History of Military Tactics

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This article gives an overview of the development of the different military operations management in the interplay of technological, sociological and military strategic progress.

overview

Technologically, the history of military tactics is shaped by five great inventions:

  1. the discovery and refined processing of iron (see metallurgy )
  2. the invention of explosives
  3. the development of the internal combustion engine ( ground troops and powered aircraft , development of air jet engines )
  4. Developments in electrical engineering , integrated circuits (communication by radio, later RADAR , ultimately through the ICs also partly autonomous processing of data in the weapon itself)
  5. the development of the atomic bomb .

In addition, there are countless small innovations, which essentially represent further developments of the five great inventions ( e.g. pikemen , stirrups , longbows , armored cavalry , needle gun , machine gun , tanks , planes , satellites ).

In the following, the historical development for Europe and the neighboring regions is presented chronologically. (In other regions of the world, the development is often similar, even if it varies greatly over time.)

antiquity

Greek phalanx

The tactics of the phalanx , a battle line formed from heavily armed hoplites , were predominant in ancient Greece . The hoplite fought with a heavy bronze-clad round shield and a thrusting spear as its main weapon. Depending on the wealth of the militiamen, breastplates (made of bronze or linen ), full helmets and greaves were added. The shield carried in the left hand covered the body from neck to knee, but left the right side of the body more or less unprotected. This was covered by the overlapping shield of the right neighbor in the phalanx. From this arose the need for a tightly closed order of battle.

The phalanges were set up 8–12 men deep, the best armed hoplites in the first rows. The opposing lines of battle marched on one another, and after the last few meters had been covered at a trot, the lines met with a loud crash. Only the first rows could still use their spears in the resulting crush and tried to hit the unprotected neck or groin of their opponents. The rear tiers were pushing their shields to put pressure on the opposing phalanx and mess them up. Once a phalanx was breached, the only thing that helped was escape.

Since almost all Greek city-states positioned their best fighters in the honorary position on the right wing of the phalanx and these thus faced the weaker units on the opposing left, there was a counterclockwise rotation in many battles and an 'outflanking' on the respective right side . This effect was reinforced by the fact that all hoplites pushed to the right into the protection of the shields of their neighbors. (The tactic of the crooked order of battle took advantage of this fact: In the 4th century BC, Thebes succeeded in the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea to defeat the Spartans , who were considered unbeatable , by massively strengthening the left side, and as this could throw the best fighters of the Spartan right, the Spartan phalanx collapsed.)

The leaders generally fought in the front row to work by example - after the start of the battle, tactical changes in the noise and chaos could no longer be implemented. Those who could not afford hoplite equipment fought as 'skirmishers' with light weapons such as slings, javelins or clubs. However, these units rarely played a decisive role in the battle.

The phalanx tactics were decisively further developed by the Macedonians under their King Philip II , probably based on the Theban model. The hoplites were armed with a sarissa , a lance up to 6 meters long. The phalanx, which was sunk to 16 ranks, was divided into tactical bodies of 256 men, making the order of battle more flexible. Due to the enormous length of the weapon, even the fighters of the fifth row of the phalanx could point their weapon against the enemy - seen from the front, the Macedonian phalanx formed a fearsome barbed wall. Since the 8 kilogram heavy Sarissa had to be carried with both hands, the hoplites could not hold shields in their hands. (A smaller shield was attached to the shoulder.) This made them vulnerable once the enemy had managed to break through the front line or attack from the flanks. They were therefore mostly inferior to the flexibly acting Roman legions, e.g. B. in the battles at Kynoskephalai , Magnesia and Pydna .

Roman legion

In the early Roman period (6th century BC) there were few differences between the fighting style of the Romans and Greeks - the popular contingent ( legio ) fought in a phalanx, the best armed in the first ranks, the less well-off in the back ranks, the poorest as lightly armed ranged fighters with slingshots or javelins. A first innovation was the introduction of the oval shield ( scutum ), which covered almost the entire body, instead of the round shield for fighters without expensive full armor. During this time, the Centuries were also established as the first organizational sub-units of the Legion.

In the years of the early republic, when Rome was waging wars against its neighbors almost continuously, the manipulation tactic arose : a legion (initially two were raised, each under the command of one of the consuls) divided into three 'meetings', i.e. H. three successive battle lines ( triplex acies ) - in the first row the youngest ( hastati ), in the second row experienced fighters ( principes ), in the third as reserve the 'veterans' ( triarii ). Each of these lines of battle was in turn divided into ten 'Manipels', each consisting of two centuries with around 80 men. Under the command of the two centurions , the maniples were able to act as independent tactical units and react flexibly, for example, to encircling the line of battle or breakthroughs by the enemy. In the Legion's basic setup, there were gaps between the maniples. Through this the light troops ( velites ) were able to withdraw after they had beaten the enemy with their throwing barriers and slings. The rear of the two Centuries of each Maniple then marched into the gap and closed the line of battle. Likewise, the first meeting could retreat behind the second and regroup, while fresh troops continued the fight. The cavalry ( equites ) provided by the wealthiest sections of the population , like the light infantry, primarily had to perform support tasks.

The legionaries of the first two meetings were now equipped with a scutum, javelin ( pila ) and the broadsword ( gladius ) as their main weapon. During the attack, the spears were thrown first, the long and thin tips of which bent on impact and therefore could not be thrown back. The barbed tips often got stuck in the enemy shields, rendering them unusable. In close combat, the legionnaire ducked behind his shield and stuck his sword out from behind it.

Another advantage of the manipulative tactic was, in addition to the tactical flexibility, a psychological one: the fight man against man in a confined space was not only physically but also mentally exhausting. While every fighter in the phalanx was directly involved in the fighting, even in the lower ranks, was exposed to the risk of injury at least from projectiles and retreating meant defeat, the legionnaires of the individual meetings were able to throw themselves into battle one after the other and often withdraw safely from it. Conversely, it must have been frustrating for the opponents when, as soon as they had forced a line of battle to retreat, they faced a new 'wall' of legionnaires. Not for nothing was a Latin phrase that was also used in everyday life to paraphrase a desperate situation: "inde rem ad triarios redisse" (for example: "now it is up to the triariars, i.e. the third meeting, to fight").

In the third century BC, the cohort was introduced as a new tactical subdivision of a legion that was decisive up until the imperial era : One maniples of each of the first, second and third meetings were combined into a cohort, so a legion consisted of ten cohorts of almost 500 men. Cohorts were also used independently in situations that did not require the presence of an entire legion. However, there was no cohort commander - the authority of command remained with the centurions of the individual centuries (probably because in the turmoil they represented the largest number of men that could be effectively led by one individual).

In a closed line of battle, there was seldom fighting. The maniples each formed a strong defensive position (e.g. in the event of fire in the 'turtle formation' testudo ), enemies who penetrated the intervals between the manipules were attacked from three sides (from the two neighboring maniples and the Manipel of the second meeting placed behind the gap). Light infantry and cavalry could also push forward again and again, and it was possible to bring reinforcements to the front line and withdraw exhausted units.

Ancient cavalry

The types of cavalry used in the ancient world formed a broad spectrum: from light cavalry , mainly used as skirmishers and ranged fighters, to heavy 'shock cavalry', which tried to defeat the opposing ranks in close combat.

The first category included the Numidian or Moorish equestrian troops of North Africa, the Parthians and Scythians of the Middle East, and later also the Huns and other Asian steppe peoples . They trusted in the speed and maneuverability of their horses in battle and tried to avoid close combat. Instead, they tried to wear down the enemy with their projectiles and arrows and ultimately to drive them away. Worth mentioning in this context is the so-called Parthian maneuvers (often called Partherschuss called). This is a bow shooting technique , in which the horse archer in full gallop to back up. On suitable terrain, this maneuver created a tactical advantage and made it possible for large armies with mounted archers to maintain the desired distance and keep the initiative in battle when attacking less mobile troops, such as the legions of Rome. The maneuver required exceptional riding skill and body control, as the hands had to remain free for the bow shot and the horse could only be steered by applying pressure from the thighs. After the invention of the stirrup, the technique was perfected. This procedure is described, for example, in Plutarch's report on the defeat of Marcus Licinius Crassus against the Parthians in the Battle of Carrhae .

At the other end of the spectrum of ancient cavalry was the heavy armored 'storm cavalry', often armed with sword and thrust lance, seeking close combat. Since even trained horses (unlike often shown in films) cannot be made to penetrate tightly closed infantry lines, an attempt was made to cause panic in the ranks of the enemy by the onslaught of a massed cavalry unit, so that they would flee or at least break up the ranks . The resulting gaps could be penetrated and the opponents knocked down from the advantageously elevated position. The best known ancient example is the hetaires riding of the Macedonians. Under the personal guidance of Philip II and his son Alexander the Great , she was often able to decide battles. While the phalanges collided, the Macedonian cavalry knocked the opposing cavalry out of the field. Under the orders of her general, she could then turn around and attack the enemy line of battle in the rear or on the flanks, which meant their certain defeat (e.g. in the battle of Issus and the battle of Gaugamela ).

Even in the Roman army, which had shaped the army of the ancient world with its legions consisting of heavy infantry, the focus shifted more and more towards cavalry in the 3rd and 4th centuries to the mounted opponents (such as the Persian Sassanids , Goths and Huns ) and to cope with the huge size of the empire. While the cavalry was initially provided by the auxiliary troops of the conquered peoples, towards the end of the epoch the bulk of the field army consisted of mounted units, with the spectrum ranging from mounted spear throwers and archers to lancers ( lancearii ) to heavily armored cataphracts ( catafractarii ).

middle Ages

Basically, the Roman tactics were continued in the Middle Ages. The use of armored knights became increasingly important over time . The knights became self-sufficient professional warriors who were vastly superior in the direct battle of the infantry, with central social significance and police authority. A change in the high and late Middle Ages can, however, be seen in the widespread introduction of specialized long-range combat units ( longbow and crossbowmen ). The increase in the threat “from the air” could change the decision in a battle significantly (for example in the Battle of Azincourt ). As a result, army formation and deployment gained in importance.

Another innovation brought the Hussites , who traversed large parts of Central Europe in the 15th century and used artillery to a significant extent in open battle for the first time . The Hussites formed a chariot with guns and carriages they had carried with them , which no knights' contingent of the time could break open. Nevertheless, this tactic did not prevail in the long term. The emergence of mercenaries made it possible to raise ever larger armies, with an increasing focus on infantry. With the end of the Middle Ages the cavalry lost its crucial importance, it could still decide battles, but the focus was on the infantry.

From Europe to the Far East, the Mongolian warfare , whose organizational prerequisites were created by Genghis Khan around 1190 , proved to be overwhelmingly superior . With the unification of the tribes by Genghis Khan, a tightly centralized state emerged after fierce battles against the representatives of the aristocratic class . The ultimate goal of the war was complete victory over the enemy. The army reform divided the Mongolian army into tens, hundreds , thousands and ten thousand. The bulk of the Mongolian army initially consisted almost entirely of light cavalry. Most warriors were archers with two or more bows on horseback. They caused a heavy hail of arrows, either in the attack or on a (often faked) escape. The Mongols used a developed system of horn and flag signals that were given by the military commander, whereupon they shifted their troops to certain positions in the theater of war or went into attack, retreat or certain formations. Mongolian armaments differed significantly from European ones. In contrast to European knights, who used plate armor (helmets, chain mail and metal parts that restricted view and movement), the Mongols wrapped themselves in silk scarves , that is, quilted armor made of many layers of raw silk and in iron-reinforced leather armor composed of rings, which gave them great freedom of movement , Outlook, endurance and resistance to weapons.

Renaissance

The Renaissance brought great changes in warfare. Due to the larger armies available through the mercenary system, the use of the pike and the emerging handguns on the one hand, the study of ancient military writers and the development of new tactical manuals on the other, marked a turning point in the Middle Ages that went much further than the mere replacement of the Knight by foot servants.

France and Burgundy had implemented the lessons of the Hundred Years War and, together with the orderly companies , created armies in which riflemen, footmen, armored riders and artillery were available in organized units. However, these ultra-modern armies were overshadowed by the Swiss army, which developed from peasant rebels to professional mercenaries.

Initially equipped mainly with halberds and similar polearms , the long spear or pike increasingly came to the fore among the Swiss . Although Swiss armies consisted not only of peasants or citizens, but also included the local landed gentry, they rarely used cavalry. They grouped their pikemen into large squares, so-called quarter heaps . In the battle they usually appeared in three groups of several thousand men ( vanguard , violent group and rear guard ), which proceeded in staggered fashion. In the Burgundian Wars in particular , the Swiss fought surprisingly agile battles and reacted quickly and effectively to opportunities that arose.

Around 1500 Swiss mercenary armies, so-called Reisläufer , ruled Europe's battlefields. Anyone who wanted to counter this set up their own pikemen. These mercenaries initially came mainly from Swabia and Northern Germany and, after initial setbacks, imitated Swiss tactics so well that they were finally able to beat their teachers. Tactical innovations were brought about not so much by the mercenary armies of Emperor Charles V , but rather by his Spanish generals. During the Italian wars, the Spaniards recognized the value of the newly emerging small arms, which they used to support the pikemen. They deployed their troops in the Tercio , with a large block of pikemen flanked at the four corners by smaller groups of riflemen. Spanish Tercios were successfully led into battle for the next 100 years, most recently in 1634 in the Battle of Nördlingen they defeated the actually more modern organized Swedish Protestant contingent.

The main burden of the battle was initially borne by the pikemen, while the riflemen only gave support. This remained so until the beginning of the Thirty Years' War , although generals like Moritz von Oranien went from the deeply tiered Tercios to the flatter but also broader Dutch order ( meeting tactics ), which was then further perfected by Gustav Adolf of Sweden . In the course of the Thirty Years' War, aided by the increasingly lighter muskets , the relationship between riflemen and pikemen changed until the pikemen were only supposed to provide support to the riflemen to ward off attacks by horsemen.

At the beginning of the Renaissance knights were still deployed, but since the Schmalkaldic War the lighter mercenary rider has prevailed. This was equipped with several wheel lock pistols, which he fired at close range at the enemy before he withdrew to reload (" karakollieren "). These mercenaries, called German horsemen , attacked in complicated formations in order to fire at the enemy as evenly as possible. Gustav Adolf was the first to return to shock riding, and in the course of the 17th century the importance of cavalry increased again, especially in the Turkish Wars . The infantry procedure, corresponding to cavalry caracolling, was called enfilade .

18th century

Field artillery

The artillery, which had previously been used primarily as a siege weapon, was increasingly used as a support weapon in field battles since the 16th century, but especially since the Thirty Years' War . Decisive for this were the increasing standardization of gun barrels, which ensured higher production numbers, increased accuracy and an easier supply of ammunition, and the use of gun mounts , which made it easier to transport and relocate the guns on the battlefield. (For example, the number of guns in the arsenal of the French army rose from 4,740 to almost 20,000 from the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701 to the eve of the French Revolution in 1789.) Only increased mobility made it possible to support the infantry even at short range Solid ball grapes were used.

infantry

The infantry remained the decisive force in the battle. The invention of the bayonet at the end of the 17th century made pikemen superfluous - by 'planting' the blade in or later on the barrel muzzle, musketeers were able to defend themselves against cavalry attacks. This made the development of linear tactics possible : The quarter heaps were dissolved, the shooters arranged in long lines with three to four members in order to use as many muskets as possible against the enemy at the same time. When the first limb had fired its volley, it stepped back to load and give way to the second limb. After the last link was fired, the loading of the first link was finished and the link rotation began again. Later the number of links was reduced to three and ultimately to two - the first kneeled while firing, the second stood behind and fired at the same time through the gaps in the first, the third link (if any) remained a few steps back as a reserve.

The effect of volley fire was not only physical but also psychological. As many shots as possible should hit the tightly closed lines of the enemy at the same time as quickly as possible - the terrible injuries from the large-caliber projectiles, the lack of cover and the bad morale of the soldiers, who were often forced to serve, did the rest. Therefore, in the training of soldiers (during this time many countries introduced drill regulations ), emphasis was placed on the exact and rapid sequence of loading and firing movements, and targeted shooting was sometimes even explicitly prohibited. (The naughty barrels of contemporary weapons and the battlefields shrouded in gun smoke made this difficult anyway.) If the enemy was decisively weakened, the line went over to the bayonet attack. Normally there was no hand-to-hand combat at all, as the psychological effect of the assault was enough to put the ailing defenders to flight.

While the long lines of battle increased the firepower of the infantry considerably and made them less sensitive to artillery fire, they were difficult to maneuver and defenseless against flanking cavalry attacks. Therefore, an important part of any drill training was the change from the line to the marching column and to the square and back again. The square was a rectangular formation in which the soldiers took up positions with bayonets pointing outwards, and thus stood in the tradition of the quarter pile. The outer links kneeled down so that the rear links could also use their bayonets. It was impossible for cavalry to 'break up' a disciplined square (even well-trained cavalry horses could hardly be made to gallop into the 'spiked wall' of bayonets), and the firepower of the riders' handguns remained meaningless compared to the firepower of the infantrymen. The target of the attack was therefore always one of the 'corners' of the square. On the other hand, the square formation made it susceptible to artillery fire, as the massive cannonballs could mutilate or kill several soldiers standing one behind the other. It was therefore all the more important to have the ability to change formations under fire in the endless drill.

cavalry

Since cavalry attacks were particularly promising if the enemy was surprised, the military added value of heavy cavalry (like the cuirassiers ) became less and less compared to their higher costs. Light cavalry armies (such as the Chevaulegers , the Hussars or the Dragoons ) were increasingly used in all European armies.

19th century

Light infantry

At the end of the 18th century, regular troop units were increasingly equipped with rifles with rifled barrels , which up to now had mainly been used by irregular troops from the hunters and citizens who brought their own hunting and rifle rifles . These troops of the light infantry (called hunters , riflemen , fusiliers or tirailleurs ) were deployed in front of the line infantry in loose order of battle and primarily had the task of covering their own advance and disrupting the advance of the enemy. Their long-range and precise weapons, which were more difficult to load, also enabled them to purposefully eliminate the opposing artillerymen and the officers (at that time almost always aristocratic). This tactic, unheard of in terms of honor, especially in the Enlightenment, was promoted primarily through the use of snipers in the American and French revolutionary troops, in which less consideration was given to noble privileges and class arrogance. However, the light infantry had little to counteract cavalry attacks - in this case the only option was to retreat to their own lines.

Column tactics

Column tactics were also developed in the French revolutionary armies , which allowed the initially relatively poorly trained troops to march on the enemy more easily: Instead of marching in a long line, one marched in closely spaced columns, and a rifle line was only formed in front of the enemy lines. The advantage of being able to maneuver easier even through rough terrain, however, was offset by the disadvantage of high losses in artillery fire and the difficulty of "developing" the column into a line under fire in order to be able to use the full firepower of your own troops.

Automatic weapons

From the middle of the century, weapon technology was significantly further developed. Rifles with rifled barrel were distributed to ever larger units, the introduction of breech-loaders with metal cartridges and later magazines increased the firepower of the infantry, plus the introduction of the low-smoke powder, which replaced the previously used black powder . In addition, the first machine guns were developed. In the case of the artillery , too , the range and rate of fire were increased through drawn barrels, breech loaders and the barrel return . Explosive bullets replaced the previous solid bullets and grapeshot and thus increased the target effect.

As a result, troop units could no longer operate as one unit on the battlefield. The camouflage also suddenly became important. The previous columns were given up in favor of swarm lines. A command problem arose from the considerably larger expansion of the individual units and the lack of suitable mobile telecommunications equipment. This gave the individual subordinates considerably more responsibility.

First World War

During the First World War there were further technical advances. At the beginning of the war, the increased weaponry forced an increased cover of the troops. On the western front, from Switzerland to the North Sea, a continuous trench system was created, which made it necessary to adapt to terrain that was previously unsuitable for warfare. So it came to the establishment of mountain troops . The expanded positions required more artillery use. Attempts to destroy the opposing troops with massive fire and throw the remains with a classic frontal attack proved inadequate. The German tactic consisted of dividing the closed front line into individual pockets of resistance and leaving strong reserves out of reach of the enemy artillery, which were used to clean up break-ins in the event of an enemy attack. Even in the attack , new paths were broken through the formation of storm troops , smaller, self-sufficient units. These units looked for weak points on the opposing front, evaded pockets of resistance and deepened the attack effect. This tactic initially proved to be successful, but the 1918 spring offensive , which was initially successful, fell through due to insufficient reserves and a shortage of supplies.

The Entente developed armored vehicles that at least offered protection from infantry weapons. In the company of infantry, individual tanks were usually switched off by field artillery in the event of a breakthrough. The use in closed units, however, showed considerable success, for example a breakthrough through the German front on August 8, 1918 at Amiens .

Second World War

In the Second World War, both sides of the war could fall back on a strong air force. In the campaigns, the aim was to capture a large area as quickly as possible, so that tanks, armored cars and other army vehicles were largely factored into the warfare. These machines and machine guns made it possible to conduct extremely fast battles (on the German side, every single tank was equipped with an on-board radio and its own radio operator), which, however, quickly led to many deaths. Long campaigns using this war technique came to a standstill when there was heavy resistance in cities, for example when half a million soldiers died in the Battle of Stalingrad and the entire city was razed to the ground by the air force and tanks. The speed of one's own attack and the ever longer supply routes made it difficult to get supplies.

In isolated cases, however, there were still simple assault attacks with pure infantry, for example on D-Day or during the landings on several Japanese-occupied islands in the Pacific. All too often, however, these attacks were associated with extreme losses from machine weapons and mortars. For the first time, paratroopers were used to decisively weaken the enemy front from the rear. This tactic ultimately did not work; to date there are very few fights decided by airborne landings. However, the airborne troops have proven themselves as an institution: Since their equipment and thus their tactics are geared towards air transport (i.e. no trucks and no heavy weapons), a type of troop emerged that can be brought to the scene of action very quickly and with minimal equipment can fight for a certain period of time without having to be supplied by land. Since airborne troops can carry almost all of their equipment on foot, they are very suitable for mountains and other remote areas. Modern examples of this are the Falklands War and the two wars in Afghanistan (1979–1989 and the one since 2001).

Likewise, very well-trained special forces were introduced during the Second World War, who are supposed to work deeply in enemy territory with the local resistance with the aim of disrupting the enemy's operations by means of attacks and acts of sabotage. Examples are the British SAS and SBS , the allied Operation Jedburgh in France and the Chindits in the war against Japan.

Outside the battlegrounds also called for actions aimed at civilian infrastructure airstrikes, as The Blitz on London or the bombing of Dresden high losses, so now is not that more only the armed forces were involved, but also the civilian population itself. With the so-called strategic bombers should the economic Enemy capacities are destroyed.

Since the end of the Second World War

The military concept of peacekeeping through mutual deterrence ( dissuasion ) is as old as war itself. However, the introduction of nuclear weapons with their extensive destructive power multiplied the deterrent effect and immediately after the Second World War led to the development of the MAD doctrine ("Mutual assured destruction") , Balance of Terror ). The term was first used in official US military doctrine in 1961. The doctrine found its first and main application during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union .

On July 25, 1980, US President Jimmy Carter spoke in Presidential Directive 59 of a " countervailing strategy ". US President Ronald Reagan continued this new direction and planned with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to replace the principle of the MAD with a new strategy. The United States was to be protected from attacks or counter-attacks from the Soviet Union by building up comprehensive, absolute missile defense. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union , tensions between Russia and the United States and between the United States and China were significantly reduced. In both cases, MAD was superseded as a model for stability between the nuclear powers, but these countries still have a nuclear weapon potential that is considered sufficient to maintain a basic deterrent.

Communication, i.e. the exchange of all kinds of information, if possible in real time, is given high priority in today's armies. It starts with telecommunications for the troops, where the individual soldiers are not only networked with the command, but also with each other. The best way to illustrate this development is to use the United States Armed Forces' IVIS (Inter Vehicle Information System) . Depending on the budget of the respective armed forces, the degree of networking will continue to increase.

The increasing autonomy of weapon systems (currently missiles and drones) is also worth mentioning. Since you can do certain things independently ( autopilot ), you do not need a remote control, so a disruption of communication with the ground crew does not lead to a crash. The computer is also able to carry out certain activities more safely and more quickly than a human could, completely without practice or even lengthy training. In addition, a loss of these weapon systems means high costs, but does not claim human lives on their own side.

See also

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Nic Fields: Roman Battle Tactics 390-110 BC. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2010, pp. 36-38.
  2. ^ Peter Connolly: Greece and Rome at War. Greenhill Books, London 1998, pp. 50f.
  3. ↑ Nic Fields: Roman Battle Tactics 390-110 BC. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2010, p. 38; Peter Connolly: Greece and Rome at War. Greenhill Books, London 1998, pp. 47f.
  4. ↑ Nic Fields: Roman Battle Tactics 390-110 BC. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2010, p. 52f .; Peter Connolly: Greece and Rome at War. Greenhill Books, London 1998, pp. 69f.
  5. ↑ Nic Fields: Roman Battle Tactics 390-110 BC. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2010, pp. 19f.
  6. ↑ Nic Fields: Roman Battle Tactics 390-110 BC. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2010, pp. 41-46
  7. ^ Ross Cowan: Roman Battle Tactics 109 BC-AD 313. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2007, pp. 5-10
  8. ↑ Harry Sidebottom: The War in the Ancient World . Philipp Reclam jun. GmbH, Stuttgart 2008, p. 132.
  9. ^ Bernhard Palme: Field Army and Border Army. The Roman military in late antiquity. In: Gerfried Mandl / Ilja Steffelbauer (eds.): War in the ancient world , Magnus Verlag, Essen 2007, pp. 98–99.
  10. ↑ Erich Egg et al .: Kanonen. Illustrated history of the artillery. Manfred Pawlak Verlag, Herrsching 1975, pp. 35-60.
  11. ↑ Peter Hofschröer: Prussian Napoleonic Tactics 1792-1815. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2011, pp. 6-8.
  12. ^ Philip Haythornthwaite: British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics 1792-1815. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2008, pp. 44-47.
  13. ↑ Peter Hofschröer: Prussian Napoleonic Tactics 1792-1815. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2011, p. 53.
  14. ↑ Peter Hofschröer: Prussian Napoleonic Tactics 1792-1815. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2011, p. 12f.
  15. ^ Philip Haythornthwaite: British Rifleman 1797-1815. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2002, pp. 5-9.
  16. ^ Paddy Griffith: French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics 1792-1815. Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2007, pp. 5-10.