Ford action

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Head of the company newspaper Tatsachen der Ford-Werke AG, Cologne. Issue 24 from 1964.
Month of publication probably June 1964. Filed in the Archive of Social Democracy ( Bonn ), call number 5 / IGMA45420228 (Alois Wöhrle estate)

The Ford action was a campaign by IG Metall to gain members within the workforce of the Ford works in Cologne from 1960 to 1966. Hans Matthöfer , then an education expert for this union, was the spiritus rector of this action until August 1964 not only his view, the trade union organization level should be increased at Ford, but also inspiration for a company-related union policy. He specifically involved young sociologists and members of the Socialist German Student Union (SDS) in the campaign. It failed because of the reaction of the Ford management and internal trade union contradictions.

prehistory

Initial situation at Ford

In 1960, only five percent of the workers and two percent of the employees at Ford in Cologne-Niehl were members of IG Metall. Because of this extraordinarily weak level of organization, Ford was regarded in the union as "cancer damage for the trade union movement in the Cologne area", because the workforce - Ford employed around 20,000 people at the time - was the worst organized here in comparison with other large companies in the West German metal industry.

Ford was not a member of the relevant employers' association , which is why there were no area collective agreements . Wages and working conditions were fixed in works agreements between the management and the Ford works council . Compared to collectively agreed wages, Ford paid significantly more, but this positive wage drift was legally less secure.

Main trade union action

At the end of 1960, IG Metall selected companies in various districts for so-called priority actions in order to improve the previously weak union organization and membership situation. Ford was one of these companies. The campaign was coordinated by the new IG Metall education expert, Hans Matthöfer.

The union hoped that key actions would not only improve the degree of organization in traditionally barely reached companies, but also increase the degree of organization in the metal industry as a whole. This has been declining since the early 1950s.

Ford and unions

Matthöfer had had excellent contacts with the United Automobile Workers (UAW) for a long time . In 1941, after a long struggle, this American union succeeded in organizing the Ford plant at the Dearborn headquarters near Detroit . If the Ford campaign had been successful, a lot could have been transferred to other companies - so the calculation. The company also stood for an epoch-making work organization: Fordism . Ford also expanded its market share in the expansive German automotive industry .

The contacts with the UAW went back to Matthöfer's stay in the USA . He had studied from August 1950 to June 1951 at the University of Wisconsin in Madison . The focus was on industrial relations as well as the theory and practice of the American unions. He had also come into contact with Max Shachtman's Independent Socialist League , a democratic socialist- oriented splinter party with influence in the UAW. In this way, Matthöfer had got to know the breadth of democratic socialism as well as the handling of unconventional ideas and practical possibilities for improving union work on site.

Company-oriented trade union policy

For Matthöfer Ford was interesting because the struggle for a company collective agreement could have been the start of a company-oriented union policy. In the dispute, he was concerned with the opportunity, even under difficult circumstances, to closely interlink a company-related collective bargaining policy, participation in the workplace and company-related educational work. The focus of the union work on company issues was crucial for him to give it new momentum. Looking back in 1968, Matthöfer said it should call on union members to get involved locally, especially in the company, so that the dangers of union bureaucratisation and crippling routines would be averted; the goal is a democratization of the situation. The question of power should not only be asked in companies, but also in the union itself. Decisions are made less by union boards and district heads, but rather in company bodies, such as company collective bargaining committees. At the grassroots level, it would be about activating trade unionists, recruiting new members, influencing working conditions and setting wages and salaries.

Central actors in this process should not primarily be the union shop stewards or works councils, but the so-called educational supervisors. These activists were trained in large numbers by the education department under Matthöfer's direction - in 1967 there were already 4,000 - and equipped with modern teaching materials. The learning should start with the current and everyday work experiences of the learners. With the help of these educational supervisors, it is promising to get stuck conflicts between companies and trade unions in motion through flexible and direct actions in companies. This will become a place of struggle, learning and change. Awareness-raising and commitment of the union members as well as overcoming a stagnation of class disputes perceived as a danger were aimed for. On the whole, it was a project to renew the unions from within. Matthöfer developed his considerations with recourse to military-strategic statements by Basil Liddell Hart and findings from West German industrial and company sociology , which had already found itself in the 1950s as a group of interested, empirically working sociologists and as a section of the German Society for Sociology .

execution

information gathering

Initially, little information was available about the specific working conditions and the working atmosphere at Ford. This resulted from the low level of union membership. There was also the hesitant, defensive position of the Cologne administration office of IG Metall, fearing for their influence, and the largely autonomous works council headed by Peter Görres, a charismatic old-style worker leader.

The information was collected through a subversive study on the working atmosphere. The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research received the order for this . In 1961, most of the Frankfurt sociology students belonging to the SDS were responsible for the implementation. 50 organized and 50 non-organized employees were questioned in semi-standardized in-house interviews. Manfred Teschner and Michael Schumann led the investigation and evaluated it.

Two central results emerged irrespective of the respondents' union membership: On the one hand, the pace of work was considered extremely stressful due to the high speed of the assembly line . It required a very high level of performance from the workers. On the other hand, the respondents criticized the arbitrariness of their superiors. The focus here was on “nose bonuses”, which the masters could arbitrarily grant or withdraw as performance bonuses . The interviews also revealed a surprisingly high level of willingness to join the union. The low degree of organization was obviously not related to the fact that Ford workers were satisfied and that unions were fundamentally superfluous. There was also widespread skepticism towards the works council, which lacks contact with the grassroots.

Company newspaper

At the beginning of 1961, Matthöfer launched a company newspaper, the facts . The title was based on the Ford Facts , the UAW organ for Ford employees. It followed the motto of the anarcho-syndicalist union Industrial Workers of the World : To Fan the Flames of Discontent (Eng . : to fan the flame of discontent ). Matthöfer worked as an editor , as a person responsible for press law (from 1963), as an editor and often also as an author for this newspaper. Facts , this collective organizer , was supposed to disseminate unions' arguments and information, encourage union membership, promote a company collective agreement, and destroy myths about Ford. These myths included the assertion that the rate of industrial accidents was below average at Ford. Facts refuted this claim with numbers and in this way stimulated a drastic reduction in the number of accidents through training and the use of safety officers . The medium took up the facts that led to particularly great dissatisfaction with the work. In order to address the many Catholics in the workforce, Matthöfer repeatedly made references to Catholic social teaching .

Covert Actions

Matthöfer had two supporters one after the other in the Cologne administrative office of IG Metall. Right at the beginning of the Ford campaign, the first, Theo Röhrig , managed to get a complete set of punched cards from the Ford workforce. Their evaluation and the comparison with Ford organization plans showed which employees had to be addressed when it came to key points in the production process , even in the event of strikes . The punch cards were also the basis for detailed files of the employees according to union membership, place of residence, gender, age group and origin. Röhrig's successor in the administrative department was Karl Krahn , a trained car mechanic , assembly line worker at Ford and later professor of industrial sociology at Bielefeld University . However, he was fired after criticizing the IG Metall representative of the Cologne district at a trade union meeting for his massive obstruction of the Ford action.

The most spectacular action was the collaboration of Günter Wallraff , at the beginning of his career. Through the mediation of Jakob Moneta , editor-in-chief of Metall and friend Matthöfers, he worked in the Ford paint shop and wrote several articles about it for Metall . Later compiled into a book with other reports, they achieved high print runs.

First successes

The number of union members increased, averaging 3,286 in 1962 and 4,002 in 1963. The circulation of the facts also increased. The activists gained increasing influence over the works council and shop stewards. In April 1963 the works council was re-elected and the activists prevailed. As new members, they filled 25 of 28 seats on this body, and in the elections the fact- backed candidates received the most votes. The new works council chairman was also one of the supporters of the Ford campaign.

Association membership of Ford and strike preparation

The next step in Ford’s campaign was to negotiate a company collective agreement. But before it was discussed for the first time between potential contract partners in October 1963 after long delays, Ford had joined the employers' association on May 1, 1963. The Ford management claimed that the working conditions, wages and salaries agreed in the collective agreement would apply. IG Metall, on the other hand, emphasized that the existing collective wage agreement did not contain any general wage conditions. From a trade union point of view, there is therefore no peace obligation . For a company-oriented company policy, Ford's entry into the employers' association was a step backwards, because tariff decisions were not made in the company itself, but rather outside the company. On the union side, the functionaries in the Cologne district administration and in the Frankfurt trade union board took over responsibility. The Ford action lost "its previous experimental leeway". The board of directors around Otto Brenner initially struck a sharp tone and threatened a strike if it did not come to negotiations on a company collective agreement. Matthöfer and his colleagues organized everything necessary to be prepared for such a labor dispute , which, from their point of view, should be waged in March or April 1964. With the help of a second survey carried out by infas in the spring of 1964, IG Metall was again informed about the mood among the workforce. The survey showed, among other things, the support for a company collective agreement and a high willingness to strike, both among IG Metall members and among unorganized people. Because talks with the employers did not take place, the union executive declared in May 1964 that the negotiations had failed. The strike vote was set for June 22nd.

Litigation and Compromise

The management of Ford under its American boss John S. Andrews responded with an injunction prohibiting the union from holding the ballot. The union's opposition was finally dismissed on June 26, 1964. The subsequent judicial clarification followed the prevailing opinion : Because the collective bargaining agreement applies to Ford, the union must adhere to the peace obligation, and ballots are not permitted.

The Cologne district manager of IG Metall proved to be the brake on any further initiative to come to a company collective agreement. In a top-level meeting with Gesamtmetall, the IG Metall board looked for a face-saving solution. It consisted of the following regulation: The union recognized the precedence of the collective bargaining agreement and also the peace obligation. In return, negotiations should be started immediately on a regulation for Ford that would supplement the collective agreement; the remuneration and working conditions should apply as an additional agreement to the area-wide collective agreement until a new area-wide collective agreement is superimposed on this additional agreement. This compromise also offered opportunities to reach a company collective agreement. The employer side, however, resisted anything that took on the appearance of this type of contract. More important, however, was the disagreement in the workers' camp: the Cologne district manager of IG Metall wanted little more than to secure the previous wage drift. The belt speed , bonus regulations or the organization of jumpers did not care much for him. Because of these discrepancies, no additional agreement to the area-wide collective agreement was reached. In the end, all that remained was a company agreement.

Results

Membership growth and committees

Hans Matthöfer withdrew from the leadership of the action in August 1964 because he had little influence on the events in Cologne. In 1966 he wrote the official final report. This made it clear that the number of union members had grown from 1,000 to 7,000, which meant an annual increase in income from membership fees of around half a million DM . The level of organization in the surrounding companies in the metal industry also increased because Ford traditionally had a high turnover . In retrospect, Karl Krahn's successes also included the establishment of a works council that wanted to tackle internal problems and grievances, as well as the now union-oriented shop stewards body.

Goals not achieved

The entry into the company-related trade union policy was not successful. Hans Matthöfer had set high goals for himself and his colleagues in May 1963: The standard of living of Ford workers was to increase through higher wages and more vacation ; working conditions should improve; wages should be fairer; participation in the workplace should be enforced; the accident rate should be reduced and occupational safety increased; A union density of 80 percent was aimed for; the cadre of shop stewards should include 800 men; a company-related collective agreement should be reached. Given this yardstick, the Ford campaign was unsuccessful.

Spanish echo

The campaign after Franco's death (1975) in Spain generated a distant echo . Under the direction of Carlos Pardo, one of Hans Matthöfer's supported socialists, Seat employees were recruited for the socialist union Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) based on the model of the Ford campaign from 1977 . The UGT outstripped the communist union Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO) in some of the Seat plants .

research

Critical considerations

In 1974, a year after the sensational wildcat strike at Ford , the three Frankfurt law students Volker Delp, Lothar Schmidt and Klaus Wohlfahrt grappled with the Ford campaign. They asked to what extent framework conditions had already been created by the Ford campaign, which almost a decade later meant that the Turkish workers striking at Ford were not supported by the shop stewards, the works council and IG Metall and were perceived by many German work colleagues as disruptors were. According to the thesis, the Ford action failed in the first half of the 1960s because there was an alliance between the IG Metall administration office in Cologne and the majority of the Frankfurt trade union board. These two groups had rejected a company-oriented trade union and collective bargaining policy and only used the latter as advertising promises to attract members. The students' contribution overlooked the differences between the Cologne district administration and the Frankfurt headquarters, which became apparent in the negotiations on a company collective agreement after the strike ballot was banned (end of June 1964). He also went on to believe that the shop stewards' body was corrupted after the Ford action . The complex internal trade union contradictions were “reduced to a basic-apparatus conflict” in this way.

Peter Birke dealt with the Ford action in a section of his dissertation published in 2007 on wildcat strikes in Germany and Denmark . It was a "head birth", the group around Matthöfer thought like traditional worker functionaries. Birke also addressed the relationship between IG Metall and Turkish guest workers . He sees it as one of the factors that led to the failure of the Ford campaign. The proportion of mostly Turkish workers in the workforce at the Ford plant in Cologne was already more than 30 percent in 1964; The concept chosen by the group around Matthöfer had remained powerless in view of this serious change within the workforce.

Social sciences and trade unions

Klaus Peter Wittemann, long-time employee at the Sociological Research Institute in Göttingen , dealt with the Ford campaign several times. Several essays dealt with the subject as early as the mid-1980s. In 1994 Wittemann presented a 300-page monograph . It was created as part of the “Industrial Sociology and IG Metall” project. It was part of the priority program of the German Research Foundation with the title “Interrelationships between social science results”. His contributions discussed the possibilities and limits of cooperation between trade unionists and left-wing social scientists . Wittemann viewed the Ford action as a case study for such an interaction, in which both sides showed great interest in the company, the place that shapes workers. For Wittemann, the essential thing was the use of the sociological knowledge acquired. The best case for him was when "the new knowledge enables the user to discover resources in the given conditions of action, with the help of which a changed practice is possible".

Wittemann measured the Ford action against the strategy developed by Matthöfer of actually mobilizing workers and union members as well as changing power in the company and society through a company-oriented trade union policy. With regard to these goals, he noted a failure.

Biographical classification

Matthöfer (right) with Georg Leber (1976), two trade unionists and SPD member of the Bundestag with constituencies in Frankfurt.

In his comprehensive biography of Hans Matthöfer, the economic historian Werner Abelshauser placed the Ford campaign in Matthöfer's life. Abelshauser pointed out that his protagonist was tackling three extensive projects at the same time at the end of 1960: the Ford campaign, the restructuring of the education system at IG Metall and his (successful) candidacy for a mandate for the German Bundestag . Matthöfer combined broad strategic considerations with detailed work in planning and implementing the campaign. Abelshauser also described the outcome of the Ford campaign as a defeat for Matthöfer, who, however, never admitted it. After the Ford campaign, Matthöfer dealt with other key activities, for example at VDO Adolf Schindling AG , at AEG and at Siemens . But even in these cases, which Matthöfer viewed as case studies for educational work, there were no successes that went well beyond the increased number of members.

attachment

literature

  • Werner Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. The trade unionist, politician and entrepreneur Hans Matthöfer . Dietz, Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-8012-4171-1 .
  • Peter Birke: Wild strikes in the economic miracle. Labor disputes, trade unions and social movements in the Federal Republic and Denmark . Campus, Frankfurt / New York 2007, ISBN 978-3-593-38444-3 .
  • Klaus Peter Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties . Schüren, Marburg 1994, ISBN 978-3-89472-108-4 .
  • Karl Krahn: The main action of IG Metall in the Ford works in Cologne from 1960–1966. In: Helmut Schmidt , Walter Hesselbach (ed.): Fighters without pathos. Festschrift for Hans Matthöfer on his 60th birthday on September 25, 1985 . Editor: Gerhard Beier . Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn 1985, ISBN 3-87831-414-0 , pp. 38-43.
  • Michael Schumann, Klaus Peter Wittemann: Company-oriented politics - almost forgotten attempt at a union offensive. In: Helmut Schmidt, Walter Hesselbach (ed.): Fighters without pathos. Festschrift for Hans Matthöfer on his 60th birthday on September 25, 1985 . Editor: Gerhard Beier. Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn 1985, ISBN 3-87831-414-0 , pp. 44-49.
  • Klaus Peter Wittemann: Industrial Sociology and IG Metall. On the relationship between “internal” and “external” social science. In: SOFI messages. No. 10, Göttingen 1984, pp. 22-28. (sofi-goettingen.de)
  • Volker Delp, Lothar Schmidt, Klaus Wohlfahrt: Trade union policy at Ford. In: Otto Jacobi, Walther Müller-Jentsch , Eberhard Schmidt (eds.): Unions and class struggle. Critical Yearbook '74 . Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt 1974, ISBN 3-436-01969-0 , pp. 161–175. (As Digitalisat again published on infopartisan.net , polling on April 24, 2019.)

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Hans Matthöfer, quoted from W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 141.
  2. ^ K. Krahn: The main action. 1985, p. 38.
  3. ↑ a b W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 141.
  4. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 131 and p. 140.
  5. ^ V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Trade union company policy at Ford. 1974, p. 161. KP Wittemann: Industrial sociology and IG Metall. On the relationship between “internal” and “external” social science. 1984, p. 23. KP Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 43 f.
  6. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 142.
  7. ↑ P. Birke: Wild strikes in the economic miracle. 2007, p. 162.
  8. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 692.
  9. ↑ On this W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, pp. 72-79.
  10. ↑ See the brief description in the IG Metall shop steward's handbook (1964), quoted by KP Wittemann: Industriesoziologie und IG Metall. On the relationship between “internal” and “external” social science. 1984, p. 24.
  11. ^ K. Krahn: The main action. 1985, p. 42.
  12. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 133.
  13. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 138.
  14. ↑ P. Birke: Wild strikes in the economic miracle. 2007, p. 164 f.
  15. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, pp. 131-137.
  16. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 42.
  17. ^ Basil Liddell Hart: Strategy . Translated from English by Horst Jordan . Rheinische Verlags-Anstalt, Wiesbaden 1955. On the reception of Liddell Hart by Matthöfer see KP Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, pp. 96-98 and pp. 102-104.
  18. ↑ M. Schumann, KP Wittemann: Business- oriented politics - almost forgotten attempt at a union offensive. 1985, p. 44 f.
  19. ↑ See Ludwig von Friedeburg : Cooperation and Competition. Industrial sociological research in the West German post-war period. (PDF; 44 kB) In: SOFI-Mitteilungen No. 25. Göttingen, 1997, pp. 25–31 , accessed on November 14, 2019 . Furthermore: Margit Weihrich, Wolfgang Dunkel: Industrial sociology between subject and structure reference: In conversation with Burkart Lutz. (PDF; 74 kB) In: Work and industrial sociological studies. Vol. 2, Issue 1, June 2009, pp. 5–18 , accessed on November 14, 2019 .
  20. ↑ M. Schumann, KP Wittemann: Business- oriented politics - almost forgotten attempt at a union offensive. 1985, p. 46. V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Union business policy at Ford. 1974, p. 163. W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 142 f.
  21. ↑ So the term in M. Schumann, KP Wittemann: Betriebsnahe Politik - almost forgotten attempt at a union offensive. 1985, p. 47.
  22. ↑ a b M. Schumann, KP Wittemann: Business- oriented politics - almost forgotten attempt at a union offensive. 1985, p. 47.
  23. ↑ a b W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 143.
  24. ↑ P. Birke: Wild strikes in the economic miracle. 2007, p. 165.
  25. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, pp. 156-158.
  26. ^ K. Krahn: The main action. 1985, p. 39.
  27. ↑ V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Union business policy at Ford. 1974, p. 163.
  28. ↑ Details of the survey results at KP Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, pp. 158-174.
  29. ^ To this KP Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, pp. 174-180.
  30. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 144. Abelshauser alludes to a word by Lenin. See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin : How to Start? In: Iskra . No. 4, May 1901. Contained in Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin: Werke , Volume 5 , Dietz, Berlin (Ost) 1955, pp. 1–13, here p. 11.
  31. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, pp. 144-146.
  32. ↑ V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Union business policy at Ford. 1974, p. 164.
  33. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 146 f.
  34. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 208.
  35. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 147.
  36. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 233 f.
  37. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 147 f.
  38. ↑ For the contents of the corresponding union draft, see K. Krahn: The focus action. 1985, p. 39.
  39. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 199.
  40. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 211.
  41. ↑ P. Birke: Wild strikes in the economic miracle. 2007, p. 166.
  42. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 149 f.
  43. ^ IG Metall: Front against Ford. In: Der Spiegel 23/1964. June 3, 1964, pp. 41-42 , accessed May 3, 2019 .
  44. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 150.
  45. ↑ This so-called Reinhartshausen recommendation is printed by KP Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 220.
  46. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, pp. 150-152.
  47. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 153.
  48. ^ K. Krahn: The main action. 1985, p. 41.
  49. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 154.
  50. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 155.
  51. ↑ a b M. Schumann, KP Wittemann: Business- oriented politics - almost forgotten attempt at a union offensive. 1985, p. 48.
  52. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 239. Antonio Muñoz Sánchez: Solidaridad alemana con la UGT, año 1977. In: Manuela Aroca, Rubén Vega (ed.): Análisis históricos del sindicalismo en España. Del franquismo a la estabilidad democrática (1970-1994) . Fundación Francisco Largo Caballero, Madrid 2013, ISBN 978-84-86716-49-3 , pp. 47-62, here pp. 59 f.
  53. ↑ See the information on the authors of Unions and Class Struggle. Critical Yearbook '74. P. 320.
  54. ^ V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Union business policy at Ford . 1974.
  55. ^ To this KP Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 221 f. Furthermore W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 152.
  56. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 226.
  57. ↑ P. Birke: Wild strikes in the economic miracle. 2007, p. 167 f.
  58. ↑ See the information on the scientist's website , accessed on May 3, 2019.
  59. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 7.
  60. ↑ Frank Seiß: Book review: Ford - they do something. A union activation concept in the 1960s. In: revue regional. No. 3, Göttingen 1995, p. 42 f. (Digitized version)
  61. ^ KP Wittemann: Ford action. On the relationship between industrial sociology and IG Metall in the sixties. 1994, p. 235.
  62. ↑ See the review by Nils Minkmar in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung on May 10, 2009 and the review by Andreas Rödder in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on August 27, 2009.
  63. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 140.
  64. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 140, p. 143 f. and p. 150.
  65. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, p. 155.
  66. ^ W. Abelshauser: After the economic miracle. 2009, pp. 156-158.
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