight revolutionary soldiers disarmed the five gendarmes posted to guard Tisza and entered the villa. The intruders blamed him for the catastrophe of the war and shot him when he put down the revolver out of consideration for his wife and niece. His last words are said to have been “It had to be like this”.

Fonts (selection)

  • From Sadowa to Sedan. Warnsdorf 1916.
  • Letters (1914-1918). Volume 1, Berlin 1928.

literature

  • Ferenc Pölöskei: István Tisza, a Hungarian statesman in times of crisis. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1994, ISBN 963-05-6761-X .
  • Gabor Vermes: István Tisza. The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of A Magyar Nationalist. Columbia University Press, New York 1985, ISBN 0-88033-077-5 .
  • Torben Gülstorff: “Only Tisza can help!” Count István Tisza and 'his' Hungary as reflected in the diplomatic and military reporting of the German Empire. In: Zoltán Maruzsa, László Pallai (ed.): Tisza István és emlékezete. Tanulmányok Tisza István születésének 150th évfordulójára. Debrecen 2011, 393-416.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Friedrich Funder: From the Empire to the Republic. Herold Verlag, Vienna 1971, p. 284.
  2. ↑ József Galántai: The Austro-Hungarian Empire and World War II. Budapest 1979, p. 153.
  3. ^ Friedrich Funder: From the Empire to the Republic. Herold Verlag, Vienna 1971, p. 420.
  4. ^ Friedrich Funder: From the Empire to the Republic. Herold Verlag, Vienna ³1971, pp. 313 and 316.
  5. ^ Mihály Károlyi: Against a whole world. My struggle for peace. Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Munich 1924, p. 37
  6. ^ Friedrich Funder: From the Empire to the Republic. Verlag Herold, Vienna ³1971, p. 309.
  7. ↑ Das Duell Tisza-Pallavicini , in: Neue Freie Presse , Vienna, No. 17599, August 21, 1913, p. 6 f.
  8. ↑ Wolfdieter Bihl : The way to collapse. Austria-Hungary under Charles I (IV.) . In: Erika Weinzierl , Kurt Skalnik (Ed.): Austria 1918-1938: History of the First Republic . Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1983, Volume 1, pp. 27–54, here p. 44.
  9. ^ Zbynek A. Zeman: The collapse of the Habsburg Empire. (Original title: The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1961), Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1963, p. 73.
  10. ^ Friedrich Funder: From the Empire to the Republic. Herold Verlag, Vienna ³1971, p. 414 f.
  11. ↑ Gordon Brook-Shepherd: To Crown and Empire. The tragedy of the last Habsburg emperor. (Original title: The Last Habsburg , 1968), Fritz Molden Verlag, Vienna / Munich / Zurich 1968, p. 63 f.
  12. ^ Gabor Vermes: István Tisza. The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of A Magyar Nationalist. Columbia University Press, New York 1985, ISBN 0-88033-077-5 , p. 354.
  13. ↑ Gordon Brook-Shepherd: To Crown and Empire. The tragedy of the last Habsburg emperor. Fritz Molden Verlag, Vienna / Munich / Zurich 1968, p. 135 f.
  14. ↑ József Galántai: Tisza and the South Slav question during the First World War. In: Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae. Sectio historica 5 (1981). Pp. 237–258, here: pp. 252 and 256.
  15. ^ Norman Stone: Hungary and the Crises of July 1914 . In: The Journal of Contemporary History 1, No 3 (1966), pp. 153–170, here: p. 155.
  16. ↑ Miklós Komjáthy (ed.): Protocols of the Joint Council of Ministers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1914–1918), Budapest 1966, p. 84 f.
  17. ↑ William Jannen, Jr: The Austro-Hungarian Decision For War in July 1914. In Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Peter Pastor (Ed.): Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of War . New York 1983, pp. 55–81, here: p. 72.
    József Galántai: István Tisza and the First World War. In: Austria in history and literature. 8 (1964), pp. 465-477, here: p. 477.
  18. ↑ Reinhold Lorenz: Count Stefan Tisza and the political symbols of dualism . In: Heinrich Fichtenau, Erich Zöllner (Ed.): Contributions to the modern history of Austria , Vienna / Cologne / Graz 1974, pp. 426–444, here: p. 444.
  19. ↑ Miklós Komjáthy (ed.): Protocols of the Joint Council of Ministers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1914–1918), Budapest 1966, p. 85.
  20. ^ Zbynek A. Zeman: The collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1963, p. 137.
  21. ^ Zbynek A. Zeman: The collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1963, p. 248.
  22. ↑ Vladimir Dedijer: The time bomb. Sarajewo 1914 (Original: The Road to Sarajevo ), Europa Verlag, Vienna 1967, p. 241.
  23. ↑ Vladimir Dedijer: The time bomb. Sarajevo 1914. Europa Verlag, Vienna 1967, p. 241.
  24. ↑ Vladimir Dedijer: The time bomb. Sarajewo 1914. Europa Verlag, Vienna 1967, pp. 773 and 782 ff.
  25. ↑ Imre Gonda: About Germany's relationship to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the war years 1916 to 1917 (based on the reports of Ambassador Prince G. zu Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst) . In: Austria-Hungary in world politics 1900 to 1918 , Berlin / GDR 1965, pp. 163–183, here: pp. 166 f.
  26. ^ Gabor Vermes: István Tisza. The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of A Magyar Nationalist. Columbia University Press, New York 1985, ISBN 0-88033-077-5 , p. 321.
  27. ^ Zbynek A. Zeman: The collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1963, p. 106
  28. ^ [Franz] Conrad von Hötzendorf: Private records. First publications from the papers of the kuk General Staff chief. Edited and edited by Kurt Peball, Amalthea-Verlag, Vienna 1977, ISBN 3-85002-073-8 , p. 269.
  29. ↑ Gordon Brook-Shepherd: To Crown and Empire. The tragedy of the last Habsburg emperor. Fritz Molden Verlag, Vienna / Munich / Zurich 1968, p. 222.
  30. ^ Gabor Vermes: István Tisza. The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of A Magyar Nationalist. Columbia University Press, New York 1985, ISBN 0-88033-077-5 , pp. 453 and 566; Article  in:  Pester Lloyd , November 1, 1918, p. 1 (online at ANNO ).Template: ANNO / maintenance / pel

Web links

Commons : István Tisza  - collection of images, videos and audio files
personal data
SURNAME Tisza, István
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Tisza by Borosjenő et Szeged, István (Stephan)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION Hungarian politician
DATE OF BIRTH April 22, 1861
PLACE OF BIRTH Budapest
DATE OF DEATH October 31, 1918
Place of death Budapest