Taklīf

Taklīf ( Arabic تكليف 'Burden, imposition, obligation') is a term in Islamic theology and legal theory that denotes the act of burdening man with duties by God . It is one of the most important subjects of Islamic theological and legal thought. In their writings, Muʿtazilite and Imamite theologians discussed above all the nature, the different types and the meaning of taklīf. In addition, theologians and legal theorists from the various disciplines discussed the prerequisites for an obligation by God. Legal theory has dealt in particular with the relationship between the taklīf and the five Sharia categories . Among today's Twelve Shiites , Taklīf also describes a ceremony that is held when girls turn nine years old, the age at which they are subjected to religious duties.

Word origin and word field

Taklīf is derived from the Arabic word kulfa ('difficulty, trouble, inconvenience') and means "the imposition of something that is afflicted with kulfa " (ilzām mā fī-hi kulfa ). It is the verbal noun to the Arabic verb kallafa , which also occurs in six places in the Koran , at each of which it is stated that God only imposes on the soul (i.e. on man) that which it is able to perform ( Sura 2: 286 : lā yukallifu Llāhu nafsan illā wusʿa-hā ; similar to Sura 2: 233 ; 6: 152 ; 7:42 ; 23:62 and 65: 7 ). The associated passive participle Mukallaf is used for the individual who is burdened by the duties, and in legal language also describes the sane person. The active participle Mukallif denotes the burden, usually God in theological context.

The Muʿtazilite theologian Abū Hāschim al-Jubbā'ī (d. 933) emphasized that in taklīf the required action must be difficult for the one to whom it was commanded. That is why one cannot subject God to taklief because nothing is burdensome for him, and one cannot use the term taklīf when asking someone to eat something good, because there is also no burden associated with it.

Definitions of Taklīf

Four different definitions of taklīf have been discussed in Islamic theology:

Taklīf as areas and prohibitions

Sunni theologians emphasized the aspect of domination (amr) and forbidding (nahy) in taklīf . Al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) defined taklīf as "taking control of that which is difficult and prohibiting that which is burdensome" (al-amr bi-mā fī-hi kulfa wa-n-nahy ʿammā fī l- imtināʿ ʿan-hū kulfa) . Al-Juwainī said that these two points could be summarized under "Call to something that is troublesome" (ad-duʿāʾ ilā mā fī-hi kulfa) . Al-Māwardī (d. 1058) is quoted with the following taklīf definition: "The domain of an act of obedience and the forbidding of an act of opposition" (al-amr bi-ṭāʿa wa-n-nahy ʿan maʿṣīya) .

ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037) explains that taklīf is used in the Sharia for territories and prohibitions because he who is commanded to do what is commanded with effort, without his instinct (ṭabʿ) to do so arrange. However, the taklīf only has an obligatory effect if the control and prohibition come from God. Each Umma obligations to their prophet in his areas and forbidding to obey, because the Prophet come from God. The duty of obedience to parents also derives from the fact that God commanded it, not from the parents' request. The taklīf can be presented directly as an order or prohibition, or in the form of a message (ḫabar) . So the message in sura 2: 228, "the women who have been rejected, for their part wait three periods", the meaning of a command, and the message in sura 56:79, "only those who have been purified touch it (sc. The Koran) “, The meaning of a ban.

Taklīf as a speech

Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdādī meant that one could also say that the importance of the "turning to the addressee with commandment and prohibition" of taklif (tawaǧǧuh al-ḫiṭāb bi-l-amr wa-n-Nahy 'ala l-muḫāṭab) was . This definition of taklīf as “address, appeal” (ḫiṭāb) also had some followers in Sunni Islam. Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) explained that according to the Sunni doctrine the taklīf is a speech (kalām) that has a starting point, namely the burdensome (mukallif) , and an end point, namely the burdensome (mukallaf) . The taklīf is a kind of address (ḫiṭāb) to which something is connected, namely the imposed (al-mukallaf bi-hī) . Whenever the addressee stands below the addressee, the speech is called taklīf. The Hanbalit Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 1223) defined the taklīf even more briefly as "the address with command or prohibition" (al-ḫiṭāb bi-amr au nahy) . Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī (d. 1316), also Hanbalit, defined Taklīf more narrowly as "the imposition of what the appeal of Sharia requires" (ilzām muqtaḍā ḫiṭāb aš-šarʿ) .

Abū Ishāq asch-Shātibī (d. 1388) points out that God addressed people when they were first burdened with duties in such a way that he first informed them of the benefits and good things that he had bestowed on them .

Taklīf as wanting and letting know

Muʿtazilite and Imamite theologians took a different approach to the definition of taklīf . The Muʿtazilit Abū Hāschim al-Jubbā'ī (d. 933) defined Taklīf as “the will of an action in which there is difficulty and effort for the person obliged ” (irādat fiʿl mā ʿalā l-mukallaf fī-hi kulfa wa-mašaqqa) . The Syrian imamite Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī (d. 1055) defined it similarly: "The reality of taklīf is the willingness of an action in which there is trouble, by the higher from the lower in the first instance" (irādat al-aʿlā min al-adnā mā fī-hi mašaqqa ʿalā ǧihat al-ibtidāʾ) . The imamitic scholar Muhammad at-Tūsī (d. 1066) provides an explanation for the specification “in the first instance”. He says: "If one of us desires prayer or fasting from another , then he is not called Mukallif because he was preceded by taklīf and volition."

The later Muʿtazilites supplemented the aspect of wanting with the aspect of letting knowledge (iʿlām) . ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad (d. 1024) taught that taklīf consists of knowing and willing. His disciple Ibn Mattawaih (d. 1076) stated that in the earlier definition of Abū Hāschim the things of reason (ʿaqlīyāt) fell out of the taklīf because they lacked the command. It would therefore be better to define the taklīf as “informing the burdened person about an arduous act and that it is desired by him”. He points out, however, that taklīf also includes things to which the will cannot be bound, such as the waiver of the repayment of a loan and all omissions. In his opinion, the following definition of taklīf is most concise: "Informing the person charged that there is benefit or harm in doing something with difficulty or not, provided that this does not reflect the degree of coercion (ilǧāʾ) achieved. ”This letting-know can be done by creating knowledge or by providing evidence. Therefore none of the people can actually be Mukallif, but always only God.

The definition suggested by Mankdīm (d. 1034), another disciple of ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad, goes in a similar direction: “To let someone else know that he has the opportunity to gain or benefit from the effort Avoiding harm provided that this does not reach the level of coercion. ”This letting-know takes place either through the creation of the necessary knowledge or through the establishment of the evidence. In both cases it could only validly come from God. In this respect, only God can actually produce a taklīf. If, on the other hand, the word is used with a person, it is only done in the manner of an expansion of meaning and in a figurative sense .

Taklīf as an occasion

The Imamite scholar al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī (d. 1277) defined Taklīf as "an inducement (baʿṯ) to an act or omission that is troublesome." His Imamite contemporary Maitham al-Bahrānī (d. 1282) expanded this to: "The first induction of a person obliged to obedience to an act or omission associated with effort, on condition that the induction is willful and that the instigated person is informed about it." For the first time, the induction must be because, for example, it is not taklīf can be mentioned when the father induces the son to ritual prayer, because in this case the instigation of God precedes his instigation. One could then only call the cause by the father in a figurative sense taklīf.

The different types of taklīf

The breakdown of Taklīf according to Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī

Muʿtazilite and Imamite theologians distinguished between different types of taklīf. One of the earliest and most complex taklīf typologies was developed by the Syrian imamite Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī (d. 1055). At the highest level he distinguished between immediately apparent (ersichtlicharūrī) and acquired (muktasab) taklīf. With the acquired taklīf, he once again distinguished between reason-based (ʿaqlī) and hearing-based (samʿī) taklīf. Below this level, the taklīf is further subdivided into various degrees of necessity and content of action, with al-Halabi specifying for each type of taklīf what it is based on. The immediately apparent taklīf is divided into “mandatory” (wāǧib) and “recommended” (nadb) . Here is a visualization of his taklīf typology in the form of a table:

The different types of taklīf according to Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī
Immediately apparent (ḍarūrī)				Appropriated (muktasab)
Compulsory (wāǧib)		Recommended (nadb)		Reason-based (ʿaqlī)	Hearing-based (samʿī)
Actions	Omissions	Actions	Omissions	Knowledge of the creation of the world, affirmation of its creator and his attributes and actions	Knowledge based on the book , consensus , and sunnah narrated by the righteous, and acting upon it
Justice (ʿadl) , truthfulness (ṣidq) , gratitude (šukr an-niʿma), etc. Ä.	Injustice (ẓulm) , lies (kiḏb) , the burden of the unattainable etc. Ä.	Charity (iḥsān) , mildness (ḥilm) , generosity (ǧūd) , generosity (qubūl al-iʿtiḏār) , forgiveness (ʿafw), etc. Ä.	Opposite of the behavior mentioned under “Actions”		Actions		Omissions
					As Fard imposed (mafrūḍ)	As Sunnah imposed (masnūn)	Zinā , Ribā , alcohol consumption and other acts deprecated by Sharia law
Justification through a priori judgment : Whoever knows justice, truthfulness, etc., knows from the outset that they are duty.		Justification through a priori judgment: Anyone who knows these things knows from the outset that they are recommended.		Reason: Duty is 1. a prerequisite for knowing about reward and punishment, which is favor with the necessary taklīf, and 2. a prerequisite for gratitude.	Reason: Carrying out the duty based on reason is laudable, omission shameful.	Reason: Execution of the reason-based recommendation is commendable, omission is not disgraceful.	Reason: Execution is shameful according to common sense and omission of shamefulness is duty.

Immediately visible and appropriated taklīf

What al-Halabī means by the distinction between immediately apparent and appropriated taklīf emerges from his explanations for the reasons for actions and omissions which, according to his teaching, are necessarily obligatory or recommended: whoever knows them, knows from the outset that they are duty or omission . are recommended. Immediately apparent taklīf is thus a taklīf that is based on an a priori judgment . The obligatory duties of the obvious taklīf include virtues such as truthfulness and justice. According to al-Halabīs, this worldly well-being has no relation to taklīf. The immediately apparent taklīf needs neither reason nor hearing. Hearing means hearing the teachings derived from the Koran , Consensus and traditional Sunna, i.e. H. devoted to the hadiths . For the immediately apparent taklīf, on the other hand, it is not even necessary that the burdened person knows about the burdening person, i.e. about God. The obligatory character of knowledge about God is rather dependent on the immediately apparent taklīf, in particular on the duty of gratitude.

The distinction between immediately apparent and appropriated taklīf can also be found later with the imamite theologian al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī, however, in contrast to al-Halabī, he regards the two types as subcategories of the reason-based taklīf. In the case of the appropriated taklīf, which he calls taklīf kasbī , he makes it clear that it is a taklīf that has been acquired through speculation (naẓar) . According to al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī, the immediately apparent taklīf includes the knowledge of the obligation to return the deposit and the repayment of debts, the taklīf appropriated through speculation includes the knowledge of the shamefulness of lies (al-kiḏb an-nāfiʿ) and the praise of harmful righteousness (aṣ-ṣidq aḍ-ḍārr) and reflection on divine knowledge.

Reason-based and hearing-based taklīf

For Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī, the reason-based taklīf consists of the knowledge of the creation of the world and the affirmation of its Creator and his attributes and actions, the hearing-based taklīf of duties and omissions, with the duties of action from him once again according to theirs The degree of necessity can be divided into Fard and Sunna obligations. Something else describes Abd al-Jabbar ibn Ahmad the hörbasierten taklif. Above all, it includes the various types of the domain of what is right and the prohibition of what is reprehensible . This area of ​​the right in turn branches into various subcategories, including the speech about the Imamat , as well as the Sharia rules with legal transactions (ʿuqūd) and acts of worship . Since the Sharia rules can only be inferred through the Koran , the Sunna and the Sharia evidence that follows them, the Mukallaf, i.e. the person obliged by God, must know these principles so that knowledge of the duties imposed on him can reach him. The most important means for this are the Usūl al-fiqh , because they deal with the hierarchy of Sharia evidence. The taklīf concept is therefore also important for the rational legitimation of the discipline of the Usūl al-fiqh. The Imamitic scholar al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī (d. 1325) declares that knowledge of the taklīf is compulsory because otherwise the imposition of the unattainable (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq) would occur . That, without which something obligatory cannot be provided, becomes obligatory itself. Acquiring this knowledge is mandatory.

The Sharia-based (šarʿī) taklīf was part of the hearing -based taklīf according to the theory of ʿAbd al-Jabbārs. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī took the view that the sharia-based taklīf burdens were subordinate to the reason-based ones in knowledge, because the sharia arises from reason. According to the description of the Imamite scholar al-Sheikh al-Mufid (d. 1022), there was a dispute between the various theological schools in Islam about the possibility of a purely reason-based taklif. Imamites and Ashāb al-hadīth believed that taklīf could only be imposed on people through a messenger . Muʿtazilites, Kharijites and Zaidi are said to have claimed that people's intellects work independently of hearing and communication.

Differences in content

Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī only distinguishes the taklīf on a subordinate level according to the content to which it relates. Its two most important categories are actions (afʿāl) and omissions (turūk) . Al-Malāhimī (d. 1144) and al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī, who also drew up typologies of taklīf, made a further distinction between acts of the limbs (afʿāl al-ǧawāriḥ) and acts of the heart (afʿāl al-qulūb) . Al-Malāhimī explains that the actions of the limbs included speech, while the actions of the heart included reflection, knowing, guessing, willing, aversion and repentance. In the actions of the limbs, man needs three kinds of knowledge: 1. Knowledge of the form of the action; 2. the knowledge of the degree of obligation of the action; and 3. the knowledge of the one whom he obeys with these actions and whom he worships with them, namely God.

Al-Bahrānī, on the other hand, distinguished between confession (iʿtiqād) and work (ʿamal) in taklīf . When it comes to confession, one can again differentiate between acceptance (ẓann) and knowledge (ʿilm) . Al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī made a similar classification: According to him, the taklīf can be related to knowledge, acceptance and work.

Basically, the later Imamite theologians tended to systematically classify the taklīf first according to differences in content and only to differentiate between reason and hearing based on a subordinate level. Al-Bahrānī explains that in the work one can distinguish between the reason-based and the tradition-based work. Examples of the former are compulsory things like returning the deposit, giving thanks to the benefactor, honesty, balance, refraining from wrong and lying, and recommended things like kindness and the good way of life. Examples of the tradition-based work are acts of religious law such as the five acts of worship , the obligatory or recommended character of which reason cannot independently recognize.

According to al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī, who differentiated between knowledge (ʿilm) , guesswork (guesswork) and work (ʿamal) in taklīf , these three types can be subdivided depending on the reasoning. With the knowledge-related taklīf there is:

1. those founded purely by reason, such as the burden of what is not conveyed by hearing, such as the affirmation of the Creator,
2. those who are founded purely by listening, such as the knowledge of the obligatory character of duties, the shamefulness of hearing-based disgraceful things, the recommendation of the hearing-based recommended things, the frowning of the hearing-based frowned upon things, and the permissibility of the hearing-based permitted things, and
3. the one established by both reason and hearing, like the knowledge of the oneness of God.

In the case of the presumption there is the one that is based purely on hearing, such as the presumption of the direction of prayer in doubt, and in the case of the work there is the one that is based on reason, such as the return of the deposit, and that based on hearing, such as ritual prayer .

The Muʿtazilite doctrine of the praiseworthy of taklīf

A question that was mainly concerned with the Muʿtazilites and the Muʿtazilite Imamites was the commendation or goodness of taklīf ((usn at-taklīf) . Mankdīm said that it could be proven in the following way: “The taklīf comes from God. It is established that He is just and wise and does not choose or do anything disgraceful. So he (sc. The taklīf) must be praiseworthy. Because if he were shameful, God would not have made him. ”Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī argued even more simply. In his view, the praiseworthy of the taklif was proven by the fact that it is an act of God, for the act of God is always praiseworthy, and so the taklīf must also be praiseworthy. In the same way, al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī, two generations younger, argued: "We teach that the taklif is good because God made it and God does nothing bad."

The taklīf as a means of probation for people

Besides these circular justifications for the praiseworthy of the taklīf, there were others who justified the praiseworthy of the taklīf with an intrinsic purpose. So taught Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (died 1274th): "The taklif is good because it contains a benefit that does not occur without it." Mankdīm said: "When God created us, gives us life and to act, our Makes understanding perfect, and creates in us desire for the bad and abhorrence of the good, then he must have a goal (ġaraḍ) in doing so. ”Theoretically, God's goal could be the seduction of man into disgrace. This is opposed, however, by the fact that the seduction to shameful is shameful and it is clear from God that he does nothing shameful. Therefore, his aim with the taklīf can only be that he bring people with the taklīf to a level that cannot be reached without him. Al-Hilli explains: "On this principle exists between Mu'tazilites unity, unlike the Mudschbiriten ., Because these reject the purpose in the actions of God, and have made them Unsinns- and chance actions" With the Mudschbiriten he probably meant the Ash'arite because they are known to refuse to answer the question about the meaning of taklīf because of their principle that there is no motive (ʿilal) to be sought in divine actions .

"Other wages must be earned"

The level to which man is to be brought through the taklīf is the reward on the other side (ṯawāb) . This, Mankdīm explains, is a tremendous benefit that is earned as a tribute (taʿẓīm) . Therefore, one cannot begin with him. Mankdīm suggests that it would not be good either to honor a stranger in the same way that one honors one's father, or to honor one's father in the same way as one honors the Prophet, because it is undeservedly done. Al-Malāhimī also gives other examples: “The reward on the other side contains a tremendous tribute to which it is not good to begin undeservedly. Do you not see that it is not good for us if we honor the young and youngsters as we honor the scholars, and the strangers as the fathers? It is true that you have to earn this. And this is only possible via the taklīf. "

Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hillī quotes the Muʿtazilites with the following statement about the taklīf: “It is the submission of that which it would not be praiseworthy to begin with and to which one can only come through the taklīf, namely the reward in the hereafter. The reward on the other side is the well-deserved, constant benefit, which is connected with honor (taʿẓīm) and reverence (tabǧīl) . "He justifies that it would not be praiseworthy if God began with the reward with the following words:" We know yes, how disgraceful it is to show honor to someone who is not known to have done anything worthy of honor. And we also consider it shameful to pay tribute to someone who converts to Islam but then does nothing of the main duties of Islam, just as, conversely, we show honor to the pious and learned who have spent much of their time in acts of worship . But if it were permissible to start something like that, then leveling the difference between them would be permissible. "

In al-Bahrānī, this thought is exaggerated. He explains: “When God created human beings and prepared them for reward and punishment, He arranged the two to be delivered only after obedience has been imposed, so that the reward includes honor and exaltation and the punishment humiliation and humiliation. "

However, some questions remained unclear about this taklīf model. For example, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbā'ī and his son Abū Hāschim al-Jubbā'ī argued over the question of whether it is right for God to increase a person's sexual desire if he knew that this would disobey God . While Abū ʿAlī considered such an increase in sexual desire to be wrong, because it was the cause of the disobedience, Abū Hāschim contradicted him with the argument that the greater desire would bring with it greater difficulty and therefore greater reward.

The taklīf as the making of an offer

The Muʿtazilites and Imamites thought of the taklīf as an offer that is made to people and can be accepted or rejected by them. ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad taught that the wisdom of taklīf consists in subjecting the burdened person to a rank (manzila) which is unsurpassed in its advantages, namely the rank of constant otherworldly reward (manzilat aṯ-ṯawāb ad- dāʾim) . The Imamit Ibrāhīm an-Naubachtī (13th century) saw the real purpose of taklīf in " offering a great profit (taʿrīḍ li-nafʿ ʿaẓīm) to which one can only get through him".

The key term in this taklīf theory was taʿrīḍ ('submission, suspension'). Muhammad at-Tūsī explains this term as follows: "It means turning the exposed person in such a way that he can reach what he has been exposed to, whereby the submitter wishes the action to which he has been exposed." Further: “Do you not see that man is really someone who exposes his son to knowledge when he enables him to learn, removes his weakness in it and wants him to learn. And if he does not want to do this or does not remove his weaknesses, then he is not an offerer to him. ”Similarly, al-Malāhimī compares this exposure to education:“ Exposure is good because of that, because the common sense thinks it is good, the children to that To suspend study and profit- making (arbāḥ) , and they justify the praise of what we have done on the fact that it can only be achieved through exposure. ”Taklīf itself has also been compared to education. It is like that with him, explains Abd al-Jabbār, like when the father imposes an education on his son so that he attains a rank that usually cannot be achieved without this education, even if both are not sure that it is Son could really achieve this rank.

Al-Malāhimī does not accept the objection that the taklīf behaves as if someone throws another into the sea and then obliges him to get out of him in order to reward him, because throwing into it does great harm while the taklīf is an invitation to noble action (makārim al-aḫlāq) , with which one can earn praise and honor. When man is exposed to the divine reward, it is a way to gain, prosperity and a lofty position for which he demands noble action.

The problem of the unbeliever's taklīf

From the doctrine that the goal of taklief is to attain the reward on the other side, the dangerous conclusion could be drawn that the taklif must be bad for one whom God knows will not achieve the reward on the other side. In order to advance this conclusion, Mankdīm explains that according to Muʿtazilitic doctrine, the goal of taklīf is not the attainment of the reward on the other side, but the turning of the obligated to a rank that cannot be achieved without taklīf. This also includes those who are known to be incredulous. Mankdīm explains that ignorance of why such a taklīf is good has led many people astray, and some heretics have even gone astray to deny the Creator, saying, “If there was a wise Creator here, then could he not run out such taklif. "the Mudschbiriten so Mankdīm would have made this problem the most important argument to God attributable wickedness and then to explain this for good. By the mujbirites, Mankdīm probably meant the Ashʿarites, because they did not consider taklīf to be praiseworthy for a person whom God knew in advance that he would be defiant, because it would expose him to punishment.

The difference between the Muʿtazilite and the Ashʿarite position on this question is particularly clear from an anecdote narrated by Ibn Challikān (d. 1282). The event described thus formed the trigger for Abū l-Hasan al-Ashʿarī to turn away from his teacher al-Jubbā'ī. In a slightly different form, the anecdote is also passed on by al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī. According to Ibn Challikān's version, al-Ashʿari wanted to know what the otherworldly fate of three brothers looks like, one of whom died as a believer, the second as an unbeliever and the third as a child. Al-Jubbā'ī replied: "The virtuous brother has a high position in paradise, the unbeliever is in the depths of hell, and the child is among those who have achieved salvation." Al-Ashʿari or one of his followers was now drifting cornered the Muʿtazilite by saying, “If the child asks God why he has not incriminated him so that he may obtain the believer's reward.” Al-Jubbā'ī then tried to explain his early death that God knew that if he had lived on, he would have become sinful. Al-Ashʿari replied that in this case the brother who had become an unbeliever was also entitled to an early death. Al-Jubba'i could not answer that.

Mankdīm suggested that such objections could be answered in two ways. In order to dispel the doubts of the laity among their own followers, one could simply say that the taklīf proceeds from God and must therefore be good in any case, because God does not do anything bad. In addition, one could also go back a little further and argue that the good thing about taklīf is that God enables and encourages people to do what he tells them to do. This is just as true for the unbeliever as it is for the believer. The only difference between the two is that the believer, based on reason, chooses correctly and accepts the faith, while the unbeliever does not. God's action with taklīf is comparable to a person who lowers his rope to two drowning people so that they can cling to it. While one of them is doing this and being saved, the other is not doing it and is perishing because of it. Just as the man with the rope showed favor to both drowning people and it cannot be said that he only did good to the one who accepted the rope, so be it with God and the taklīf of the believer and the unbeliever.

Mankdīm admits that the unbeliever is harmed by the taklīf, but he believes that God remains a benefactor towards him through the taklīf. That is to say, it behaves with him as with someone who gives another person money, in which case that other person loses the money. Just as the donor does not lose his status as a benefactor by losing the money, be it with God and the unbeliever. Other examples were later used to illustrate the praiseworthy commitment of the unbeliever. An-Naubachtī is quoted as saying: “Even the obligation of one who is known to disbelieve is good because of the submission. For unbelief comes from himself, not from the original. For the same reason, it is good if we invite someone to dinner who we know is prevented, or to invite someone to religion who we know is opposed. "

Mankdīm also reports a dissent among the Muʿtazilites about the reason that the taklīf of the one known to disbelieve is good. While according to the opinion of his own school this taklīf is good because God is offering him a level that he could not reach without taklīf, namely the reward from the beyond, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balchī (d. 931) took the utilitarian view that his taklīf is good only because he is more useful (aṣlaḥ) . He said: “It is good of God to incriminate Zaid if he knows that a group of people believes through his burden, even if it can be seen from his condition that he does not believe, because the number of people is decisive ( kaṯrat an-nās) . ”The Baghdad Muʿtazilites were of the opinion that for the unbeliever's obligation to be commendable, it was sufficient if only one other person thereby found faith. Al-Hillī quotes them with the statement: "In the obligation of the unbeliever lies the good of the believer." Mankdīm rejected such justifications, arguing that the burden of one for the benefit of another is injustice (ẓulm) . Because if one defined injustice differently, there would be no injustice in the world, because in every thing there is an oppressor and his family who would benefit from it. Al-Hillī, on the other hand, considers this objection that the benefit of one cannot be in the harm to the other to be unfounded and argues that the burden on the unbeliever is no harm to him insofar as the burden occurred before his disobedience and therefore in there is no nonsense in his burden.

Is Taklief obligated to God?

The Imamites Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī and al-Bahrānī even took the view that the taklīf was compulsory for God. They justified this by stating that if God did not burden the person who met the requirements for taklīf, he would lead him to wrong. If God did this, he would be doing wrong himself, but it was unthinkable that wrong should go from him.

As reported by al-Ghazālī , the Muʿtazilites generally believed that after the creation of man, God was obliged to incriminate them. In contrast, al-Ghazālī declares that God also has the possibility not to burden people and is therefore not obliged to taklīf. According to the understanding of his school, only that is compulsory (wāǧib) which, if neglected, will sooner or later cause harm to the person who fails to do so. With God, however, harm is unthinkable. In response to the objection that the taklīf is obligatory to God not because of the benefit to himself but because of the benefit to people, al-Ghazālī replies that many people wish not to be subject to the taklīf, like inanimate things or animals. Since God himself does not derive any benefit from taklīf, he is not obliged to do so. Incidentally, God could give people the wages even without taklīf. To say that the reward earned by taklīf is more pleasurable and sublime than that of the gift, it is an arrogance towards God and an exaltation towards his gift. It is God himself who ultimately enables people to fulfill their duties and thus also to receive the reward on the other side.

Conditions for entering taklīf

Another topic that has been dealt with in both Islamic theology and Islamic legal theory is the conditions under which a taklīf can occur. Most of the time, the prerequisites relating to the mukallaf, i.e. the burdened person, were discussed, but individual prerequisites also concern the action that is imposed on the mukallaf.

Life

According to the prevailing opinion, taklīf ends with death. The first prerequisite for the taklīf to occur is that the person concerned is alive, but the taklīf can have an effect beyond death. Examples of such an effect of taklīf beyond death are the prohibition on wrapping a deceased man in a shroud of silk and the prohibition on perfuming a dead man who has entered the Ihrām state during his lifetime or for him Cutting hair or fingernails.

In addition, the question was discussed whether the inhabitants of the hereafter are also included in the taklīf. In the opinion of al-Ka'bī , they alone are obliged to know. The Imamit al-Sheikh al-Mufid (d. 1022) taught that the inhabitants of paradise were exempt from taklīf, while conversely the inhabitants of hell were exposed to all possible forms of taklīf. The Muʿtazilit Ibn Mattawaih, on the other hand, was of the opinion that there could be no taklīf for the hell dwellers, because otherwise they would have the opportunity to earn a reward, but this was impossible because the continuation of the punishment was certain. Badr ad-Dīn al-Zarkaschī reports the view that the hereafter is the "house of retribution" (dār al-ǧazāʾ) , while this world is the "house of burden" (dār at-taklīf) , but means that this is only describe the predominant situation in the two places and not exclude the possibility that there is a taklīf in the hereafter.

Belonging to humans or jinn

Some Muslim scholars have believed that accepting the obligation of taklīf (taqallud ʿuhdat at-taklīf) is a special distinction for humans above other living beings. According to al-Ghazālī and al-Baidāwī , it means the “entrusted good” (amāna) mentioned in sura 33:72 , which God first offered to the heavens, the earth and the mountains, but then, after their rejection, to the People transferred. Shāh Walī Allaah ad-Dihlawī meant that the taklīf was one of the requirements of the human species.

Muslim scholars are unanimously agreed that animals and inanimate bodies are not subject to taklīf. However, it has been assumed by many scholars that the jinn are also subject to taklīf. Among other things, this was derived from the Koran word in sura 51:56 , according to which people and jinn were only created to serve God. Badr ad-Dīn az-Zarkaschī points out that the taklīf of the jinn is partly different from the taklīf of the people. Because of their ability to fly , jinns are obliged to perform the Hajj while flying.

In theology the question was also discussed whether the angels are also included in the taklīf. Abū l-Hasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 931) is said to have taught with the majority of speculative thinkers (ahl an-naẓar) that they are subject to taklīf and the commands and prohibitions. He derived this from the Koranic statement in sura 66: 6 : "Angels who defy God in nothing what he has commanded them and do what he has commanded them." Ash-Sheikh al-Mufid taught that the Angels are subject to Taklīf and salvation and disaster are announced to them as well. He derived this from the following Koran statement: “Whoever speaks of them: 'See, I am God next to him', we will reward him with hell! In this way we reward the wicked. ”- Sura 21:29. One group of the Imamites reportedly denied that the angels were burdened. They are reported to have claimed that they were forced to do their actions. This was also the opinion of the Ashāb al-hadīth . Ibn Hajar al-Haitamī said that because of the statement in Sura 66: 6, the angels are obliged to show practical demonstrations of obedience (ṭāʿāt ʿamalīya) . It is different, however, with the belief that must be present in them, so that an obligation to do so would be an absurd tautology .

Understanding the appeal

In his Risāla ilā ahl aṯ-ṯaġr , al-Ashʿarī declares that the ancestors (as-salaf) agreed that a person can only be legally obliged to act if his mind and his organs of judgment (ālāt tamyīz) are in good health . For al-Juwainī , the mind that enables man to understand God's appeal is the second of the four foundations for the possibility and rational thinkability of taklīf. Otherwise it is an obligation to the impossible. The obligation of someone who cannot understand the invitation is, in al-Juwainī's view, unthinkable, because it amounts to the obligation of animals and inanimate things. Abū Yaʿlā (d. 1066) explains that man is subject to taklīf when he has enough understanding to distinguish between harmful and useful and, if necessary, look for information on what he does not know.

According to al-Ghazālī, the taklīf requires obedience (ṭāʿā) and submission (imtiṯāl) . But this is not possible without the intention of submitting oneself. Intention, in turn, presupposes knowledge of what is intended and an understanding of the taklīf. Because how should one say to someone who does not understand: "Understand!" Similarly, the North African Ibadit Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Shammāchī (d. 1522) names the understanding of the person on whom the matter is imposed as a prerequisite for the taklīf.

Persons from whom the taklīf is excluded due to the lack of this requirement are:

• the insane man (maǧnūn) . The speech given to him is not called taklīf, al-Ghazālī explains.
• the indistinguishable minor (aṣ-ṣabī allaḏī lā yumaiyiz) .
• the drunk one (as-sakrān) . Al-Dschuwainī said that with him the taklīf was excluded because he could not understand the speech addressed to him and accordingly it was not possible to intentionally submit. Al-Ghazālī expresses himself similarly: Since the drunk does not understand the appeal addressed to him, he cannot be incriminated. From Ahmad ibn Hanbal, however, the opinion is passed down that the drunk is very sane. According to the Hanbalite Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī, the request in Sura 4:43 , “do not come to prayer drunk” must either be interpreted in the sense that one must not get drunk before one comes to prayer, or it must be related to the person who was raptured by the intoxication but still has his wits. Some scholars believe that the taklīf is not exposed in the drunk because he is subject to a hadd punishment and the talāq formula he pronounced is also valid. The duty to prayer, hajj and fasting should continue to apply to him.
• the forgetting one (an-nāsī) as long as his forgetting continues. Al-Ghazālī uses the expression "forgetting inattentive" (an-nāsī aḏ-ḏāhil) . However, forgetting the religious rules due to the strength of sexual desire should not override the taklīf, as Badr ad-Dīn al-Zarkaschī (d. 1370) notes. So the one who sees a beautiful woman and looks at her carelessly, even though he knows that this is forbidden, is not exculpated. The same goes for slander and ear blowing, arrogance and pride and other "diseases of the heart".
• the sleeper (an-nāʾim) .
• the Ohnmächtige (al-muġmā'alai-hi) and that, by the consumption of henbane is intoxicated.

In contrast to the mentally ill and indistinguishable minor, the drunk, the forgetful and the sleeper have to catch up on the missed worship because the duty already existed before they entered this state.

The Muʿtazilites tied the taklīf more closely to reason. According to Abū ʿAlī al- Jubbā'ī, taklīf is incumbent on man only when he is forced to know through reasonable thinking. Taklīf is only binding on him when it occurs to him that he is not sure unless he thinks about the fact that things have a Creator who punishes him for not thinking, or when he does so through Learn the testimony of an angel or messenger. Some Baghdad Muʿtazilites, on the other hand, are said to have taught that a person falls under the taklīf with only thought and admonition, even if they did not produce any knowledge.

The question of maturity

It was controversial whether the taklīf also requires maturity (bulūġ) . While some scholars believed that even the discernible (mumaiyiz) minor was subject to taklīf, others took the view that the criterion of “first understanding of the appeal” should not be based on reality, but attached to a specific sign must be, with which the person is burdened, namely the coming of age. Sharia, said at- Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī , has made maturity an obvious sign that a person is suitable for taklīf. Signs of maturity are sexual maturity (iḥtilām) , the onset of pubic hair (inbāt) or the completion of the 15th year of life.

Ibn an-Najjār explains that according to the valid teaching of the Hanbalites, the adolescent is not burdened because his understanding of the intended matter is not yet complete and the divine lawgiver has made maturity the sign of the appearance of reason. Proof of this is the hadith , according to which the sins of three people are not recorded, namely the sleeper until he wakes up, the boy until he grows up and the madman until he comes to his senses. However, Ibn an-Najjār also refers to various traditions from Ahmad ibn Hanbal , according to which the adolescent or ten-year-old is already burdened with prayer and the discerning child is obliged to fast .

The Muʿtazilites around ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad also linked taklīf to maturity. With their definition of taklīf as “wanting and letting know”, the boy becomes burdened when he comes of age, because in this situation he gains knowledge. When the taklīf approaches the burdened person, he knows of the obligation to perform a certain act and to abstain from other acts. That is the only use of taklīf. And it is through it that the burdened person differs from the child, the mentally ill, the animal, etc.

Belonging to Islam

It was controversial whether membership of Islam is also a requirement for taklīf. In the Muʿtazilite definition of taklīf as “wanting and letting know”, the unbeliever was also burdened because he is exposed to knowledge through the provision of evidence, even if he does not know what is imposed on him. Among the Sunni scholars in particular, the question was discussed whether the infidels to fulfill the Islamic individual provisions (furū') as the ritual prayer, zakat , fasting and the Hajj is required. While Ahmad ibn Hanbal, asch-Shāfi Aī and the Ashʿarites answered in the affirmative, Abū Hanīfa took the opposite view.

Al-Ghazalī said that the possibility of the unbeliever's commitment to the individual determinations was proven by the fact that the mind did not consider it unthinkable. Because with prior belief it is possible to reach it, was stopped just as the one who was in a state of ritual impurity to be after been incurred purity to perform the ritual prayer. The unbeliever is not urged to pray himself in a state of unbelief, but this is indirectly instructed (ʿalā waǧh at-tawaṣṣul) . Ibn Burhān refers to the statement by scholars of his legal school that the invitation to prayer and the payment of zakāt in the Koran is addressed to all people and that unbelief does not constitute a dispensation that invalidates this invitation for the unbeliever. As Qur'anic invitations to worship, which are addressed to all people, sura 2:21 , “You people. Serve your Lord ”, and sura 3:97 ,“ and people are obliged to God to make the pilgrimage to the house ”, quoted.

Jalāl ad-Dīn al-Mahallī (d. 1459) stated that the assessment of this question at the theoretical level depends on whether the occurrence of the religious law requirement is also a requirement for the validity of the obligation. According to Tādj ad-Dīn as-Subkī , the majority of scholars denied this. For this reason, he saw the unbelievers obliged to comply with Islamic norms. Only Abū Hāmid al-Isfarāyīnī and the majority of the Hanafis were of a different opinion. They said that the unbeliever is generally not obliged to obey Islamic norms.

Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī said that on this question one must distinguish between the ordinary unbeliever and the apostate , because the latter, in contrast to the former, is the addressee of the religious appeal. Therefore, he must later catch up on the worship exercises that he missed during the apostasy. The Hanbalit Ibn Naddjār (d. 1564) emphasizes that the dispute over the question has no significance in this world, but only for the hereafter. The unbeliever should not be asked to perform the worship exercises or to catch up on them, but rather the size of the punishment of the unbelievers in the hereafter. He is punished not only for his disbelief, but also for the missed worship exercises.

Freedom from coercion

The Muʿtazilit Ibn Mattawaih defined taklīf as follows: “Informing the burdened person that there is benefit or harm in doing something with difficulty or not, provided that it does not reach the level of coercion (ilǧāʾ) . “For him, freedom from coercion was a prerequisite for taklīf to enter. The Muʿtazilites assumed that whoever was forced to worship could not be subject to taklīf. They justified this with their principle that the obligated person must be rewarded in the hereafter, whereas the one who is brought to something (by a person) is not rewarded.

Al-Juwainī states that this principle does not apply to the Ashʿarites, and declares that the forced may well be subject to the taklīf because he can understand and submit even if he acts under duress, and a taklīf is also possible without any otherworldly reward be. Al-Ghazālī said that the act of the forced may fall under the taklīf, as opposed to the act of the child, the feeble-minded and the animal, because the prerequisite for the taklīf is the hearing and understanding of the obliged. While this is lacking in the feeble-minded and in the animal, the forced understand; his action lies in the realm of the possible , because he can accomplish it or also omit. For example, if he was forced to kill, he could be obliged by the taklīf not to kill because he was able to do so, even if he was then risking his own life. And if he were forced to do something that was his obligation, then a taklif was also possible. For example, if the unbeliever is forced to convert to Islam and convert, it is said that he has done what he is obliged to do. Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī repeats these statements in one of his works, but adds that he who intends to convert to Islam Taqīya is acting in opposition. In the case of the person who is being forced to kill, he finds that he is no longer subject to the force, because at the moment of killing he is acting voluntarily and not by force.

The view of the Muʿtazilites that the forced cannot fulfill an obligation because he is only performing an action that he is forced to and in which he has no free choice, al-Ghazālī shows on the grounds that the forced can also omit this act , as wrong back. For example, if he is forced to kill a Muslim, he must refrain from doing what he is being forced to do. Conversely, if he is forced to kill a snake or shed wine, he has a duty to do so. However, there is a fine distinction: namely, submission is only an act of obedience (ṭāʿa) if it is induced by the divine command and obligation and not by compulsion.

Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī explains that the disagreement on this issue is related to different assessments of human actions. Those who consider them (like the Ash Aarites) to be created by God also teach that there is a taklīf of the forced. The others did not teach this. The obvious justice given by the Sharia, however, requires that there should be no taklīf for the forced. At-Tūfī explains why there are two ways of doing God. One way of acting is formative (takwīnī) by virtue of its production and creation for people. In doing this, God does what he will, including the “imposition of the unattainable ” (Taklīf mā lā yuṭāq) , according to the Qur'anic word in sura 21:23 : “He is not held accountable for what he does. But they will be held accountable. ”Justice is hidden here. The other mode of action of God is obligatory (taklīfī) by virtue of his invitation to mankind to perform acts of obedience and refrain from resisting. In doing this, God followed the path of people to justice with one another and did not burden people with anything that was obviously unthinkable, but disclosed the legal grounds (ʿilal) for all norms . So there is no imposition of the unattainable with any question of the application of the law and the foundations, but only with the question of the creation of actions, which, however, belong to the first mode of action. This is now the obvious righteousness, which requires that God cannot oblige the person under duress because he is like a tool and according to the statement in sura 17:15 , “and no one will bear the burden of another”, not for that what another had made him do, could be held accountable. Only those who are forced to kill fall out of this rule of judgment.

Badr ad-Dīn az-Zarkaschī (d. 1370) thinks that in taklīf one has to distinguish between the forced (al-mukrah) and the forced (mulǧaʾ) . Taklīf is excluded only in the case of those who are compelled and who have no alternative. He is to be judged like someone who is pushed off the cliff and then no longer has any freedom of action. He does not act himself, but is a mere instrument like a knife that is in the hand of the person cutting, his movement is like the movement of a trembling man. In the case of the forced, however, the taklīf persists. Nor is freedom, in his view, a requirement for taklīf; the slave is also subject to it. He is only exempt from payment obligations because he has no property.

Capacity to act

In his Risāla ilā ahl aṯ-ṯaġr , al-Ashʿarī explains that the ancestors (as-salaf) agreed that a person's obligation to act of obedience is only valid if his body and the organs necessary for it are intact. For al- Juwainī, man's ability to act (qudra) is one of the four foundations for the possibility and rational thinkability of taklīf. According to the Imamite Ibrāhīm an-Naubachtī, the ability to act is one of the prerequisites for taklīf. If the prerequisite is not met, then it is a question of a taklīf mā lā yutāq , who is disgraceful (qabīḥ) . If the taklīf needs a tool, explains Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī, then it is up to the wisdom of God to provide it, such as a hand or foot, pen or bow, because otherwise the action would be impossible.

Al-Bahrānī names the ability to fulfill the imposed action and the power over the external requirements as well as the necessary means as prerequisites for the taklīf, because otherwise it would be an obligation to do the unthinkable. Abū Ishāq asch-Shātibī shares this view and explains that if it appears at first impression that the divine lawgiver intends to impose something that is not in the power of man, this is upon closer examination of the preceding or following parts of the sentence or To trace back connections, as with God's request in sura 2: 132 : “Do not die without being Muslim.” Here only that which is in his power is required of man, namely the acceptance of Islam. As an example of the things that are not required of man because they represent the imposition of the unattainable (Taklīf mā lā yuṭāq) , ash-Shātibī names the abolition of natural dispositions such as the desire for food and drink, as well as the beautification of ugly ones Body parts. All that is required of the human being is that he conquer his instinctual soul with regard to its inclination to the unlawful and give in to it in a moderate way in the things that are allowed.

Ibn al-Humām explains that the prerequisite for taklīf is the ability to act, and that with Hanafis and Muʿtazilites for reasons of reason (bi-l-ʿaql) , because the imposition of the unattainable (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq) is shameful according to reason and it is impossible Ascribing shameful things to God, and with the Ashʿarites on the basis of revelation (bi-š-šarʿ) , because they see scriptural evidence in the Koranic statement that God only imposes on the soul that which it is able to achieve. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī explains that a difference between the Qadarites (meaning the Muʿtazilites) and his own discipline (meaning the Ashʿarites) is that the former teach that the ability to act must already be present at the time of taklīf while the latter believe that it must only be given at the time of action.

The prerequisite for the ability to act indirectly also plays a certain role in the modern concept of Fiqh al-aqallīyāt . The methodological foundations of this concept include the so-called principle of relief ( taisīr ) in the event of incapacity to act. Ashraf ʿAbd al-ʿĀtī thinks that this concept can be derived from the Koranic statements, according to which nobody is obliged to do an action that he cannot perform.

The question of the transferability of the taklīf

Al-Ghazālī has rejected the notion of "obligation with the act of a third party" (taklīf bi-fiʿl al-ġair ). The Hanafis , however, consider this to be conditionally possible, in that they differentiate in the Taklīf between “obligation to perform” ( wuǧūb al-adāʾ ) and “obligation to guilt” ( al-wuǧūb fī ḏ-ḏimma ). An execution obligation is the demand for the execution or omission of an action that is firmly tied to the person. A debt obligation, on the other hand, should arise, for example, if a child has ruined the assets of a third party. In this case, it is not the child, but his or her guardian , who is obliged to compensate for the damage. Reason and understanding are a prerequisite for an obligation to perform, but not for a debt obligation. The obligation to carry out arises directly from the Sharia appeal, whereas the obligation to debt arises from certain legal reasons.

Requirements in the act

Some authors also cite requirements that the imposed action must meet in order for the taklīf to take place. Here are some examples:

• According to al-Juwainī, the third of the four foundations for the possibility and rational thinkability of taklīf is that the imposed action is in itself possible so that it can actually occur. For example, the obligation to combine opposites (ǧamʿ aḍ-ḍiddain) or to stay in two different places at the same time is inconceivable . AlGhazālī says in his treatise al-Manḫūl : “In our opinion, only that can be imposed that is not reasonably inconceivable that it will happen.” The North African Ibadit Abū l-ʿAbbās asch-Shammāchī (d. 1522) mentions the possibility of the imposed (imkān al-mukallaf bi-hī) as a prerequisite for the taklīf . Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī points out that a group of scholars consider the burden of the impossible to be conceivable, and in this context opens up the discussion of the Taklīf mā lā yutāq .
• According to Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī, the person must know that the command for the action comes from God so that a will to obedience can be imagined in him. According to al-Ghazālī, it must be an act of obedience (ṭāʿa) . Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī states as a prerequisite that the duty character of the action must be known, because otherwise it cannot be carried out with the intention of obedience and submission to God's will
• Al-Ghazālī explains in his Mustaṣfā that only willful actions (afʿāl iḫtiyārīya) can be the object of taklīf. The Hanafi scholar Ibn al-Humām (d. 1457) explains that in the opinion of most Kalām scholars there is no taklīf without action (fiʿl) . In the case of a prohibition, the act consists of the Nafs standing back from what is forbidden. Many Muʿtazilites, on the other hand, have taught that in taklīf what is imposed is the “non-existence of the action”. However, this could not be because of something taklif Vermochtes (maqdūr) requires that non-existence is nothing but Vermochtes.
• According to Ibn Qudāma and Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī, the action must not have already taken place. The Ibadit Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Shammāchī states that, in contrast to al-Ashʿarī, according to his teaching, the taklīf ends at the time the action takes place.

Obstacles that cancel the taklīf

Badr ad-Dīn al-Zarkaschī names a number of circumstances which negate the obligation to perform certain acts pertaining to taklīf:

• Travel. It cancels half of the prayers with four rakʿas and justifies performing them after the allotted time and joining them as ruchsa with other prayers. In addition, when traveling, it is allowed not to focus on the qibla during voluntary prayers and to skip Friday prayer . On longer journeys, it is also allowed to break the fast and just rub your shoes during the ritual cleansing .
• Emergency. If this is necessary for life support, it is permissible, for example, to eat meat (maita) that has not been ritually slaughtered .
• Ignorance. Therefore, anyone who does not know that alcohol or zinā is forbidden will not be subject to the hadd penalty .
• Menstruation . It abolishes the duty of ritual prayer and fasting, but fasting must be made up for.
• Illness. In the event of illness, the duty to stand is suspended for all compulsory acts and fasting may be postponed. Between bleeding and urinary incontinence lift the obligation to wudoo ' and ghusl on praying.
• Slavery. It relieves the obligation to participate in Friday prayer.

The relationship of the taklīf to the five Sharia categories

A question that was discussed above all in Islamic legal theory, but also in Islamic theology, was the relationship of the taklīf to the five Sharia categories : Are all these categories also taklīf categories (aḥkām at-taklīf) ? Al-Ghazālī viewed the discussion on this question as a pure "name dispute" (nizāʿ fī ism) . Ibn Burhān expressed himself in a similar way: Ultimately it was only a question of the generalization of the term taklīf; One should not argue about generalizations (lā mušāḥḥa fī l-iṭlāqāt) because there are no restrictions on the expressions. Nonetheless, the dispute over this question is an important topic in the Usul-al-fiqh literature. There were three different positions, which are presented below:

Position 1: Only Wajib and Haram belong to the Taklīf

According to the opinion of al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), Ibn Burhān al-Baghdādī (d. 1124), al-Āmidī (d. 1233) and Ibn Hajar al-Haitamī (d. 1573) only the categories Vajib and Harām belong to the obligation categories ( aḥkām taklīfīya ), but not the categories Mandūb, Makrūh and Mubāh. Al-Ghazālī said that what is permitted cannot belong to taklīf because it is “the requirement of something difficult ” (ṭalab mā fī-hi kulfa) , which does not apply to what is permitted. He justified the exclusion of the recommendation from the taklīf with the fact that with her sin was abolished. Ibn Burhān argued that taklīf is the imposition of troublesome things, but with mandūb there is no troublesome act because if a person does the act in question, he receives reward, but if he fails to do it, he is not punished. So he assumed that the real difficulty with taklīf was not the act or omission itself, but their respective otherworldly punishment. He also suggested that there are endless acts of worship that could be classified as mandūb. But what is endless is not sufficiently concretized to fall under the taklīf. Ibn Hajar meant that only Wādjib and Harām have a taklīf in the real sense.

Position 2: Mandūb and Makrūh are also taklīf categories

According to the second view, which was held by al-Bāqillānī , (died 1013), ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad , Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī and al- Juwainī (died 1085), there were also Mandūb in addition to Wādjib and Harām and Makrūh Taklīf categories, but not the permissible (mubāḥ) . ʿAbd al-Jabbār and Abū s-Salāh al-Halabī justified their position on the category of permissibility with the Muʿtazilite doctrine on the meaning of taklīf. It cannot belong to the taklīf because the performance of permitted actions is not rewarded in the hereafter. The Imamite Muhammad at-Tūsī (d. 1066/67) argued in a similar way: what is permitted is not part of the taklīf because it does not earn praise or reward.

Al-Juwainī pointed out that the categories of recommended and frowned upon lacked the compulsive character suggested by the term taklīf, because people were given a choice. He said, however, that they still fall within the scope of taklīf because the Sharia includes all four categories. Permission alone is not included in the meaning of taklīf. Al-Āmidī (d. 1233) actually took the view that what was recommended did not belong to the taklīf, but said that it could be classified as a taklīf category considering that belief in its recommendedness was an obligation. In this context, the Hanbalit Ibn an-Najjār pointed out that a recommended action could be more arduous than an obligatory one.

Position 3: All five Sharia categories are taklīf categories

Finally, according to the third view, permissiveness also belongs to taklīf. This view was mainly supported by the Ashʿarite scholars Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (died 1027), ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī and Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qarāfī (died 1285) as well as the Hanbalites ʿAbd as-Salīyah died 1254) and Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī (died 1316).

Al-Isfarāyīnī is said to have justified his view on the fact that what one is burdened with in doing what is permitted is the belief in one's membership of the Sharia . Al-Ghazālī rejected this view, arguing that such an obligation does not arise through permissibility itself, but only on the basis of belief. There is no difficulty in the act itself. Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī also pointed out that this must then apply to all categories of law (aḥkām) . According to Ibn Burhān, al-Isfarāyīnī based his position on the fact that in order to know what is permissible and the difference between him and what is forbidden, considerations must be made, which represent a kind of effort. Ibn Burhān rejected this argument, however, with the objection that the permissibility of what is being discussed has already been established and no longer needs to be ascertained. The intellectual efforts referred to by al-Isfarāyīnī were part of the general duty of religious study, but had nothing to do with this question.

ʿAbd as-Salām Ibn Taimīya, the grandfather of the well-known scholar Ahmad Ibn Taimīya , is quoted as saying that there are a total of five taklīf categories (aqsām aḥkām at-taklīf) , namely Wādschib, Mandūb, Mubāh, Makrūh (and Mahzūr) forbidden'). In his opinion, what is permitted also belongs to the taklīf categories because it relates solely to the mukallaf, but has no relevance for the forgetting, the sleeper or the mentally ill, because neither do commands nor prohibitions apply to them. That is the reason why permissiveness has been added to the taklīf categories, although there is nothing in it that is imposed on people. The fact that Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī also viewed permissiveness as a category of taklīf had to do with his particular definition of taklīf as "the imposition of what the appeal of Sharia law requires." In his view, the Shari'a special appeal to permissiveness was, “If you want, do it, and if you want, don't.” The taklif is then the imposition of what this appeal requires.

The legal theorist Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qarāfī not only assumed that there are five taklīf categories, but also introduced a new distinction by contrasting these taklīf categories (aḥkām taklīfīya) with positive categories (aḥkām waḍʿīya) . By positive categories he understands such concepts as reason (sabab) , requirement (šarṭ) and obstacle (māniʿ) , which have legal consequences but do not contain a request. Today, even in the Twelve Shia , there is a tendency to regard all five Ahkām as taklīf categories. The modern Iranian legal theorist Abū l-Qāsim Gurdschī lists all of them under the taklīf categories, but distinguishes between mandatory taklīf categories (aḥkām taklīfīya ilzāmīya) , to which he ascribes Wādschib and Harām, and non-mandatory taklīfīmḫ (aḥīkāya taklīfīmḫ (aḥīkāya tar'ya ) , to which he attributes Mustahabb ('desired'), Makrūh and Mubāh.

Taklīf as a ceremony and rite of passage

Among today's Twelve Shiites , Taklīf refers to the celebration that is held when girls turn nine years old and have thus reached the age from which they are responsible for performing religious duties. These religious duties include, above all, wearing the hijab , but also the five daily prayers and fasting in the month of Ramadan . The taklīf celebration (ǧašn-e taklif) was first introduced in 1981 in the Islamic Republic of Iran and represents a Shiite counterpart to Catholic first communion celebrations and Jewish bat mitzvah ceremonies. Taklīf celebrations are also held for boys, but they are used for them not given so much importance. This is explained by the fact that circumcision is a well-established rite of passage in boys .

Since the mid-1990s, Shiite schools in Lebanon have also been holding large taklīf ceremonies to mark this crucial transition in the girls' lives. Lara Deeb, who asked a sheikh in Lebanon why the taklīf is not celebrated in the same way with boys starting at the age of ten, received the answer that many boys of this age have already started praying and fasting beforehand anyway, so that there is no significant change in lifestyle associated with the taklīf.

Taklīf celebrations for girls are now also held by Shiites living in Europe. It serves as a means of conveying religious practices to their children and is an important rite of passage in the transition to adulthood. By organizing taklīf ceremonies, the families concerned want to express their Islamic piety towards their movement. The taklīf symbolizes the admission of girls into the local social community of Muslims as well as into the universal community of the ummah . In the special diaspora situation, however, the taklīf also means that the girls experience the demarcation from the surrounding non-Muslim society more strongly because their Muslim identity is now more clearly identified by wearing the hijab.

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Individual evidence

1. ↑ Ibn Qudāma: Rauḍat an-nāẓir . 1998, p. 153.
2. ↑ G. Bergsträsser: Fundamentals of Islamic Law. Edited u. ed. by J. Schacht. Berlin-Leipzig 1935. p. 35.
3. ↑ ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār ibn Aḥmad: al-Muġnī . Vol. XI, p. 293.
4. ↑ Quoting al-Ǧuwainī: al-Burhān fī uṣul al-fiqh . 1399h, p. 101.
5. ↑ Az-Zarkašī: Al-Bahr al-muhit . 1992, Vol. I, p. 341.
6. ↑ Al-Baghdādī: Uṣūl ad-dīn . 1928, p. 307.
7. ↑ Al-Baghdādī: Uṣūl ad-dīn . 1928, p. 308.
8. ↑ Al-Baghdādī: Uṣūl ad-dīn . 1928, p. 307.
9. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād . 1962, p. 178.
10. ↑ Ibn Qudāma: Rauḍat an-nāẓir . 1998, p. 154.
11. ↑ Naǧm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa . 1998, Vol. I, p. 179.
12. ↑ aš-Šāṭibī: al-Muwāfaqāt . 1997, pp. 279f.
13. ↑ ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār ibn Aḥmad: al-Muġnī . Vol. XI, p. 293.
14. ↑ Al-Ḥalabī: Taqrīb al-maʿārif . 1417h, p. 113.
15. ↑ at-Tūsī: al-Iqtiṣād fīmā yataʿallaq bi-l-iʿtiqād . 1986, p. 106.
16. ↑ Ibn Mattawaih: al-Maǧmūʿ . 1965, Vol. I, p. 1.
17. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 510.
18. ↑ al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī: Al-Maslak fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 1414h, p. 93.
19. ↑ Al-Bahrānī: Qawāʿid al-marām . 2013, p. 279f.
20. ↑ Al-Ḥalabī: Taqrīb al-maʿārif . 1417h, pp. 119-121.
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23. ↑ al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī: Al-Maslak fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 1414h, p. 96.
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25. ↑ Al-Ḥalabī: Taqrīb al-maʿārif . 1417h, p. 131.
26. ↑ Ibn Mattawaih: al-Maǧmūʿ fī l-Muḥīṭ bi-t-taklīf. 1986, Vol. II, p. 170.
27. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Muntahā al-maṭlab fī taḥqīq al-maḏhab . Maǧmaʿ al-Buḥūṯ al-Islāmīya, Mašhad, 1992. Vol. I, p. 7.
28. ↑ al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī: Al-Maslak fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 1414h, p. 96.
29. ↑ Mufīd ibn al-Muʿallim: Kitāb Awāʾil al-maqālāt . 1993, p. 8.
30. ↑ For al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī cf. his al-Maslak fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 1414h, p. 95f.
31. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 269.
32. ↑ Al-Bahrānī: Qawāʿid al-marām . 2013, p. 286.
33. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Manāhiǧ al-yaqīn . 1415h, p. 384.
34. ↑ Al-Bahrānī: Qawāʿid al-marām . 2013, p. 286.
35. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Manāhiǧ al-yaqīn . 1415h, p. 384.
36. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 512.
37. ↑ al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī: Al-Maslak fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 1414h, p. 93.
38. ↑ Quoted in al-Ḥillī: Kašf al-murād . P. 345.
39. ↑ Quoted in al-Ḥillī: Kašf al-murād . P. 344.
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56. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 511.
57. ↑ Az-Zarkašī: Al-Bahr al-muhit . 1992, Vol. I, p. 342.
58. ↑ See Ibn Ḫallikān: Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān . - Engl. Transl. William Mac Guckin de Slane , Vol. II, p. 670.
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61. ↑ See Ibn Ḫallikān: Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān . - Engl. Transl. William Mac Guckin de Slane, Vol. II, p. 670.
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63. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 512.
64. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Anwār al-malakūt fī šarḥ al-Yāqūt . 1984, p. 150.
65. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 518.
66. ↑ Ibn Mattawaih: al-Maǧmūʿ fī l-Muḥīṭ bi-t-taklīf. 1986, Vol. II, p. 223.
67. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Manāhiǧ al-yaqīn . 1415h, p. 383.
68. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 518.
69. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Manāhiǧ al-yaqīn . 1415h, p. 383.
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143. ↑ Al-Bahrānī: Qawāʿid al-marām . 2013, p. 284f.
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147. ↑ Al-Baghdādī: Uṣūl ad-dīn . 1928, p. 307.
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150. ↑ az-Zanǧānī: Taḫrīǧ al-furūʿ . 1982, p. 127.
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153. ↑ Abū l-ʿAbbās aš-Šammāḫī: Kitāb Muḫtaṣar al-ʿadl wa-l-inṣāf . Muscat 1984. p. 20.
154. ↑ Ibn Qudāma: Rauḍat an-nāẓir . 1998, pp. 169-171.
155. ↑ Ibn Qudāma: Rauḍat an-nāẓir . 1998, p. 166.
156. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Mustaṣfā . Vol. I, pp. 285-87.
157. ↑ Naǧm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa . 1998, Vol. I, p. 221.
158. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Mustaṣfā . Vol. I, p. 285.
159. ↑ Amīr Bādšāh: Taisīr at-taḥrīr . 1932, Vol. II, p. 135.
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175. ↑ Muḥammad Alālā Ibn-ʿAlī at-Tahānawī: Kitāb kaššāf iṣṭilaḥat al-funūn . 2 vol. Calcutta 1862. Vol. II, p. 1255.
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177. ↑ ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār: al-Muġnī . Vol. XI, p. 503.
178. ↑ Al-Ḥalabī: Taqrīb al-maʿārif . 1417h, p. 119.
179. ↑ aṭ-Ṭūsī: al-Iqtiṣād fīmā yataʿallaq bi-l-iʿtiqād . 1986, p. 112.
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181. ↑ al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. 2003, Vol. I, p. 163.
182. ↑ Ibn an-Naǧǧār: Sharḥ al-Kaukab al-munīr . 1993, Vol. I, p. 405.
183. ↑ Quoting al-Ǧuwainī: al-Burhān fī uṣul al-fiqh . 1399h, p. 102.
184. ↑ Al-Baghdādī: Uṣūl ad-dīn . 1928, p. 308.
185. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Mustaṣfā . Vol. I, pp. 243f.
186. ↑ Al-Ġazālī: Al-Manḫūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl . 1970, p. 22.
187. ↑ Ibn Qudāma: Rauḍat an-nāẓir . 1998, p. 137.
188. ↑ Ibn Burhān: al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl . 1983, Vol. I, p. 77.
189. ↑ ʿAbd as-Salām, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm and Aḥmad Ibn Taimīya: al-Musauwada fī uṣūl al-fiqh . Ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī d-Dīn ʿAbd-al-Ḥamīd. Maṭbaʿat al-Madanī, Cairo, 1964. p. 36. Digitized .
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191. ↑ Sherman Jackson: Islamic law and the state: the constitutional jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī . Brill, Leiden, 1996. pp. 116-119.
192. ↑ Gordji: The Relationship Between Haqq and Taklif. 2001, p. 262.
193. ↑ Lara Deeb: An enchanted modern: gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006. pp. 224f.
194. ↑ Azam Torab: Performing Islam: Gender and Ritual in Iran . Brill, Leiden, 2007. pp. 169f.
195. ↑ Lara Deeb: An enchanted modern: gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006. pp. 224f.
196. ↑ Cf. the description of a taklīf celebration by Iraqi women in Copenhagen in Pedersen: Iraqi Women in Denmark . 2013, pp. 117–119.
197. ^ Pedersen: Iraqi Women in Denmark . 2013, 121.
198. ^ Pedersen: Iraqi Women in Denmark . 2013, 123.
199. ^ Pedersen: Iraqi Women in Denmark . 2013, 124.
200. ^ Pedersen: Iraqi Women in Denmark . 2013, 124f.