Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Flag of the UPA
Leaders	Vasyl Ivakhiv, Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Roman Shukhevych, Vasyl Kuk
Dates of operation	1943-1949 (official)
Active regions	primarily in territories of prewar Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia populated with Ukrainian majority, with raids as far east as Kiev region
Allies	temporary arrangements with Nazi Germany
Opponents	Nazi German SS, the Polish Armia Krajowa, Soviet partisans, the Soviet Red Army, NKVD
Battles and wars	mainly guerrilla activity

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army ([Українська Повстанська Армія, Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, UPA] Error: {{Lang-xx}}: text has italic markup (help)) was the military formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists- Bandera wing (the OUN-B), originally formed in Volhynia (north-western Ukraine) in spring-summer 1943, until being formally disbanded in early September, 1949. During its existence, the UPA fought a large variety of military forces, including Nazi German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, the Polish underground army (Armia Krajowa), and Soviet forces - including Soviet partisans, the Red Army, NKVD, SMERSH, MGB and MVD. From beginning of 1944, the UPA and OUN-B cooperated with the German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, SIPO and SD against the Soviets and Poles. The OUN-B and UPA played an important role in the killing and ethnic cleansing of much of western Ukraine's Polish population.

After World War II, the UPA remained active in Poland until 1947 and in the Soviet Union until 1949. According to 1988 work of Subtelny, Orest among the anti-Nazi resistance movements it was unique, in that it had no significant foreign support. Its growth and strength was a reflection of the popularity it enjoyed among most Ukrainians. While, 2004 work of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences conclude what outside of Western Ukraine, UPA support was minimal, and predominant majority of the Ukrainian population considered the OUN/UPA to have been collaborators with the German oppressors and supplied by them with arms and ammunitions from the beginning of the 1944.

Another UPA also existed in Volyn in 1941-July 1943. It was nominally formed earlier in late November 1941 and from spring 1942 was a most active Ukrainian nationalist armed group before the formal formation of UPA in spring 1943. This group belonged to political opponents of the OUN(B) - OUN(UNR), and allied itself politically and military with OUN(M). This grouping led by Taras Bulba-Borovets had links to the UNR in exile. It was renamed the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army in July 1943 before being later partially and forcibly absorbed into the UPA of the OUN(B).

Organization of UPA

File:UPA.jpg

UPA propaganda poster. OUN/UPA formal greetings is written in Ukrainian bold on two horizontal lines Glory to Ukraine (Glory to (her) Heroes)

UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN in a sophisticated network that was highly centralized. The UPA was responsible for operations while the OUN was in charge of administrative duties; each had their own chain of command. The six main departments were military, political, security service, mobilization, supply, and the Ukrainian Red Cross. Despite the division between UPA and the OUN, there was overlap between OUN and UPA posts and the local OUN and UPA leader were frequently the same person. Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from the German, Polish and Soviet military, while UPA units planned to be trained based on a modified Red Army field unit manual (draft developed by beginning of the 1944). The General Staff from end of 1943 consisted of operations, intelligence, training, logistics, personnel and political education departments. UPA's largest units, Kurins, consisting of 500-700 soldiers, were equivalent to battalions in a regular army, and its smallest units, Riys (literally bee swarm), with 8-10 soldiers, were equivalent to squads. Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more Kurins would unite and form a Zahin or Brigade.

File:Shukhewich.jpg

Roman Shukhevych

UPA's leaders were: Vasyl Ivakhiv (spring – 13 of May 1943), Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Roman Shukhevych (January 1944 until 1950) and finally Vasyl Kuk.

In November 1943, UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and three areas (group} commands: UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-South. Three military schools for low-level command staff were also established.

Ukrainian Academy of Sciences data referred to spring 1944, mentioned what UPA predominantly composed from peasants (poor and moderate in wealth) from western Ukraine (60% from Galicia and 30% from in Volhynia and Podolia).

By late 1943 and early 1944, the UPA controlled much of the territory of Volyn, outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers.

The number of UPA fighters varied by source and time of estimation. A German Abwehr report from November 1943 estimated that UPA had 20,000 soldiers ; Paul Robert Magocsi in his 1996 work estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000.; By the mid of 1944 -time of OUN/UPA maximum strength ,Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and other scholars estimates of OUN/UPA membership not higher then 30 thousand fighters and mentioned what Nazi’s info about 80-90 thousand fighters as fantasy ; Paul Robert Magocsi in his 1996 work estimated such as high as 100,000 soldiers ;a similar figure to Magosci also appeared at 1952 OUN statement.

The armaments of the UPA

Initially, UPA used the weapons collected from the battlefields of 1939 and 1941. Later they bought weapons from peasants and individual soldiers, or captured them in combat. Some light weapons were brought in by deserting Ukrainian auxiliary policemen. In 1944 UPA were armed directly by German units but with Soviet arms. For the most part, the UPA used the light infantry weapons of Soviet and to a lesser extent German origin (for the lack of ammo). Many kurins were equipped with light 51 mm and 82 mm mortars. During large-scale operations in 1943-1944, insurgent forces also used artillery (45 mm and 76.2 mm). According to Polish historian data in 1943 a light Hungarian tank was used in Volyn. In 1944 the Soviets captured from UPA a U-2 aircraft and 1 armored car and 1 personnel carrier. However, it was not stated that they were in operable condition, while no OUN/UPA documents noted the usage of such equipment. By end of WWII in Europe from UPA by NKVD were captured 45 artillery systems (45 and 76.2 mm calibers) and 423 mortars. In the attacks against Polish civilians, axes, and pikes were used. However, the light infantry weapon was the basic weapon used by the UPA.

UPA Background

1941

“Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian State” signed by Stepan Bandera. Highlighted “The newly formed Ukrainian state will work closely with the National-Socialist Greater Germany, under the leadership of its leader Adolf HITLER which is forming a new order in Europe “ and The Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army which has been formed on the Ukrainian lands, will continue to fight with the ALLIED GERMAN ARMY against Moscovite occupation for the sovereign and united State and a new order in the whole world..

In a Memorandum from August, 14 1941 OUN (B) proposed to the Germans, to create a Ukrainian Army “which will join the German Аrmy ... until the latter will win”, in exchange for German recognition of an allied Ukrainian independent state The Ukrainian Army was planned to have been formed on the basis of DUN (Detachments of Ukrainian nationalists - Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsiоnalistiv) and specifically on the basis of the “Ukrainian legion”, at that time composed of two battalions “Nachtigall” and “Roland.” These two battalions were included in the Abwehr special regiment “Brandenburg-800”. These proposals however, were not accepted by the Germans, and by the middle of September 1941 the Germans began a campaign of repression against the most proactive OUN members.

At the beginning of October 1941, during the first OUN Conference the OUN formulated its future strategy. This called for transferring part of its organizational structure underground, in order to avoid conflict with the Germans. It also refrained from open anti-German propaganda activities. At the same time, the OUN tried to infiltrate its own members into and create its own network within the German Auxiliary police.

By the end of November 1941, both the “Ukrainian Legions” Roland and Nachtigall were disbanded and the remaining soldiers (approximately 650 persons) were given the option of signing a contract for military service after being transferred to Germany for further military training. At the same time (end of November 1941) the Germans started a second wave of repression in Reichskommissariat Ukraine specifically targeting OUN (B) members. Most of the captured OUN activists in Reichskommissariat Ukraine however, belonged to OUN (M) wing.

1942

At the Second OUN(B) conference held in April 1942 the policies for the “creation, build-up and development of Ukrainian political and future military forces”, “action against partisan activity supported by Moscow” were adopted. The primary enemy targeted were the Soviet partisans. German policy was also criticized.

In July 1942 OUN (B) issued a statement in which it stated that the main enemy targeted was “Moscow”, while the Germans was ephemerally criticized for their policy concerning the Ukrainian independent state. Until December 1942, OUN(B)'s principal activity was propaganda and the development of its own underground network, while actions against the Germans were described at that time as undesirable and provocative.

In December 1942 near Lviv the “Military conference of OUN(B)” was held. It resulted in the adoption of a policy for the accelerated growth for the establishment of OUN(B) Military forces. The Conference emphasised that “all combat capable population must support, under OUN banners, the struggle against the Bolsheviks enemy”.

UPA's relations with Germany

Hostilities

According to visions of Dmytro Klyachkivskyy and Roman Shukhevych, the main threat were Soviet partisans and Poles while actions against German should be conducted in form of “self defense for people”. Despite two attempts (In February and August 1943) by D.Stepnyak (OUN leader of Western Ukrainian Lands) to call for wide appraisal and active actions against Germans, majority of OUN/UPA leaders decide to act in form of “self defense for people”. Such tactics expect maximum avoidance of clashes with Germans and expect actions only when they attack Ukrainian population or UPA units.

OUN (B) leadership at March 20, 1943 issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German auxiliary police in 1941-1943 to desert with their weapons and to join the units of UPA in Volyn. This process in some place involved engaging in armed conflict with German forces trying to prevent them from doing so. The number of trained and armed soldiers deserting into the ranks of UPA was estimated as being between 4 to 5 thousand.

Under German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on police stations and military convoys. In the region of Zhytomyr the insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland. . The UPA were able to send small groups of raiders deep into eastern Ukraine.

According former UPA officer L. Shankovskyy , the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid to late 1943 in Volyn: in July, 35; in August, 24; in September, 15; October-November, 47. During the summer of 1943, according to post-war estimates, the Germans lost over 3,000 men killed or wounded while the UPA lost 1237 killed or wounded.

However Erich Koch in his November 1943 report and New Year 1944 speech mentioned what “nationalistic bands in forests does not have any major threat” for Germans .

Same information mentioned in top secret report as of January 21 1944 from famous soviet partisan commander General-Major Feodorov: “while acting from July 1943 till January 1944 in Volynskaya and Rovenskaya regions we did not seen any facts, when Ukrainian nationalists, excluding numerous brave reports in their own press, conduct any action against German occupants”

In general OUN and UPA actions on anti-German front do not play an important role in liberation of Ukrainian territory from Germans occupants. [ Despite post war OUN/UPA propagandistic claims (1947) about UPA successes at anti-German front , they unable to prevent German deportation for slave works 500,000 of Ukrainians from west regions of Ukraine, nor “Ukrainian peoples looting” by Germans as far as OUN/UPA does not control German roads and especially railways communication network. [

While in a debriefing before U.S. authorities in 1948, a Committee of former German commanders on the Eastern front claimed that "the Ukrainian Nationalist movement formed the strongest partisan movement in the East, with the exception of the Russian Communists."

Collaboration

OUN under Bandera actively cooperate and acted in favors of Germans military and intelligence authorities before and few months after German invasion to Soviet Union in 1941 [

In autumn 1943 some detachments of UPA attempted to find reapproachment with the Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order from November 25, 1943, such actions were not halted In May 1944 the OUN submitted instructions to "switch the struggle, which was conducted against the Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets.".

In early 1944 UPA forces in several Western regions OUN/UPA engaged in cooperation with the German Wehrmacht, Waffen SS, SIPO and SD. In early January-February 1944, UPA forces in some regions engaged in cooperation with the German Wehrmacht (as for instance with 4-th Tanks Army) . In March UPA detachments concluded a deal with Germans SD and SS in selected regions. In March-July senior leader of OUN(B) in Galicia conducted negotiations with SD and SS officials, which has as a result German decision to supply UPA with arms and ammunitions. However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and Nazi forces because UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against the repressive actions of the German administration. OUN/UPA report claimed that, on January 20th, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded. While Germans documents limited OUN/UPA activities to “looting the German soldiers”.

In a top secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadefuhrer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenfuhrer General Hans Prutzmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that “The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army Group” on the southern Front. By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for UPA for their Anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"

By end of 1944 Germans supplied OUN/UPA by air with arms and equipments. Also by air were transferred some German prepared personnel to conduct terrorist and intelligence activities in Soviet rear. Also by same way were transferred some OUN-B leaders

UPA and Poles

Further information: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

UPA was active in the ethnic cleansing actions of ethnic Poles from areas of Ukrainian autonomous settlement through terrorist acts and the mass-murder of Polish civilians.

Ethnic cleansing operations against the Polish population began on a large scale in March 1943.

Soviet partisans in the Rivne region reported that terror actions committed by “nationalists” against the Polish population commenced in April 1943). Władysław Filar from the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, an eyewitness to the massacres, claims that it is impossible to establish whether these events were ever planned. According to Polish historians, the decision to “clean Volyn from the Polish element” was adopted in February 1943 during the Third Conference of OUN(B). However, according to modern Ukrainian historians the ethnic cleansing was ordered by Dmytro Klyachkivsky and was adopted on a regional level by the OUN (B) and has a support from Roman Shukhevych. Although in August 1943 UPA placed notices in every Polish village stating "in 48 hours leave beyond the Buh or the Sian river - otherwise Death," no known documents exist proving that the UPA-OUN made a decision to exterminate Poles in Volhynia.

Brutal methods such as beheading, disembowelling, and killing with knives and axes were employed against Polish villagers. In addition to the UPA, Ukrainian peasants also participated in the violence, and large groups of armed "bandit" marauders unaffiliated with UPA brutalized civilians. so the exact number of Poles killed specifically by UPA is unknown. The UPA also killed ethnic Ukrainians who did not cooperate with them, as well as those Ukrainians who had intermarried with Poles. In anti-Polish actions from autumn 1943 in Galicia, the UPA conducted cooperative actions with detachments of regiments of the Galician Division. The estimates of the number of Poles murdered in Ukraine range from 100,000 to 500,000; many more Poles left the area because of the UPA actions.

In post war time amongst some historians exist opinion that UPA's activities can be seen as a reaction to past policies and actions of the inter-war Polish government, such as shutting down Ukrainian schools and churches or encouraging Polish settlement in the regions considered by OUN to be "ethnically Ukrainian". Some claims what in 1944 Polish-Ukrainian hatred was often provoked by Soviet forces, who used Poles as informants and in anti-Ukrainian destructive battalions, resulting in savage reprisals.

According to 1988 work of Subtelny, Orest UPA's actions were matched by similar actions by the Polish Armia Krajowa and by Polish police forces working for the Germans. The brutal conflict escalated out of control with many thousands of civilians being murdered by both Ukrainian and Polish forces. Estimates of the death tolls from the retaliatory actions of the Polish Home Army forces include numbers such as 2,000 Ukrainian civilians or as high as 20 thousand in Volhynia alone.

UPA's actions against the Soviet Union

Under German occupation

The total number of local Soviet Partisans acting in western Ukraine was never high, due to the region enduring only two years of Soviet rule (some places even less). Only towards the end of the war, in 1944 did the number and activity of Soviet Partisans in Ukraine increase.

According to 1988 work of Subtelny, Orest in early 1943, the Soviet partisan leader Sydir Kovpak established himself and in the summer of 1943, well-armed with supplies delivered to secret airfields formed a group numbering several thousand men, while own Sydir Kovpak memoirs limited group strength to 1.5-1.8 thousand men and establishing to November 1941, which went deep into the Carpathians. Attacks by the German air force and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units In 1944 which were attacked by UPA units on way back. Famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA membersm

Fighting the Soviet Army (1944-45)

With the liberation of Ukraine by the Red Army, the UPA avoided clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military fearing their offensive action would annihilate them. Soviet archival data shows that UPA attacks were focused on small units and groups of Soviet soldiers, often ending with killing of the captured and wounded. The UPA opposed the mobilization of able-bodied men into the Soviet Army through the extermination of whole families of those who joined. The UPA also disrupted Soviet efforts at collectivization.

In March 1944, UPA insurgents wounded front commander Army General Nikolai Vatutin, who led the liberation of Kiev. Estimates of OUN/UPA and Soviet casualties vary depending on the source. A letter to the state defense committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that in April 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and UPA resulted in 2018 killed and 1570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviet killed and 46 wounded. Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member stated that he received a reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while the Soviet forces lost 2,000. The first significant sabotage operations against communications of the Soviet Army before their offensive against the Germans was conducted by UPA in April-May 1944. Such actions were promptly stopped by the Soviet Army and NKVD troops, after which the OUN/UPA submitted an order to temporarily cease anti-Soviet activities and prepare for further struggle against the Soviets.

Despite heavy casualties during the initial clashes, the operation was inconclusive. New large scale actions of UPA, especially in Ternopil Oblast, were launched in July-August 1944, when the Red Army advanced West.

Soviet archival data states that on October 9, 1944 1 NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with the total number of 26,304 NKVD soldiers stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, 2 regiments with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment and 1 unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them.

During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data, “Ukrainian nationalists” (all wings of OUN and UNR military and paramilitary formation) suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000 killed, approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data “Ukrainian nationalists” actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and the disappearance of 427 others. According to 1988 work of Subtelny, Orest, despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in western Ukraine. While in February 1945 OUN/UPA issued an order to liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya’s (companies) and to act predominantly by choty’s (platoons).

Spring 1945- late 1946

Further information: Sluzhba Bezbeky

After Germany surrendered in May 1945, the Soviet authorities turned their attention to insurgencies taking place in Ukraine and the Baltics. Combat units were re-organised and special forces were sent in. One of the major complications that arose was the local support the UPA had from the population, which became a priority for the Soviets.

Bukowsko (Sanok County) village burned down by Ukrainian Insurgent Army on 5 April 1946.

Bukowsko village burned down by UPA Army on 5 April 1946.

File:1946nowo2.jpg

Nowotaniec (Sanok County) village burned down by Ukrainian Insurgent Army on 5 April 1946. People displaced by attacking UPA Army.

From areas of Ukrainian Nationalists activity were deported: officially Soviet archives state that between 1944 and 1952 a total of 182,543 people while according to 1988 work of Subtelny, Orest number only for 1944-47 may have been as high as to 500,000. According Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of History, Northeastern University, mass arrests of suspected UPA informants or family members were conducted; between February 1944 and May 1946 over 250,000 people were arrested in Western Ukraine., ( Those arrested typically experienced beatings or other violence. Those suspected of being UPA members underwent torture. The many arrested women believed to be affiliating with UPA were subjected to torture, deprivation, and rape at the hands of Soviet security in order to "break" them and get them to reveal UPA members' identities and locations or to turn them into Soviet double-agents. Mutilated corpses of captured rebels were put on public display. While Ukrainian Academy of Sciences limited this number to approximately 28,000 “proponents of Ukrainian nationalists” and “few facts of breaching the soviet low” were investigated and punished, while public execution of Nazi criminals and their collaborationists were a common in ex-occupied Soviet territories few years after WWII.

According Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of History, Northeastern University UPA responded to the Soviet methods by unleashing their own terror against Soviet activists, “suspected collaborators” and their families. This work was particularly attributed to the Sluzhba Bezbeky (SB). In a typical incident in Lviv region, in front of horrified villagers, UPA troops gouged out the eyes of two entire families suspected of reporting on insurgent movements to Soviet authorities, before hacking their bodies to pieces. Due to public outrage concerning these violent punitive acts, OUN/UPA stopped the practice of killing the families of collaborators by mid 1945. Other victims of OUN/UPA included Soviet activists sent to Galicia from other parts of the Soviet Union; heads of village Soviets, those sheltering or feeding Red Army personnel, and even people turning food in to collective farms. The effect of such terrorist acts was such that people refused to take posts as village heads, and until the late 1940s villages chose single men with no dependants as their leaders.

While Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and own Sluzhba Bezbeky (SB) captured documents depict what the terror and civil population extermination by Sluzhba Bezbeky (SB) appeared from the 1943 and not ended till total extermination of SB members in 1948-49.

According Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of History, Northeastern University, between February 1944 and December 1946 11,725 Soviet officers, agents and collaborators were assassinated and 2,401 were "missing", presumed kidnapped, in Western Ukraine., while Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Soviet sources limit and distinct such numbers to 3-4 thousands of different government institution servicemen and 8-9 of civilians. In one county in Lviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed ten members of the Soviet activ and a secretary of the county Communist party, and also kidnapped four other officials. UPA traveled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members. According to a 1946 report by Khrushchenv's deputy for West Ukrainian affairs A.A. Stoiantsev, out of 42,175 operations and ambushes against UPA by Destructive Battalions in Western Ukraine, only 10 percent had positive results - in the vast majority there was either no contact or the individual unit was disarmed and pro-Soviet leaders murdered or kidnapped. According Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of History, Northeastern University, morale amongst the NKVD in Western Ukraine was particularly low. Even within the dangerous context of Soviet state service in the late-Stalin era, West Ukraine was considered to be a "hardship post", and personnel files reveal higher rates of transfer requests, alcoholism, and nervous breakdowns and refusal to serve among NKVD field agents there at that time.

The first success of the Soviet authorities came in early 1946 in the Carpathians, which were blockaded from January 11 until April 10. The UPA operating there ceased to exist as a combat unit. The continuous heavy casualties elsewhere forced the UPA to split into small units. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home, when the Soviet Union offered three amnesties during 1947-1948

By 1946, UPA was reduced to a core group of 5-10 thousand fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border (at Polish territory). Here, in 1947, they allegedly killed the Polish Communist deputy defense minister General Karol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and the USA. Although the OUN/UPA obtained help from the CIA and British intelligence during the latter phase of its struggle, the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. After the huge winter 1945/46 operation by the NKVD, UPA/OUN fielded 479 units and had 3,735 fighters, according to an NKVD estimate from April 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947 MGB estimated OUN and UPA as having 530 fighting units with 4,456 fighters.

UPA fighters in Rivne Oblast, in 1947

The end of the UPA (1947-1949)

According Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of History, Northeastern University, the turning point in the struggle against the UPA came in 1947, when the Soviets established an intelligence gathering network within the UPA and shifted the focus of their actions from mass terror to infiltration and espionage. After 1947 the UPA's activity began to calm down. On May 30, 1947 Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare [14]. In 1947-1948 OUN/UPA resistance has weakened enough to allow the Soviets to begin implementation of large-scale collectivization throughout western Ukraine. In 1948, the Soviet central authorities purged local officials who had mistreated peasants and engaged in "vicious methods". At the same time, Soviet agents planted within the OUN/UPA had taken their toll on morale and on the OUN/UPA's effectiveness. According to the writing of one slain Ukrainian rebel, "the Bolsheviks tried to take us from within...you can never know exactly in whose hands you will find yourself. From such a network of spies, the work of whole teams is often penetrated..." In November 1948, the work of Soviet agents led to two important victories against the UPA: the defeat and deaths of the heads of the most active OUN/UPA network in Western Ukraine, and the removal of "Myron", the head of the SB unit.

The Soviet authorities tried to win over the local population by making significant investments into Western Ukraine, and by setting up a quick dispatch groups in many regions to combat the UPA. According to one retired MVD major, by 1948 ideologically we had the support of most of the population. The end of OUN and UPA at Polish territory was helped by the Polish government implementing Operation Wisła in 1947. On September 3, 1949 Shukhevych issued an order, liquidating UPA units and headquarters and integrating UPA's personnel into the OUN (B) underground.

On May 30, 1947 the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of October 14, 1942 as the official day for celebrating UPA's creation.

The UPA's leader, Roman Shukhevych, was killed during an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950 . Although sporadic OUN underground activity continued until the mid 1950's. An assessment of OUN underground manpower by Soviet authorities in April 17, 1952 indicated that OUN underground had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. Last head of UPA’s General Command , Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May, 24 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished by the beginning of 1956".

A controversy exists that there were NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population. were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954. While well known what such kind of “special group practice” was cancelled from March 1949

One famous example of an ex-UPA turned MVD fighter was Bohdan Stashynsky who would then climb the ladder of MGB (and later KGB) hierarchy to become a foreign agent who assassinated the OUN chief Lev Rebet in 1957 and later Stepan Bandera in 1959.

Prominent people killed by the UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan.

In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas affiliated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the period after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of "Ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against the UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.

OUN-B/UPA's and “Jew’s question” at Ukraine

Despite that fact what by the time of UPA establishing at Reichskommissariat Ukraine (spring-summer 1943) and General Government (summer-winter 1943) almost all Jewish population of that areas were exterminated by Nazi’s with the notable assistance of Ukrainian militia and Ukrainian Auxiliary Police which filled by OUN-B proponents, were exist a different historical assessment of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalist and it members and proponents in the destruction of Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation. Accordingly to documents presented to the International Military Tribunal confirmed by affidavit of the Major General Erwin Von Lahausen, Abwehr Division I head, Ukrainian organizations (OUN) which are working with Amt Abwehr have same (as Nazi’s) “objectives”, namely, the Poles and the Jews . Such “objects” described as “all farms and dwelling of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed” .

OUN -B General Instruction adopted in 1941 “ Fights and activities during the war” stated “enemies to us are: moskali (Russians), Poles, Jews…” and thus them must be“… exterminated in fight, especially whom which protect regime: remove to their land, assassinate, predominantly intelligentsia… Jews assimilation is impossible.” [15], moreover, in minutes of OUN (B) July 1941 Conference of OUN (B) clear visible a plan for partially Jewish population extermination and “ghettoizetion”. Captured SD and SIPO reports till end of October 1941, which were presented at Nurmberg_Trial noted about active role especially of OUN -B groups in “communists and Jewish extermination” at Reichskommissariat Ukraine . In June 1943 report by SS- Gruppenfьhrer and General Lieutenant of the Police Fritz Katzmann called “The Solution of the Jewish Question in Galicia” noted the significant role of the Ukrainian police in the Jews extermination in 1941- early 1943 Numerous accounts ascribe to OUN-UPA a role in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation. While group of Northern-American historians, mostly with Ukrainian roots, do not support the arguments that UPA was involved in anti-Jewish massacres.

John-Paul Himka, a historian also with Ukrainian roots, has called this "a blank spot in the collective memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora." He states that this group does not so much ignore the Holocaust of the Ukrainian Jews, but denies the participation of Ukrainians in this crime against humanity.

However, according to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin dated March 30, 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews." Such fact also confirmed by few survivors from Lviv Ghetto – they noted what Ukrainian Auxiliary Police Guards of Ghetto sold faked documents for most richest Jewish families, and some of them able to escape from ghetto, but after some of them were looted and killed by Ukrainian Police, while some returned to ghetto and executed.

It has proven to be difficult to ascribe the particular numbers of Jews to have been killed specifically by OUN-B/UPA. Ukrainians fought in many German military and paramilitary forces such as the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police , Schutzmannschaftsbataillons and military formation under SS and SD and SIPO command. However should be noted what on initial stage of UPA formation (late March – beginning of April 1943), it was absorbed from 4 to 6 thousands of Ukrainian Auxiliary Police as from Reichskommissariat Ukraine, as from General Government. Also many high ranked UPA commanders (as also a Roman Shukhevych) served in under German command in same areas (Ukraine, Belarus) and in a same time were Holocaust actions taken place. In 1944 OUN/UPA absorbed most of failed to retreat with Nazi’s members of different collaborators formations in including those who served in SS and SD.

According to 1988 work of Subtelny, Orest in 1944, the OUN formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity" , however in late 1944 in UPA commanders reports were used Nazi’s propaganda words construction - “Jew-Communist-Bolsheviks”. .

Ukrainian Diaspora media presented few cases of Jewish participation within the ranks of UPA, claim some of whom held high positions. These included Dr. Margosh, who headed UPA-West's medical service, Dr. Marksymovich, who was the Chief Physician of the UPA's officer school, and Dr. Abraham Kum, the director of an underground hospital in the Carpathians.

Aftermath

File:100 0810.JPG

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and other UPA graves in the Ukrainian Orthodox Cemetery in South Bound Brook, New Jersey.

According to Columbia University professor John Armstrong "If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979...the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million...however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950.".

During the following years the UPA was however officially taboo in the Soviet Union, and mentioned only as a terrorist organization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, there have been heated debates to award former UPA members official recognition as legitimate combatants, with accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. UPA veterans have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Soviet Army veterans and some Ukrainian politicians particularly from the south and east of the country. Neighbouring governments in Russia and Poland have also reacted negatively.

Attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations. In 2007, president Yushchenko awarded the title "Hero of Ukraine", the country's highest honour to UPA leader Roman Shukhevych.

File:Former UPA and SS-Galizien members in Berezhany 2006.jpg

Former UPA and UNA members with Plast Scout Organization pose for photos shortly after the Anniversary of the UPA ceremony in Berezhany, Ukraine

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds. Restoration of graves and cemeteries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.

In late 2006 the Lviv city administration announced the future transference of the tombs of Stepan Bandera, Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk and other key leaders of OUN/UPA to a new area of Lychakivskiy Cemetery specifically dedicated to Ukrainian nationalists.

File:The Monument to the Victims of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA-OUN) Simferopol, Ukraine. 2007..jpg

Monument to the Victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Simferopol, Ukraine

Without waiting for official Kiev notice, many regional authorities have already decided to approach the UPA history on their own. In many western cities and villages monuments, memorials and plaques to the leaders and troops of the UPA have been erected, including a monument to Stepan Bandera himself which opened in October 2007. In response to this, many eastern provinces responded with opening of memorials to their victims, the first one of which opened in Simferopol, Crimea in September 2007.

On January 10, 2008 President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko submitted a draft law "On the official Status of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in 20s-90s of the 20th century". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920-1990 as part of the:

• Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO)
• Karpatska Sich
• OUN
• UPA
• Ukrainian Main Liberation Army,

as well as persons who assisted these organizations shall be recognized as war veterans.

In 2007, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in order to make public original sources.

See also

• 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galizien (1st Ukrainian)
• Galicia (Central Europe)
• Operation Wisła
• Ukrainian Military Organization

Sources

• Template:En icon Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-5808-6.
• Template:En icon Davies, Norman (2005). God's playground: a history of Poland: in two volumes, Vol. 2, Chapter 19. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-925340-4.
• Template:Pl icon Sowa, Andrzej (1998). Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939-1947. Kraków. ISBN 83-909631-5-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Template:Pl icon Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Warszawa: ISP PAN / RYTM. ISBN 83-788373-163-8. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
• Template:Uk icon УПА розпочинає активні протинімецькі дії (UIA Start the Active anti-German actions) (За матеріалами звіту робочої групи істориків Інституту історії НАН України під керівництвом проф. Станіслава Кульчицького)
• Documents on Ukrainian Polish Reconciliation
• Template:En icon Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11

External links

• UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army
• Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Encyclopedia of Ukraine
• Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army