Secret meeting of February 20, 1933

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The place of the meeting - the Reichstag Presidential Palace (2008)

The secret meeting of February 20, 1933 was a meeting of Adolf Hitler after the seizure of power with 27 industrialists in Hermann Göring's official residence in the Reichstag Presidential Palace to finance the NSDAP's election campaign in the Reichstag elections of March 5, 1933 .

At this meeting, for the current election campaign for the Reichstag election, with which the NSDAP wanted to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority for the Enabling Act together with the black-white-red campaign and which was to prove to be the last multi-party Reichstag election of the German Reich , an electoral fund of three Millions of Reichsmarks for the NSDAP and the black-white-red battle front decided, of which around two million demonstrably came in as payment. 75% of the sum went to the NSDAP. Two weeks earlier, Hitler had given a speech to the Reichswehr leadership.

Attendees

The organizer of the meeting: Hjalmar Schacht (1931)

The following business representatives attended the meeting:

  1. Hjalmar Schacht , former and future President of the Reichsbank
  2. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach , Chairman of the Presidium of the Reich Association of German Industry
  3. Albert Vögler , first chairman of the board of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG
  4. Fritz Springorum , Hoesch AG
  5. Ernst Tengelmann , CEO of Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG
  6. August Rosterg , General Director of Wintershall AG
  7. Ernst Brandi , chairman of the mining association
  8. Karl Büren , General Director of Brown Coal and Briquette Industry AG , member of the board of the Association of German Employers' Associations
  9. Günther Heubel , General Director of C. Th. Heye Braunkohlenwerke AG, board member of the "Association of German Employers' Associations"
  10. Georg von Schnitzler , board member of IG Farben
  11. Hugo Stinnes junior , board member of the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie , member of the supervisory board of the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlen-Syndikats
  12. Eduard Schulte , general director of Giesches Erben, zinc and mining company , later resistance worker
  13. Fritz von Opel , board member of Adam Opel AG
  14. Ludwig von Winterfeld , board member of Siemens & Halske AG and Siemens-Schuckert-Werke AG
  15. Wolf-Dietrich von Witzleben , head of the office of Carl Friedrich von Siemens
  16. Wolfgang Reuter , General Director of Demag , Chairman of the Association of German Mechanical Engineering Institutions, Presidential Member of the Reich Association of German Industry
  17. Günther Quandt , large industrialist, later military economic leader due to his support for the regime .
  18. August Diehn , board member of Wintershall AG
  19. Hans von und zu Löwenstein , executive board member of the mining association
  20. Ludwig Grauert , managing director of the employers' association of the Northwestern Group of the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists
  21. Friedrich Flick
  22. Kurt Schmitt , board member of Allianz AG
  23. August von Finck , was on numerous supervisory boards and specialist bodies
  24. Erich Fickler , general director of Harpener Bergbau AG , chairman of the supervisory board of the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlen-Syndikats , board member of the RDI , member of various supervisory boards
  25. Paul Stein , Chairman and General Manager of the Auguste Victoria Colliery Union in Marl- Hüls and member of the IG Farben board of directors
  26. Herbert Kauert, board member of Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG

The participants were invited by Hermann Göring . According to the historian Alfred Kube, Göring invited representatives of German industry to his place on February 13, 1933 to prepare the ground for the meeting. As one handed down telegram to Krupp has on 16 February 1933 he invited Krupp for the February 20, 1933 at 18 o'clock in the Reichstag President's Palace one. The purpose stated was that Hitler wanted to explain his policy. According to Hjalmar Schacht, Göring and his adjutant had drawn up the list of those to be invited. According to Schacht, “almost all the men in German industry from all sectors were represented” and he was not aware of anyone who did not accept the invitation.

In a letter signed by Krupp, Ludwig Kastl and Jacob Herle on February 18 to the members of the Presidium, the Board of Directors, the Main Committee and the specialist groups, the Reich Association of German Industry informed its leading members about the meeting and announced "with all the energy for it to advocate that the economic policy of the new government takes into account the necessities of life and justified demands of industry ”and“ to leave no opportunity unused in order to successfully maintain our position ”. He recalled the duty of its members to “work for the establishment of a stable foundation of government and the implementation of a national gathering and concentration of all constructive forces”, but left the “practical conclusions from this general principle” to the “sense of responsibility of every individual industrialist”.

The invited Paul Reusch did not take part; he stated that he was on a trip abroad. Carl Friedrich von Siemens flatly declined the invitation. Robert Bosch rejected the invitation in a letter to Wilhelm Keppler on the grounds that he could only get to the meeting in time by plane, with his sleep impaired, which he could no longer expect at his age.

procedure

After an extensive report from the informant Martin Blank to Paul Reusch , Hermann Göring appeared 15 minutes late on February 20, accompanied by Walther Funk, and gave a short speech in which he pointed out the importance of the ongoing election campaign. Then Hitler appeared accompanied by his adjutant Dr. Wagner, shook hands with everyone gathered and took a seat at the top of the table. In a one-and-a-half hour free speech he professed private property , extolled the superiority of the dictatorship over democracy and claimed that the NSDAP was the only way to save from the communist danger. The basis of the NSDAP is the Volkish idea and the idea of ​​defensibility. Life is a continuing struggle that only a well-defended people can endure and only a well-defended nation can have a flourishing economy.

In his speech, Hitler declared that democracy was to blame for the rise of communism. A recording of his speech found in Krupp's personal files states:

“Today we are faced with the following situation: Weimar has imposed a certain constitutional form on us, with which we have been placed on a democratic basis. However, this did not give us effective governance. On the contrary, after what I criticized democracy at the beginning, communism had to drill deeper and deeper into the people. "

Then Hitler declared that he needed all of the state's means of power to overthrow communism:

“We must first get hold of all the means of power if we want to throw the other side to the ground. […] We have to win 10 more seats in Prussia [note: simultaneous state elections ] and 33 more seats in the Reich. If we use all our resources, that is not impossible. Then the second action against communism begins. "

After Hitler's speech, Krupp expressed his gratitude to those involved and particularly emphasized the commitment to private property and defenselessness. After that, Hitler left the meeting. Goering gave a short speech in which he pointed out that the NSDAP's coffers were empty and asked the gentlemen present to help. The cabinet decided unanimously not to finance the election campaign from public funds. Then Goering left the meeting and Hjalmar Schacht spoke. According to Louis P. Lochner , Schacht is said to have said: "And now, gentlemen, to the cash register!" Schacht called for three million Reichsmarks to be raised. As a key he specified:

  • 1,000,000 Reichsmarks - Western coal and iron industry
  • 500,000 Reichsmarks - chemical industry
  • 500,000 Reichsmarks - Potash mining
  • 500,000 Reichsmarks - lignite
  • 100,000 Reichsmarks - automotive industry
  • 100,000 Reichsmarks - mechanical engineering
  • 300,000 Reichsmarks - electrical engineering

Blank notes that 1 million Reichsmarks were immediately committed by the western coal and iron industry, 100,000 Reichsmarks for mechanical engineering by Wolfgang Reuter and 100,000 Reichsmarks by Siemens. No commitment has yet been made for the 500,000 Reichsmarks of the chemical industry. According to Fritz Springorum , Vögler, Krupp, Fickler, Tengelmann, Löwenstein, Brandi and he agreed to try to collect the 1 million Reichsmarks, but in which case “all services would have to be paid for”. Originally Schacht wanted to distribute the donations himself, but at the suggestion of Springorum, the distribution key 75% NSDAP and 25% combat front black-white-red was decided. According to the usual formula, 60% of the heavy industry share should come from the coal industry and 40% from the iron industry. According to Georg von Schnitzler , the German People's Party was also included in the election fund at the suggestion of Paul Stein

The next day Fritz Springorum wrote to Paul Reusch :

"In this meeting, Herr Hitler gave a presentation of the political development of the last fourteen years and presented his basic attitude to political events, as well as to the economy, individual personality and private property, in such a way that he probably had the complete approval of all 27 gentlemen who were present. "

The managing director of the RDI Ludwig Kastl, however, wrote to Krupp on February 25, 1933:

“I find it a great, if not to say unheard of, impertinence on the industry to raise 3 million in the shortest possible time. I'm outraged about the distribution key (only 20% to the black-white-red block). But there is nothing I can do about it. After the elections one will have to talk about the matter again among the participants. "

donate

The money was transferred to the special account “Nationale Treuhand, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht ”at the Delbrück Leo & Co bank . The money was then transferred to Rudolf Hess and the Franz-Eher-Verlag . The rest was paid directly to Alfred Hugenberg and into the Papen fund.

A list of deposit receipts introduced into the IG Farben process and an identical, complete list of all payments for Hjalmar Schacht from April 5, 1933, prove payments to the special account amounting to 2,021,000 Reichsmarks. If you skip staggered payments, then 1,660,000 Reichsmarks, i.e. more than 95% of the final sum reached, had arrived by election day. Individual payers took action several times, especially the mining association with its record contribution of a total of 600,000 Reichsmarks. There were a total of 14 different contributors. An assignment to the participants of the meeting is not always immediately apparent. An election campaign donation from Kurt Schmitt amounting to 10,000 Reichsmarks is not listed in the source of the “Nuremberg Trials” .

Payments received to the account “Nationale Treuhand, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht "at the Delbrück Schickler & Co.
date Payer total
February 23 Mining Association 200,000 Reichsmarks
February 24th Karl Hermann (chief secretary of the potash indicator ) 150,000 Reichsmarks
Automobile exhibition, Berlin 100,000 Reichsmarks
February 25 Dir. A. Steinke ( BUBIAG ) 200,000 Reichsmarks
Demag 50,000 Reichsmarks
27th of February Telefunken 35,000 Reichsmarks
Osram 40,000 Reichsmarks
February 28 IG colors 400,000 Reichsmarks
1st March Hjalmar shaft 125,000 Reichsmarks
3 March Dir. Karl Lange, machine industry (in two individual items) 50,000 Reichsmarks
Mining Association 100,000 Reichsmarks
Karl Hermann, Berlin Dessauer Str. 150,000 Reichsmarks
AEG 60,000 Reichsmarks
Election day subtotal 1,660,000 Reichsmarks
7th March Fritz Springorum 36,000 Reichsmarks
Accumulatorenfabrik AG , Berlin (owner: Günther Quandt ) 25,000 Reichsmarks
March 13th Mining Association 300,000 Reichsmarks
total 2,021,000 Reichsmarks

According to a correspondence in the Hugenberg estate between Schacht and Hugenberg, 162,500 Reichsmarks were paid to the Papen Fund, of which 100,000 Reichsmarks were paid by IG Farben, 35,000 Reichsmarks from western industry and 27,500 Reichsmarks from western lignite industry. Heavy industry transferred 215,000 Reichsmarks directly to Hugenberg. The potash industry stated that they only gave 300,000 instead of 400,000 because they had already donated significantly directly to the black-white-red battle front. Schacht found that the lignite had given the battle front too much, otherwise it had sometimes failed.

Friedrich Flick stated in an interrogation on January 14, 1947 before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal that he and Albert Vögler had donated a further 100,000 Reichsmarks to the DNVP, because they had "missed out on distributing these donations".

In his memoirs, Hjalmar Schacht briefly mentions the meeting and confirms that 3 million Reichsmarks had been paid. He points out that of the 3 million, 600,000 Reichsmarks remained after the election.

Comparison with other political funds

The Board of Trustees for the Reconstruction of German Economic Life raised 4.8 million marks for the election to the German National Assembly in 1919. According to Tilo von Wilmowsky , German industry made 12 million Reichsmarks available for the Hindenburg election fund for the 1932 presidential election .

Follow-up developments

On the same day Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary about the importance of this campaign donation for the NSDAP :

“We can raise a very large sum for the election, which relieves us of all financial worries at one stroke. I alert the whole propaganda machine , and an hour later the rotary machines are rattling. Now we're going to crank it up at full speed. If there is no more extraordinary breakdown, then we have already won across the board. "

In his interrogation before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Schacht stated that you could only influence “that little bit of driftwood that, as I said, constantly swung back and forth between left and right” with money for propaganda.

The other circumstances were then favorable for the NSDAP, so that it was able to achieve significant profits in the Reichstag election on March 5, 1933, but - surprisingly for many observers - missed the absolute majority. This development, supported by the meeting and the payments brought about by it, came to an end with the seizure of power by Chancellor Hitler through the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, which authorized his government to enact laws without the consent of the Reichstag .

In a letter from Krupp to Hitler on March 24, 1933, the Reich Association of German Industry welcomed the election result with the words:

"The elections have created the basis for a stable government foundation and the disruptions that have arisen from the constant political fluctuations in the past and that have severely paralyzed economic initiative have been eliminated."

and stated:

"The Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie - as the economic and political representative - will do everything to help the Reich government with its difficult work."

Evaluation in research

In Marxist research, including Kurt Pätzold , this meeting is regarded as further evidence of the financing of the NSDAP by big industry.

According to the left-wing historian Ulrike Hörster-Philipps , the extent of the financial support reflected the agreement in principle “of all banks and corporations” with the objectives of the NSDAP. And the money, together with terrorist methods, made a decisive contribution to the election success.

In contrast, the historian Henry Ashby Turner points out that the donations of the entrepreneurs "can hardly be described as voluntary" and that "most of the industrialists present turned out to be less important personalities of the industry on closer inspection". For him it was a “sophisticated trick” by Hitler to invite the industrialists to “reach into their pockets”, and he describes the meeting as “a milestone: the first significant material contribution of large-scale industrial organizations to the National Socialist cause .” Also the British historian Ian Kershaw assesses in his biography of Hitler that the payment came about through “political blackmail”.

The historian Karsten Heinz Schönbach contradicts Turner's thesis of extortion by referring to the above-mentioned letter from the RDI, the content and “self-confident tone” of which clearly indicate that the industry expected Hitler to be “accountable for his intended policy” and that they would take their position on him will make you dependent.

For Peter Langer, the whole “ crème of industry” was represented, but it was “literally run over” by Schacht with the request to donate three million.

For the British historian Adam Tooze , those present were made up of a “strangely thrown together crowd” of captains of industry and “a number of clearly secondary actors”. He judges:

“Quite apart from its consequences, this meeting on February 20 is one of the most notorious examples of the readiness of German big business to assist Hitler in setting up his dictatorial regime. The evidence for this cannot be eradicated. "

For him, "Krupp and Co." were "willing partners in the destruction of political pluralism in Germany". He restricts, however, that Hitler did not need the consent of the entrepreneurs and knew this. Tooze points out that in his speech to the generals on February 3, 1933 , Hitler openly spoke of territorial expansion, which he did not do in that speech.

According to Werner Abelshauser , Hitler made it clear to industrialists who was a horse and who was a rider on the ride into the Third Reich.

See also

Belletristic representation

  • Éric Vuillard : The agenda. Translated from Nicola Denis, Matthes & Seitz, Berlin 2018.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b c Record by Martin Blank for Paul Reusch printed in: Dirk Stegmann: On the relationship between large-scale industry and National Socialism 1930–1933. Archive for Social History , 13, Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1973, p. 477 ff. Friedrich Flick named Krupp, Albert Vögler, Ernst Tengelmann, Mr. Löwenstein, Mr. von Schnitzler, Mr. Springorum and possibly General Director Dr. Buehren as a participant. Interrogation of Flicks before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal on January 14, 1947. Excerpts from: Karsten Heinz Schönbach: Die Königsmacher - Hitler, die Großindustrie and February 20, 1933 . In: Contributions to the history of the labor movement . 2/2018, p. 45.
  2. ↑ Blank only mentions the last names. Turner writes which member of the Tengelmann family it is is unclear. ( Henry Ashby Turner : The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 531, footnote 81). According to Stegmann, it is Ernst Tengelmann. (Dirk Stegmann: On the relationship between large-scale industry and National Socialism 1930–1933. Archive for Social History, 13, Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1973, p. 478.) Friedrich Flick named Ernst Tengelmann as a participant in an interrogation on January 14, 1947 before the Nuremberg Military Court . Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 45.
  3. ↑ Flick's testimony before the Nuremberg military court. Excerpts printed in: Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 45 f. phdn.org
  4. ^ Interrogation of Kurt Schmitt on July 8, 1947. Gerald D. Feldman : The alliance and the insurance company 1933-1945. Munich 2001, p. 92.
  5. ↑ August Finck's hearing on September 22, 1947. Feldman, Allianz, p. 92.
  6. ↑ a b c d Letter from Fritz Springorum to Paul Reusch dated February 21, 1931, printed by: Stegmann, p. 480 f.
  7. ^ A b Georg von Schnitzler on Hitler's appeal to leading German industrialists on February 20, 1933 (affidavit, November 10, 1945). Retrieved May 24, 2008 .
  8. ^ Nuremberg Document PS-2828, Funk interrogation of June 4, 1945. Printed in: Office of the United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality (ed.): Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression . Washington 1946, Volume 5, p. 495. loc.gov (PDF)
  9. ↑ Kube is based on an entry in Erhard Milch's diary . See: Alfred Kube: Pour le Mérite and swastika, Hermann Göring in the Third Reich . Munich 1986, p. 120. (Diary entry from Feb. 13, 1933, BA-MA, Nachlass Milch N 179 / No. 36, Diary 1933)
  10. ^ Nuremberg Document D-201.
  11. ↑ Schacht testimony before the Nuremberg Military Court on July 21, 1947. Excerpts from: Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 42.
  12. ↑ Krupp Archive Essen, FAH 4 E 208, pages 126–128. Quoted in Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 39.
  13. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner : The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. Siedler, Berlin 1985, pp. 393-396. After Peter Langer, Reusch went on a winter holiday to Sils Maria on February 14th despite an invitation . The reservation confirmation for the vacation was received on January 26th. Peter Langer: Power and responsibility. The Ruhr Baron Paul Reusch . Essen 2012, pp. 548 and 553.
  14. ↑ Adam Tooze : Economy of Destruction, The History of the Economy in National Socialism . Siedler, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-88680-857-1 , p. 134 .
  15. ^ Robert Bosch Archive N11 / 73 printed by: Rolf Becker, Joachim Scholtyseck: Robert Bosch and the Franco-German understanding . Stuttgart o. J. (1996), p. 177. Cf. Theodor Heuss : Robert Bosch, Leben und Leistungs . Stuttgart 1948, p. 633.
  16. ↑ Turner confuses him with Otto Wagener , Henry Ashby Turner: The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 393. Petzold, who relies on Turner for his presentation, accepts this error. Likewise Gustav Luntowski. See: Gustav Luntowski: Hitler and the gentlemen on the Ruhr . Frankfurt am Main 2000, p. 91.
  17. ↑ a b Nuremberg Document D-203, printed in International Military Court Nuremberg (Ed.): The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Court (November 14, 1945 to October 1, 1946) . Nuremberg 1947, volume 35, p. 42 ff .; English version available online from The Mazal Library : NMT, Volume VII, p. 557. (Document D-203 is found on pp. 557-562), The Farben Case
  18. ↑ Louis P. Lochner : The Mighty and the Tyrant . Darmstadt 1955, p. 172. The journalist Lochner, whose presentation is otherwise only based on material from the Nuremberg Trial, gives no source for this often-cited sentence.
  19. ^ A b Joachim Petzold : Franz von Papen, Ein deutsches Verfassnis , Berlin / Munich 1995, pp. 172–174.
  20. ^ Nuremberg Document NI-391; printed in: Eberhard Czichon : Who helped Hitler to power . Cologne 1967, p. 82 f .; (Czichon erroneously refers to this document as NI 9550); English version available online from The Mazal Library : NMT, Volume VII, p. 567. (Document NI-391 is found on pp. 565-568), The Farben Case
  21. ^ Association of German Chemists: The chemical factory . Volume 8, Verlag Chemie 1935, p. 338.
  22. ↑ Interrogation Excerpts printed in: Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 45 f.
  23. ↑ Hjalmar Schacht : 76 years of my life . Bad Wörishofen 1953, p. 380.
  24. ↑ Gottfried Treviranus : The end of Weimar. Heinrich Brüning and his time . Düsseldorf 1968, p. 298.
  25. ↑ Elke Fröhlich: The diaries of Joseph Goebbels, all fragments. Munich / New York / London / Paris 1987, part 1, volume 2, p. 380.
  26. ↑ Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 43.
  27. ^ Document NI-904. Printed by: Czichon, p. 83.
  28. ↑ Kurt Pätzold , Manfred Weißbecker : swastika and skull, the crime party . Berlin 1981, p. 213.
  29. ↑ Ulrike Hörster-Philipps : Big Capital, Weimar Republic and Fascism . In: Gerd Hardach (ed.): The destruction of the Weimar Republic . Cologne 1977, p. 119.
  30. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner : The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. Siedler, Berlin 1985, pp. 393-396.
  31. ↑ Ian Kershaw : Hitler 1889-1936. Stuttgart 1998, p. 567.
  32. ↑ Schönbach, Königsmacher, p. 22.
  33. ↑ Langer, Reusch, p. 552 f.
  34. ↑ Tooze, p. 129.
  35. ↑ Tooze, p. 129 ff.
  36. ↑ Werner Abelshauser : Ruhr coal and politics, Ernst Brandi 1875-1937 . Essen 2009, p. 78.