Live and let live (First World War)

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British officers cook at the front. The smoke from cooking fires could easily attract artillery fire, but “live and let live” was often the order of the day during mealtimes.

As a live and let live the spontaneous emergence of non-aggressive behavior is between military units called, who, during the First World War were facing at the front as enemies. After the first occurrence, this behavior could be expanded into a system of unstable cooperation. This happened through the avoidance of violence or the ritualized use of violence without intent to injure, as well as through de-escalation , but also through predictable and moderate retaliation in the event of violations of the implicit agreements. In contrast to open fraternization, communication with the opponent usually took place through (non-) action instead of language. The behavior pattern occurred particularly during prolonged phases of stagnation in trench warfare on the western front . The best-known, albeit atypical example is the Christmas Peace of 1914 . The system was most widespread on quiet sections of the front between November 1914 and the end of 1916, before it was undermined by offensive patrols and shock troops on the orders of higher staff, only to collapse completely with the German spring offensive of 1918 and the subsequent war of movement . The “live-and-let-live” strategy is a subject of study in game theory .

principle

Occur

The life-and-let-live principle manifested itself in the deliberate refusal to use violence during the war. Typical forms of behavior in terms of the principle were:

  • During the time the food is brought to the front and consumed, there is practically a ceasefire .
  • Field artillery that fires at the same time every day at the same spot in no man's land or behind enemy trenches, making artillery fire predictable and easy to avoid
  • Work commands, exposed at night in no man's land, repairing field fortifications and repairing barbed wire entanglements, while ignoring each other
  • Snipers who aim to miss; in individual cases at the same point on a house in the back country of the enemy until a hole was made in the wall

This behavior occurred at the level of smaller units, typically up to battalion size . This results from the social cohesion of these units, in which deviant (too aggressive) behavior of individual soldiers would have been punished informally. Battalions were also relieved together and rotated with other battalions on duty at the front. During the handover to the following unit, the local customs of live-and-let-live were often passed on orally.

Not all units regularly participate in live-and-let-live when given the opportunity. On both sides of the front there were units that "quickly turned a quiet section into a hornet's nest". Ashworth (1980) calls these battalions " elite units" and lists the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Welch Fusiliers and the 1st Battalion of the Royal West Kents as examples on the British side . The naming of the battalion numbers is relevant for British regiments, as the battalions with higher numbers were assigned to the traditional regiments ("Regular Army"), but came from the New Army or Territorial Army . On the German side, the guards regiments and certain regiments of the Prussian line infantry were considered less inclined to apply the principle of life-and-let-live. In contrast, the Saxon regiments had a reputation for following the principle with pleasure.

Creation and maintenance

The live-and-let-live principle was seldom agreed in open local armistices , as was the case with the Christmas Peace of 1914. More often it came about through demonstrative behavior: either through not using the weapons, where this would have been easily possible, or through use in a purely ritual or predictable form. The latter signaled the non-fatal intention and kept the appearance of aggressive behavior in front of superiors. The reason could also be external conditions that made fighting very difficult, such as heavy rain and the associated mud and flooded trenches.

British artillery officers in the front area in front of the entrance to their shelter, which was "better secured and more comfortable" than a trench

In addition to the practical consideration that adhering to the principle would ensure their own survival, many soldiers were reluctant to kill their directly visible counterparts without a fight having preceded it. The artillery, which only fired at coordinates, had no such inhibitions. In addition, the artillery was subject to less retaliation. The trench crews therefore tried to persuade the artillery observation officers assigned to them , who directed the fire, to comply with the principle. This was done, for example, through preferential provision of food and a safe shelter for the observer; direct agreements between infantry officers and artillery observers have also been handed down. Field artillery batteries were often assigned to a specific battalion over a longer period of time so that social bonds could be formed. Coordination with the heavy artillery , which was also controlled centrally, was more problematic . If it was known that one's own heavy artillery was deployed in the front line, the enemy trench crews were sometimes warned by signals.

After the principle had been practiced once by means of a tacit agreement between the front troops, it then perpetuated itself - " Sleeping dogs should not be woken up ". If one side did use violence, this was responded to locally with precisely counted counter-violence, often according to the “three-to-one” principle: the answer was given to a targeted shot by the other side that did not comply with the live-and-let-live principle with three aimed shots, and then ceased fire.

Possible retaliation for breaches of the Principle was important to its upkeep. Paradoxically, therefore, the sections of the front where the trenches faced each other within calling and throwing distance were the safest. In mountainous sections such as in the Vosges , the ditches were sometimes only a few meters apart. Even the use of hand grenades without warning would have been devastating and was therefore avoided. Instead, the trenches there were lavishly constructed using pioneering techniques, which would have been impossible without mutual ignoring of the construction teams.

Attitude of the military leadership

Generals, commanders from regimental level and senior staff officers who were not themselves exposed to the direct action of enemy fire were not part of the life-and-let-live agreements and behavior. Nevertheless, there was an awareness of the existence of the system at higher levels. However, the relationship to this was not always clear: The existence of quiet sections of the front was used to recover worn-out units. On the other hand, the indirect cooperation of the front troops with the enemy harbored the risk of the fighting spirit being worn down to the point of fraternization . In the worst case, the leadership feared a resulting refusal to give orders and mutiny , should it come back to direct attack orders . From a strategic point of view, the English and French general staff were definitely interested in a war of attrition, since the resources of the Central Powers did not seem up to it in the long term.

Pragmatic considerations for the recovery of troop units and the reduction of casualty rates in static situations led, at least in certain front sections or periods of time, to a tacit tolerance of the system of life-and-let-live by the military command. Nevertheless, the system on both sides of the front was in fundamental opposition to the current military doctrine and the ideals of aggressive masculinity . On the British side, the desired attitude was called "offensive spirit" (aggressive spirit). In a service regulation on trench warfare from 1916, the GHQ warned against passivity and lethargy and recommended, in addition to constant preoccupation with the expansion of the fortifications, the interference attack on the enemy as the best therapy for its own troops:

“[T] he state of comparative inactivity, which is the normal condition of life in the trenches, is very unfavorable to the development of these qualities [dash and gallantry of a very high order] in officers and men. There is an insidious tendency to lapse into a passive and lethargic attitude, against which officers of all ranks have to be on their guard, and the fostering of the offensive spirit, under such unfavorable conditions, calls for incessant attention. [...] Constant activity in harassing the enemy may lead to reprisals at first, and for this reason is sometimes neglected, but, if persevered in, it always results in an ultimate mastery. "

“Life in the trenches is characterized by persistent inactivity. This condition has a very unfavorable effect on the development of desired qualities such as cutting edge and bravery in officers and soldiers. There is a creeping tendency to lapse into a passive and lethargic attitude. Officers of all ranks must be on their guard against this - promoting the offensive spirit in such unfavorable conditions requires incessant attention. [...] Constant fire and aggression against the enemy can initially lead to counterattacks, and for this reason is sometimes avoided. However, if the interference is sustained, this ultimately leads to superiority. "

- General Headquarters : Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare (1916)

On the French side, the contradiction between live-and-let-live and the ideal of the “ offensive à outrance ” (attack to the extreme) was even greater. Even if the French leadership had abandoned the pure ideal of an infantry frontal attack after horrific losses in the first months of the war, the attack remained a target by all means. It was not until 1917 that the French commander-in-chief Pétain turned away from it under the impression of the widespread mutinies in his army.

Countermeasures

The higher levels used statistics on their own losses, ammunition consumption and reports of attacks to analyze the attacking spirit of their own troops. Since the ammunition consumption due to predictable and intentionally untargeted fire was not sufficiently informative, patrols and raiding parties were ordered. Enemy prisoners had to be brought in to prove the violent conduct, but at least a piece of the opposing barbed wire or a piece of equipment belonging to opposing soldiers.

On December 4, 1917, a directive was issued in the French army prohibiting open fraternization, which was signed by its Commander-in-Chief Pétain. Another such directive followed on January 29, 1918: "Anyone who talks to enemy soldiers in the trenches is to be handed over to a court martial because of 'secret connections to the enemy'".

The live-and-let-live system was fragile at all times and could be destroyed by deadly force. In the end, this was done by centrally arranged raiding troops and commandos, often carried out by units or volunteers who were newly transferred to the front section. As a result, the balance between life-and-let-live could not be maintained, because the voluntary avoidance of violence by a front troop unit could not prevent the ordered deployment of shock troops on the other side. The practice declined in the course of 1917 except for a few quiet front sections such as the Vosges. In March 1918, with the German spring offensive, the war of movement returned to the western front, making the principle of life-and-let-live finally obsolete.

Contemporary witness reports

The first, widespread account of the life-and-let-live system was published by John Hay Beith in 1915 under the name of Ian Hay. Beith was an officer in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from April 1915 on the front lines in France, as one of the first 100,000 in the New Army. His book The First Hundred Thousand was a compilation of articles he wrote for Blackwood's Magazine . The book was translated into several languages ​​and read and discussed both at the front and at home. It says about night work in no man's land and dealing with supplies in the early morning hours:

“We perform our nocturnal tasks, in front of and behind the firing trench, amid a perfect hail of star-shells and magnesium lights, topped up at times by a searchlight. [...] The curious and uncanny part of it all is that there is no firing. During these brief hours there exists an informal truce, founded on the principle of live and let live. [...] It would be child's play to shell the road behind the enemy's trenches, crowded as it must be with ration-wagons and water-carts, into a blood-stained wilderness. But so long as each side confines itself to purely defensive and recuperative work, there is little or no interference. [...] After all, if you prevent your enemy from drawing his rations, his remedy is simple: he will prevent you from drawing yours. Then both parties will have to fight on empty stomachs, and neither of them, tactically, will be a penny the better. So, unless some elaborate scheme of attack is brewing, the early hours of the night are comparatively peaceful. "

“We carry out our nightly work, in front of and behind the trenches, lit by a real hail of flares and flares, reinforced from time to time by a searchlight. […] The curious and uncanny thing about it is that there is no shooting. During these short hours there is an informal truce based on the 'live and let live' principle. [...] It would be child's play to cover the street behind the enemy trenches with artillery fire. That street, now crammed with wagons full of supplies and water, would then be nothing but blood-smeared nothing. But as long as either side restricts itself to purely defensive work or recreation, there is little or no interference. [...] Because whoever prevents the enemy from receiving his food will feel his antidote: he will now prevent his own food from arriving. Then both sides have to fight on empty stomachs and nobody gets any benefit from it. So unless a major attack is imminent, the early hours of the night are comparatively peaceful. "

- Ian Hay : The First Hundred Thousand (1915)

The English poet Edmund Blunden described in his war memoirs published in 1928 how his unit replaced the Royal Welch Fusiliers in the village of Boezinge on the Ypres front. The position and its degree of expansion were precarious, so that the survival of Blunden's comrades depended on live-and-let-live:

“Our future, in short, depended on the observance of the 'Live and Let Live Principle', one of the soundest elements in trench. Unfortunately it was not invariably observed. "

“In short, our future depended on adherence to the 'live and let live' principle, one of the most meaningful parts of trench warfare. Unfortunately, the principle was not always followed. "

- Edmund Blunden : Undertones of War (1928)
Front course at Hartmannswillerkopf on the Vosges front, in the foreground on the right the French trenches, in the full field of fire of the German "Feste Dora" on the left

The French journalist Gabriel Chevallier processed his own war experiences in his war memoirs published in 1930. In it he describes the fortification work on a section of the Vosges front, where the trenches on both sides were badly damaged by artillery fire. In some places in the mountainous terrain, the no man's land was only a few dozen meters wide:

“The trench, which is almost leveled, is lined with a line of entrenching soldiers who have placed their rifles next to them. At a distance of twenty meters one can also hear the clatter of spades, and the bent soldiers are easy to see. The Germans work there, this section of the front is a single construction site. "

- Gabriel Chevallier : La Peur (1930)

In the original version of his war diaries, Ernst Jünger reported repeatedly on how he “got to know and also appreciate” the system of life-and-let-live. In the seven later editions of his work In Stahlgewittern , which emerged from the diaries, Jünger removed such texts with descriptions of calm, yes, comfort on the one hand and an uninhibited thirst for adventure on the other, and thus decided on the one-sided representation of a war experience of "eschatologically inflated war elites".

Representations by historians

The most important study of the phenomenon comes from the English historian Anthony E. (Tony) Ashworth, who examined the subject using the diaries , letters and testimonies of war veterans of the British Army and published it for the first time in 1968, and included all 57 British divisions in his investigation who had fought for at least three months. He also conducted a number of background interviews with war veterans, but limited his analysis to contemporary written documents. He only used official documents and service regulations insofar as countermeasures against the life-and-let-live principle could be read from them. This procedure is explained by the fact that failure to mention facts that would put an officer or staff in a negative light in the hierarchical system of the army does not imply the absence of the facts. "Absence of proof is not proof of absence", only in this case the evidence is limited to private written material. Ashworth found that 56 of the 57 divisions examined had, at least intermittently, informal truces and / or the upholding of life-and-let-live. In his book Trench warfare 1914–1918 , Ashworth summarized in 1980 that life-and-let-live-was well known among British soldiers and officers with frontline experience during wartime. Most often the system occurred when a unit was withdrawn from combat and deployed on a quiet sector of the front. Overall and averaged over the war period, calm sections of the front (“cushy sectors”) made up about a third of the length of the front held by British troops.

The American historian Leonard V. Smith published his dissertation in 1994, in which he presented the history of the French 5th Infantry Division in World War I. A particular focus of the work was the relations between men and officers and the mutinies of 1917 . Smith argues in direct reference to Ashworth's theses that live-and-let-live was by no means a temporary, unspoken truce. Instead, the degree of prevailing violence in trench warfare is always a point on a continuum when major attacks are excluded. This continuum ranges from an effective truce with a few deliberately untargeted shots per day to practically constant fire from artillery, grenade launchers and snipers combined with patrols, raiding parties and raids. Neither men nor officers nor the general staff expected the decision of the war in trench warfare , which was a stalemate on a strategic level . Therefore, it was always about choosing a point in the violence continuum that made sense at the time, and not about an either-or decision. In practice, this choice was negotiated between men and officers - mostly not explicitly, but rather by following or not or apparently following orders.

In 2005, the book Frères de tranchées ("Brothers of the Trench") published by Marc Ferro was published , in which French, British and German historians were involved. In addition to a renewed investigation of the Christmas peace of 1914, the work contains statements about fraternization and the avoidance of violence between British and German troops on the western front as well as about the (non) fighting spirit of the Austro-Hungarian army, both based on files of the military letter censorship . In the case of Russian troops on the Eastern Front , failure to shoot led to fraternization and ultimately to revolution . After the success of the film Merry Christmas about the Christmas peace, the work also appeared in English translation.

Game theory

In 1984, the American political scientist Robert Axelrod , in his highly acclaimed book The Evolution of Cooperation, characterized the situation between the opposing trench crews in World War I as a form of the prisoner's dilemma . In this dilemma from the game theory two hypothetical prisoners as an accomplice charged with a crime. They cannot communicate with each other during interrogation. If both are denied, each receives a low penalty. The denial move is referred to as "cooperate" ( , from "cooperate"). If only one prisoner confesses, he goes unpunished, while the prisoner who denies the act receives the maximum sentence. If both confess, everyone will be punished equally severely. The move of confessing is referred to as "becoming renegade" ( from " defect "). The dilemma is that every prisoner is better off if he confesses - that is the dominant strategy . However, collectively, this is not optimal. When iterative prisoner's dilemma , the situation, as Axelrod changes in several computer simulations show could. The tit for tat strategy prevails . This strategy always starts with a cooperative move. Each subsequent move then mirrors the behavior of the opponent: Cooperation follows cooperation, renegade behavior is answered with renegade behavior.

Axelrod based his game theory theses on trench warfare solely on the investigations of Ashworth, so he did not undertake any historical research of his own on the First World War. Axelrod saw each of the two sides in the trench warfare as one of the prisoners in the dilemma. Not exercising violence against the other side is a cooperative move ( ), whereas exercising violence is a renegade move ( ). Since the same opponents face each other for days and weeks, cooperative behavior can be rewarded and apostate behavior can be punished. This allows the tit for tat strategy to prevail and cooperation develops .

Axelrod's interpretation of live-and-let-live-as a prisoner's dilemma was rejected by political scientist Joanne Gowa in her 1986 review of Axelrod's work. In their opinion, the dilemma of the soldiers at the front should be interpreted as an assurance game .

The philosopher Rudolf Schüßler joined this criticism in his dissertation in 1990. So it is not apparent what direct benefit the individual soldier would derive from aggressive behavior ( ). On the contrary, a targeted shot would draw targeted counterfire at him with a high degree of certainty. On the other hand, a weakening of the enemy would probably not benefit him personally, since any planned attack by the opposing side would not be expected for weeks or months - at this point the soldier's unit would probably be elsewhere.

The statistician Andrew Gelman ( Columbia University ) criticized Axelrod in 2008 with the same argument as Gowa and Schüßler (but without quoting them) and came to the conclusion that life-and-let-live is not a prisoner's dilemma. For the individual soldiers it was less risky, not to shoot ( ), therefore the benefit (is from a game theory perspective English Utility ) from the cooperation greater than the benefits from the non-cooperation . As SLA Marshall pointed out in Men against Fire , the majority of American infantrymen in World War II avoided shooting directly at the enemy - and this in less static situations than those underlying the live-and-let-live system. Despite these glaring flaws, Axelrod's theory is attractive, according to Gelman, because it shows a glimmer of hope despite the inhuman situation of trench warfare. Cooperation is possible even between mortal enemies - this thesis was particularly relevant in 1984, a time when the Cold War was resurgent .

literature

  • Anthony E. Ashworth: The sociology of trench warfare 1914-18 . In: The British Journal of Sociology , Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1968), pp. 407-423, doi : 10.2307 / 588181 .
  • Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980. ( Excerpts ; Current paperback edition: Pan Macmillan, London 2000, ISBN 0-330-48068-5 .)
  • Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . NYU Press, New York 2007, ISBN 978-0-8147-5832-8 , pp. 208-226 .
  • Robert Axelrod: The Evolution of Cooperation . Basic Books, New York 1984, ISBN 0-465-02122-0 . (Chapter 4: "The Live-and-Let-Live System in Trench Warfare in World War I," pp. 73–87.)

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . New York 2007, pp. 208-209.
  2. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, pp. 119 f.
  3. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, p. 114 .
  4. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, pp. 109-110 .
  5. ^ Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . New York 2007, p. 214.
  6. ^ A b Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, p. 45.
  7. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, p. 150.
  8. ^ Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . New York 2007, p. 216.
  9. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, pp. 119-123.
  10. ^ Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . New York 2007, p. 215.
  11. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, pp. 44-45.
  12. ^ Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . New York 2007, p. 221 f.
  13. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system . Macmillan, London 1980, pp. 41-47.
  14. ↑ General Staff, War Office (ed.): Notes for infantry officers on trench warfare . HMSO , London 1916, pp. 10-11. (1917 American reprint online )
  15. ^ Tony Ashworth: The Live and Let Live System . In: Michael S. Neiberg (Ed.): The World War I Reader . New York 2007, p. 221.
  16. ^ André Bach: The mood of the soldiers deployed on the French front from 1917 to 1918 according to the documents of the letter censorship . In: Jörg Duppler and Gerhard P. Groß: End of the war 1918 - event, effect, aftermath . Oldenbourg, Munich 1999, ISBN 3-486-56443-9 , pp. 205-206 .
  17. ↑ Ian Hay: The First Hundred Thousand “K (1)” . 1915. Online
  18. ↑ Edmund Blunden: Undertones of War . London 1928, quoted from Ashworth: Trench Warfare 1914–1918 , p. 18 f. The current Blunden edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-871661-7 ) no longer contains this citation.
  19. ↑ Quoted from Jörn Leonhard: The Pandora's Box: History of the First World War , CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66192-1 , p. 335.
  20. ↑ a b Harro Segeberg: From canon to canon: Ernst Jünger as author of the century . In: Matthias von Beilein, Claudia Stockinger, Simone Winko (Hrsg.): Canon, evaluation and mediation - literature in the knowledge society . (= No. 129, Studies and Texts on the Social History of Literature ) de Gruyter, Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-11-025996-4 , p. 111 .
  21. ^ AE Ashworth: The sociology of trench warfare 1914-18 . In: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1968), pp. 407-423.
  22. ↑ Thomas Heinzen, Wind Goodfriend: Case Studies in Social Psychology: Critical Thinking and Application . SAGE, 2018, ISBN 978-1-5443-0890-6 . (Chapter 10.2 The Bacon Truce: Zig Zags and the Development of Co-operation )
  23. ^ Tony Ashworth: Trench warfare 1914–1918: the live and let live system. Macmillan, London 1980.
  24. ↑ Leonard V. Smith: Between mutiny and obedience: the case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I . Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1994, ISBN 0-691-03304-8 .
  25. ^ Leonard V. Smith: Between mutiny and obedience . Princeton 1994, pp. 89-91.
  26. ↑ Marc Ferro, Olaf Müller, Malcolm Brown, Rémy Cazals: Frères de tranchées . Perrin, Paris 2005, ISBN 2-262-02159-7 .
  27. ↑ Marc Ferro, Malcolm Brown, Rémy Cazals, Olaf Mueller: Meetings in No Man's Land: Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War , translated from the French by Helen McPhail. Constable, London 2007, ISBN 978-1-4721-1280-4 . ( Extracts )
  28. ^ A b Robert Axelrod: The Evolution of Cooperation . New York 1984, pp. 73-87.
  29. ^ Joanne Gowa: Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations . In: International Organization , Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), pp. 167-186, JSTOR 2706746 .
  30. ^ Rudolf Schüßler: Cooperation among egoists: 4 dilemmas . Oldenbourg, Munich 1990, ISBN 978-3-486-55836-4 , pp. 25-32 .
  31. ^ Andrew Gelman: Methodology as ideology: Some comments on Robert Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation" . In: Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria , ISSN 1971-4017, year 2008, no. 2, pp. 167-176.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on November 23, 2018 .