Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit

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The planning company Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (abbreviated to PBDE ) was a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn for the rapid implementation of many rail projects of the Verkehrsprojekte Deutsche Einheit (VDE). The company was founded in 1991 and became part of DB Projekt Verkehrsbau GmbH in 2000 .

The company was responsible for the planning and construction of the railway projects transferred to it.

history

After German reunification , the federal government decided in April 1991 to launch the German unity transport project . At the Federal Ministry of Transport, experts from the railways, administration and business discussed how the possibilities of accelerated planning and administration procedures could be used through a new form of project control. This resulted in the establishment of the PBDE and its sister company, the German Unit Fernstraßenplanungs- und -bau GmbH (DEGES). Most of the investments should have been made within ten years.

The company was founded on August 15, 1991 in Berlin as a privately organized project management company in order to implement VDE projects from the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan faster than in the state railways' administrative structures. It should exist as long as the German Unity rail transport projects were implemented.

While sovereign tasks and powers remained with the two state railways, the task of the PBDE lay in the technical, legal, financial and scheduling planning and construction. It acted in the name and for the account of the two state railways.

The company was there, in equal parts, a subsidiary of the two German state railways . They each carried DM 500,000 of the DM 1 million share capital . Employees from the German railways, the Austrian rail industry and a Swiss engineering office were also involved, as were industry managers who contributed experience from international plant engineering. The company was headed by three managing directors: one for business, one for technology and a spokesman. The projects were coordinated and controlled from the Berlin headquarters. The management was made up of Siegfried Deficiencies (spokesman), Dieter Weiß (technology) and Dieter Bantleon (economy).

The company's supervisory board was made up of seven representatives from the two state railways, business and representatives from the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Transport . It was chaired by DB board member Peter Münchschwander. Other members also included the former CEO of Daimler-Benz , Werner Breitschwerdt and the economic policy spokesman for the CDU / CSU parliamentary group, Rainer Haungs . The Supervisory Board appointed the company's three managing directors for five years each.

The company started operations on October 1, 1991. Regional project centers were established by the end of 1991. Then the gradual takeover of the preliminary planning of the individual projects began. In mid-1992 the company had 132 employees who controlled 60 engineering offices with 1260 employees.

In 1993 the planning company managed seven of the nine VDE rail transport projects with a total volume of almost 30 billion D-Marks. (The Hanover – Berlin and Bebra – Erfurt routes did not fall under the responsibility of the PBDE .) The company employed fewer than 200 people who coordinated more than 60 engineering offices with around 1200 employees. The VDE projects 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 were controlled by nine regional project centers. In addition to the PBDE, the planning company Schnellbahnbau Hannover – Berlin (PGS) and DEGES were entrusted with the implementation of the VDE projects.

From 1992 to 1994 the company modernized around 630 kilometers of track. The VDE project 6 was completed as the first project in May 1994.

At the end of 1994, the PBDE employed 80 to 90 engineering offices a year, which with around 2500 employees had applied for planning contracts worth around 1.2 billion DM. By May 1995, 87 planning law proceedings had been completed, 23 of them by waiving the plan (on average after 2.8 months), 27 by planning approval (after an average of 6.5 months) and 37 by planning approval (on average 11.2 months). The range ranged from proceedings in the Bitterfeld – Berlin section, which were completed after an average of 0.8 months, to a plan approval procedure for the Bavarian part of the high-speed line Nuremberg – Erfurt in Bavaria, which took 17.7 months. By the end of October 1995, 147 planning law proceedings had been completed, 45 of which were waived (after an average of 2.6 months), 40 through planning approval (after an average of 5.2 months) and 62 as a plan approval process (on average 11.6 months). The duration of the procedure ranged between 0.7 months (plan waiver in Thuringia) and 22.9 months (plan approval in VDE project 8.3 in Saxony-Anhalt).

In mid-1995 the company had 211 employees, including 110 engineers, 39 businesspeople and 12 lawyers. 153 came from the new federal states, 58 from the old federal states. In addition to the management (in Berlin), eight regional project centers and two project offices were maintained. While strategy, fundamental issues, project controlling, contract and procurement, law, press and public relations were handled in the headquarters, operational tasks, planning and implementation management and project control were decentralized. The involvement of numerous railway engineers from the former Deutsche Reichsbahn, who had to work directly under market-economy conditions (e.g. procurement law), proved to be a challenge.

On April 1, 1996 the planning company Schnellbahnbau Hannover-Berlin (PGS) and the PBDE were merged. The DB Group Representative for Thuringia, Siegfried Knüpfer , was appointed spokesman for the new management . The contracts of managing directors Siegfried Deficiencies, Dieter Bantleon and Hans-Dieter Weiß, which expired at the end of 1996, were not extended and management was dismissed. According to a press report, the managers had set too fast a pace, for example by rebuilding the S-Bahn from Berlin-Tegel to Heiligensee / Hennigsdorf within a year. Official funding channels have been ignored. With the reorganization, Deutsche Bahn AG has also secured more influence. Until autumn 1996, Weiß was still the managing director for technology.

In addition to Knüpfer, as spokesman for the management, the businessman Günter Haass headed the PBDE in 1996 and 1997.

In January 1997, the projects for the high-speed line Nuremberg – Ingolstadt – Munich (NIM) and the Hof – Leipzig / Dresden railway lines were assigned to the PBDE . In October 1997 the PBDE took over the planning and implementation of the Berlin – Dresden line . At the end of 1997, the Schönholz - Tegel - Hennigsdorf S-Bahn Berlin project was also part of the portfolio. At the beginning of 1999, the Berlin – Frankfurt (Oder) railway , the Magdeburg junction and other Deutsche Bahn construction projects followed. Deutsche Bahn justified the takeover of the NIM planning with better economic efficiency.

In mid-1996 the company had 210 employees, at the beginning of 1997 it was 273, in mid-1997 286 and at the end of 1997 around 300.

In 1999 the company employed around 360 people. In addition to the headquarters in Berlin, eight project centers coordinated the work of several dozen engineering offices and construction companies:

The management of the PBDE reported regularly directly to the transport committee of the German Bundestag. In addition, the PBDE set up a state advisory board, in which representatives of the traffic administration of the federal states involved met regularly with the management of the planning company.

Following the example of the PBDE, Deutsche Bahn later founded further project companies for large-scale projects in the legal form of a GmbH . These included the high-speed line Cologne – Rhine / Main , the Berlin railway junction and the Stuttgart 21 project .

The company was on January 1, 2000 with the DB transport engineering GmbH Berlin hub merged and then in DB project transport engineering GmbH renamed . The merger was notarized in April 2000 and completed on July 1, 2000 with retroactive accounting effect from January 1, 2000.

The integration into the Deutsche Bahn Group initially brought several projects to a virtual standstill.

Project volume

The PBDE accounted for DM 27 billion of the initial total investment of DM 31 billion in the rail transport projects of the German Unity Transport Projects. The project for the high-speed line from Hanover to Berlin , supported by PGS, was valued at four billion DM .

The total route scope of all the undertaken projects initially amounted to a route length of 1730 km, including 1429 km of upgraded and 301 km of new lines; the high-speed line from Hanover to Berlin was initially not included. A total of 426 km should be a high-speed route (for at least 200 km / h). When the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan came into force in 1992, around one billion D-Marks (around 510 million euros) had already been invested in advance measures. While in the 1992 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan, the VDE rail projects were calculated at 25.71 billion DM, the PBDE calculated in September 1992 with an investment sum of 27.03 billion DM.

By August 1993, around 300 of the 2000 kilometers planned at that time had been completed. Around two billion DM had been invested, around two thirds of which in the first half of 1993. 40 percent of the planning and 70 percent of the construction contracts were awarded to companies in the new federal states. It became foreseeable that the budget would not be sufficient to implement all of the planned projects.

By mid-1994, 3.3 billion D-Marks had been invested; At the beginning of 1995 it was more than four billion Deutschmarks.

By the end of April 1995, DM 5.5 billion had been invested (not including VDE project 6). Of this, DM 1.4 billion was spent on planning, DM 2.9 billion on construction and DM 1.2 billion on route equipment. Of the construction contracts, DM 1.3 billion were awarded in total trades, half a billion DM for individual trades and DM 1.1 billion to railway construction companies and Deutsche Gleis- & Tiefbau GmbH. The majority of the individual and overall trade awards were wholly or partially awarded to medium-sized companies. By December 1995, DM 6.3 billion had been invested, including DM 1.9 billion in 1995. Around 884 km of track had been renewed. 42 percent of the expansion program was thus completed.

By autumn 1995, 800 kilometers of track had been renewed and around seven billion Deutschmarks had been invested. According to the company, almost 40,000 people were employed with an annual investment volume of around DM 2 billion. By the end of 1996, 1,173 km of track had been built, of which 282 km in 1996. By the end of 1997, 878 km of track had been modernized.

According to its own information, the PBDE had invested DM 10.7 billion by the end of 1996, DM 12.7 billion by the end of 1997, and DM 15 billion by the end of 1998. According to the company, the costs of the projects controlled by the PBDE have continuously decreased over time. If in 1991 40.9 billion DM had been planned, the expected costs would have been 36 billion DM. For 2005, according to the planning status at the end of 1997 and 1999, DM 33.7 billion was planned.

In mid-1994 the company announced that it would be able to cut its originally planned project budget of 33 billion Deutschmarks by six billion Deutschmarks. This could be achieved through the use of modern technologies, lower building prices and the abandonment of some sub-projects. By March 1995, the projects implemented by then had saved more than DM 635 million compared to the originally planned costs. According to information from 1997, the total costs of the German unity rail transport projects should be reduced from the original (1991) 36 billion DM by 2005 to 28 billion DM at the 1991 price level.

The main reasons for these cost reductions were many new ideas, including European tenders, awarding of services in packages, the encouragement to form medium-sized working groups and the use of new technical solutions in many areas. The plants could also have been made leaner through streamlined operations. In the case of construction technologies, for example, cost reductions have been achieved through the bundling of construction sites and building under full closures. By saving investments, other sections of the route could have started earlier. The Europe-wide awarding of order packages, instead of the hitherto customary assignment according to skilled workers (individual trades), contributed to the cost reductions. This meant that much less time and coordination was required. The general contractors commissioned , often formed from medium-sized working groups , were supposed to provide the services at fixed prices and fixed dates.

Around ten percent savings (compared to the initially planned 33 billion DM) had been achieved through rationalization measures and the renunciation of the “expansion standards decided in the euphoria of the fall”, the rest through innovations in construction technology and the consistent skimming of competitive advantages in the European market. According to the Austrian Ministry of Transport, the German market for rail technology had previously been sealed off by national sensitivities. By opening up the market, the PBDE was able to generate considerable pressure on prices and technology. On the other hand, changes in public procurement law caused by European law in the 1990s required Europe-wide awards anyway.

The functional tendering procedure, which was previously unusual in the railway industry and introduced by the PBDE, initially caused considerable additional effort, as the engineering offices, which were still inexperienced with it, often submitted unusable documents. From this, a strategy for total contracting was finally developed.

literature

  • Main Association of the German Construction Industry (Ed.): Weitblick: PBDE was founded 20 years ago , without location, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 .

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (ed.): Info-Brief , ZDB -ID 2668166-3 , issue 1/1999, July 15, 1999, pp. 7-10.
  2. ↑ a b c d Siegfried Deficiencies : Reunification and the railway on new paths - what a departure . In: Der Eisenbahningenieur , Issue 9/2011, pp. 63–67.
  3. ↑ a b c d East-West rail connections rapidly expanded . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , August 17, 1993, No. 189, p. 11.
  4. ↑ a b c Planning companies for transport projects . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , August 13, 1991, p. 9.
  5. ↑ a b c d e f g h Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit (Hrsg.): Information on the implementation of the rail transport projects . Brochure, 1992, without page numbering.
  6. ↑ a b c Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit (Ed.): Professionals for project management: The Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH introduces itself . 16-page brochure, Berlin, 1993.
  7. ^ A b c d Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit (Hrsg.): Transport projects German unity: Tasks - ways to implementation - results. Transport policy working group of the SPD parliamentary group in the German Bundestag. Conversation with Prof. Dr. S. Defects, spokesman for the management of the Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (PB DE) . Berlin, 1995, pp. 8, 10, 14.
  8. ↑ List of authors . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , pp. 70–71.
  9. ^ Siegfried Deficiencies , Dieter Weiß, Dieter Bantleon: After twenty years - review, appreciation, outlook . In: Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie (Ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , pp. 67–69.
  10. ↑ Peter Münchschwander: The chairman of the supervisory board remembers . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (Ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , p. 16.
  11. ↑ In four hours from Berlin to Munich . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany edition), March 3, 1995, p. 905.
  12. ↑ a b c Siegfried Deficiencies: Transport projects for German unity: Political will is successfully implemented . In: Eisenbahntechnische Rundschau , Volume 44 (1995), Issue 4 (April), pp. 261–266.
  13. ↑ Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit (Ed.): Middle class parliamentary group of the CDU / CSU parliamentary group of the German Bundestag: Conversation with Prof. Dr. S. Deficiencies, spokesman for the management of the Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (PB DE) (…) . Berlin, February 9, 1995, p. 22.
  14. ↑ Legal reform accelerates traffic route construction in East Germany . In: Handelsblatt , No. 23, February 1, 1996, p. 6.
  15. ^ A b Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit (Ed.): Transport projects German unity. Railways. Fast ways for tomorrow. Information for the transport committee of the German Bundestag. Conversation with Prof. Dr. S. Defects, spokesman for the management of the Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (PB DE) on November 23, 1995 in the Bonn Parliamentary Society . Bonn, November 23, 1995, without page numbering.
  16. ↑ Hans Koller: Overall trade strategy: a forgotten PBDE innovation . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (Ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , pp. 51–56.
  17. ↑ Bahn secures more influence again. Project company reorganized. In: Der Tagesspiegel , February 6, 1996.
  18. ↑ a b Around 210 employees control the railway construction . In: Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (publisher): Info-Brief , ZDB -ID 2668166-3 , issue 2/1996, July 15, 1996, p. 11.
  19. ↑ a b Around 270 employees control the railway construction . In: Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (publisher): Info-Brief , ZDB -ID 2668166-3 , issue 1/1997, January 1997, p. 10.
  20. ↑ a b c d e Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit (Ed.): Economical building. Drive faster. Brochure, Berlin, November 30, 1997, pp. 8 f, 14 f, 28.
  21. ↑ Bahn AG puts planning in new hands . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany edition), August 20, 1996, p. 32.
  22. ↑ Around 290 employees control railway construction . In: Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (publisher): Info-Brief , ZDB -ID 2668166-3 , issue 2/1997, August 31, 1997, p. 10.
  23. ^ Siegfried Deficiencies : German Unity Transport Projects “Rail”: Promise redeemed . In: The Railway Engineer . tape 65 , no. 8 , 2015, ISSN  0013-2810 , p. 10-15 .
  24. ↑ Dirk Fischer : Efficient traffic routes for the united Germany . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , pp. 14-15.
  25. ^ Siegfried Knüpfer: Infrastructure measures in the state of Berlin . In: ZEVrail , issue 1/2002, pp. 4–10.
  26. ↑ Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Annual Report 2000 (PDF file; 1.4 MB), p. 8.
  27. ^ Reinhard Heinemann: Transport projects German unity: A masterpiece of transport policy . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , pp. 63–65.
  28. ↑ a b The betrothed are already thinking of divorce . In: Deutsches Allgemeine Sonntagsblatt , No. 40, October 1, 1993, p. 12.
  29. ↑ a b Rail expansion cheaper than planned . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , No. 190, 1994, August 17, 1994, p. 10.
  30. ↑ Power on all tracks towards Berlin . In: Berliner Zeitung , No. 230, October 2, 1995, p. 28.
  31. ↑ Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (Ed.): Info-Brief , ZDB -ID 2668166-3 , issue 1/1997, January 1997, p. 1 f.
  32. ↑ a b Expansion of traffic routes on the test bench. New models show success . In: Der Tagesspiegel , March 18, 1995, p. 18.
  33. ↑ Successes in innovative work . In: Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit mbH (publisher): Info-Brief , ZDB -ID 2668166-3 , issue 2/1997, August 31, 1997, p. 8.
  34. ^ A b Siegfried Deficiencies: The country needs new paths . In: Neue Bahn , issue 3/1994, pp. 22, 24.
  35. ^ Bahnbau Ost is cheaper . In: Handelsblatt , No. 158, 1994, p. 1.
  36. ↑ Gernot Grimm: Respect . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (Ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , p. 17.
  37. ↑ a b Frank Weindorf: When the lawyers got to know quick planning and building . In: Main Association of the German Construction Industry (ed.): Weitblick , ohne Ort, 2012, ISBN 978-3-00-038025-9 , pp. 45–49.