Rhine crisis

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The Rhine Crisis of 1840 was a political crisis between France and Germany . It was triggered by demands from the French public for the Rhine border , which were raised after the diplomatic defeat of the government under Adolphe Thiers during the crisis in the Orient . The Rhine should be established as the natural border of France . In response, in several Member States of the flared German Confederation of nationalism on. On both sides of the Rhine, nationalist poems and Rhine songs were written, of which the best known today are Die Wacht am Rhein and the Lied der Deutschen . In historical research, the crisis is interpreted as the breakthrough of German nationalism into a mass movement . Politically, it was quickly settled after King Louis-Philippe I installed a more compromise government in October 1840.

prehistory

Orient crisis

The Ottoman Empire was further weakened by the Greek War of Independence and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828/29 . After the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II refused to appoint Mehemed Ali , the viceroy of Egypt , which was part of the Ottoman Empire , as governor in Syria , Egyptian troops occupied Palestine and Syria in 1831 and advanced as far as Anatolia in 1832 .

France had used the Turkish defeat in the Greek War of Independence to occupy Algeria in 1830 . It saw in Mehemed Ali an ideal ally and supported the Egyptian viceroy to finally break away from the suzerainty of Sultan Mahmud II. The aim of French policy was to turn Africa , which borders the Mediterranean , beyond Suez into a French sphere of influence.

When the Egyptian viceroy was able to win another war with the sultan in 1839 , this led to the oriental crisis of 1839–1841. Britain, Austria, and Prussia feared Russia would take advantage of a further weakening of its ally, the Ottoman Empire, to increase its influence in Constantinople and the Straits. Therefore they were just as hostile to Mehemed Ali's expansion of power as Russia, albeit for different motives. When France now rejected coercive measures by the great powers against the Egyptian pasha, the British foreign minister Lord Palmerston decided to teach him a lesson: the great powers would not accept his wishes as law. Great Britain, Russia , Prussia and Austria , in the preservation of fragile Ottoman Empire a better guarantee saw their interests as the disintegration of the Turkish rule, the incalculable risks would have involved, concluded on Palmerston's initiative on 15 July 1840 in London the quadripartite agreement for Pacified the Levant and forced France to give up support to Egypt.

French domestic politics

Domestically, the July Monarchy was in an unstable position at the end of the 1830s. The regime of King Louis-Philippe I had to deal from the right with the opposition of the Legitimists who wanted to bring the House of Bourbon back to the throne. It was also criticized from the left by Bonapartists and Republicans , who called for a more revolutionary orientation and a more resolute representation of French interests.

Adolphe Thiers. Original steel engraving by Luigi Calamatta , around 1840

Obvious cases of corruption made new elections to the Chamber of Deputies necessary, in which on March 2, 1839 the left-wing nationalist opposition had won a clear majority. The successor of the hapless Prime Minister Louis-Mathieu Molé was Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult in May 1839 , who, however, had to resign after nine months because of a conflict between King Louis-Philippe I and Parliament over a donation to Prince Louis Philippe . He was succeeded on March 1, 1840 by Adolphe Thiers. This resolute advocate of a stronger parliamentarization in France was considered to be the "epitome of the revolution" because of his leading role in the July Revolution and his historical works on the French Revolution and the Empire . In the chamber debate of January 13, 1840, he had clearly struck nationalist tones: If France put the motive of national honor in the foreground during the crisis in the Orient, revolutionary enthusiasm would return.

How heated the domestic political situation was was also shown in several attempts from left and right to overthrow the government: On May 2 and 13, 1839, the secret society Société des saisons of the French socialist Auguste Blanqui launched an uprising, which was quickly put down . On August 6, 1840, Louis Napoléon Bonaparte attempted an equally unsuccessful coup . On October 15, 1840, a left-wing worker attempted an assassination attempt on the king, which also failed.

Belgian-Luxembourg question

Another factor that helps explain the strong emotional reactions that showed up in the Rhine crisis was the final clarification of the Belgian-Luxembourg question in 1839: When Belgium separated from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Belgian Revolution in 1830 , Luxembourg had a member of the German Confederation, lost more than half of its national territory. This was enshrined in the so-called final treaty after Great Britain came closer to Russia , but there was still resistance in the German Confederation to the loss of territory.

course

The Rhine as the French eastern border 1806
Borders of the German Confederation around 1840

Demands for the Rhine border

In France, the four-power treaty that had come about without his knowledge was perceived as a new edition of the victorious coalition of 1814 . The foreign policy crisis turned into a nationalist storm of the public: People felt ignored and humiliated, there was talk of a “diplomatic Waterloo ”. Starting with the liberal newspaper Constitutionnel , which on August 1, 1840 called for an advance to the Rhine, an “ annexionist chauvinism ” spread that demanded compensation for the supposed shame: the Bonapartist Capitole presented himself on August 2, almost entirely Germany is only waiting for French intervention as an opportunity to get rid of its "petits despotes". The pro-government Courrier français threatened on August 5th with a war of extermination and an advance on the Rhine in the event of a Russian intervention in the Ottoman Empire . Similar demands were soon made by legitimist newspapers. As in the July Revolution of 1830, a revision of the treaties of 1815 and a reconquest of the Rhine border was called for : "You have to tear up the treaties of 1815 [...] On to the Rhine [...] Continue the national movement through the war".

In order not to let the indignation of the population grow into a threat to the monarchy, Prime Minister Thiers resorted to a bluff: he demonstrated his readiness for war by summoning reservists on August 5, 1840, issuing a government loan for armaments purposes and having Paris fortified. This only spurred the nationalist emotions in the country on: the government was dragged into mouthfulness, the socialist journalist Louis Blanc declared frankly: "What we need is a war, and to wage it, a revolutionary regime". The fact that on May 12, 1840, shortly before the outbreak of the crisis, it was decided to transfer the remains of Napoleon to Paris reinforced the impression that France was returning to the policy of expansion. Thiers hoped that Mehemed Ali would be able to hold out militarily in Syria, but this did not come true: the Egyptians had to withdraw from Syria in the autumn. The Prime Minister now planned to take military action in the Alps and on the Rhine and tried to convince the King not to rule out a war in his speech from the throne at the end of October. When he refused, Thiers resigned on October 20th.

German reactions

The German side responded in the same way with nationalistic excitement. A war psychosis or a “storm of Francophobia ” went through the German public, especially in the western states and in Bavaria. There were also calls to recapture Alsace and German Lorraine from France. Across all social strata, a spontaneous call was made to ward off the supposed national threat, and the national ideology first demonstrated its enormous integrative power . While the newspapers throughout the German Confederation agreed to reject the French claims, there were clear regional differences: the Baden press, for example, tended to try to be more moderate, the judgments in the national newspapers and those of the Rhine province were more severe . On the other hand, there were also papers that continued to advocate a common struggle between the “brother peoples” Germany and France against despotism . In some parts of the east of Germany, too, the francophobic nationalism triggered by the Rhine crisis was hardly noticeable. Nevertheless, the Rhine crisis is referred to as the "dawn of the Vormärz in the narrower sense": In the following years up to the revolution of 1848 the number of members in the various pre-political nationalist organizations ( gymnasts , choral societies , student progress movement , etc.) rose to around a quarter of a million .

Germania on the watch on the Rhine , painting by Lorenz Clasen , 1860

There was a real poet war between the French and the Germans. The "Rhine Song Movement" produced a wealth of nationally enthusiastic political casual poetry . Nikolaus Becker wrote his poem, set to music more than seventy times, You shouldn't have him, the free German Rhine . Max Schneckenburger wrote Die Wacht am Rhein , a national patriotic appeal to defend the Rhineland. Ernst Moritz Arndt once again called for war against France: “To the Rhine! Across the Rhine! All-Germany into France! ” Nikolaus Müller , who, as a former Jacobin in Mainz, was anything but Francophobic, has now published a collection of Germanic war songs. The revolutionary poet Georg Herwegh wrote his Rheinweinlied in exile in Switzerland in October 1840 : “Skin, brothers, brave! The old father Rhine, the Rhine should remain German. "

The song of the Germans , the third stanza of which is the German national anthem , was also composed under the influence of the French demands. Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben wrote it on August 26, 1841 on Heligoland . Unlike Becker, Schneckenburger and Arndt, he was by no means Francophobic; he was hostile to the “Rhineland epidemic”. He left the Rhine unmentioned.

In German political journalism, “German” and “French freedom” were now widely understood as opposites. This was associated with disorder, foreign rule and social redistribution, while the former was understood as the way on which the desired national unity could be won. The Kölnische Zeitung wrote on August 26, 1840:

“Not for robbery, not for anarchy , not for a new distribution of all property, not for the community of women […] she [the German youth] craves. She wants nothing but victory, and through victory she will win peace and glory. She wants to fight the last battle of the nations of the new civilization, so that each nation is assigned its position. "

The liberal Karl Biedermann demanded in 1842 that one must “finally understand that political freedom is not an end but a means, that [...] in order to form a free nation, a nation must first exist and that this can be achieved through the mere struggle for Constitutional forms could never be brought into being. ”We vote against that of Arnold Ruge , who complained in April 1840 about the“ stock German direction ”, which feared“ nothing but horror and ruin ”from France, remained the exception.

It was also argued that the mistake had been made at the Congress of Vienna to forego a significant downsizing of France. This will take bitter revenge in the next war, which is why a corresponding correction must be implemented in a future peace agreement. Therefore, in the years after 1840, there were repeated arguments about annexing the entire fortress system on France's eastern border or all of Switzerland in order to maintain security from the neighbors.

The aggressive tones from Germany were perceived in France with disappointment, worry or anger. The German-friendly Saint-René Taillandier complained of "challenges, slander and insult". The poet Alphonse de Lamartine presented a Marseillaise de la paix . The romantic Alfred de Musset answered Becker's war song in 1841 with the combative Le rhin allemand . Edgar Quinet presented lyrical warning calls with Le Rhin and La teutomanie in 1841. In Le Rhin in 1842, Victor Hugo spoke out in an apparently conciliatory way for a close and friendly relationship between Germany and France, but whose border should be the Rhine: He too spoke in favor of annexing the Rhineland.

Politics also became active. The new Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. , Who had only ascended the throne on June 7, 1840, was briefly infected by the enthusiasm. On January 10, 1841, he wrote to the Austrian State Chancellor Klemens Wenzel Lothar von Metternich that the current national upswing should be used to make “Germany [...] more powerful than ever”. Austria should "put its mighty advice into the scales so that the probably non-recurring elevation of the feeling of princes and the people is made blessing and successful for the near future and thus also for the more distant future of Germany". In his answer of April 1841, however, the conservative Metternich was averse to changing the German Confederation. Specifically, Friedrich Wilhelm proposed to the German Confederation to enlarge the federal army and arm the federal fortresses. Its bill was accepted by the Bundestag in June 1841 . The federal fortresses of Mainz , Ulm and Rastatt were expanded considerably, and the Kingdom of Bavaria pushed ahead with the construction of the Germersheim fortress . The Bavarian King Ludwig I even hoped for a war in which Strasbourg , annexed by France in 1697 , could be recaptured. Prussia and Austria agreed a military union in the event of a French attack. This cooperation between the two great German powers raised false hopes among supporters of the national movement that it would be perpetuated, which would result in German unity. Since both conservative powers had no interest in worsening the crisis, they left it at that: The armament originally planned by Prussia and the reform of the Federal War Constitution were not carried out.

consequences

Before the Rhine crisis could escalate into a war, Louis-Philippe adopted a policy of appeasement after Thiers' resignation : the new cabinet under Prime Minister Soult with Foreign Minister François Guizot sought a conciliatory policy. It clearly rejected the nationalist agitation in the country and declared its interest in restoring the concert of the great powers . Just one year later, with the Dardanelles Treaty, the straits issue could be settled amicably between all five great powers. The Rhine Crisis also had no lasting effects on the cultural relations between the two countries: it neither diminished the admiration of French intellectuals for Germany, nor did it withdraw their exile in Paris from the German socialists persecuted by the political police.

The effect of the Rhine Crisis was more lasting in the history of the German national movement: with it, nationalism, which until then had been an elite event with limited personnel in Germany, established itself as a mass movement for the first time. From now on, the idea of ​​the nation state, although it remained an opposition ideology until 1871, according to historian Bernd Schönemann , “could no longer be contained or even suppressed”. Heinrich Heine wrote in 1854 that “at that time Thiers drummed our fatherland into the great movement which aroused political life in Germany; Thiers got us back on our feet as a people. ” Heinrich von Treitschke later wrote that in the Rhine crisis“ the Germans became one for the first time despite the political fragmentation ”.

The historian Reiner Marcowitz believes that the French demand for the Rhine border "had a similar catalytic function to the development of the German unified state concept as the" Wars of Liberation "". Christian Jansen sees the Rhine crisis, alongside the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and organized mass nationalism on the eve of World War I, as the first of three high points of the nationalist movement in Germany.

For Wolfgang Hardtwig it is the turning point from a modernizing , civic nationalism , which was designed to expand participation , to a socially defensive nationalism that started out from a cultural or people nation . According to Theodor Schieder , with the Rhine Crisis against France, national sentiments also penetrated liberal layers in Germany and set the tone there for a long time. According to Harald Biermann , France was finally established as Germany's "hereditary enemy" during the Rhine crisis .

Heinrich August Winkler , on the other hand, sees the effect of the Rhine crisis on the German liberals in a rapprochement with the previously ostracized Prussia:

"The Franco-German confrontation taught moderate liberalism that the German question was primarily a question of power that could only be resolved in cooperation with the undoubtedly German great power Prussia"

According to Frank Lorenz Müller , the Rhine crisis contributed to a climate of opinion in Germany that drew imperialist consequences from the threat from France and Russia and the envy of British overseas successes : This is the cause of the demands for a German colonial economy , for a German fleet and German settlement colonies , as they were raised in the revolution of 1848/49.

literature

  • Wolf D. Gruner: The German Confederation, the German constitutional states and the Rhine crisis of 1840. Considerations on the German dimension of a European crisis. In: Journal for Bavarian State History , No. 53 (1990), pp. 51-78 ( online ).
  • Frank Lorenz Müller : The dream of world power. Imperialist goals in the German national movement from the Rhine crisis to the end of the Paulskirche. In: Yearbook of the Hambach Society , 6 (1996/97), pp. 99-183.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 32; Reiner Marcowitz : great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . (= Supplement to Francia 53). Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 978-3-7995-7447-1 , pp. 152-157 ( online ).
  2. ↑ Reiner Marcowitz: Great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 175 ( online ).
  3. ↑ Gilbert Ziebura : "France from the Great Revolution to the fall of Napoleon III." In: Theodor Schieder (Ed.): "Handbook of European History, Vol. 5, Europe from the French Revolution to the national movements of the 19th century" . Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1968, p. 274 f .: Reiner Marcowitz: Great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 158 f. ( online , here are the quotes).
  4. ↑ Gilbert Ziebura: "France from the Great Revolution to the fall of Napoleon III." In: Theodor Schieder (Ed.): "Handbook of European History, Vol. 5, Europe from the French Revolution to the national movements of the 19th century" . Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1968, p. 274 f.
  5. ↑ Wolf D. Gruner: The German Confederation, the German Constitutional States and the Rhine Crisis of 1840. Considerations on the German dimension of a European crisis. In: Journal for Bavarian State History , 53 (1990), pp. 51–78, here p. 54.
  6. ^ Heinrich Lutz : Between Habsburg and Prussia. Germany 1815–1866 . Siedler, Berlin 1994, p. 200 (here the quote); Reiner Marcowitz: great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 161 ( online ).
  7. ^ A b Hans-Ulrich Wehler : German history of society. Second volume: From the reform era to the industrial and political “German double revolution” 1815–1845 / 1849 . CH Beck, Munich 1987, p. 398.
  8. ↑ Reiner Marcowitz: Great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 161 ( online ).
  9. ↑ Quoted from Heinrich Lutz: Between Habsburg and Prussia. Germany 1815–1866 . Siedler, Berlin 1994, p. 201.
  10. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 32 f.
  11. ^ Gilbert Ziebura: France from the Great Revolution to the fall of Napoleon III. In: Theodor Schieder (Ed.): Handbuch der Europäische Geschichte, Vol. 5, Europe from the French Revolution to the national movements of the 19th century . Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1968, p. 275.
  12. ↑ Reiner Marcowitz: Great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 162 ( online )
  13. ^ A b Gordon A. Craig : History of Europe 1815–1980. From the Congress of Vienna to the present . CH Beck, Munich 1984, p. 63.
  14. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 33 f.
  15. ↑ a b Ute Planert : Role model or enemy image? The Age of Napoleon in the memory of the 19th and 20th centuries . In: Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte / European History Yearbook 14 (2013), p. 21 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  16. ^ Christian Pletzing: From the spring of nations to the national conflict. German and Polish nationalism in East and West Prussia 1830–1871 . Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2003, p. 96 f.
  17. ↑ Wolfgang Hardtwig : From elite consciousness to mass movement. Early forms of nationalism in Germany 1500–1840. In: the same: Nationalism and civil culture in Germany 1500-1914. Selected essays. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1994, p. 48 f.
  18. ^ Roland Alexander Ißler: Father Rhine and mother Europe. To exchange battle cries, hits and chansons between France and Germany . In: Lied und popular Kultur / Song and Popular Culture 57 (2012), p. 111–141, here p. 119 f.
  19. ↑ Quoted from Hans-Ulrich Wehler: Deutsche Gesellschaftgeschichte. Second volume: From the reform era to the industrial and political “German double revolution” 1815–1845 / 1849 . CH Beck, Munich 1987, p. 399.
  20. ↑ Georg Herwegh: Gedichte eines Lebendigen (Volume 1) - Chapter 45 , online on Projekt Gutenberg-DE , accessed on May 2, 2019, quoted by Johannes Fried : Die Deutschen. An autobiography . CH Beck, Munich 2018, p. 139.
  21. ↑ Wolf D. Gruner: The German Confederation, the German Constitutional States and the Rhine Crisis of 1840. Considerations on the German dimension of a European crisis. In: Journal for Bavarian State History , 53 (1990), pp. 51–78, here p. 52.
  22. ^ Roland Alexander Ißler: Father Rhine and mother Europe. To exchange battle cries, hits and chansons between France and Germany . In: Lied und popular Kultur / Song and Popular Culture 57 (2012), pp. 111–141, here p. 118.
  23. ↑ Wolfgang Hardtwig: From elite consciousness to mass movement. Early forms of nationalism in Germany 1500–1840. In: the same: Nationalism and civil culture in Germany 1500-1914. Selected essays. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1994, p. 51 f.
  24. ↑ Wolfgang Hardtwig: From elite consciousness to mass movement. Early forms of nationalism in Germany 1500–1840. In: the same: Nationalism and civil culture in Germany 1500-1914. Selected essays. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1994, p. 51 f.
  25. ↑ Thomas Müller: Imagined West. The concept of the "German western area" in the national discourse between political romanticism and national socialism . transcript, Bielefeld 2015, ISBN 978-3-8394-1112-4 , pp. 21, 67-77 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  26. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 34 fM Roland Alexander Ißler: Father Rhine and mother Europe. To exchange battle cries, hits and chansons between France and Germany . In: Lied und popular Kultur / Song and Popular Culture 57 (2012), pp. 111–141, here pp. 136 ff.
  27. ↑ Dirk Blasius : Friedrich Wilhelm IV., 1795–1861: Psychopathology and History. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, 97 f.
  28. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 33.
  29. ↑ a b Theodor Schieder: From the German Confederation to the German Empire. (= " Gebhardt. Handbook of German History ", Vol. 15.) dtv, Munich 1975, p. 64.
  30. ↑ Wolfgang Hardtwig: From elite consciousness to mass movement. Early forms of nationalism in Germany 1500–1840. In: the same: Nationalism and civil culture in Germany 1500-1914. Selected essays. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1994, p. 53.
  31. ^ Ilja Mieck : Prussia from 1807 to 1850. Reforms, restoration and revolution . In: Otto Büsch (Hrsg.): Handbook of Prussian History, Vol. 2: The 19th century and major themes in the history of Prussia . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, ISBN 978-3-11-083957-9 , p. 167 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  32. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 34; Reiner Marcowitz: great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 163 ff. ( Online on Perspektiveia net ).
  33. ^ Ilja Mieck: Prussia from 1807 to 1850. Reforms, restoration and revolution . In: Otto Büsch (Hrsg.): Handbook of Prussian History, Vol. 2: The 19th century and major themes in the history of Prussia . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, ISBN 978-3-11-083957-9 , p. 166 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  34. ^ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. CH Beck, Munich 1982, p. 35.
  35. ↑ Wolfgang Hardtwig: From elite consciousness to mass movement. Early forms of nationalism in Germany 1500–1840. In: the same: Nationalism and civil culture in Germany 1500-1914. Selected essays. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1994, p. 49; Reiner Marcowitz: great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 169 ( online ); Frank Lorenz Müller : Britain and the German Question. Perceptions of Nationalism and Political Reform, 1830–1863 . Palgrave, Houndmills 2002, p. 42; Christian Jansen with Henning Borggräfe: Nation - Nationality - Nationalism. Campus, Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 75.
  36. ↑ Bernd Schönemann: People, Nation, Nationalism, Mass. In: Otto Brunner , Werner Conze , Reinhart Koselleck (eds.): Basic historical concepts . Historical lexicon on political and social language in Germany. Volume 7, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1992, p. 348.
  37. ^ Heinrich Heine: Lutetia. Reports on politics, art and popular life. ( online at zeno.org , accessed on March 29, 2017), quoted by Johannes Fried: Die Deutschen. An autobiography . CH Beck, Munich 2018, p. 141.
  38. ↑ Reiner Marcowitz: Great power on probation. The interdependence of French domestic and foreign policy and its effects on France's position in the European concert 1814 / 15–1851 / 52 . Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, p. 168 ( online )
  39. ↑ Christian Jansen with Henning Borggräfe: Nation - Nationality - nationalism. Campus, Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 75.
  40. ↑ Wolfgang Hardtwig: From elite consciousness to mass movement. Early forms of nationalism in Germany 1500–1840. In: the same: Nationalism and civil culture in Germany 1500-1914. Selected essays. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1994, pp. 37 and 49.
  41. ↑ Harald Biermann: Myth History. The invention of the German nation in the 19th century. In: Otto Depenheuer (ed.): Myth as fate. What constitutes the constitution? VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2009, p. 76.
  42. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west , Vol. 1: German history from the end of the Old Empire to the fall of the Weimar Republic . CH Beck, Munich 2000, p. 88.
  43. ^ Frank Lorenz Müller: Imperialist Ambitions in Vormärz and Revolutionary Germany. The Agitation for German Settlement Colonies Overseas, 1840-1849. In: German History 17, Heft 3, (1999) pp. 346–368, here pp. 347 f.