Battle of the Catalaunian Fields
Medieval depiction of the battle, around 1330
| date | 451 |
|---|---|
| place | probably near Châlons-en-Champagne |
| Exit | Victory of the Western Roman Empire and the Visigoths |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| about 40,000 men | about 45,000 men |
| losses | |
|
unknown |
unknown |
The battle on the Catalaunian fields took place in AD 451 between the Romans under Flavius Aëtius and the Visigoths under Theodoric I on the one hand and the Huns under Attila and the Ostrogoths on the other. It took place in what is now northeastern France near the present-day city of Châlons-en-Champagne . The majority of the battle is dated June 20th, 451, a minority is September 20th. The Roman-Visigoth army defeated the Huns with heavy losses and forced them to retreat from Gaul .
The battle was once considered a defense of Western Europe against the Huns. Modern research, on the other hand, emphasizes that at that time two mixed alliances faced each other, and often sees the events as a power struggle between the two rivals Attila and Aëtius.
Sources
Prosper Tiro of Aquitaine , contemporary of the battle, only briefly mentions Attila's campaign. The contemporary witness Priskos also provides important information on the prehistory . But there is only one substantial late antique source that describes the battle on the Catalaunian fields in more detail, namely the Roman-Gothic historian Jordanes , who wrote about a century after the event and is not always reliable. Above all, his figures on army strengths are completely exaggerated, and he idealized the role of the Visigoths and demonized Attila. A considerable mistrust is therefore appropriate to his statements. In addition, the traditional reports must be treated with great caution, as they only convey the retrospective view of the winners; It was important to them to portray the events as a barbaric attack on the Imperium Romanum and not as a Hunnic intervention in inner-Roman conflicts. In addition to Jordanes, Agathias and Prokopios are also fighting the battle.
prehistory
In the beginning there was actually a good relationship between Attila's multi-ethnic federation and Western Rome. In addition, the Hun ruler Attila and the Western Roman army master ( magister militum ) and actual head of government, Flavius Aëtius , initially maintained good personal relationships. Aëtius had only survived a civil war with the help of the Huns in 433 and has dominated the imperial court in Ravenna ever since . After 447, however, relations deteriorated, and there is much to suggest that the war of 451/52 should be understood primarily as a power struggle between Attila and Aëtius. The interaction of several factors finally led Attila to attack the Western Roman Empire in 451 and also determined the composition of the two conflicting parties. These factors were:
- Disputes over Honoria , the sister of the Western Roman emperor Valentinian III. She had had an affair with a court official in 450, which Aëtius saw as a threat to his position, and had therefore been forcibly married to an old senator. In this situation, the court party around Honoria turned to Attila for help. According to contemporary Priskos , Honoria sent him her signet ring and promised cash payments. A century later, Jordanes also reports an alleged marriage vow of the princess to Attila; the latter gladly accepted and, as it is said, demanded half the western empire as a dowry. One thing is certain: the extradition of the princess was negotiated for a while, but Attila's demands did not allow an agreement, as they would have been tantamount to the downfall of Aëtius.
- The resistance of the new Eastern Roman emperor Markian . Immediately after his enthronement, he revoked the 447 completed foedus with Attila and stopped paying tribute to the Huns. Since Attila knew that an invasion of the already plundered Eastern Roman Balkan provinces would have been just as pointless as an attack on the almost impregnable Constantinople, it was also natural to turn to the west.
- The side of the vandal Geiserich . Geiseric was an old enemy of Aetius, even if a foedus had been closed in 442 . In addition, there was his hostility to Theodoric I , the rex of the Visigoths. His daughter had been married to Geiserich's son Hunerich years earlier , but was then mutilated on charges of poisoning and then sent back. When Geiseric came to an understanding with Attila, this led to the fact that the Visigoths , who had previously wavered for a long time, sided with Aëtius.
- Conflicts of succession to the throne among the Franks may also play a role , with Attila and Aëtius supporting various pretenders.
Attila seems to have hesitated for a while, then decided to launch an all-out attack on Gaul to capture Aetius and the Visigoths. In the spring of 451 he began to concentrate the pressure on the Rhine . The Alemanni resisted, but the Franks on the right bank of the Rhine largely joined him. The Ripuarian Franks on the left bank of the Rhine subordinated themselves to Aëtius, who, just coming from Italy to Gaul, drew all the existing Roman troops and the federates into himself - including the Burgundians in Savoy, the Alans around Orléans and the Visigoths ; the latter were of particular importance to Aëtius because of the strength of their army. At first, however, King Theodoric I of the Visigoths seemed to want to wait in Aquitaine to see how the power struggle would end. Aëtius then sent the former Praetorian prefect of Gaul, Avitus , who was respected by both the Romans and the Goths, to Theodoric. Avitus succeeded in convincing the Visigoths of the advantages of joint action against Attila.
During these negotiations, Attila's army moved over Argentoratum and, on April 7, 451, Metz - both cities were thoroughly plundered - past Paris towards Orléans . Aëtius, now reinforced by the Visigoths, also marched towards Orléans from the southwest. According to Jordanes' tradition, the city fell shortly before the arrival of Aëtius, who surprised the Huns when they sacked the city and forced them to retreat. This is still in doubt, however, as it seems almost inconceivable that the Hunn scouts should have hidden the arrival of such a large army. Presumably Attila withdrew his troops from Orléans in good time and then marched eastward to his camp, an entrenched wagon castle . Attila's retreat from Orléans took place at night, covered by the Gepid warriors , who brought up the rear . The Ripuarian Franks, in turn, provided the vanguard of the Western Roman army. In the bitter night skirmish that followed, both sides suffered heavy losses until they parted without result. Aëtius followed with the army and set up camp within sight of Attila's wagon castle.
Place of battle
The name Katalaunische fields ( Latin Campi Catalauni ) comes from the Gallierstamm the Katalaunen from that settled in the region in which the battle took place.
The identification of the battlefield is controversial. So until today it has not been possible to determine with certainty where the battle took place. For a long time a plain near Châlons-en-Champagne was assumed to be the site of the battle. It is believed that a larger group of Huns founded the village of Courtisols after the battle, eleven kilometers east of the city .
But since it is reported that Attila retreated from Orléans to the east, it seems more likely that the battle was fought somewhere on the plain between Châlons-en-Champagne and Troyes (present-day northeastern France), probably closer to Troyes.
It is known that the battlefield was defined by a vast plain. This was limited in the north by a river, presumably the Marne , and in the south by some non-contiguous forests. To the north a hill rose before the river.
Armies
The troop strength of both sides can only be estimated, since the historical information is obviously exaggerated and therefore unreliable. Jordanes speaks of 500,000 fighters. According to military historians, considering the logistics at the time, it would have been possible in the best case to supply around 50,000 or 60,000 warriors on both sides, but it was probably even less. In the case of the Roman army, this can be estimated quite well, because half of the army, according to Jordanes, was provided by the Visigoth foederati , who in their best times could never field many more than 20,000 men. So the imperial army, including the Alans, should not have exceeded 45,000 men in any case. Attila's army is said to have had a small numerical superiority, so it must have been a maximum of 50,000 men. According to other estimates, both armies should have been around 30,000 men strong - this would have corresponded to the average size of an army of late ancient times in the 5th and 6th centuries.
Attila's army consisted only about half of the Huns, while the other half was provided by his vassals . These contingents were arranged according to size; those of the Ostrogoths under Valamir , those of the Gepids under Ardarich and the Franks on the right bank of the Rhine as well as those of the Burgundians (from a sub-tribe that lived on the Main ) were particularly important .
Heruli , Skiren , Lombards and others were also represented in small contingents of several hundred to about two thousand warriors . It should be noted that the Ostrogoths apparently made up about half of the vassal force. As usual, the Huns were mounted and armed with a spear , club and rope loop as well as their most important weapon, the specially made horsebow . As a rule, they did not wear armor , only a small, round leather shield was used for defense. It was different with the Germanic vassals. With the exception of the Ostrogoths, about a third of whom were horsemen, almost all of them were foot soldiers. The Ostrogoth cavalry can be classified as heavy cavalry, as they were equipped with a push spear and long sword and at least with leather armor , but often also with chain armor and helmet. However, the stirrup was still unknown in late antiquity. With the exception of the Franks, the foot warriors will probably have gone into battle without armor, but with a round shield , spear, sax or long sword . Long-range weapons were hardly used by the Teutons, and archers are only recorded in the Ostrogoths. The Franks used the Franziska , a curly throwing ax that was used just before the fighters clashed , as a one-time long-range weapon . Apart from that, the Frankish warriors were also armed with spears, saxes and a wooden shield, and sometimes with long swords.
Aëtius' army consisted about half of regular Roman units as well as Frankish and Burgundian foederati on one side and the Visigoth warriors on the other. There were also several thousand federated Alans.
Romans, Franks and Burgundians made up the heavy infantry. The late Roman soldiers can no longer be imagined as the legions of the early imperial era . They were armed with an oval shield, a Spangenhelm , a long sword ( spathe ) and the composite bow was responsible oriental style, probably in no small Roman for the still considerable clout armies, mostly they still wore a coat, but no rail tanks more. Some of the units were still called legio , but were only 1,000 to a maximum of 2,000 men strong. Many soldiers that Aëtius had mobilized seem to have been limitanei , these were often recruited from the local population around the locations. Although this reduced mobility, the morale of these troops, who defended their own communities and families, was all the higher. The imperial movement army , the comitatenses , apparently no longer played a major role in West Rome around the middle of the 5th century, as the endless internal and external conflicts had led to high losses among this elite troop, which could not be compensated due to the empty state coffers. Aëtius seems to have opposed Attila with everything he still had in the way of Roman troops, including certainly comitatenses . Many were mounted.
The Ripuarian Franks were probably just as armed as the above-mentioned Franks on the right bank of the Rhine. The Burgundians on both sides were apparently armed only with long swords. Since the Battle of Adrianople in 378 the Visigothic warriors had increasingly moved from infantry to cavalry through the striking example of the Alan cavalry. At least two thirds of the Visigothic contingent were therefore mounted. They were divided into the aristocratic cavalry, armed with chain armor and push spear, and the mass of lightly armed cavalry. The latter usually had no armor, but javelins , long swords and probably small equestrian shields made of wood or several layers of leather. The most widespread among the foot soldiers are spear, long sword and shield, and occasionally simple bows, but no armor whatsoever. Finally, the Alans were very similar to the Huns in terms of their armament and fighting style.
Course of the battle
Jordanes provides a detailed, but heavily literarily revised account of the course of the battle in his Getica . In the course of the late morning Aëtius led the army to battle on the plain between the two camps. Leaning against the river to the north, the Romans stood in the first, the federated Franks and Burgundians in the second, forming the left wing and the left center of the battle order. Adjacent to the south, federated Alans under their leader Sangiban were placed in the center between the Romans and Visigoths. It is said that they were placed between the Romans and the Visigoths because Sangiban was considered unreliable. Subsequent to them, a large contingent of Visigoths under Theodoric I held the right part of the center and the right wing up to the first forests. In the northeast, behind the hill, Aëtius had also posted a smaller force of the Visigoths under Thorismund , Theodoric's son, who were supposed to threaten the right flank of the Huns from there. It was not until noon that Attila also led his army out of the camp to accept the offered battle. According to Jordanes, his battle line-up was as follows: At the southern foot of the hill, the troops of the Gepids, Burgundians and Franks stood as the right wing. Adjacent to the south stood the Hunnic cavalry, which formed an elongated center and whose front stretched from the right part of the Romans over the front of the Alans and the left part of the Visigoths. To the south of it, the Ostrogoths stood as the left wing opposite the right wing of the Visigoths up to the woods.
In the early afternoon the battle began with the attack of the Huns in the center and the Ostrogoths on the left wing. The Alans could not or would not withstand the attack and allegedly fled when they first encountered the enemy. To the left and right of it, however, the Romans and Visigoths equally halted the attack. At this point Thorismund attacked over the hilltop with his dismounted warriors. Thereupon Ardarich, the leader of the Gepids, threw part of his troops at them. The Goths could hold the hill, but could not advance any further. As a result of the Alans' flight in the center, the Visigoths now got into a crisis. They were attacked both head-on by Huns and Ostrogoths and on the left flank by breached Huns riders. Confusion spread and for a moment it looked like the Visigoth army was going to panic.
In the midst of his people, Theodoric, according to Jordanes, who wants to emphasize the heroism of the Goths, gathered his warriors for renewed resistance on two sides. At this point, Attila let his troops attack the Romans, presumably to prevent Aëtius from sending help to the Visigoths. In doing so, however, he made the tactical mistake of only attacking the Romans head-on, although he could have got them into the open flank from the south. However, thanks to the high penetration power of the composite archers, the frontal attacks could be repulsed time and again with high losses on the Hunnic side. Nevertheless, the situation on the right wing was becoming increasingly critical and it seemed only a matter of time before the Visigoths collapsed under the double attack from the front and from the side.
Finally, Theodoric fell from his horse after being hit by a javelin (allegedly hit by an Ostrogoth named Andages of the Amal family ) and was immediately trampled to death by numerous hooves. But it was precisely this event that drove the Visigoths to bitter resistance. Now it was no longer about the battle, but about revenge for their rex . The Ostrogoths' attacking power slowly began to weaken, and on the other hand, Thorismund, on the news of his father's death, led his troops down the hill in a death-defying attack. In the confused hand-to-hand combat, he almost fell into the hands of the Gepids. In this fight the heavy losses that the Gepids had suffered in the nightly battle took their revenge. Eventually the entire right wing was thrown back and, despite Ardarich's efforts, escaped.
Now Attila made his second tactical mistake. Instead of stopping the attacks on the Romans and strengthening his right wing against Thorismund, he continued to attack, allegedly in the hope that Aëtius would be killed in the process. The attacks on Aëtius' front were both unsuccessful and costly. At the other end of the Hunnic battle line, the Ostrogoths were harassed more and more until they finally turned to flee. The situation had changed fundamentally. It was already getting dark when Aëtius let his front advance. The exhausted Huns, who were now threatened on both flanks and now also attacked from the front, could no longer build up a successful defense. Attila ordered the withdrawal to the wagon castle in good time, even before the supposedly foreseeable collapse of his army. That night, Aëtius and Thorismund locked Attila's army in his camp, according to Jordanes.
After the battle
The next morning, Attila found himself locked in and allegedly believed that he was completely lost. According to Jordanes, he even had a pyre built from wooden horse saddles on which he wanted to be burned when the enemy army first broke through. But it did not come to that, allegedly because Aëtius had now turned from an army master back to a politician. According to Jordanes, he feared that the Visigoths, under a vigorous rex , would no longer be satisfied with the federation status in Aquitaine after the fall of the Huns as a common enemy. So he supposedly convinced Thorismund of the need to return to Toulouse as soon as possible in order to assert his claim to the crown against his brothers. This was actually able to establish itself as the new rex .
However, from then on the army master had to forego Visigoth help, as Thorismund was his personal enemy, which some modern researchers suggest that he actually withdrew against the will of Aëtius. In 453 he had the Goths murdered.
In any case, Aëtius himself, whose army had also suffered heavy losses, set out on the second day after the battle and had Attila withdraw. For several days he supposedly thought of a trap before he discovered through scouts that there was no enemy army left in the area. Thereupon he withdrew across the Rhine.
Consequences and meaning of the battle
The battle obviously ended with a tactical success for Aëtius. Contrary to the claims of the Jordanes, the consequences for Attila were apparently not too serious, as he not only remained unchallenged internally, but was able to attack Westrom again with a very large army next year, this time directly in Italy.
For Aëtius, the battle meant maintaining his position in Gaul and at the imperial court, although he was virtually invulnerable anyway. However, this last major defensive effort seems to have finally consumed all western Roman reserves of strength. The losses among the regular troops were very high and could not be compensated in time. In 452, Aëtius could therefore obviously no longer even block the Alpine passes; after his invasion of Italy he could only resist Attila with Eastern Roman troops.
The Battle of the Catalaunian Fields has long been seen as one of the most important decisions in world history, as a defense of the West against Asian hordes. An example of this is the long-told legend that this battle is repeated acoustically every night in the air.
This view has been largely deviated from in historical studies today , since Attila and his goals and possibilities are now viewed more soberly. Even if he had won the battle, that would not have been the end of Rome, but at most the end of Aëtius and his rule in Ravenna. The fact that Attila had planned a permanent conquest of Gaul or other areas is not very realistic - mainly because he did not have the necessary resources and because he was never concerned with conquering the Roman Empire, but with booty for his own Warriors and reputation that had been lost through previous snub.
He succeeded in the former to a limited extent, but not in the latter. When he brought his army, which had been decimated by an epidemic , home from Italy in 452, he had gained nothing. He was still denied all annual allowances, as well as a Roman title that would have brought him prestige, and a foedus that would have regulated his relationship with the west and east. He died in 453, presumably of natural causes. A little later Thorismund was murdered, allegedly at the instigation of Aëtius (see above). Since this now had no opponent to fear, he wanted to cement his position in Ravenna by sharing his son with the daughter of the emperor Valentinian III. engaged. He reacted by killing the overpowering army master 454 himself. Only three years after the battle in the Catalaunian fields all military leaders were dead, and Westrom was heading for a new civil war.
literature
- Henning Börm : Westrom. From Honorius to Justinian . Stuttgart 2018, p. 90 ff.
- Peter J. Heather : The Fall of the Roman Empire . London 2005, p. 333 ff.
- Michael Maas (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Attila . Cambridge 2015.
- Otto J. Maenchen-Helfen : The world of the Huns . Wiesbaden 1997 (German first edition 1978; standard work on the Huns, but partly out of date).
- Franz Georg Maier : The transformation of the Mediterranean world (= Fischer world history . Volume 9). Fischer paperback, Frankfurt am Main 1968.
- Evan Michael Schultheis: The Battle of the Catalaunian Fields AD 451 . Barnsley 2019.
- Gerhard Wirth : Catalaunian fields . In: Lexikon des Mittelalters , Vol. 5, Col. 1058 f.
- Herwig Wolfram : The Empire and the Teutons . Berlin 1990.
Web links
- Grigori Tomski: Champs catalauniques (French)
Individual evidence
- ↑ Simon MacDowall: Catalaunian Fields AD 451. Rome's last great battle , Bloomsbury, London 2015, p. 55.
- ↑ Peter Geiss, Konrad Vössing: Die Völkerwanderung: Myth - Research - Mediation . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020, ISBN 978-3-8470-1154-5 ( google.com [accessed June 20, 2021]).
- ↑ Martin Schanz: History of Roman literature: up to the legislative work of Emperor Justinian . CH Beck, 1969, ISBN 978-3-406-01398-0 ( google.com [accessed June 20, 2021]).
- ↑ Demandt, Magister militum , Col. 654–656.
- ↑ Priskos , frg. 17 [Blockley]. See Henning Börm : Westrom. From Honorius to Justinian . Stuttgart 2013, p. 81 ff.
- ↑ Jordanes , Getica 224.
- ↑ Reinhard Pohanka: The migration of people . marixverlag, 2014, ISBN 978-3-8438-0244-4 .
- ↑ Alexander Demandt: The late antiquity. 2nd Edition. Munich 2007, p. 188; Raimund Schulz: Generals, warriors and strategists. War in antiquity from Achilles to Attila. Stuttgart 2012, p. 408.
- ^ Hydatius, Chronicon for the year 453.
- ↑ Timo Stickler: The Huns. Munich 2007, p. 99f.
- ↑ Otto Maenchen-Helfen: The world of the Huns. Wiesbaden 1997, p. 97ff.