Southwest Pacific Area

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Epaulet badge of the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area.

Southwest Pacific Area ( SWPA ) was the name of the Allied command area in the Southwest Pacific during the Pacific War . He was one of four major Allied command areas in the Pacific during the war. It included the Philippines , Borneo , Dutch East Indies without Sumatra , Australia , New Guinea and the surrounding archipelagos, as well as the western Solomon Islands and some adjacent areas. In it the troops of the various Allied powers, mainly the United States, Great Britain , Australia, the Netherlands and the Philippines were bundled under a common command.

Supreme Commander was General Douglas MacArthur . Allied Land Forces (Allied under his command in the SWPA five subcommands were formed land forces Allied Air Forces (Allied), Air Force ), Allied Naval Forces (Allied naval forces ), United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA, military forces of the United States in Australia) and United States Army Forces in the Philippines. The latter became extinct with the surrender of the last Allied forces in the Philippines on Corregidor on May 6, 1942. The USAFIA was transformed into the United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area (USASOS SWPA). After a reform of the United States Army Forces in the Far East in 1943, this took over the administrative tasks of USASOS, which meant that it only performed logistical tasks. In 1945 both were removed from the SWPA network. The three remaining sub-commands remained subordinate to him until his formal dissolution on the day of Japan's surrender on September 2, 1945.

Origins

Map of the various areas in the Pacific, 1942. State borders as of June 1937.

The direct predecessor of the Southwest Pacific Area was the short-lived ABDACOM . In December 1941 and January 1942 it was also called the South West Pacific Area. The rapid Japanese advance in the Dutch East Indies quickly separated the area of ​​the ABDACOM into two separate areas, which is why its commander, British Field Marshal Archibald Wavell , dissolved it again in February 1942. As British Commander-in-Chief in India he then took over the theaters of war Burma and Sumatra in the west of the former ABDACOM.

Between February 26 and March 1, the Chiefs of Staff of the forces of Australia and New Zealand met in Melbourne to discuss how the space, now under no higher order, could be rearranged. As a result, they proposed the creation of a new area of ​​command encompassing Australia and New Zealand and making Wavell's former deputy, Lieutenant General George Brett, Commander in Chief. Brett had taken command of the USAFIA on February 25th.

Southwest Pacific Area

The President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill discussed the command division at a meeting in Washington, DC on March 9. Roosevelt proposed dividing the world into American and British areas of command and subordinating the Pacific to the United States. There would be an American Supreme Commander there who would report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff . Churchill expressed his approval of Roosevelt's proposal, which is why the governments of Australia and New Zealand were notified of him. They also endorsed it, but expressed the wish to be given a certain say at least on strategic issues.

The Pacific War Council had already been formed and met for the first time on February 10, 1942 in London. In this Churchill, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden represented the United Kingdom. Earle Page was the Australian representative. Other countries represented were New Zealand, the Netherlands, British India and the Republic of China . In June 1942 Stanley took Bruce Page's seat on the council. In parallel to this, another Pacific War Council was formed in Washington, DC, which first met on April 1, 1942. He presided over President Roosevelt, while Richard Casey and later Owen Dixon represented Australia. Canada as the third councilor was represented by its Prime Minister Mackenzie King . The councils never had an effective role or influence over war strategy, but they did allow the British Dominions to raise their concerns with the United States and the United Kingdom at the highest level.

Lineup

For those responsible, the most obvious choice of the Supreme Commander in the Pacific was the American General Douglas MacArthur . Even before his flight from the Philippines to Australia in March 1942, he had received instructions on February 22 of that year to take command of the newly established ABDACOM to take over. Even before discussions about the nature of the Pacific command area began in earnest, his superiors promised him command of it. While President Roosevelt, the army command and the American people largely supported MacArthur and his positions, the leadership of the Navy saw him critically. The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet , Admiral Ernest J. King believed that the Pacific War would be fought primarily through naval operations and that command should not be transferred to an Army officer. Since there was no naval officer in the United States Navy at the time who could rival MacArthur in prestige and personal size, King proposed the division of the Pacific into several independent areas of command. The planners of the US Army under Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower were ready to compromise on divided areas of command, but wanted to divide Australia and New Zealand into different areas. Between March 9 and 16, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the various proposals made by the Army and Navy and ultimately decided to implement the Navy's plans with minimal changes.

While the discussions continued, the US Chief of Staff of the Army , George C. Marshall , contacted Brett and asked if the Australian government could nominate MacArthur, who was about to arrive in Australia, as their election for Supreme Commander. It did so on March 17th, the day MacArthur arrived in Batchelor , northern Australia. On March 24th, the Combined Chiefs of Staff passed a directive that placed the Pacific under the strategic jurisdiction of the United States. On March 30, the Joint Chiefs of Staff divided the Pacific into three areas of command: the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under MacArthur, and the Southeast Pacific Area , which was never established has been. An addition regulated the boundaries of the command areas.

On April 17, 1942, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin instructed all members of the Australian Defense Forces to treat orders issued by MacArthur "as if they were from the Commonwealth of Government" The Army and Training and Logistics Facilities of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF ) were not subject to the SWPA. By subordinating their troops to the SWPA and thus MacArthur's command, changes in the command structure and the dimensions of the command area could only be made with the consent of the Australian government. It was particularly important to them that the Supreme Commander could not deploy their troops outside of Australia itself or Australian territory without their consent, as the area of ​​operations of the Australian militia forces was subject to legal restrictions. The first change in command came when the Joint Chiefs of Staff replaced Brett as commander of the Allied Air Force, ignoring the Australian government. MacArthur and Curtin agreed that Thomas Blamey's status as Allied Land Forces commander would remain unchanged and that the government would be informed of any further planned changes. When the Commander of the Navy, the American Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary , was to be replaced a few months later, Curtin's approval was obtained first.

General Headquarters

MacArthur was appointed supreme commander of the SWPA on April 18, 1942, but preferred the more ordinary title of commander in chief . With his first general order, he ordered the establishment of five subordinate commands: Allied Land Forces, Allied Air Forces, Allied Naval Forces, United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) and United States Army Forces in the Philippines. The latter command was only granted a short lifespan, as the troops under the command of General Jonathan M. Wainwright disbanded more and more under the ongoing Japanese attacks in the following three weeks and ceased to exist with the surrender of Corregidor on May 6th .

General Douglas MacArthur and Australian Prime Minister John Curtin meet in the Australian Parliament, March 26, 1942.

MacArthur announced the composition of his staff, known as Headquarters General (GHQ), on April 19th. Major General Richard K. Sutherland became Chief of Staff , Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall became Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Charles P. Stivers assumed Division G-1, Col. Charles Willoughby G-2, Brigadier General Stephen J. Chamberlin G-3, Colonel Lester J. Whitlock G-4. Brigadier General Spencer B. Akin became a signaling officer, Brigadier General Hugh J. Casey became a pioneer officer, Brigadier General William F. Marquat became an air defense officer, Colonel Burdette M Fitch first adjutant, and Colonel LeGrande A. Diller became public relations officer.

Although Marshall MacArthur had recommended that as many Australian and Dutch officers as possible be appointed to senior positions, almost all of his staff consisted of US Army officers who had served under him in the Philippines. The rest, including Chamberlain, Fitch, and Whitlock, consisted of USAFIA staff. MacArthur explained this to Marshall by saying that there were no qualified Dutch officers in Australia and that he did not want to exacerbate the existing shortage of staff officers in the Australian armed forces. Despite this justification, he put some Australian and Dutch officers in addition to American naval officers on low staff positions. In July of that year, MacArthur moved his GHQ north from Melbourne to Brisbane . There he addressed his staff and in later than MacArthur Central known AMP Building a. Originally, the GHQ was to be relocated to Townsville , which was not done due to the poor communication infrastructure on site. The headquarters of the allied air and naval forces were also located in the AMP building . The advanced headquarters of the land forces set up in St. Lucia, about 12 km away . An advanced section of the GHQ moved to Hollandia in September 1944 , to Leyte in October 1944 , and to Manila in May 1945 .

Command Structure of the Southwest Pacific Area, July 1943.

In April 1945 a major reorganization took place in preparation for the planned invasion of Japan . All army units in the Pacific were placed under MacArthur's command, including those in Admiral Nimitz's POA. A new command area, the Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC) was formed, which was subordinate to the SWPA's GHQ. The army units in the POA initially remained under Nimitz 'operational control, and the first major unit, the 10th US Army , was not subordinated to the AFPAC until July 31, 1945. The SWPA was dissolved together with the Allied land, air and naval forces on September 2, 1945, but its GHQ remained as GHQ AFPAC.

Allied land forces

The Commander in Chief of the Australian Army General Thomas Blamey was appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied Land Forces in the SWPA. Their headquarters was the existing General Headquarters of the Australian Armed Forces and was abbreviated as LHQ. Blamey was chosen because much of the land forces in the SWPA were Australians. In April 1942, there were only 38,000 American troops in the SWPA compared to 369,000 Australians. The LHQ was under five commands: The 1st Army stationed in Queensland under Lieutenant General John Lavarack , the 2nd Army under Lieutenant General Iven Mackay in Victoria , the III Corps in Western Australia under Lieutenant General Gordon Bennett , the Northern Territory Force under Major General Edmund Herring and the New Guinea Force under Maj . Gen. Basil Morris . Ten Australian and two American divisions were divided between these five command areas. In August 1944, 463,000 men and women served in the Australian Army while 173,000 men in the US Army were in the SWPA. At the end of 1944, there were 18 American divisions in the SWPA compared to only seven Australian ones.

While the GHQ moved to Brisbane, the LHQ remained in Melbourne. On Blamey's orders it merely set up an advanced headquarters under Deputy Chief of Staff George Alan Vasey in St. Lucia near Brisbane. In September 1942, Major General Frank Berryman replaced Vasey as deputy chief of staff and held this position until January 1944. He took over the post again in July 1944 and held it until December 1945. The forward LHQ followed the transfer of the main body of the GHQ to Hollandia and straightened out there from December 15, 1944. When the GHQ main body was relocated to Leyte in February 1945, the advanced LHQ no longer followed. Only an even smaller, advanced unit under Berryman moved on with the GHQ. The rest of the forward LHQ did not move again until April 1945 when it went to Morotai to coordinate the fighting on Borneo .

MacArthur preferred to divide the land forces into "task forces". These were directly subordinate to the GHQ and their commanders had direct access to all land, air and naval forces in their command area if a Japanese land attack threatened. The most important of these task forces was the "New Guinea Force" established in 1942, which was under Blamey's personal command in September 1942 and again in September 1943. In February 1943, the US 6th Army under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger arrived at the SWPA and set up its headquarters at that of the Alamo Force. Since this was under MacArthur's direct command, this also applied to the 6th US Army, which means that most American armed forces were no longer under Blamey's command from that point on. Nevertheless, his position was not dissolved.

In March 1944, MacArthur met with Curtin to discuss the details of his plan for the Battle of Western New Guinea . He declared that he would take direct command of all land forces as soon as he reached the Philippines. For Blamey he suggested accompanying him as an army commander or staying in Australia as the Australian commander in chief. This new form of organization of the land forces came into force in September 1944 and the 6th and 8th US Army and the XIV US Corps as well as the 1st Australian Army and the 1st Australian Corps were subordinate to the GHQ. The Allied Land Forces Command remained an important administrative and logistical institution until it was dissolved together with the SWPQ on September 2, 1945.

Allied air forces

The Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Air Force, Vice Air Marshal George Jones, at a meeting with the Commander of the Allied Far East Air Forces, Lieutenant General George Kenny, in Manila, July 1945.

In April 1942, during the reorganization of the armed forces, the formation of the Allied Air Force under George Brett took place. Unlike MacArthur, Brett created a headquarters in which the Allies were equally divided. Vice Air Marshal of the RAAF William Bostock served Brett as chief of staff. Each staff officer of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) was faced with an officer from the RAAF, whereby the higher officer ranks were evenly divided between Americans and Australians. So Australians held the majority of the command posts. In July, Brett was replaced by Major General George Kenney . In order to circumvent the USAAF personnel shortages, personnel of the RAAF also served in their groups , where they took over all positions with the exception of those of the pilot.

In May 1942, the Australian government appointed Vice Air Marshal George Jones as chief of the air staff . He assumed responsibility for non-operational matters such as training and administration. Tensions quickly emerged between Bostock and Jones, with Kenney taking the side of Bostock and supporting him as chief of staff. As a result, the division of staff tasks remained.

One of the first orders Brett received from MacArthur was to organize a bombing raid on the Philippines. MacArthur had his Chief of Staff, Sutherland, deliver the order personally. Sutherland brushed aside concerns on the part of Brett by pointing out that MacArthur was demanding that the order be carried out. The mission was under the orders of Brigadier General Ralph Royce , but MacArthur sent Brett a personal warning. From then on, Bostock regulated communication from the Supreme Command to the Air Force with Sutherland. Further disagreements between MacArthur and Brett ensued. In the meantime, Brett's integrative command concept caused irritation to General Marshall and the USAAF commander, Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold in Washington. Both were also bothered by his strained relationship with MacArthur. On a July 6 radio message, Marshall MacArthur offered Major General George Kenney or Brigadier General James H. Doolittle to replace Brett. MacArthur accepted the offer and selected Kenney as the new commanding officer.

Kenney relieved Major General Ralph Roye, Brigadier Generals Edwin S. Perrin, Albert Sneed, and Martin Scanlon, and forty colonels from their duties. The two American brigadier generals Ennis Whitehead and Kenneth Walker who recently arrived in Australia served as replacements . In August, Kenney reorganized the air force and placed Whitehead in command of the 5th Fighter Command and Walker over the 5th Bomber Command . The Allied Air Forces consisted of personnel from both the RAAF and the USAAF, which Kenney wanted to separate. In September, Kenney replaced William Bostock as Chief of Staff with Brigadier General Donald Wilson, who had arrived from the United States . Bostock then took over command of the newly formed RAAF Command . Walker fell in January 1943 when his plane was shot down over Rabaul . His successor, Brigadier General Howard Ramey , disappeared just two months later on a reconnaissance flight over Torres Street .

Kenney deviated from the normal structure of an air force by establishing a Highlighted Command Level (ADVON) under Whitehead. This new headquarters had the authority to change the assignments of aircraft to advanced positions. He received this in order to be able to counter local influencing factors such as weather changes and enemy influences more directly than from Australia. To control air operations in the frontline and special operations, he created the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Task Force, another departure from valid air doctrines. While Kenney endorsed the innovations, his superiors in Washington rejected them and transported the three task forces to the 308th , 309th and 310th bomber squadrons . In June 1944, the 13th US Air Force under Major General St. Clair Streett was placed under the Air Force . Kenney formed the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) from the 5th US Air Fleet , while ADVON became the new 5th Air Fleet. The RAAF set up the 1st tactical Australian air fleet under air commodore Frederick Scherger in October 1944 . In March 1945 Major General Paul Wurtsmith replaced Streett. The Allied air forces were disbanded on September 2, 1945.

Allied naval forces

Vice Admiral George C. Kinkaid and General Douglas MacArthur on the Phoenix during the bombing of Los Negros in preparation for landings, February 28, 1944.

Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary was named Commander in Chief of the Allied Naval Forces in April 1942. In February 1942 he had been appointed commander of the ANZAC Force, the naval forces in the ANZAC command area east of Australia. He was directly subordinate to Admiral King. The main unit under his command was the ANZAC squadron , commanded by Rear Admiral John Gregory Crace . With the formation of the SWPA, Leary also became the commander of the Southwest Pacific Force (COMSOUWESPAC), while the ANZAC squadron was transformed into Task Force 44. In June, Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley replaced Crace as their commander.

With the approval of the Australian government, Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender replaced Leary on September 11th. Like Leary before, he was in command of COMSOUWESPAC Admiral King and, with the Allied naval forces, subordinated to General MacArthur. Like Leary, Carpender was not the senior naval commander. Both the Chief of Staff of the Australian Navy Admiral Guy Royle and the Vice Admiral of the Dutch Navy Conrad Helferich were senior to him. Royle nevertheless agreed to serve under Carpenter as commander of the South West Pacific Sea Frontier established on March 16, 1943.

The COMSOUWESPAC was converted to the 7th US fleet on March 15, 1943 and its Einsatzgruppen renumbered, so that Einsatzgruppe 44 became Einsatzgruppe 74. Another important component was Einsatzgruppe 76, which had been set up on January 8, 1943 under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey and represented the amphibious force for the Southwest Pacific. Later that year it was renamed the VII Amphibious Force. Two amphibious operations training facilities have been established, HMAS Assault at Port Stephens and another at Toorbul Point . The VII Amphibious Force initially consisted of Australian infantry landing ships , the Manoora , Westralia , Kanimbla, and the American assault landing ship Henry T. Allen , but grew quickly.

General MacArthur was bothered by the fact that Royle, as was customary in the Commonwealth, communicated directly with the British Admiralty . He was also aware that Royle had criticized the structure of command and some of its decisions. For these reasons he proposed to replace Royle as Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Navy by the sea captain John Augustine Collins , in which Carpender supported him. Over the Admiralty, Curtin replaced the commander of Einsatzgruppe 74, Crutchley, in June 1944, while at the same time being promoted to Commodore by Collins. The aim was to get Collins in position so that he could replace Royle when his tenure expired. A serious wound of Collins' on October 21, 1944 in the Gulf of Leyte prevented the assumption of command.

MacArthur also had problems with Carpender and twice requested his replacement. In November 1943, Admiral King replaced Carpender with Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid without consulting MacArthur or the Australian government. In order for all those involved to be able to save face, a covert official explanation was issued. For the planned landing on Leyte , the 7th US fleet was massively increased with ships from the Pacific fleet. The 3rd US fleet under William F. Halsey was supposed to cover the landing, but remained under the command of Admiral Nimitz. During the sea ​​and air battles in the Leyte Gulf , the divided command and misunderstanding between Halsey and Kinkaid almost resulted in a crushing defeat for the Allied forces. Like the SWPA, the Allied naval forces were formally dissolved on September 2, 1945.

US Army Services of Supply

The USAFIA was under the command of Major General Julian F. Barnes, who had already commanded the first US troops that arrived in Australia in December 1941. Its 4,600 soldiers were part of a convoy that was on its way to the Philippines when the war broke out and was then diverted to Australia. He took over command of the newly formed USAFIA when it landed in Brisbane. Several base departments were gradually established in Australia. Originally they were supposed to support the American troops in the Philippines. A total of seven base departments spread across Australia were under the command of the USAFIA. They were in Birdum , Townsville, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth, and Sydney. On July 20, 1942, the USAFIA became the United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area (USASOS SWPA) under the command of Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall. Barnes returned to the United States.

Organizing the administration and resupply of the US Army forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, July 1943.

With the arrival of the headquarters of the 6th US Army in Australia in February 1943, the administrative tasks were withdrawn from USASOS and placed under the newly established United States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE). These were directly under MacArthur's command. The command command had the same name as MacArthur's in the Philippines, but took on different functions. With the shift in competence, USASOS only performed logistical tasks. The new structure turned out to be poor and required several adjustments before it worked satisfactorily for the commanders. In September 1943, Brigadier General James L. Frink took command from General Marshall.

In August 1942 an advanced base was established in Port Moresby and subordinate outposts in Milne and Oro Bays . In April 1943 they were named Outpost A and Outpost B. At the same time as this was named, Outpost C was set up on Goodenough Island , but was formally dissolved in July when the 6th US Army took control of the island. In the meantime, outpost D had been set up at Port Moresby in May. In August all previous outposts were upgraded to bases and in November outposts E at Lae and F at Finschhafen were established. Shortly thereafter, outpost G at Hollandia and outpost H on Biak were established .

With the Allied advance, new bases emerged, while the base departments in Australia were gradually closed. The departments in Townsville and Sydney were the last to be deactivated in June 1945 and their tasks were transferred to the Australian base department, which had existed since February 1945. In July and September 1945, bases A to E in New Guinea were also closed. At the same time, bases K, M, R, S and X were set up in the Philippines. They were initially subordinate to the Luzon base department, which was renamed the Philippines base department on April 1, 1945. On June 7, 1945, the USASOS SWPA became part of the Army Forces, Western Pacific (ADWESPAC) under the command of Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer . From this point on they were incorporated into the USAFFE.

Intelligence activities

In April 1942, American Brigadier General Spencer B. Akin of the GHQ and Australian Major General Colin H. Simpson of the LHQ agreed to join forces and establish a common intelligence organization known as the Central Bureau . The armies of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the RAAF and RAN, all recruited personnel for the organization dealing with cryptanalysis of Japanese radio communications. Magic and Ultra were found to be essential to the SWPA's maneuvers.

For other intelligence activities, Blamey and MacArthur set up the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). The Services Reconnaissance Department with its Z Special Unit was subordinate to him . This was responsible for operations and special forces such as Operation Jaywick and Secret Intelligence Australia and the Coastwatchers . The latter looked behind enemy lines for Japanese aircraft and ship movements. She also belonged to the Far Eastern Liaison Office . Two other important organizations that were not part of the AIB were the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section and the Allied Geographical Section .

Since quality is far more important than pure manpower in this field, the smaller allies Australia and the Netherlands were able to play important roles here. Through education, the Allies were able to maximize their successes while minimizing risks. After the war, Australia benefited greatly from the structures that had been established. David Horner later wrote that "Intelligence cooperation to date may be the longest and most important impact of coalition warfare in World War II."

Effects

The Allied command structure in the SWPA solved the difficulties of coalition warfare in various ways and with varying degrees of success. The benefits of war alliances proved substantial, but required sustained efforts to maintain them. For Australia, coalition warfare became the norm, and the SWPA experiences turned out to be essential political and military lessons. In the decades that followed, Australian and American forces fought together in various wars, such as the Korean and Vietnam War and the War on Terror .

Remarks

  1. ^ Paul Hasluck: The Government and the People 1942–1945. 1970, p. 49.
  2. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command - The First Two Years. 1962, pp. 240-242.
  3. ^ A b Louis Morton: Strategy and Command - The First Two Years. 1962, pp. 242-245.
  4. ↑ JMA Gwyer and JRM Butler: Grand Strategy. 1964, p. 437.
  5. ^ Paul Hasluck: The Government and the People 1942–1945. 1970, pp. 227-228.
  6. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command - The First Two Years. 1962, pp. 244-246.
  7. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command - The First Two Years. 1962, pp. 247-249.
  8. ^ Grace P. Hayes: The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II. The War against Japan. 1982, p. 765.
  9. ^ A b c Paul Hasluck: The Government and the People 1942–1945. 1970, pp. 112-113.
  10. ↑ a b c d e f g Samuel Milner: Victory in Papua. 1957, p. 22.
  11. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, p. 309.
  12. ^ Paul Hasluck: The Government and the People 1942–1945. 1970, p. 60.
  13. ^ A b Paul Hasluck: The Government and the People 1942–1945. 1970, p. 115.
  14. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command - The First Two Years. 1962, pp. 264-268.
  15. ^ A b David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, pp. 206-207.
  16. ^ A b Samuel Milner: Victory in Papua. 1957, p. 48.
  17. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, p. 342.
  18. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, p. 348.
  19. ^ D. Clayton James: 1941-1945. 1975, p. 67.
  20. ^ A b Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, p. 174.
  21. ↑ a b c d Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, p. 311.
  22. ^ Dudley McCarthy: South-West Pacific Area - First Year. 1959, pp. 24-26.
  23. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 227.
  24. ^ Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, p. 19.
  25. ^ Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, p. 31.
  26. ^ Dudley McCarthy: South-West Pacific Area - First Year. 1959, p. 174.
  27. ^ Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, p. 593.
  28. ^ A b Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, pp. 24 and 47.
  29. ^ Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, pp. 46-47.
  30. ^ Dudley McCarthy: South-West Pacific Area - First Year. 1959, pp. 74 and 159.
  31. ^ Dudley McCarthy: South-West Pacific Area - First Year. 1959, p. 236.
  32. ^ A b David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 221.
  33. ^ Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, pp. 594-595.
  34. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, pp. 309-310.
  35. ^ Australian War Memorial: GHQ Operations Instructions. In: Blames Papers, 3DRL 6643 3/102. No. 67, September 9, 1944.
  36. ^ A b David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, p. 207.
  37. ^ A b David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, pp. 350-353.
  38. ^ Lex McAulay: Battle of the Bismarck Sea. 1991, pp. 26-27.
  39. ↑ Thomas E. Griffith, Jr.: MacArthur's Airman. General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific. 1998, p. 63.
  40. ^ Paul P. Rogers: MacArthur and Sutherland. The Good Years. 1990, pp. 276-277.
  41. ^ Herman S. Wolk: The Other Founding Father. 1987, p. 165.
  42. ^ Herman S. Wolk: George C. Kenney. MacArthur's Premier Airman. 1988, p. 92
  43. ^ Herman S. Wolk: The Other Founding Father. 1987, pp. 168-169.
  44. ↑ George C. Kenney: General Kenney Reports. A Personal History of the Pacific Warfare. 1949, p. 11.
  45. ↑ James A. Barr: Airpower Employment of the Fifth Air Force in the World War II Southwest Pacific Theater. 1997, p. 20.
  46. ↑ George C. Kenney: General Kenney Reports. A Personal History of the Pacific Warfare. 1949, p. 100.
  47. ↑ George C. Kenney: General Kenney Reports. A Personal History of the Pacific Warfare. 1949, p. 176.
  48. ↑ George C. Kenney: General Kenney Reports. A Personal History of the Pacific Warfare. 1949, pp. 216-217.
  49. ^ Matthew K. Rodman: A War of Their Own. Bombers over the Southwest Pacific. 2005, p. 77.
  50. ↑ Thomas E. Griffith, Jr.: MacArthur's Airman. General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific. 1998, pp. 174-175.
  51. ↑ George C. Kenney: General Kenney Reports. A Personal History of the Pacific Warfare. 1949, pp. 537-538.
  52. ↑ George C. Kenney: General Kenney Reports. A Personal History of the Pacific Warfare. 1949, p. 519.
  53. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1936-1942. 1957, pp. 520-521.
  54. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 4.
  55. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 34.
  56. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 113.
  57. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 236.
  58. ↑ Gerald E. Wheeler: Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet. A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, US Navy. 1994, pp. 346-349.
  59. ↑ a b c G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945. 1968, p. 277.
  60. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 22 July 1942–1 May 1944. 1950, p. 131.
  61. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, pp. 364-366.
  62. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 380 and 441.
  63. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 512.
  64. ↑ Gerald E. Wheeler: Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet. A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, US Navy. 1994, pp. 343-344.
  65. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, pp. 494-496.
  66. ↑ Gerald E. Wheeler: Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet. A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, US Navy. 1994, pp. 404-406.
  67. ^ Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, pp. 19-20.
  68. ^ Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, pp. 250-251.
  69. ^ A b Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, p. 37.
  70. ↑ Joseph Bykovsky and Harold Larson: The Transportation Corps. Operations overseas. 1957, p. 428.
  71. ^ Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, pp. 66-67.
  72. ^ A b Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, p. 120.
  73. ^ Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, p. 184.
  74. ^ Hugh John Casey (Ed.): Organization, Troops and Training. 1953, pp. 181-182.
  75. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, pp. 226-230.
  76. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, pp. 237-242.
  77. ^ David Horner: High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945. 1982, p. 246.
  78. ^ David Horner: Australia and Coalition Warfare in the Second World War. 2005, pp. 123-124.

Quotes

  1. ↑ "as emanating from the Commonwealth Government"
  2. ↑ "task forces"
  3. ↑ "it may prove that present day intelligence cooperation has proved to be the most lasting and important legacy of Australia's experience of coalition warfare in the Second World War."

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