Kleitophon (dialogue)

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The beginning of the Kleitophon in the oldest surviving manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale , Gr. 1807 (9th century)

The Kleitophon ( ancient Greek Κλειτοφῶν Kleitophṓn , Latinized Clitopho ) is a short literary dialogue in ancient Greek that began in the 4th or 3rd century BC. Was written. In ancient times it was considered the work of the philosopher Plato , but this attribution is controversial in modern research. Many ancient scholars do not consider it an authentic work by Plato, but others advocate the authenticity or at least consider it. The Kleitophon is considered a mystery; Research has divided opinions about the author's intention.

The content is a fictional conversation between the philosopher Socrates and his pupil Kleitophon , after whom the dialogue is named. The questions discussed are what relation to the reality of life does the philosophical ideal of virtue have, how one should care for the well-being of the soul and for what purpose justice should be practiced. Kleitophon's relationship with his teacher is ambivalent. On the one hand he admires him because Socrates stands up for justice in a convincing and moving way, on the other hand he dislikes the fact that only general principles are mentioned and the concrete implementation, the actual goal of ethics , remains unclear. Therefore, Kleitophon believes that Socrates can or only wants to exhort to virtue, but not to guide its realization. There is no reply from Socrates to this reproach from his pupil.

Circumstances and Participants

When and in what environment the dialogue takes place is not communicated. The setting is in any case in or near Athens , the hometown of both interviewees. A framework plot introducing the initial situation is missing. The event is not told by a reporter, but begins suddenly and is consistently reproduced in direct speech.

In the Kleitophon , Socrates only has a brief word at the beginning. By far the largest part of the text is made up of the following long monologue by Kleitophons, in which earlier statements by Socrates and the Socratics are reproduced and criticized. Socrates is interested in the criticism and initially assures him that he wants to learn from it, but in the end he does not comment. The basic attitude of Socrates represented in the Kleitophone is the same as in the certainly real dialogues of his pupil Plato. His thinking revolves around the well-being of the soul and the basic virtue of justice. He considers virtue to be teachable and wants to make justice the decisive norm of the conduct of life and politics. A big difference to the certainly real dialogues, however, is that the reader receives an unfavorable-looking picture of the Socratic philosophy.

Kleitophon is a person who actually lived in Athens at the time of Socrates. The historical Kleitophon was active as a politician in the camp of the moderate oligarchic tendency and played a role in the preparation of the oligarchic constitutional amendment of the year 411 BC. In the Politeia , certainly a genuine work of Plato, Kleitophon is one of Socrates' interlocutors. There, as in the dialogue named after him, he appears as a critic of Socrates' position. However, he only spoke briefly in the Politeia .

As a figure in the Kleitophon , the namesake of the dialogue is a dissatisfied student of Socrates, who also takes part in the lessons of the famous sophist Thrasymachus . There he looks for what he lacks in Socrates. With this he vacillates between two opposing poles, because Thrasymachus, who is familiar to Plato readers from the Politeia , embodies with his entire attitude a life plan that stands in radical contrast to that of Socrates. Kleitophon wants to be instructed by an authority, he demands clear and undoubtedly correct information; the Socratic approach - the search for truth in dialogue - is alien to him.

content

Socrates says that someone told him that Kleitophon had disparaged his philosophy lessons. Kleitophon, on the other hand, extensively praised the transfer of knowledge at Thrasymachos . The Kleitophon thus confronted tries to justify himself: Although he actually did not praise some things about Socrates, others did. Now he wants to correct what has been wrongly reproduced and thereby correct the disgruntlement that has arisen. Socrates agrees; He explains that he hopes that this will provide helpful information about his strengths and weaknesses. The rest of the conversation consists of Kleitophon's elaboration of his opinion on Socrates' philosophy lessons. He first describes what he likes and then goes on to criticize.

First of all, Kleitophon summarizes some key points of the teaching of Socrates, which find his unreserved approval and to him like divine messages. The starting point is the philosopher's criticism of the behavior of ignorant people who only care about the accumulation of goods instead of striving for insight and are therefore unable to raise their children well and teach them values. Such people will one day bequeath their property to their sons, but have foolishly failed to instruct their future heirs in proper use of property and to teach them righteousness. Nor have they found anyone to teach the children in this area. The consequences of the fateful educational failure are disputes and wars. The body is looked after, the far more important soul is neglected. There is a lack of knowledge that the unjust does not act maliciously, but out of ignorance. Not living would be better than living a bad life. For those who cannot act sensibly, a life as a slave would be better than one in freedom, since then they would not be subject to their own evil rule. However, the acquisition of virtue could remedy this. This path is open to man because, according to Socrates' conviction, virtue can be taught.

Kleitophon emphasizes that he still considers the aforementioned theses of Socrates to be applicable and important and continues to be convinced of the teachability of virtue. However, he feels that the mere teaching of theory in class is unsatisfactory. He is concerned with the practical application of the knowledge gained; he wants to know how to put the philosophical insights into practice. For this purpose, as he now reports, he first turned to the most competent companions of Socrates. He asked them his questions: Should one spend one's life only exhorting others to be virtuous, whereupon they in turn pass on the exhortation? Or what else needs to be done if you want to be fair? How should one begin to specifically acquire the required virtue? To these questions the most capable of those questioned gave him the answer that the means one needed to do this was nothing other than justice.

Kleitophon's reply was: Just as a doctor or builder not only trains others in his field, but also has to produce a product (“work”, Greek érgon ), namely health or a building, so the righteous cannot limit themselves to that either to instruct others in righteousness, but must also produce something as its own specific product. But what is it? To this question, Kleitophon received the answers "the useful", "the appropriate", "the beneficial" and "the beneficial". On the other hand, he objected that this was nothing special, but applied to every application of knowledge, including every craft; it says nothing about the specific purpose of justice. Finally, an apparently particularly astute Socratics declared that justice produces philia (friendship, love for friends) in state communities. The philia is not an erotic bond, rather it should be defined as a like-mindedness. You only do good. Then Kleitophon asked whether this like-mindedness was based only on the agreement of opinions or on real common knowledge of the friends. Since wrong opinions do nothing good, the interlocutor had to admit that it could only be real knowledge. Here, however, the objection arose that knowledge-based like-mindedness also existed in all other areas of knowledge, for example in medicine. In each subject it can be specified exactly what the respective knowledge relates to and what its purpose is. In the case of justice, however, this is quite unclear. So this attempt to attribute a special product to justice failed.

Kleitophon then turned to Socrates personally, but always received, as he now says, only contradicting and confusing answers. Therefore, he now takes stock of his efforts so far and comes to the conclusion that Socrates could indeed call for justice better than anyone, but he was not in a position or unwilling to guide the concrete realization of the advertised ideal. Therefore he, Kleitophon, would now turn to Thrasymachus and others. If Socrates can actually lay out the path to virtue in concrete terms, he should finally do so. Otherwise it is almost an obstacle for those who have already recognized the necessity of virtue and now want to get serious about its implementation. There is no answer from Socrates; the dialogue ends in an aporia , a situation in which no solution is in sight.

Author, date of origin and interpretation

In modern research, the question of who wrote the Kleitophon and what the author's intention was, is controversial.

The ancient scholars strongly believe that this dialogue does not come from Plato, but from an unknown writer who imitated Plato's style. The arguments for the inauthenticity include the brevity of the dialogue and the fact that Socrates is attacked violently and also with irony by a student without the author having him respond to the massive criticism. The question arises whether this is compatible with Plato's loyalty to the spiritual legacy of his revered teacher. Attention is also drawn to the exceptionally strong dependence of the Kleitophon on Plato's dialogues that are certainly genuine. It is also asserted that the line of thought is in places too clumsy for Plato. It is also strange that Socrates is said to have addressed a crowd as a speaker. In addition, there are linguistic and stylistic peculiarities of the dialogue.

However, the opposing position also has a significant number of supporters. They stand up for Plato's authorship or at least consider it to be possible. In favor of the authenticity hypothesis, it is argued that neither the ancient tradition supports a doubt, nor does the language offer significant suspicions. In dealing with the subject, the Kleitophon shows its proximity to certainly genuine works by Plato such as the Politeia , the Apology of Socrates and Euthydemus . This shows the familiarity of the author with the ideas of these writings, but does not prove his identity with Plato. Konrad Gaiser finds in the Kleitophon a “typically platonic background”, which speaks for the authenticity, since a pupil or even someone distant could not be trusted. On the basis of a study of the statistics of the language, Gerard L. Ledger comes to the conclusion that the Kleitophon belongs to Plato's late works and was created at the beginning of the last creative phase of the philosopher, probably around 355 BC. With this dialogue, Plato said goodbye to Socratic philosophizing and then embarked on a new path in the later works. The editor Simon R. Slings offers a detailed explanation of the authenticity hypothesis in the introduction to his edition. He thinks that the Kleitophon contains criticism of an “explicit” protreptic , a direct advertisement for a philosophical way of life. Such a protreptic was put into Socrates' mouth in non-Platonic writings, which Plato displeased. Plato's response to the criticism of his dialogue figure Kleitophon at the explicit praising of philosophy lies in the “implicit” protreptic of the Politeia . The fact that Kleitophon has the last word does not speak against Plato's authorship from the point of view of the authenticity proponents. For Geoffrey S. Bowe the reason for the lack of a reply from Socrates is that Kleitophon has fallen into a constructive perplexity ( aporia ), which should form the starting point for his further considerations in the future; it is not up to Socrates to find a solution. Jenny Bryan judges similarly; she attributes Socrates' silence to the fact that Kleitophon is not open to the Socratic approach to the search for truth, which requires the active participation of the student.

As an alternative possible solution, the assumption is brought into play that the Kleitophon is incomplete; it was an unfinished draft by Plato that was found among his notes after his death. This hypothesis is intended to explain the abrupt end without a response from the attacked Socrates. It was represented by August Boeckh as early as 1840 and is presented in different versions. The incompletion could be due to the fact that the text was conceived as an introduction to the Politeia , but Plato then did not use it for this purpose. According to another assumption, Plato decided not to complete it because he had meanwhile succeeded in expressing the same thoughts better in Euthydemos . Another proposed explanation is that Plato found himself unable to formulate a response to Kleitophon's criticism of Socrates that was satisfactory for himself. However, Slings objects to the incompletion hypothesis. In his estimation, the dialogue in no way gives the impression of incomplete. Slings believes that Socrates is not answering because any possible answer would be trivial. It could only consist in the admission that the criticism was justified and that he would therefore change his behavior as a teacher. Socrates had already expressed his fundamental willingness to do so at the beginning of the conversation, so he did not need to repeat that. Socrates was not superior, rather he was beaten with the means of his own debating skills. The layout of the dialogue shows that the author planned this outcome from the start. Even Michael Erler takes acceptance of incompleteness unsatisfactory. He considers the dialogue to be probably inauthentic, but does not rule out the possibility that Plato wanted to practice self-criticism and show the vulnerability of the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of virtues. In the Kleitophon , Plato's thesis that the true philosopher and politician can make his fellow citizens fair is critically examined.

In recent research - regardless of the question of authenticity - the emergence of the Kleitophon is unanimous in the period between approx. 370 BC. And the end of the 3rd century BC Set. It is considered likely that the dialogue in the 4th century BC. Was written; Either Plato himself or a member of his philosophy school, the Platonic Academy , is accepted as the author . Slings advocates drafting in the late 370s or 360s BC. Antonio Carlini, on the other hand, considers the author to be an academic who lived at the time of the Scholarchen (head of the school) Arkesilaos († 241/240 BC), ie in the initial phase of the "Younger Academy" era that began with Arkesilaos. Hans Joachim Krämer sees in the author a critical academic who, in view of the philosophical advances achieved in the academy, wanted to portray Socrates' approach as inadequate and outdated. According to Joachim Dalfen , the Kleitophon and other spurious dialogues are works that Plato commissioned his first students to create. With this hypothesis, Dalfen explains the proximity of these works to Plato's early writings and the lack of elements that are typical of the later real dialogues. The Kleitophon must have arisen before Plato's dialogue with Gorgias , because it represents a preliminary stage to this. The Gorgias explains in detail what remained in the Kleitophon until the end, an open question that Socrates apparently could not answer.

Johannes Geffcken turned against the widespread assumption that the dialogue must either come from Plato himself or from a Platonist . He saw in the author a partly Aristotelian thinking, but actually unphilosophical rhetor and sophist who had polemicized against Platonism. Also Luc Brisson wrote the dialogue for an author who studied the philosophical life with skepticism and the rhetoric and political activity gave the preference.

In any case, it was a concern of the author to show the questionability of a protreptic promotion of philosophical ideals without a real understanding of the propagated values. It is significant that none of the companions of Socrates mentioned could come up with a satisfactory answer to Kleitophon's probing questions. With this, the author wanted, if he was a Platonist, to point out the uselessness of a study that is limited to the appropriation of slogans and unreflected assertions and to clarify the indispensability of conceptual analysis.

reception

Ancient and Middle Ages

The writer Xenophon , a contemporary of Plato and an admirer of Socrates, commented on the accusation that Socrates was able to encourage people to be virtuous, but was unable to lead them to it. He dismissed the criticism in his memories of Socrates (Memorabilia) back. His rendering of the charge seems to be an allusion to the Kleitophon , but it cannot be concluded with certainty that Xenophon was familiar with the dialogue. After all, his efforts to refute the criticism of Socrates show that the opinion of the dialogue figure Kleitophon that Socrates did not provide any concrete instructions for a virtuous life was represented even then.

In the 3rd century BC Chrysippus , the Stoic, criticized one of the theses put in Socrates' mouth in the Kleitophon in his work On Protreptic : the assertion that it is better not to live at all for a person who does not know how to live properly. This is the oldest reliable evidence for the reception of the Kleitophon .

The authenticity of the dialogue was not in doubt in ancient times. In the tetralogical order of the Platonic works, which apparently in the 1st century BC Was introduced, the kleitophone belongs to the eighth tetralogy. The historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios listed it among the real works of Plato. He counted it among the "ethical" dialogues and gave Protreptikos as an alternative title . In doing so, he referred to a now-lost script by the Middle Platonist Thrasyllos .

In the Roman Empire , the kleitophone was used by speakers. Dion Chrysostom adopted ideas of dialogue in his 13th speech (In Athens on exile) . The late antique rhetor Themistios also resorted to the work ascribed to Plato; In his 26th speech he offered a modified version of Socrates' remarks in the Kleitophon . The Platonists Apuleius and Alcinous and the Christian writer Hippolytus of Rome cited the dialogue when discussing the Socratic thesis that bad deeds are only committed involuntarily.

The Platonist Ptolemy , who presumably lived in the 3rd century, explained the lack of a response by Socrates to the criticism by saying that Socrates Kleitophon did not appreciate any answer.

In the Middle Ages, the scholars of Western and Central Europe had no access to the text of the dialogue. In the Byzantine Empire, however, there were copies. The oldest surviving Kleitophon manuscript was made there around the middle of the 9th century. Presumably it was intended for the library of the imperial palace. An indication of - perhaps only indirect - knowledge of the kleitophone in the Arabic-speaking world of the Middle Ages is offered by the philosopher al-Fārābī , who in the 10th century gave an overview of Plato's writings with the title The Philosophy of Plato, Its Parts and the Order of Its Parts of Theirs Written from beginning to end . According to al-Fārābīs report, Plato compared the teaching method of Socrates with that of Thrasymachus and came to the conclusion that while Socrates was able to scientifically investigate justice and virtues and to enlighten people about their ignorance, but that Method of Thrasymachus is more suitable for character formation. This representation can probably only be traced back to the Kleitophone .

The beginning of the Kleitophon in the first edition, Venice 1513

Modern times

In the West, the Kleitophone was rediscovered in the age of Renaissance humanism . The humanist Marsilio Ficino doubted its authenticity, but translated the work into Latin, as did the other dialogues. He published the translation in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Latin translations of Plato. This made the dialogue accessible to a broader, educated reading public.

The first edition of the Greek text appeared in Venice in September 1513 by Aldo Manuzio as part of the first complete edition of Plato's works. The editor was Markos Musuros . With regard to the question of authenticity, there was a confusion: the Kleitophone was classified under the fake works, but listed in the table of contents under the real ones. The Latin translation that the humanist Willibald Pirckheimer made and published in Nuremberg in 1523 by his printer Friedrich Peypus is based on this edition, the " Aldine " . Henri Estienne (Henricus Stephanus), who published his complete edition of Plato's oeuvre with Latin translations by Jean de Serres (Johannes Serranus) in 1578, spoke out in favor of authenticity, as did de Serres. Its edition remained authoritative until the early 19th century.

In 1809, Friedrich Schleiermacher pleaded against authenticity in the introduction to his German Kleitophon translation. He argued that the beginning of the possibly incomplete text was completely non-Platonic and that it was not clear for what purpose Plato "should have initiated such an attack against Socrates". The dialogue probably came from “one of the best schools of speakers” and was directed against Socrates and the Socratics, including Plato. The whole thing is "a continuous parody and caricature of Platonic manners". The "delicate negligence of certain Platonic periods" is reproduced in this work "in an abundance that will not easily fail to make a lively impression".

In modern research, the question of authenticity has given rise to long discussions. Numerous researchers have spoken out in favor of the inauthenticity, but the opposing view also has a number of supporters and the debate continues. Attempts to place the creation of the work in a specific historical context and to determine the author's intention more precisely have remained hypothetical. The judgments on literary quality have generally been relatively favorable. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff was convinced of the inauthenticity, but described the Kleitophon as a valuable answer to the real dialogues Politeia and Phaedrus . He considered the author to be a renegade member of the Platonic Academy, an honest man "who could not or did not like the path of science and therefore remained unsatisfied", because for him, with his disposition, "a revealed moral law, a firmly prescribed path of salvation" fit. Alfred Edward Taylor rejected the assumption of authenticity for reasons of content, but said that in linguistic terms nothing speaks against Plato's authorship, the style is on the level of the real works. In 1978, William KC Guthrie found the style to be reminiscent of the sophistic art of manipulation. That does not rule out authenticity, however, because it should be remembered that Plato was a brilliant imitator and parodist. In 1990, Hans-Georg Gadamer described the Kleitophone as strange, but not insignificant. He said that one should perhaps "trust the playful spirit of Plato that he really was the author". As a prelude to Plato's 'Politeia', the Kleitophon is by no means unworthy.

Editions and translations

  • Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, ISBN 0-521-62368-5 (authoritative critical edition with extensive introduction, English translation and commentary)
  • Franz Susemihl (translator): Kleitophon . In: Erich Loewenthal (Ed.): Platon: All works in three volumes , Vol. 1, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 884-890
  • Helmut von den Steinen (translator): Platonica I. Kleitophon, Theages. An introduction to Socrates. Edited by Torsten Israel. Queich-Verlag, Germersheim 2012, ISBN 978-3-939207-12-2 , pp. 39-46 (staged artistic transmission in rhythmic prose)

literature

Overview display

Comments

  • Jacques A. Bailly: Plato's Euthyphro & Clitophon. Commentary with Introduction, Glossary and Vocabulary . Focus Publishing, Newburyport (MA) 2003, ISBN 1-58510-059-5 , pp. 111-176
  • Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, ISBN 0-521-62368-5 , pp. 263-335

Investigations

  • Geoffrey S. Bowe: In Defense of Clitophon . In: Classical Philology 102, 2007, pp. 245-264
  • Jenny Bryan: Pseudo-Dialogue in Plato's Clitophon . In: The Cambridge Classical Journal 58, 2012, pp. 1-22
  • Francisco J. Gonzalez: The Socratic Elenchus as Constructive Protreptic . In: Gary Alan Scott (Ed.): Does Socrates Have a Method? The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 2002, ISBN 0-271-02173-X , pp. 161-182
  • Mark Kremer (Ed.): Plato's Cleitophon. On Socrates and the Modern Mind . Lexington Books, Lanham 2004, ISBN 0-7391-0817-4 (collection of articles with contributions by Mark Kremer, David L. Roochnik, Clifford Orwin and Jan H. Blits)
  • Christopher Moore: Clitophon and Socrates in the Platonic Clitophon . In: Ancient Philosophy 32, 2012, pp. 257-278

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ On the dialogue figure Socrates see Konrad Gaiser: Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon , Stuttgart 1959, pp. 141–143; Simon R. Slings: Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 39-46; Christopher Moore: Clitophon and Socrates in the Platonic Clitophon . In: Ancient Philosophy 32, 2012, pp. 257–278, here: 262–264.
  2. ↑ Plato, Politeia 340b.
  3. ↑ See on the role of the historical and literary kleitophone Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 102 f .; Geoffrey S. Bowe: In Defense of Clitophon . In: Classical Philology 102, 2007, pp. 245-264, here: 251-259; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 305; Simon R. Slings: Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 46-58; Christopher Moore: Clitophon and Socrates in the Platonic Clitophon . In: Ancient Philosophy 32, 2012, pp. 257–278, here: 259–262, 264 f., 269–271; Jenny Bryan: Pseudo-Dialogue in Plato's Clitophon . In: The Cambridge Classical Journal 58, 2012, pp. 1-22.
  4. ↑ Kleitophon 406a-407a.
  5. ↑ Kleitophon 407a-408c.
  6. ↑ Kleitophon 408b-409a.
  7. ↑ Kleitophon 409a-410a. Cf. Konrad Gaiser: Protreptik und Paränese in Plato , Stuttgart 1959, p. 145 f.
  8. ↑ Kleitophon 410a-e.
  9. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 305; Hans Joachim Krämer: The older academy . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. Die Philosophie der Antike , Vol. 3, Basel 1983, pp. 1–174, here: 126; Christopher Rowe: Cleitophon and Minos . In: Christopher Rowe, Malcolm Schofield (ed.): The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge 2000, pp. 303–309, here: 304–307; Christopher Rowe: What might we learn from the Clitophon about the nature of the Academy? In: Klaus Döring , Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (Eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 213–224; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 352 f .; Antonio Carlini: Alcuni dialoghi pseudoplatonici e l'Accademia di Arcesilao . In: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere, Storia e Filosofia , Volume 2, Vol. 31, 1962, pp. 33-63, here: 33-41; Beniamino Stumpo: Sull'autenticità del Clitofonte . In: Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 1, 1920, pp. 408-419.
  10. ↑ Among those in favor of authenticity are Simon R. Slings: Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 222–228, 233 f .; Joseph Souilhé (ed.): Plato: Œuvres complètes , vol. 13, part 2: Dialogues suspects , Paris 1930, pp. 169–180; Jacques A. Bailly: Plato's Euthyphro & Clitophon , Newburyport (MA) 2003, pp. 125-127; Konrad Gaiser: Protreptik and Paränese in Platon , Stuttgart 1959, pp. 140–147; David L. Roochnik: The Riddle of the Cleitophon . In: Mark Kremer (Ed.): Plato's Cleitophon. On Socrates and the Modern Mind , Lanham 2004, pp. 43-58 and Gerard R. Ledger: Re-counting Plato. A Computer Analysis of Plato's Style , Oxford 1989, pp. 146, 169, 206-208. See Franco Trabattoni: Sull'autenticità del Teage e del Clitofonte (pseudo) platonici . In: Acme. Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Milano 51, 1998, pp. 193–210, here: 207–210.
  11. ↑ Konrad Gaiser: Protreptik und Paränese in Plato , Stuttgart 1959, p. 146.
  12. ^ Gerard R. Ledger: Recounting Plato. A Computer Analysis of Plato's Style , Oxford 1989, pp. 206-209.
  13. ↑ Simon R. Slings: Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 215-234.
  14. ↑ Simon R. Slings: Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 3 f., 124 f., 209-212. See, however, the statement by Christopher Rowe: Plato and Socrates . In: Phronesis 45, 2000, pp. 159–173, here: 160–162 and the criticism by Hayden W. Abroad: On a Curious Platonic Dialogue . In: Ancient Philosophy 25, 2005, pp. 403-425, here: 403-407.
  15. ^ Geoffrey S. Bowe: In Defense of Clitophon . In: Classical Philology 102, 2007, pp. 245-264, here: 259-264.
  16. ↑ Jenny Bryan: Pseudo-Dialogue in Plato's Clitophon . In: The Cambridge Classical Journal 58, 2012, pp. 1-22.
  17. ↑ See for the older research history Johannes Geffcken: Das Rätsel des 'Kleitophon' . In: Hermes 68, 1933, pp. 429-439, here: 427 f.
  18. ↑ See the research overview in Simon R. Slings (ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 10-12.
  19. ↑ Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 13-18.
  20. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 306.
  21. ↑ Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 216-222.
  22. ↑ Antonio Carlini: Alcuni dialoghi pseudoplatonici e l'Accademia di Arcesilao . In: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere, Storia e Filosofia , Volume 2, Vol. 31, 1962, pp. 33-63, here: 55-57, 62.
  23. ^ Hans Joachim Krämer: The older academy . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 3, Basel 1983, pp. 1–174, here: 126.
  24. ↑ Joachim Dalfen: Observations and thoughts on the (pseudo) Platonic Minos and other spuria . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 51–67; Joachim Dalfen: Plato: Minos. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2009, pp. 29–67.
  25. ↑ Johannes Geffcken: The riddle of the 'Kleitophon' . In: Hermes 68, 1933, pp. 429-439.
  26. ↑ Luc Brisson: Plato: Clitophon . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , vol. 5, part 1, Paris 2012, p. 788 f.
  27. ↑ Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 209-212.
  28. ↑ Xenophon, Memories of Socrates 1,4,1.
  29. ↑ Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 77-82, 216, 230-233.
  30. ↑ See Rolf Westman : Chrysipp III 761 and the dialogue Kleitophon . In: Eranos 59, 1961, pp. 89-100; Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 217-220.
  31. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 3: 56–60.
  32. ↑ Simon R. Slings (Ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 94-98.
  33. ^ Geoffrey S. Bowe: In Defense of Clitophon . In: Classical Philology 102, 2007, pp. 245-264, here: 246.
  34. ^ Proklos , In Platonis Timaeum I 20,7-9.
  35. ↑ Parisinus Graecus 1807; see on this manuscript and its date Henri Dominique Saffrey: Retour sur le Parisinus graecus 1807, le manuscrit A de Platon . In: Cristina D'Ancona (Ed.): The Libraries of the Neoplatonists , Leiden 2007, pp. 3–28. On the Byzantine manuscripts, see Simon R. Slings (ed.): Plato: Clitophon , Cambridge 1999, pp. 237, 340–342.
  36. ↑ Muhsin Mahdi : Alfarabi: Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , 2nd edition, Ithaca 2001, p. 66 f. (English translation of al-Fārābī's work). See Hayden W. Abroad: On a Curious Platonic Dialogue . In: Ancient Philosophy 25, 2005, pp. 403-425, here: p. 413 and note 33.
  37. ^ See on Ficino's translation by James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, p. 306 f. and note 102; Geoffrey S. Bowe: In Defense of Clitophon . In: Classical Philology 102, 2007, pp. 245-264, here: 247 f.
  38. ^ Geoffrey S. Bowe: In Defense of Clitophon . In: Classical Philology 102, 2007, pp. 245-264, here: 247.
  39. ↑ On Pirckheimer's translation, see Niklas Holzberg : Willibald Pirckheimer , Munich 1981, pp. 301–311.
  40. ^ See on Estienne's statement by Hayden W. Abroad: On a Curious Platonic Dialogue . In: Ancient Philosophy 25, 2005, pp. 403–425, here: p. 417 note 50.
  41. ^ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Kleitophon. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, p. 335 f.
  42. ↑ See the research overview by Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 305. Kyriacos Demetriou offers a detailed account of the history of research in his review of the edition of Slings: Reconsidering the Platonic Cleitophon . In: Polis 17, 2000, pp. 133-160, here: 133-146.
  43. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 386 note 1 and Plato. Supplements and text criticism , 4th edition, Dublin / Zurich 1969 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 329.
  44. ^ Alfred Edward Taylor: Plato. The man and his work , 6th Edition, New York 1956 (reprint), pp. 12, 538.
  45. ^ William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, p. 388.
  46. ↑ Hans-Georg Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 7, Tübingen 1991, p. 106, p. 339, note 1 (statements in two essays by Gadamer from 1990).
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