Sheikh Ubeydallah uprising

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Joseph Cochran (seated with hat) and Sheikh Ubeydallah (seated right)

The Sheikh Ubeydallah uprising was the first primarily nationalist-motivated Kurdish uprising in history. It broke out in 1879 and was directed initially against the Ottoman Empire and later against Persia . The uprising was led by Sheikh Ubeydallah , the most powerful Kurdish leader of his time. He mobilized a number of Kurdish tribes . The uprising failed. Ubeydallah was caught and died in exile a few years later.

prehistory

The battle for Beyazid in the war of 1877/78

At the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire carried out political reforms that included centralization of the empire. As a result, the Kurdish principalities in the east of the empire were deprived of their privileges. After this decline of the Kurdish emirs , the religious sheikhs emerged as new actors who assumed the emirs' positions of power as religious and secular leaders. Sheikh Ubeydallah himself was a very influential Kurdish sheikh of the Naqschbandi order from Nehri in Hakkâri . Due to his wealth and origins, he had both worldly and spiritual influence on the Kurds and was considered the most powerful Kurdish leader of his time.

Several wars between the Russian Empire and the Ottomans had ruined the economy in Eastern Anatolia, causing famine and unrest. The Ottoman state had borrowed even more abroad, devalued the Akçe currency and increased taxes in the already poor economic situation. One of the Russo-Ottoman wars took place in 1877/1878 . The fronts ran in the Caucasus and the Balkan Peninsula . Sultan Abdülhamid II called on the Ottomans to jihad against Russia. Sheikh Ubeydallah joined this call and obtained several thousand modern rifles from the Ottoman government. According to the British consul William C. Abbott in Tabriz , Ubeydallah owned 20,000 Winchester and Martini-Henry rifles . According to Basil Nikitin , he commanded over 70,000 tribal warriors. Sheikh Ubeydallah fought the Russian army at Beyazid . But his irregular troops could do little against the Russian army. However, they used the rifles on their own initiative to raid and plunder Christian- Armenian villages in the vicinity of Van . This behavior strengthened the Europeans' view that the Christian Armenians in the Ottoman Empire needed protection. This was then put down in writing in Article 61 of the declaration of the Berlin Congress : The Sublime Porte undertook , without delay, to introduce improvements and reforms in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, which the local needs demand, and to give them security against the Circassians and Guarantee Kurds. From time to time it will be made aware of the measures taken for this purpose to the powers that be, who will supervise their application . After the end of the war, the Sheikh only returned a small part of the rifles to the government. He sold some of the weapons in Persia.

Motives and reasons for the uprising

Over time, the sheikh turned from a loyal supporter to an opponent of the sultan and the idea of ​​an independent Kurdish state took shape. The three main reasons for the change were

  • the burgeoning nationalism,
  • the ineptitude of the Ottoman and Persian officials and the state and
  • the fear of the establishment of a Christian-Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia.

Ubeydallah saw the Kurds as an independent people. With the decline of the economy and the wars in Kurdistan, the tax burden on the population increased, as did lawlessness. The sheikh blamed the Ottomans and Persians for the precarious situation in Kurdistan. The governments failed to stop the gangs. Probably the strongest impetus for the revolt against the Ottomans and later also the Persians was Ubeydallah's fear of the establishment of a Christian Armenia. Since the Treaty of Berlin and the reforms regarding the Armenians in the eastern provinces, there have been rumors about an Armenian state, which the Ottomans have probably also spread. The British who traveled to the area after the Berlin Congress increased the rumors. Ubeydallah vehemently opposed a Christian state, although he was aware of the bad situation of Christians. He blamed the Ottoman government for this. He even wanted to involve Christians in his plans and thereby win the sympathy of the European powers.

So he got in touch with the Armenian Archbishop Yohannes Wardapet from Başkale and the Catholicos Patriarch Mar Schimun in order to win them over. Yohannes Vardapet declined the sheikh's invitations and Mar Schimun was initially on his side, but then had to stop his help under pressure from the British. Nevertheless, during the invasion of Persia there were several hundred Nestorian fighters and Armenian messengers who were supposed to win the Armenians in Persia for the sheikh's cause.

revolt

Revolt against the Ottomans

The influence of the sheikh in the border area between the Ottoman Empire and Persia 1880

In the late 1870s, the Herki tribe refused to pay taxes. The Kaymakam ( district administrator ) of Gever (today Yüksekova ) initiated a punitive expedition and arrested many tribesmen. Sheikh Ubeydallah then called on the Kurdish leaders of the region to revolt and declared that he no longer recognized the Ottoman government and would march on Amediye . An Ottoman unit from Mosul then met 900 men of the rebels at Amediye under the leadership of Ubeydallah's son Seyyit Abdülkadir and defeated them. The uprising collapsed after five days.

The punitive expedition was just a pretext for Sheikh Ubeydallah's uprising. There were indications that the uprising had been planned for two years. For some time now, Ubeydallah has been in contact with other Kurdish tribal leaders and the Nestorians of Van and has been buying his men large quantities of grain for a long time. However, the Van Wali had not followed up on the hint of a planned uprising . He later suspected that the Sheikh wanted to found his own principality and only used the Gever incident as an excuse. According to the British consul in Erzurum Major Henry Trotter, however, there was a financial background. According to the Persian consul in Van, the sheikh was a Persian citizen and received monthly payments from there. But when war broke out in 1877 and the sheikh fought on the side of the Ottomans, Persia stopped making payments. The sheikh then demanded money and medals from the Ottomans for his services in the war. When the Ottomans refused, he kept his distance.

The Ottoman government behaved inconsistently towards the sheikhs. While the uprising was suppressed swiftly and severely, she was lenient to the Sheikh and even transferred the kaymakam of Gever. Sheikh Ubeydallah was supposed to meet with government officials in Van to resolve the crisis. He had stayed in the background during the uprising and later protested his loyalty and his ignorance of the incidents. His sons have since fled to Persia.

Kurdish Alliance

Sheikh Ubeydallah tried to forge a Kurdish alliance. The provisions of the Berlin Congress, which gave the Christian Ottomans far-reaching rights, were one reason for this. A conference with several Kurdish leaders in Nehri did not bring the desired success. The sultan had his own plans with a possible alliance of the Kurds and wanted to use them against the Armenians. In his uprising against the Ottomans, the sheikh did not receive much support. So he chose Persia as the next target because the Qajars in the east were involved in wars against the Turkmens and the Persian army in the west was not that strong. In addition, Persia was weakened by the wars in the Caucasus and was a worthwhile goal for the Sheikh.

Invasion of Persia

Ubeydallah therefore turned his attention to Persia. Then he wanted to move against the Ottomans with fresh troops. He claimed a Kurdish state and justified this with the fact that the Kurds are a people with their own language and religion. Other authors say that the sheikh merely sought an autonomous principality and that he was always loyal to the Ottoman sultan.

His son Seyyit Abdülkadir fled to Persia after the uprising in 1879, where he administered his father's property. Hamza Agha of the Mangur had attended the sheikh's tribal meeting and was now preparing for an attack. When he got involved in fighting with the Persian troops, the sheikh sent his son with 1000 men to help.

The tribal troops, including the battle-hardened Nestorian tribes from Hakkari, attacked Persia from three directions. These were led by his sons Seyyit Abdülkadir and Sheikh Sıddık and the confidante Sheikh Mehmed Said. Seyyit Abdülkadir marched with his men south of Lake Urmia towards Mahabad and Tabriz . Sheikh Sıddık stayed with Margawar to protect his brother . Sheikh Mehmed Said moved towards Choy , Salamas and Urmia Lake. At the beginning of September 1880 the areas of Lahidzhan and Sardasht were conquered. In October 1880, Sheikh Ubeydallah himself and his men crossed the border.

In Persia they were joined by the Mameş, Mengûr, Zerza, Gewrik, Bane, Herki and Begzade tribes from the Persian part of Kurdistan. Some of the tribes that joined him in Persia were the Mengûr and the Mameş with 5,000 men each, the Zerza with 8,000 men and the Mukri with 10,000 men. The city of Mahabad surrendered to the attackers after negotiations. After taking the city, the spiritual leader of the Sunnis of Mahabad called for jihad against the Shiites. The Sheikh then sent envoys to Miandoab to buy food, among other things. However, they were all killed there, whereupon the Sheikh called his son to attack Miandoab. Many residents fled, 2000 to 4000 people fell victim to the attackers. The troops captured and sacked the city. Seyyit Abdülkadir moved on to Maragha and from there to Tabriz.

Meanwhile, the Sheikh and his son Sheikh Sıddık marched against Urmia. According to Nikitin, they had 12,000 men at their disposal. After brief fighting, both sides decided to negotiate. Knowing of the fate of Miandoab, the Vali of Urmia wanted to hand over the city. However, the Persians were able to obtain a postponement from the sheikh to hand over the city. Meanwhile, a Persian army had arrived in Urmia, so that the city could be held and the sheikh broke off the siege after ten days.

The Persian ruler Nāser ad-Din Shah had requested support and help from Russia and England. You should put pressure on the Ottoman Sultan. Russia agreed to do so and moved troops to the Persian border in Nakhichevan . But the Persian army, led by Austrian officers , quickly gained the upper hand and pushed the Kurds back to the Ottoman border. There they were intercepted by Ottoman soldiers and handed over to the Persians. The Persian troops killed numerous Sunnis and Kurds, and many Nestorians were also killed at Lake Urmia. 60,000 to 70,000 Kurds fled the army to the Ottoman Empire. The devastation in the country, especially around Urmia, was enormous; many places were sacked.

equipment

Sheikh Ubeydallah's fighters were tribal warriors and not as disciplined as regular soldiers. In the event of defeat, they dispersed quickly, and in the event of a victory they would return home after looting and not continue fighting. Hence the number of fighters on the part of the sheikh cannot be stated with any certainty.

Sheikh Ubeydallah had several thousand rifles. An Armenian source says that he had 200 Persian and 4,000 Ottoman rifles. Abbott even reported 20,000 rifles. The Persian consul in Istanbul claimed that the sheikh owned an ammunition factory. Sheikh Ubeydallah was definitely better equipped than the local Persian army. That was already shown by the 160 captured camels that were loaded with weapons and ammunition.

Reactions abroad

The sheikh sought international support for his uprising, but the great powers were dismissive. Russia feared a divided Persia and England wanted to prevent the region from being destabilized. Russia had experience of a similar incident a few years earlier in the Caucasus. Imam Shamil , who was also a Naqschbandi , had risen against the Tsarist empire. The Russians feared that Sheikh Ubeydallah could also influence the Muslims of the Caucasus against the tsar. On the other hand, the uprising came in handy for the Russians to drive back English influence in the region.

Persia suspected American missionaries of cooperation with Ubeydallah. The US intervened to protect its citizens, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Persia suspected the Ottoman government to be the mastermind behind the uprising. The Ottomans were initially passive. They were against any reform in favor of Christians in the Orient and viewed the Berlin Congress as a preliminary stage to another war.

Sheikh Ubeydallah's fate

Under pressure from other states and Persia, the Ottoman sultan intervened and summoned the sheikh to Istanbul in June 1881. Sheikh Ubeydallah was received with all honors, but was still a prisoner at court. He assured the Sultan that his revolt against Persia was a response to the predatory policies of the Persians.

After a few months in Istanbul, he was able to flee to Nehri again. The Ottomans sent soldiers to arrest him. The sheikh holed himself up in the fortress of Oramar and offered the government to go into exile in Mosul. Finally he was accompanied by Ottoman soldiers to Mosul, but his son Seyyit Abdülkadir freed him on the way and went into hiding with him in the village of Scheptan. When the Ottomans besieged the village, the sheikh and his son surrendered on November 13, 1882. The sheikh was sent to the Hejaz , where he died around 1883/84.

His eldest son, Sheikh Sıddık, was later able to return to Nehri. Seyyit Abdülkadir, on the other hand, settled in Istanbul and continued to play a major role in Kurdish nationalism.

Individual evidence

  1. Paul J. White, p. 58
  2. Nikitin in Les Afsars d'Urmiyeh , quoted from Wadie Jwaideh p. 170 (Turkish edition).
  3. Bilal N. Şimşir p. 183
  4. Berlin contract on wikisource
  5. ^ Paul J. White, p. 59
  6. ^ Correspondence respecting the condition of the populations in Asia minor and Syria , Turkey No. 4 (1880), p. 69, quoted from Wadie Jwaideh, p. 167 (Turkish edition).
  7. ^ Correspondence respecting the condition of the populations in Asia minor and Syria, Turkey No. 4 (1880), p. 87, quoted from Wadie Jwaideh, p. 169 (Turkish edition).
  8. Martin van Bruinessen: Agha, Sheikh and State. Politics and Society of Kurdistan. Berlin 1989, p. 343.
  9. Celile Celil, p. 94
  10. SG Wilson: Persian life and customs , p. 111, quoted from Wadie Jwaideh, p. 175 (Turkish edition).
  11. Nikitin in Les Afsars d'Urmiyeh , quoted from Wadie Jwaideh p. 173 (Turkish edition)
  12. Celile Celil, p. 107
  13. ^ Correspondence respecting the Kurdish invasion of Persia , Turkey No. 5 (1881), p. 6, quoted from Wadie Jwaideh, p. 173 (Turkish edition).
  14. ^ Correspondence respecting the Kurdish invasion of Persia , Turkey No. 5 (1881), p. 61, quoted from Wadie Jwaideh p. 173 (Turkish edition).
  15. ^ Correspondence respecting the Kurdish invasion of Persia , Turkey No. 5 (1881), p. 57, quoted from Wadie Jwaideh, p. 173 (Turkish edition).
  16. Celile Celil, p. 118

literature

  • Celile Celil : 1880 - Şeyh Ubeydullah Nehri Kürt Ayaklanması (1880 - The Kurdish Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri Uprising), Peri Verlag, Istanbul 1998, ISBN 9758245031
  • Wadie Jwaideh: The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development , Syracuse Univ. Pr., 1960 (new edition 2006), ISBN 9780815630937
  • Hakan Özoğlu: Nationalism and kurdish notables in the late ottoman-early republican era , published in International Journal of Middle East Studies , Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 383-409, August 2001.
  • Hakan Özoğlu: Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries , Suny Press, 2004. ISBN 0791459934 . Preview
  • Bilal N. Şimşir: Kürtçülük 1787 - 1923 , Bilgi Yayınevi, April 2007, ISBN 9789752202153
  • Mehmet Fırat Kılıç: Sheikh Ubeydullah's Movement , dissertation at Bilkent University in Ankara, November 2003. Online version on the Bilkent University website (PDF; 510 kB)
  • Paul J. White: Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernisers ?: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey , Zed Books Ltd, 2002, ISBN 978-1856498227