Northern expeditions

date	Spring 228 to August 234
place	Gansu and Shaanxi
output	Strategic victory by Cao Wei

Parties to the conflict

Wei Dynasty

Shu Han
Qiang

Commander

Cao Zhen
Sima Yi

Zhuge Liang

Three Kingdoms Territories in 262

The Northern Expeditions ( Chinese 北伐 , Pinyin běifá ) were a series of five military campaigns by the Shu Empire against the Wei Dynasty in the north . They were all led by the famous strategist and statesman Zhuge Liang . Although they never achieved their purpose and did not bring about a decision in the conflict between the two adversaries, the Northern Expeditions are probably the best-known military confrontation of the Three Kingdoms period . In popular historiography , they are counted with the battle on the Wu-Zhang plain to the six campaigns from Mount Qi (六出祁山) .

background

In the year 227 China was divided into the three realms Wei, Shu and Wu , each of which strove for the reunification of the fallen Han Empire . In the State of Shu, the strategic thought can behind the Northern expeditions to the year 207 be traced, when the then 27-year-old Zhuge Liang his master Liu Bei his Longzhong plan submitted (隆中對). In it he broadly explained the need for a viable geographic base; then he explained a two-speed attack on the north to conquer it. The route ran from the Yi province in the west (approximately today's province of Sichuan ), north through the Qinling Mountains in the valley of the Wei River and from there to a strategic point near the city of Chang'an , from which you had control of the great loop of the Yellow River . The second route led north from Jing Province to Luoyang , the political center.

With the capture of Yi Province in 215 , Liu Bei had the basic requirements to put the plan into practice. The geopolitical interplay that Zhuge Liang had in mind, however, proved to be militarily unstable. The alliance with the Wu empire in the east broke due to the claims to the Jing province occupied by Shu. She was lost to Wu in 219 and Liu Bei died in 223 . At that time, most of the merited Shu generals were also dead; of the Five Tiger Generals only Zhao Yun lived . Shu's position after the Battle of Xiaoting was difficult, but Zhuge Liang managed to reestablish the alliance with Sun Quan of Wu. Now he no longer had to fear his flank, but had to forego the second route of his Longzhong plan.

In his well-known memorandum for the evening of the departure of 227 , he explains to the Emperor Liu Shan in highly ideological terms the motives for his departure from the capital Chengdu : “We should lead the three armies to secure the central plain in the north. If I do my best, we must wipe out the sly, restore Han's house, and return to the old capital. This requires the thing; so I honor the previous emperor (meaning Emperor Xian ) and prove my loyalty to your majesty. "

geography

Schematic representation of the Longzhong plan.

Zhuge Liang's plan was to march north around Hanzhong City , which was the population center of Yi Province. In the 3rd century , the region around Hanzhong was a sparsely populated area surrounded by wild jungle. It was important as a strategic point in the elongated, fertile valley of the Han River between the Qinling and Micang Mountains in the north and south. That is why Hanzhong was the administrative center of the mountainous border area between the Red Basin in the south and the valley of the Wei River in the north. The area also gave access to the arid northwest, and to Gansu .

From a geographical point of view, the jagged barrier of the Qinling Mountains represents the greatest obstacle before Chang'an. This mountain range consists of a series of parallel ridges that run slightly to the southeast and are separated by a labyrinth of branching valleys. Because of the displacements caused by earthquakes, the topographical features present some difficulties. At that time, access from the south was only possible via a few mountain paths, which were called tunnel roads. They crossed important passes and were known for their road-building artistry and their ingenious layout. The oldest path was northwest of Hanzhong and crossed the San Pass. The path called Lianyang ("connected cloud") was established in the 3rd century BC. Chr. Under the Qin Dynasty built to transport goods. It followed the Jialing Valley and exits to the north where the Wei River widens considerably, near the city of Chencang. Another route was the Baoye route, which runs across the Yegu Pass and ends south of Mei. A few smaller and more difficult routes were to the east. One should mention the Ziwu route, which leads directly to Chang'an.

First expedition (228)

Zhuge Liang held a war council in Hanzhong on the implementation of the tactical goal of taking Chang'an. He recommended taking the upper Wei valley in a wide left hook. This is the necessary requirement for taking Chang'an. Commander Wei Yan, however, opposed this plan and proposed a daring advance through the pass in the Qinling Mountains with 10,000 elite soldiers in order to win Chang'an in a surprise attack. He was confident that he could hold the city against Wei until Zhuge Liang arrived with the main force. Zhuge Liang rejected this plan because it was too daring for him; he preferred a more cautious approach. Two smaller armies were sent through the Ji Gorge, one of which was led by Veteran General Zhao Yun . This was supposed to be the bait for Wei to fake a threat to Mei city. The real goal was to capture the Longyou region west of Chang'an: Tianshui, Anding, Nan'an and especially the camp on Mount Qi, the largest bastion in the upper Wei Valley.

Cao Rui , the emperor of Wei, personally went to Chang'an to oversee the defense. Commanding General Cao Zhen secured Mei against Zhao Yun while a 50,000-strong cavalry and infantry force under Zhang He set out to meet Zhuge Liang. In Jieting, Zhang He found the bulk of the Shu army under Ma Su . Because his water supply collapsed, Zhang He was able to easily beat him in the Battle of Jieting and set up a field guard while the remnants of the Shu army fled south. Meanwhile, Zhao Yun's small force encountered significant resistance. Zhuge Liang therefore ordered a total retreat to Hanzhong, because the Wei army now threatened him too. After this defeat, Zhuge Liang had Ma Su executed for his tactical mistakes and then sent a memorandum to the emperor in which he stood up for his Failure kasteite.

Second expedition (228)

Not long after the first expedition ended, Wu den Wei had defeated the Wei in the Battle of Shiting . Because he feared a breakthrough in the valley of the Huai River , Cao Rui strengthened the southeast border by withdrawing troops from the west. Realizing the opportunity, Zhuge Liang made his way through the Qinling Mountains in the winter of that year to take Chencang, the transportation hub for the entire Wei Valley.

The fortified city was held by Hao Zhao with about 1000 men. Cao Zhen warned Hao Zhao to prepare his defense after Zhuge Liang's first expedition.

Although the Shu army was clearly outnumbered with 20,000 men, Hao Zhao declined their surrender offer.

Soon, Zhuge Liang was deploying siege weapons, including armored ladders, siege rams, and turrets. In spite of everything, Chencang could not be won, and the Wei soldiers maintained their stubborn resistance and set the enemy war machinery on fire.

After three weeks, Zhang He arrived with the relief troops and provisions. Because Zhuge Liang's supplies were running low, he ordered the retreat to Hanzhong. One of Zhang He's officers, Wang Shuang, pursued the Shu Army through the Qinling Mountains and was killed in an ambush by Zhuge Liang. The loss of a capable man reminded the Wei generals that they were dealing with an ambush master at Zhuge Liang.

Third expedition (229)

In the spring of 229 , Zhuge Liang went on his third expedition. His goal was still the Longyou region, where he first and foremost wanted to take the territories of Wudu and Yinping. They lay at the foot of the western Qinling Mountains, were quickly conquered and were intended to serve as a stepping stone into the valley of the Wei River. Zhang He, stationed in Tianshui, ordered his officer Guo Huai to attack the Shu Army in the south. Carefully, Zhuge Liang immediately reinforced his vanguard and began the battle with Guo Huai at Jianwei, northwest of Wudu. Guo Huai was defeated, but was able to withdraw and prepared his defensive position. This nullified Zhuge Liang's plan to advance quickly to Tianshui. Zhuge Liang was frustrated that his tactical victory at Jianwei had not brought him any particular strategic benefit, and he feared a stalemate with such a strong enemy as the weakening of his army's strengths and supplies. Therefore, Zhuge Liang withdrew to Hanzhong. With this retreat, he gave up wudu and yinping, the residents of which questioned Shu's credibility.

In the winter of 229 and the spring of 230 , Hanzhong was the scene of a new military development. After learning of a Wei offensive, Zhuge Liang began intensive defense preparations. He even had two 200 km long entrenchments built. The Emperor of Wei had chosen to abandon defensive policies and launched a triple attack on Hanzhong, led by Sima Yi , Cao Zhen and Zhang He. When the offensive began in autumn 230, Wei Yan was sent behind enemy lines with cavalry and infantry units from Chengdu to incite the barbarian contingents of the Wei army against one another and to exchange silk for horses and weapons. The Wei offensive did not really get going. Heavy rains made the mountain trails impassable, and Zhang He feared a revolt in the west. After a few weeks in which they had made little headway, this disastrous campaign was broken off. Zhuge Liang went on a daring march northwest to relieve Wei Yan, who was harassed by Guo Huai on his return. Then he ordered the retreat to Hanzhong.

Fourth expedition (231)

Zhuge Liang undertook his fourth expedition in the spring of 231 with the same immediate goals as in the third: he wanted to take the area around Wudu and Yinping as a deployment base. Zhuge Liang sent messengers to the Xianbei and Qiang tribes to induce them to revolt against the Wei Empire. In addition, the supply of food was improved through the introduction of the “wooden ox”. Even so, the goal of capturing Luoyang was very ambitious, as the Wei's defense situation had improved significantly. The Qi Garrison was an excellent outpost for Tianshui, held by battle-hardened Generals Guo Huai and Dai Ling. The Shu offensive began with a skirmish near Mount Qi camp. General Cao Zhen in command thought it was a mock attack designed to divert attention from a main attack on Chang'an. In early summer, Cao Zhen fell ill and was replaced by Sima Yi, who horrified the camp on Mount Qi with the main forces from Chang'an. When Zhuge Liang found out about this, he withdrew part of the 30,000 men from the siege and tried to capture the surrounding Wei garrisons around Tianshui.

Without the use of strategic control, his enemies played into his hands. Guo Huai was ordered to clash with Sima Yi at the qi camp, but he took the initiative and joined forces with Shanggui garrison commander Fei Yao to poke Zhuge Liang. As soon as they left their defensive positions, the Shu army routed them and left the paths to Longyou open. Even so, Zhuge Liang did not move to Tianshui; perhaps because he feared difficulties with supplies if his army expanded too much. Instead, he had the spring wheat harvested in the area. After examining the situation after Guo Huai and Fei Yao's defeat, Sima Yi conquered the hills east of Shanggui and stopped the advance of the Shu army. When Zhuge Liang's troops finished harvesting, they marched south and stopped to prepare for battle. Sima Yi initially turned down the challenge. But when he heard the mockery and laughter of the Shu army, Sima Yi gave in and attacked with his army head-on, but suffered defeat. Sima Yi was forced to withdraw haphazardly. The Shu Army captured 3,000 armor, 5,000 swords and 3,100 crossbows.

It is astonishing that Zhuge Liang took no advantage of this victory and launched a major offensive. Instead, Wei and Shu's armies at Shanggui were in a stalemate that only Shu could lose because of his limited supplies. In this situation, Li Yan , who was in charge of supplying the Shu Army, realized that the rain had cut off transport from Hanzhong. He reported to Zhuge Liang that Liu Shan had ordered the withdrawal. Yet the campaign had not been in vain. Sima Yi sent Zhang He out with the cavalry to pursue them, and Zhuge Liang and his crossbowmen stopped them at the Mumen Pass, where all Wei soldiers and Zhang He were killed.

Fifth Expedition (234)

Over the next two years, both sides developed their agriculture and prepared for the inevitable next campaign in Longyou. Sima Yi for his part made the Zheng Guo Canal navigable again, which was built in 234 BC. Chr. Was set up under the Qin Dynasty. In doing so, he improved his potential to withstand a protracted war with the help of the Navy.

In the spring of 234 , 100,000 Shu soldiers marched through the Qinling Mountains on the Baoye Trail to the vast Wu-Zhang plain . This was Zhuge Liang's fifth and final expedition to the north. Sima Yi was well prepared with his 200,000-strong army and took his position near the fortifications on the southern bank of the Wei. As a veteran against Zhuge Liang, Guo Huai appreciated that the Shu Army did not intend to attack Chang'an directly, but wanted to secure its position on the Wu-Zhang plain to take over the Longyou region. He noted that there were already reports that the Shu Army had already crossed the upper reaches of the Wei River and established lines of communication. Sima Yi, fearful of loss of connections in the south, strengthened the Beiyuan Liaison Center. This was not a moment too soon, as Zhuge Liang was already beginning to encroach on the Wei positions in the north. After two months of maneuvers north of the Wei River, he moved to a cul-de-sac on the Wu Zhang Plains. The Shu army got a long struggle ahead of it, using the Duntian system ( introduced by Cao Cao ) when they awaited the agreed attack on Wei by Wu.

However, Sun Quan's army in the Huai region was defeated and his offensive collapsed as an endemic plague spread among the men. The breaking of this last hope for change accelerated the deterioration of Zhuge Liang's health and depressed him. In late summer, he gave instructions to his next officers on Shu's future. In the early fall of the year, Zhuge Liang died at the age of 54. The news of his death was kept secret until the army reached the safe Baoye Valley to return to Hanzhong. Sima Yi, who thought the news was a trick by Zhuge Liang, was reluctant to persecute the Shu army. Only after an inspection of the abandoned Shu Camp revealed the truth did he go out in pursuit. When he reached the Baoye Valley, however, he realized that he did not have enough supplies with him for the rest of the way, and returned with the army to the Wei River. With the death of Zhuge Liang, a formidable military threat to the Wei Empire ended.

analysis

It is surprising that Shu, the weakest of the Three Kingdoms, pursued such vigorous, offensive military policy in his early years. If Zhuge Liang hadn't passed away, he probably would have continued her. The diplomatic success of reestablishing the alliance with Sun Quan had proven useless, as there were hardly any strategic advantages: both sides had different political agendas, which hampered close military coordination. After the first northern expedition repulsed, the Wei Empire was able to handle the threat on two fronts.