To my people and to the German nation

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"To my people and to the German nation"
probably mainly written by Heinrich Alexander von Arnim-Suckow , March 21, 1848,
Single sheet printing on paper
Copy from the German Historical Museum (Berlin): 42 cm × 62.4 cm. and a copy of the Paderborn City Archives: 35 cm × 22 cm

To my people and to the German nation ” is a proclamation dated March 21, 1848, which arose in connection with the Berlin March Revolution . In the proclamation, the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV addressed the national liberal freedom movement of the time. The Prussian Foreign Minister Heinrich Alexander von Arnim-Suckow had drafted the declaration . The document was eventually published with the approval of the King and members of the State Department. The leadership role of Prussia in the German question claimed in the proclamation aroused opposition from the major European powers as well as from the German princes, the aristocracy and the parliaments of the so-called “ Third Germany ”. The contradicting role of the king in Prussian national politics also ultimately contributed to the political failure of the proclamation.

Historical background to the proclamation

In contrast to France and Great Britain, Germany did not form a political unit until 1871. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna created the German Confederation as a loose amalgamation of German individual states. The German Confederation lacked a common jurisdiction, administration, legislation and army organization. Due to its " enlightened - reform tradition" (Christian Jansen), Prussia was seen as a possible trailblazer in national unification. In contrast to Austria , the second German great power, it was not culturally, economically or politically aligned with Eastern Europe. In 1815, Prussia grew mainly westward into German territory.

When the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV took office on June 7, 1840, the so-called German question seemed to be moving. The public knew that Friedrich Wilhelm IV was not hostile to the German national movement. However, the national understanding of the new king was incompatible with that of the national liberal forces . His national concept was based on a restoration of the Holy Roman Empire , which fell in 1806 and which he viewed as an ideal Christian and class state. He also believed that he should not violate the historical rights of the German dynasties. Because of their establishment by God's grace and their tradition of rule that has existed for centuries, he believed that he had to rely on their consent in order to promote national unity. Above all, the Habsburgs , who last wore the Roman-German imperial crown , should, according to him, rise again to "the highest head of Christianity". Friedrich Wilhelm IV saw himself in the role of a future “King of the Germans”, who was to be elected by the German princes and then anointed and crowned in Frankfurt's Imperial Cathedral of St. Bartholomew (cf. the role of the electors in the Holy Roman Empire). In this function he wanted to serve the German Kaiser as a kind of “Prime Minister” (according to David E. Barclay). Following on from the tradition of the ore offices of the Holy Roman Empire, Friedrich Wilhelm IV envisaged the office of "imperial ore general" for himself. According to Christopher Clark , Friedrich Wilhelm IV would have been interested in a German imperial dignity. Frank-Lothar Kroll emphasizes that Friedrich Wilhelm IV's understanding of nationality can neither be understood with the term “liberal nationalism” nor with that of “conservative internationalism”. Although the Prussian king shared an interest in “ interventionism to protect the legitimate dynasties and to maintain the old order” (according to Kroll) with the representatives of conservative internationalism, such as the Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich and Tsar Nikolaus I , he refused to them “a national great power policy”. Kroll thinks it is likely that Friedrich Wilhelm IV gave German interests and Prussian hegemony claims less priority than maintaining the supranational Holy Alliance .

In particular , the king wanted to use the national euphoria triggered by the Rhine crisis of 1840 to gain popularity among the Prussian population despite his rejection of a contemporary constitution . In December 1840 he wrote in a letter to King Ludwig I of Bavaria that he wanted a French attack on the Rhine, because "then the German Confederation will appear for the first time as a European power". During the Rhine crisis, Friedrich Wilhelm relied on cooperation with Austria: In a letter to Metternich on January 10, 1841, he demanded that Austria should be the "midwife" of the new Germany. Austria feared, however, that the establishment of a German nation- state would encourage separatist movements in the multi-ethnic state , which could mean the territorial collapse of the Habsburg monarchy . Without support from Vienna, Friedrich Wilhelm left his national policy to symbolic gestures, as was the case at the Cologne Cathedral Building Festival in 1842, at which the laying of the foundation stone for the continued construction of the cathedral was celebrated. While the Wartburg Festival in 1817 and the Hambach Festival in 1832 had imitated the secular and liberal ceremonial acts of the French Revolution, the Prussian king wanted to counter these events with "monarchical-Christian values". In 1847, Friedrich Wilhelm IV entrusted the diplomat Joseph von Radowitz with the task of negotiating a reform of the German Confederation with Metternich, whereby the individual German states were only to cede limited political sovereignty to the Confederation. The cooperation between Prussia and Austria should be established. However, the federal reform no longer came about because the revolution of 1848 "overran the approaches".

Origin of the proclamation and the king's national stance in March 1848

On the other events → March Revolution 1848 in Berlin

The ride of Friedrich Wilhelm IV through Berlin on March 21, 1848

After the French King Louis-Philippe I was overthrown in February 1848 and the Austrian State Chancellor Metternich in March 1848 , there was also a mass demonstration in Berlin on March 18. Giving in to public pressure, the King announced a patent at 2 p.m. that announced that the forthcoming Prussian United Landtag should debate the transformation of the “confederation into a federal state”, ie the member states of the German Confederation should join a common federal constitution. This national political concession could no longer prevent the violent conflict between royal troops and civilians in Berlin. When the king gave the order to withdraw the troops on March 19, 1848, he became directly dependent on the Berlin opposition. In this situation, a group of advisors who wanted to regain the initiative by letting the monarch take the lead in the unification of Germany finally gained importance in this situation. The previous Prussian diplomat in Paris, Heinrich Alexander von Arnim-Suckow, who was appointed Foreign Minister on March 21, 1848, distributed posters in Berlin on the morning of the same day, without consulting the King, that the King would ride with the old venerable Colors of the German Nation ”(meaning: black-red-gold). Arnim also submitted his draft of the proclamation "To my people and to the German nation", which had already been formulated on March 17, 1848, to the State Ministry and King. In contrast to Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Arnim was a liberal advocate for strong Prussian supremacy in Germany.

The king expressed his aversion to such plans just a few hours later when he was touring the streets of Berlin: on the Schlossplatz , at the university , Alexanderplatz and Cöllnischen Rathaus he gave short speeches in which he warned against the legitimacy of others to question German princes:

"What you see here (...) is not usurpation . I don't want to overthrow princes from their thrones. Everything is aimed only at the restoration of the unity of Germany. "

The king responded negatively to a cheer from the crowd who celebrated him as "Emperor of Germany". Presumably, according to the historian Rüdiger Hachtmann , the later rejection of the German imperial crown , which the all-German Frankfurt National Assembly was to offer him in April 1849 , was already becoming apparent. Friedrich Wilhelm did not consider the public or representatives of the people to be entitled to award him the imperial crown. He saw this alone as a privilege of the German princes. In addition, according to the historian Peter Krüger, Friedrich Wilhelm's lack of an “eye for the interrelationships of the order in Germany, Central Europe and the European world”. The king was "too fixated on Germany itself".

Content of the proclamation

Allusion to the liberation war of 1813

In order to historically legitimize the claim of a Prussian leadership in Germany, Arnim drew parallels to the proclamation " To my people " of 1813, in which Friedrich Wilhelm's father had called for resistance against the Napoleonic troops. The proclamation "To my people and to the German nation" therefore begins as follows:

“Thirty-five years ago, in the days of great danger, the king spoke to his people with confidence, and his confidence was not shamed. The king, united with his people, saved Prussia and Germany from shame and humiliation. Today, at the moment when the fatherland is in great danger, I speak to the German nation with confidence. "

As before Prussia's entry into the war in the Wars of Liberation , a war against France threatened in 1848. The Prussian government feared that revolutionary France might attack Prussia as it did in 1792 and 1806, but this did not happen. Friedrich Wilhelm IV nevertheless considered a preventive war against Paris at times. Prussia, at least according to the statement in the proclamation “To my people and to the German nation”, had already played a prominent role for the national cause in the wars of liberation, which should now entitle it to lead the German nation again. In fact, the appeal “To my people” of 1813 did not justify a “German people's war”: Although Friedrich Wilhelm III. addressing his Prussian subjects as Germans in the document, he meant only the inhabitants of the four provinces remaining to him, namely Brandenburg, Prussia, Silesians and Lithuanians. In addition, the proclamation "To my people" was a reminder of the "past Prussian glory under the Great Elector and Frederick the Great ". An association that points to a future German unity, on the other hand, is never evoked. Voluntary associations also hardly played a role in the Wars of Liberation, unlike Arnim's proclamation “To my people and to the German nation”. Napoleon's defeat was mainly brought about by the regular Prussian army .

Relationship between revolution and German nation

The document further states:

“Germany is seized with internal ferment and can be threatened by external danger from more than one side. Rescue from this double (meant; revolutionary and foreign policy) danger can only (...) emerge under one direction. I (Friedrich Wilhelm IV.) Take over this leadership today for the days of danger . "

In addition to the external defense, the proclamation also emphasized the obligation to prevent Prussia's revolutionary unrest or "internal fermentation" in Germany. To this end, the appeal proposed a “union of German princes and peoples under (the) leadership” of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. With this "advance into the national unity question" Arnim wanted to bring the revolutionary movement under the control of the Prussian government. The “responding to the national movement” was also in the interests of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, since he did not want to leave German nationalism to its “liberal and democratic opponents”. In this way, from the point of view of the monarch, the national movement should be “cleansed” of liberal, revolutionary elements and at the same time reconciled with the conservative forces. Kroll sees “the days of danger” as an indication of Austria's inability to act in the German Confederation since the fall of State Chancellor Metternich. Since Austria would fail as a historically legitimate German leading power, Prussia would temporarily have to assume its leading position.

In the further course, in order to accommodate Friedrich Wilhelm's national concept, the "banner" of the Holy Roman Empire is alluded to:

"Today I have adopted the old German colors and placed myself and my people under the venerable banner of the German Empire."

The proclamation follows the erroneous assumption that the colors black-red-gold were already the colors of the Old Kingdom. In fact, the flag of the Roman-German emperors consisted of a black double-headed eagle on a gold background.

Relationship between Prussia and Germany

The core sentence of the proclamation, that “Prussia will henceforth be absorbed into Germany”, was deliberately kept vague, as different ideas circulated within the government as to how the “relationship between Prussia and Germany” (according to Rüdiger Hachtmann) could be shaped at all. In addition, a concretization of the uniform plan would only have turned the other German princes, who fear for their political sovereignty, even more against Prussia. According to the historian Walter Bussmann , Friedrich Wilhelm IV would never have come to terms with a complete dissolution of Prussia, despite all the national enthusiasm. The main aim of the proclamation was to calm the public opinion after the Berlin barricade fight, while the German question was of secondary importance. The split between Prussia and Germany was even strengthened by the competition between the two national assemblies in Berlin and Frankfurt am Main . The historian Anselm Doering-Manteuffel comes to a different conclusion with the ambiguous formulation “Prussia will henceforth rise in Germany”: At the time of the proclamation, the Frankfurt National Assembly was still pending. That is why the Prussian government found it difficult to estimate what the national movement actually meant by German unity. Accordingly, the formulation remained imprecise. Nevertheless, the proclamation was only made because of the “helpless” situation of the king and only a “half-hearted” commitment to the national movement.

Second United State Parliament and liberal concessions

The proclamation also states that the "Princes and Estates of Germany" should join the Second United State Parliament in Berlin , which was convened for April :

“The Landtag, which has already been convened on April 2nd, presents itself as a means and legal organ to move forward in association with My People to save and calm Germany. I intend to give the princes and estates of Germany the opportunity in a form that will be considered in more detail immediately to open a joint assembly with the organs of this state parliament. "

This “expansion of the Prussian state parliament to a German national representation” (according to Heinrich August Winkler), proposed in the proclamation, turned out to be a project that was hardly feasible. The liberal and democratic forces in the German medium and small states did not want to accept Prussian supremacy as long as Prussia was not a real constitutional state. The institution of the United Diet was based on an estate that represented only a small part of the people and did not result from elections. To demonstrate their resistance to the Second United State Parliament, opposition members in Stuttgart shot publicly at a doll that was supposed to represent Friedrich Wilhelm IV and then threw it into the fire. There were also protests in the Prussian provinces, especially in Silesia. In the last sentence of the proclamation, central March demands such as the introduction of “true constitutional constitutions”, ministerial responsibility , jury courts and a “truly popular administration” were apparently included in the government program. In doing so, the government went beyond the concessions in the reform patents of March 18, 1848, but once again remained “imprecise” and “ambiguous” in its wording. In retrospect, Friedrich Wilhelm IV justified this by claiming that he saw Germany aflame in March 1848 and could only have extinguished it with the “unclean water” of constitutionalism . With his liberal concessions he only intended to remove the basis of the revolutionary unrest throughout Germany. Nevertheless, the proclamation and the behavior of the government met with decided rejection in the highly conservative environment of the king. According to the historian Heinrich August Winkler , this had seen it as a “disgusting ingratiation to the revolution” and “intellectual betrayal of Prussia”. The royal advisor and confidante Leopold von Gerlach commented on Prussian policy towards Germany in his diary as follows:

"How hypocritical is this Germanomania and what kind of wounds has it not already struck Germany?"

For Gerlach, the national enthusiasm of the liberal character, to which Friedrich Wilhelm had partially given in in the proclamation, represented a foreign import from revolutionary France. According to his understanding, Germany could only exist as a "class-monarchical ruling association" in the historical succession of the Holy Roman Empire . Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Has now deviated from this core idea of ​​the previous Prussian foreign policy.

consequences

Prussia's Germany policy in the Schleswig-Holstein survey

In the so-called Schleswig-Holstein Uprising , the Prussian government put the claim made in the proclamation to want to defend Germany militarily for the first time. The background to this was the multiethnic composition of the entire Danish state. The question was whether the German-speaking duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which were ruled by the Danish King Frederick VII , could be incorporated into a German nation-state. The Danish annexation of Schleswig on March 21, 1848 sparked national outrage in the German states. A provisional government was formed in Kiel, which asked the Bundestag and later the all-German National Assembly for membership. On April 4, 1848, the Bundestag instructed the Prussian government to come to an "intermediary deal" with Denmark. Once again giving in to public pressure, Friedrich Wilhelm IV finally ordered the mobilization of the Prussian army. On April 23, 1848, a federal army under Prussian command crossed the border to Schleswig and advanced as far as Jutland . However, under pressure from Russia, Great Britain, France and Sweden, Prussia had to consent to the Malmö armistice on August 26, 1848 . According to Christopher Clark, this external resistance shows that “the German question was ultimately a European question that Prussia could not solve alone”. The all-German National Assembly , which had declared the Schleswig-Holstein affair to be a “matter of honor for the German nation”, acted as the aggressor, while “Denmark defended territory that it owned” ( Dieter Langewiesche ). From the point of view of the European neighbors, a possible German nation-state could upset the balance between the great powers that has existed since the Congress of Vienna. According to Rüdiger Hachtmann, however, the Prussian government did well to the armistice. After Malmö, the Prussian troops were no longer bound outside Prussia, which promoted their possible use against revolutionary unrest inside.

Caricature, chalk lithograph after a drawing by Isidor Popper

Rejection of the German imperial dignity by Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

The question of the demarcation and form of government of the German nation state remained controversial until the end of the revolution. However, since the majority of the members of the all-German National Assembly wanted to include the princes in the new state order, the two German great powers Austria and Prussia played a key role. Thus, the question became more important if Austria according to the Greater German solution belong to Germany or the correspondingly small German solution should also be excluded. For the National Assembly, however, it was inconceivable to incorporate the non-German-speaking areas of the Habsburg Monarchy , such as Bohemia and Slovenia, into the German nation-state. This idea resulted in the fact that the regions outside Germany would only have remained connected to the rest of the Danube monarchy through a loose personal union, which in view of the separatist movements would have contributed de facto to the dissolution of the multi-ethnic state. The rejection from Vienna thus only allowed a small German solution under Prussian leadership. On March 28, 1849, the Frankfurt National Assembly elected Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Emperor of the Germans with 290 out of a total of 538 possible votes. However, on April 3, 1849, the monarch refused the imperial crown offered to him by an embassy because he did not want to be a ruler by the grace of the people and avoid a military confrontation with Austria.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Wolf Nitschke: Adolf Heinrich Graf v. Arnim-Boitzenburg (1803-1868). A political biography. Berlin 2004, p. 213.
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  3. Inventory number: pp. 1/8/22. Junfermann'sche Buchdruckerei. See Wilfried Reininghaus': catalog part In: Wilfried Reininghaus / Horst Conrad (ed.): For freedom and law. Westphalia and Lippe in the Revolution 1848/49 (book accompanying the exhibition "For Freedom and Law"), Münster 1999, pp. 141–280, here p. 167.
  4. Wolfgang J. Mommsen : 1848 - The unwanted revolution: The revolutionary movements in Europe 1830-1849. Fischer, Berlin 2000, p. 31.
  5. Christian Jansen : Vormärz and social unrest. In: Karl Marx 1818–1883: Life. Plant. Time. Theiss, Stuttgart 2018, p. 75.
  6. David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, pp. 275-276.
  7. ^ Peter Krüger : European-Christian order as an answer to the crisis of the state system in the middle of the 19th century . In: Peter Krüger, Julius H. Schoeps (ed.): The misunderstood monarch. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In his time. Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, Potsdam 1997, pp. 181–218, here p. 199.
  8. Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, p. 483.
  9. ^ Frank-Lothar Kroll: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the state thinking of the romantic. Spiess, Berlin 1990, p. 152.
  10. Wolfgang J. Mommsen: 1848 - The unwanted revolution: The revolutionary movements in Europe 1830-1849. Fischer, Berlin 2000, p. 72.
  11. David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, p. 87.
  12. ^ Peter Krüger: European-Christian order as an answer to the crisis of the state system in the middle of the 19th century . In: Peter Krüger, Julius H. Schoeps (ed.): The misunderstood monarch. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In his time. Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, Potsdam 1997, pp. 181–218, here p. 199.
  13. Dirk Blasius : Friedrich Wilhelm IV., 1795–1861: Psychopathology and History. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, pp. 122-123.
  14. ^ Wolf Nitschke: Adolf Heinrich Graf v. Arnim-Boitzenburg (1803-1868). A political biography. Berlin 2004, p. 213.
  15. David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, p. 222.
  16. David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, p. 218.
  17. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, p. 211.
  18. David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, pp. 217-218.
  19. Peter Krüger: European-Christian order as an answer to the crisis of the state system in the middle of the 19th century In: Peter Krüger, Julius H. Schoeps (Ed.): The misunderstood Monarch. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In his time . Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, Potsdam 1997, pp. 181–218, here p. 198.
  20. Walter Grab (Ed.): The Revolution of 1848/49. A documentation. 131 documents and a timetable. Nymphenburger Verlag, Munich 1980, p. 59.
  21. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann : Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, p. 122.
  22. Christopher Clark: Prussia: Rise and Fall 1600-1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, p. 560.
  23. Jörg Echternkamp: The rise of German nationalism (1770-1840). Campus. Frankfurt am Main / New York 1998, p. 217.
  24. Peter Brandt : The Wars of Liberation from 1813 to 1815 in German history. In: On the threshold of modernity. Germany around 1800. Research institute of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Historical Research Center, Bonn 1999, p. 99.
  25. Walter Grab (Ed.): The Revolution of 1848/49. A documentation. 131 documents and a timetable. Nymphenburger Verlag, Munich 1980, p. 59.
  26. Dirk Blasius : Friedrich Wilhelm IV., 1795–1861: Psychopathology and History. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 129.
  27. ^ Frank-Lothar Kroll: The all-German unity of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In the crisis year 1848. In: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the state thinking of the romantic. Spiess, Berlin 1990, p. 128.
  28. ^ Frank-Lothar Kroll: The all-German unity of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In the crisis year 1848. In: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the state thinking of the romantic. Spiess, Berlin 1990, p. 130.
  29. Walter Grab (Ed.): The Revolution of 1848/49. A documentation. 131 documents and a timetable. Nymphenburger Verlag, Munich 1980, p. 59.
  30. Dirk Blasius: Friedrich Wilhelm IV., 1795–1861: Psychopathology and History. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 129.
  31. ^ Heinrich August Winkler : The long way to the west: German history from the end of the Old Empire to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 103.
  32. ^ Walter Bußmann: Between Prussia and Germany. Friedrich Wilhelm IV .: A biography. Siedler, Munich 1996, p. 295.
  33. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, p. 671.
  34. ^ Anselm Doering-Manteuffel: From the Vienna Congress to the Paris Conference. England, the German Question and the System of Power 1815–1856. Vandenhoeck, Göttingen 1991, p. 74.
  35. Walter Grab (Ed.): The Revolution of 1848/49. A documentation. 131 documents and a time table, Nymphenburger Verlag. Munich 1980, p. 59.
  36. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, p. 291.
  37. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west: German history from the end of the Old Empire to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 103.
  38. ^ Frank-Lothar Kroll: The all-German unity of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In the crisis year 1848. In: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the state thinking of the romantic. Spiess, Berlin 1990, p. 129.
  39. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west: German history from the end of the Old Empire to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 103.
  40. ^ Bernhard Ruetz: The Prussian conservatism in the fight against unity and freedom. Duncker and Humblot, Berlin 2001, p. 78.
  41. ^ Bernhard Ruetz: The Prussian conservatism in the fight against unity and freedom. Duncker and Humblot, Berlin 2001, p. 78.
  42. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, p. 670.
  43. ^ Walter Bußmann: Between Prussia and Germany. Friedrich Wilhelm IV .: A biography. Siedler, Munich 1996, p. 302.
  44. Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, p. 570.
  45. ^ Dieter Langewiesche: Nation, nationalism and nation state in Germany and Europe. Beck, Munich 2000, p. 272.
  46. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, pp. 871-873.