Rheinisch-Westphalian coal syndicate

The Rheinisch-Westfälischer Kohlen-Syndikat (RWKS) can be understood in two ways:

• a no longer existing sales and distribution organization for Ruhrkohle based in Essen or else
• a also historical syndicate cartel , which included the above sales and distribution organization as an executive body, but also consisted of other bodies.

The RWKS as a sales organization (founded in 1893) had the legal form of an AG. The parallel to it existing "Association of the coal mine owners" of the coal mining of the Ruhr area was not organized as a corporation, but as a society under civil law.

The RWKS as a syndicate in the sense of the scientific cartel theory was a "higher order" cartel , i. H. a particularly highly developed and stable business cartel : Due to the monopoly of sales in the central sales point, the cartelized mines (as a rule) no longer had their own sales departments and no longer had access to customers .

The meaning of the word Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat was expanded pars pro toto, i.e. from the part (= sales organization ). towards the whole (= syndicate cartel ). It ran parallel to a similar change in the term in the scientific cartel theory, where the word syndicate for cartels with centralized sales was not used until around 1900 .

the sales logo of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal cartel, around 1910

history

Shares in the AG Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat for 300 marks from January 10, 1918

The Syndikats-AG for the distribution of Ruhr hard coal existed between 1893 and 1945. It was officially dissolved in 1945.

The RWKS was founded in February 1893 by Emil Kirdorf as the successor to various smaller mining cartels . The syndicate was - as the main energy supplier of the German Reich and the main coke supplier in continental Europe - always significant and controversial in terms of economic policy:

• In 1900, bad planning and / or excessive pursuit of profit led to the so-called coal emergency, a supply crisis.
• In 1901 the pricing policy of the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikats triggered the Kartellquete , a committee of inquiry into the role of cartels
• Between 1904 and 1911 there were greater tensions between the RWKS and the Bergfiskus (the Prussian state and its Ruhr collieries). In 1904, the syndicate thwarted the takeover of the Hibernia mining company by the state of Prussia, which in turn retaliated with reluctance to approve new explorations.
• In 1912 the Prussian state mines were associated with the RWKS, which was terminated in 1913.
• In 1915 the syndicate threatened to break up under the conflicting interests of its members caused by the war. The extension of the syndicate agreement was only possible under state pressure.
• After the November Revolution of 1918, the coal syndicate was converted into a semi-public corporation with the participation of the Free State of Prussia with extended co-determination .
• In 1923, during the French occupation of the Ruhr area , its seat was temporarily relocated to Hamburg .
• In 1934 the cartel was supplemented by the mines of the Aachen mining district and in 1935 by those of the Saarland and was then sometimes called the "West German coal syndicate".
• In 1941, the RWKS became part of the Reich Coal Association , a steering association of the National Socialist economy.
• Before the end of the war in 1945, the sales areas for the Bavarian pitch coal mines were defined within the RWKS.
• In 1945 the cartel was officially dissolved by the occupying powers . However, the functions of the RWKS were essentially retained; they were taken over and exercised by successor organizations, which were mainly named differently. These were 1947–1952 the German coal sales and 1952–1956 the community organization Ruhrkohle (GEORG). The later Ruhrkohle AG from 1968 can be seen as a continuation of the RWKS in corporate form.

Purpose and function

The RWKS was a sales cartel with central pricing and volume regulation. The aim of the syndicate was to prevent "unhealthy" competition among the mines involved by controlling these market parameters . Due to its importance as a central sales organ, the RWKS-AG became an important branch and economic policy institution for the companies involved, which procured market information, made international contacts and brought together heavy industry entrepreneurs to determine uniform opinions and positions.

The RWKS set new participation figures, i.e. funding quantities, for each colliery every year. In particular, self- consumption and credits were not taken into account. This favored the emergence of smelter mines , because the vertical integration with steel and smelting companies counted their enormous consumption as own consumption and a mine could thus bypass the delivery rate limitation. Major users of this approach were Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen .

The RWKS and its predecessors also promoted further cartel formation in the Ruhr area through the cohesion of their members. Since 1888, several economically smaller syndicates have been set up to recycle waste materials and by-products . The AG Ruhrgas (today: E.ON Ruhrgas) from 1926 had its origins here as a cross-company solution for the recovery of the coke oven gases.

Rank and reputation

The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate has been a model of organizational art since it was founded in 1893 and has been an "ideal cartel" worldwide for decades (demonstrably still in 1939). Similar highly renowned syndicate cartels only existed in the steel sector, such as the German Steelworks Association of 1904 or the International Crude Steel Export Association in 1933/39. The RWKS had a direct and indirect influence on the German and international cartel movement for many years and was considered a model for association reorganizations. For example, other national cartel groups in the international steel cartel took over the organizational procedures of the German Ruhr industry from 1933. Tightly organized syndicate cartels were considered to be particularly successful insofar as they stipulated prices and quantities at the same time, monopolized the sales of their members via the joint sales point, thereby enabling effective joint control and providing for financial or commercial "compensation" for deviations from the business plan.

Headquarters, building, monument preservation

Business building of the Rhein.-Westf. Coal Syndicate around 1900 (then Frau-Berta- [Krupp] -Straße from the east)

Business building of the Rhein.-Westf. Coal Syndicate around 1910 (top left: representative new wing from 1905)

Evonik corporate headquarters: the Syndikats- and Ruhrkohlehaus were located here (former Frau-Berta-Krupp-Strasse from the west)

In 1893, fierce competition broke out between the cities of Bochum , Dortmund and Essen for the headquarters of the newly founded RWKS . Essen won this competition - thanks to an extremely affordable offer (building and land free) and due to its central location in the Ruhr area and at other coal institutions. According to the syndicate's wishes , the city fathers had a representative building erected by 1894 (Frau-Berta-Krupp-Strasse), which received an extension in 1905 (Syndikatstrasse, later: Gärtnerstrasse). At the turn of the century, more than 100 people worked there; In 1935 the RWKS had 895 employees.

In 1943 the syndicate building fell victim to an Allied air raid, with the exception of the 1905 extension. 1949–1952, the building was rebuilt according to plans from 1936, whereby the remaining part from 1905 was integrated into the new building. The new " Ruhrkohlehaus " initially had the same function - central sales point for Ruhrkohle - as it did during the actual syndicate times. In 1952 the " German coal sales " was renamed the " Ruhr coal community organization ". In 1957 the building was divided up by a large number of improvised partition walls for at least optical “unbundling” of three formally independent sales companies, which, however, actually remained continuous through secret intermediate doors.

In 1997 the Ruhrkohlehaus was torn down to make way for a representative new building for the headquarters of Ruhrkohle AG . The responsible monument preservation office of the Rhineland Regional Association had spoken out in favor of preserving the building in a report from 1990. This statement was justified with the historical significance of the city, not with the special economic culture of a highly developed cartel or the earlier world reputation of the RWKS. The city of Essen gave in to the demolition request from Ruhrkohle AG, including a change in street layouts and names. The headquarters of Evonik , a spin-off of Ruhrkohle AG , has been located where the world's most famous syndicate cartel had its seat (without any indication of a plaque) .

Organizational structure of the syndicate cartel

The RWSK as a syndicate cartel consisted of the following main bodies:

• the "mine owners meeting",
• the "Advisory Board" for ongoing control tasks,
• the "committees", permanent and temporary as well
• the joint sales point (RWSK-AG). In addition to the management, the AG itself also comprised the “General Assembly of the Mine Owners” and the “Supervisory Board” - in apparent duplication.

Operationally, the advisory board was the main organ of the coal cartel. The general assembly of the mine owners, however, was legally and politically the last and highest authority of the RWKS as a syndicate cartel .

Chairwoman of the supervisory board of the sales company

Representatives from larger member companies regularly qualified for the chairmanship of the supervisory board at RWKS AG:

• 1893–1925 Emil Kirdorf , General Director of Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG ,
• 1925–1927 Albert Vögler , Chairman of the Board of United Steel Works ,
• 1927–1935 Erich Fickler , General Director of Harpener Bergbau AG ,
• 1935–1942 Hermann Kellermann , board member of Gutehoffnungshütte ,
• 1942–1945 Herbert Kauert , board member of Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG , at the time a subsidiary of the United Steelworks .

“The personal ties between the AG and the [colliery] association were close: the chairman of the AG's supervisory board and the chairman of the civil society company were usually united in one person. In Emil Kirdorf, the personal union of the chairman of the mine owners' meeting, the supervisory board and the advisory board is most evident over the decades. "

Relationship to National Socialism

In the 1930s, left-wing Reich German politicians and later those who had fled into exile from Hitler sought to bring the German cartels closer to National Socialism . In the 1940s this was repeated by American and European neoliberals. The RWKS was an ideal target for this because of its economic size and importance. Later research, however, rehabilitated the leaders and officials of this syndicate on important points.

In 1931 various rumors circulated that the Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlen-Syndikat would participate in the financing of the NSDAP . Sun announced Rudolf Breitscheid , the parliamentary leader of the SPD , on 14 October in front of the Reichstag , he learned that the coal industry a levy of 50 cent per tonne coal to the NSDAP and the DNVP pay. This was unlikely because the cost of producing a ton of coal was less than this amount. If this were the case, the two parties would have had around 50 million Reichsmarks a year at their disposal, a sum that was obviously too high. The Upper President of Saxony Carl Falck reported something similar to the Prussian Interior Minister Carl Severing in December 1931 : He had received a message "which goes back to industrial circles", according to which the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate had donated approximately two million Reichsmarks to the NSDAP in 1931. These rumors could never be confirmed: The long-time managing director of the coal syndicate Albert Janus declared in 1947 in lieu of oath that there had been no payments to the NSDAP before 1933. The American historian Henry Ashby Turner , who has examined the relationship between big industry and the NSDAP in detail, could not find any evidence of this in the archives. The fact that representatives of the Social Democrat- led Prussian state government and the socialist trade unions have been on its supervisory board since 1919 also makes it unlikely that the Nazis would be financed by the coal syndicate.

research

At the Ruhr University Bochum (Chair of Economic and Corporate History), a DFG-funded research project "Sales and sales strategies of the West German hard coal mining in the first half of the 20th century" is ongoing. The German Mining Museum has been funding a doctoral scholarship since the summer of 2011 (research project "The sales organization of the RKWS on the national market, 1896–1933").

See also

• Central German lignite syndicate

Individual evidence

1. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 110.
2. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 96.
3. ↑ Dieter Wilhelm: The Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat and the Upper Silesian Coal Convention until 1933. Erlangen 1966, pp. 76–79.
4. ↑ Dieter Wilhelm: The Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat and the Upper Silesian Coal Convention until 1933. Erlangen 1966, pp. 75, 79.
5. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 89.
6. ↑ Hans Spethmann: Building blocks for the history of the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlen-Syndikats (special print from the Deutsche Kohlenzeitung, year 1943, p. 41 ff), Berlin 1943, p. 10.
7. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 224.
8. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 324.
9. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 505.
10. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, p. 84.
11. ↑ John Gillingham: To the prehistory of the coal and steel union. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 34, 1986, pp. 382-384. (PDF)
12. ^ Günter Streich: The exchange of black diamonds. Ruhrkohle in Essen - history and stories. Essen 1996, p. 17.
13. ^ Günter Streich: The exchange of black diamonds. Ruhrkohle in Essen - history and stories. Essen 1996, p. 22.
14. ^ Günter Streich: The exchange of black diamonds. Ruhrkohle in Essen - history and stories. Essen 1996, pp. 44, 49.
15. ^ Günter Streich: The exchange of black diamonds. Ruhrkohle in Essen - history and stories. Essen 1996, p. 53.
16. ^ Günter Streich: The exchange of black diamonds. Ruhrkohle in Essen - history and stories. Essen 1996, p. 49.
17. ^ Evelyn Kroker , Norma von Ragenfeld: Finding aid for inventory 33: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat: 1893–1945 (= publications from the German Mining Museum Bochum / German Mining Museum Bochum ). Bochum 1980, S. V; Dieter Wilhelm: The Rheinisch-Westphalian coal syndicate and the Upper Silesian coal convention up to 1933. Erlangen 1966, pp. 41–48.
18. ↑ Dieter Wilhelm: The Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat and the Upper Silesian Coal Convention until 1933. Erlangen 1966, p. 48.
19. ^ Evelyn Kroker, Norma von Ragenfeld: Finding aid for inventory 33: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat: 1893–1945 (= publications from the German Mining Museum Bochum / German Mining Museum Bochum ). Bochum 1980, p. VIII.
20. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, pp. 272–278.
21. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner : The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. Siedler Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 223ff.
22. ^ Georg Franz-Willing: The Hitler Movement 1925 to 1934 . Preussisch-Oldendorf 2001, p. 333.
23. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner: The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. 1985, p. 476.
24. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner: The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. 1985, pp. 3ff, pp. 224-230 and ö.
25. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner: The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler. 1985, p. 227.
26. ↑ Sales and sales strategies of West German coal mining in the first half of the 20th century. ruhr-uni-bochum.de

literature

• Oskar Stillich : Hard coal industry (= political economic research in the field of large industrial enterprise. Volume 2) Jäh & Schunke, Leipzig 1906, OCLC 16399750 .
• Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. History of theory studies. Hildesheim 2013, ISBN 978-3-487-14840-3 .
• Günter Streich: The exchange of black diamonds. Ruhrkohle in Essen - history and stories. Essen 1996, ISBN 3-922785-32-8 .
• Dieter Wilhelm: The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate and the Upper Silesian Coal Convention until 1933. Erlangen 1966, DNB 481375414 .

Web links

• Early documents and newspaper articles about Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat in the press kit of the 20th century of the ZBW - Leibniz Information Center for Economics .