Battle of Mortara
The Battle of Mortara on March 21, 1849 was the first clash in the second phase of the First Italian War of Independence and ended with the defeat of the Sardinian-Piedmontese troops. Between Mortara and Vigevano , 19,000 Austrians and around 26,000 Piedmontese faced each other, led by King Karl Albert of Savoy .
prehistory
King Karl Albert did not want to accept the defeat of the previous year against the Austrians under Field Marshal Radetzky and saw the uprising of the Hungarians as a given occasion to open war. A coup by insurgents in February 1849 against Grand Duke Leopold II of Habsburg in Tuscany gave the necessary reason to rekindle the Italian War of Independence. With an army of 97,500 men (including 5,600 horsemen) and 152 cannons, the troops of the Kingdom of Sardinia were to move back into Lombardy . The Piedmontese army, under its new chief of staff , the Polish general Wojciech Chrzanowski , wanted to advance directly on Milan and, as in the previous year, get the population of this city to revolt. The Austrians quickly became aware of the enemy’s military intent. It was therefore confidently assumed on the part of the Piedmontese that the Austrian army would retreat behind the Adda to the fortress square around Mantua , as in 1848 .
The response of the Austrians under Field Marshal Radetzky envisaged a lightning campaign against the Piedmontese, whereby the Ticino in the Pavia area had to be crossed with mass and the offensive could be led to Vercelli or Alessandria depending on the development of the situation . The Austrian army had a total of 62 battalions and 42 squadrons, about 73,400 men, 6,900 of whom were horsemen supported by 182 cannons. The II. Army Corps under Constantine d'Aspre reached the Ticino crossing at Mezzana with the Stadium Brigade , followed by the III. Army Corps ( FML Appel) with general advance direction via Carbonara to Grapello. The 1st Army Corps (General of the Cavalry Wratislaw) had to advance to Vigevano via Zerboli and Gambolò . The I. Reserve Corps was intended for the river crossing near the Gravellona , which was to be carried out in three columns under FML Wocher . According to Radetzky's plan, they wanted to penetrate Piedmont after a southern enclosure and take the further route directly to Turin . The left wing of the Austrians, the IV Corps under FML Thurn , tried to manage the crossing in the Belgioioso area on March 20 , where the opposing General Ramorino was commissioned to secure the river between Vigevano and Pavia on the one hand, but also south of the Po to advance further departments to Piacenza . The imperial troops under Field Marshal Lieutenant Wocher found almost no resistance at Gravellona, as Ramorino had only sent 200 volunteers and a Bersaglieri battalion from Manara, which was soon forced to withdraw. Around 9.00 a.m., an adjutant to General Bes arrived, who reported to the king that Radetzky had passed near Pavia and that it had been encircled on the right bank of the Po. This news ruined all attack plans; A Ticino crossing was now out of the question, rather all troops had to be regrouped southwards to protect Turin.
On March 20th, at 12 noon, the Sardinian avant-garde crossed the Ticino between Trecate and Boffalora with the 4th Division of the Duke of Genoa (Brigade Piedmont and Brigade Pinerolo) . During the planned advance on Milan, King Karl Albert was in the vanguard at the head of a light Bersaglieri brigade. In Trecate, contrary to all expectations, no opponent was found who tried to block the river crossing. When news of the situation in the Pavia area became known, General Ramorino was ordered to go to headquarters to report; he gave the command of his 5th division to General Fanti . Ramorino was later imprisoned in Turin for high treason and sentenced to death.
Assuming that the opponent would penetrate from the room Pavia now in Piedmont, ordered Chrzanowski in the evening of March 20 that the first division under Durando of Vesper Alto to Mortara and the 2nd Division under Bes Cerano about Cassolnovo by San Siro should advance. Major General Paolo Solaroli's independent brigade was instructed to leave Oleggio in order to secure the Ticino Bridge at Buffalora. The bulk of the 4th Division of the Duke of Genoa remained in the Magenta area , while the King and Chrzanowski remained with their headquarters in Trecate.
Battle at Vigevano
Early on March 21, Chrzanowski ordered the 2nd Division (General Bes) to occupy Vigevano and advance an advance guard 5 km southwest of it to Sforzesca and San Siro. At the same time, the 1st Division (General Durando) with the Brigades Aosta and Regina was ordered to prepare a front to the south near Mortara, the reinforcement behind it by the 6th Division ( Duke of Savoy ) could not be expected before 3 p.m. General Bes had Sforzesca occupied by General La Rocca's brigade, the Casale brigade (General Boyl) had to cover the western part of Mortara and Fogliano. Around 12 noon, the 3rd Division (General Perrone ) and the arriving Brigade Savoy (General Mollard) reinforced the defensive position at Vigevano. The Brigade Savona of the 4th Division ( Duke of Genoa ) arrived too late for the soon-to-be-open fight . General Chrzanowski ordered the Duke of Savoy's reserve division to bring reinforcements to Durando's division. In the meantime, Radetzky concentrated on Mortara, where the I and II Corps were advancing from Zerbolò and Gambolò, while the IV Corps were marching on San Giorgio di Lomellina .
The battle between Gambolò and Vigevano (Italian name: Battaglia della Sforzesca ) began. The vanguard of the Austrian 1st Corps under Count Wratislaw , led by Colonel Schanz, arrived in San Siro and immediately attacked the outposts of General Bes's 2nd Division . Around 4 p.m. the brigades Strassoldo and Wohlgemuth attacked at Vigevano and Gambolò; the attack was initially unsuccessful: The Savoyard 1st Infantry Regiment No. 1 under Colonel Saillet von Saint Cergues excelled in defense, which brought the Austrians considerable losses. The Piedmontese were too few here and had to withdraw to Sforzesca. The place Sforzesca was attacked by the Austrians, the defense led the 17th infantry regiment (Colonel Filiberto Mollard) and the 23rd infantry regiment (Colonel Enrico Cialdini ). Two squadrons of the royal hussar regiment carried out two very violent attacks despite the unsuitable nature of the soil, which were able to stop the advance of the Austrians.
Battle of Mortara
Field Marshal Radetzky decided on March 21 to concentrate his forces at Mortara and then to turn against Vercelli or Novara; here or there he wanted to meet the main power of the Piedmontese.
The 1st Brigade of the Sardinian 3rd Division arrived at Vigevano around noon with the king and Chrzanowski, the 2nd Brigade of this division together with the Duke of Genoa could not be expected until around 5:00 pm. General Chrzanowski had sent General Alessandro La Marmora to Mortara to carry out his orders on the left wing. General Durando's troops with the Sardinian 1st Division, deployed between Garlasco and San Giorgio di Lomellina, leaned between the monastery of Sant'Albino as far as the cemetery. The front line was covered on the left by the Brigade Aosta (General Lovera), the cavalry and some reserves on the right commanded the Brigade Regina (General Trotti). The division of Duke Victor Emmanuel of Savoy instead arrived at Castel d'Agogna and marched on the left behind Durando's troops. Due to the difficult terrain, there was no connection between the two divisions; all the fighting was a burden on the Regina Brigade, which could not be supported after the Austrian attack.
The II Corps of the Austrians under General d'Aspre started the attack at 5:00 p.m. with the division of Archduke Albrecht von Österreich-Teschen , which was supported by 24 cannons. Borgo, San Siro, Gambolo and finally Mortara were quickly stormed and the Piedmontese were forced to retreat at all points. The Sardinian troops, mostly made up of recruits of volunteers, could not withstand and went back untidily to Mortara, pursued by the Austrians, of whom three battalions occupied the entrance to Garlasco. The attempt by La Marmora to use a retained battalion of the Regina Brigade to counterattack failed. Due to the early darkness, these divisions were mistaken for enemy forces and were under fire by Cuneo's own brigade. The Sardinian troops at St. Albino did not support the fight after the defeat of the Regina Brigade against the soldiers of the Austrian Kolowrat Brigade became apparent. Rather, they left their positions at the monastery and withdrew to Mortara with both battalions of the Cuneo Brigade.
During the storming of Mortara, the division of Archduke Albrecht, which formed the head of the Austrian II Army Corps, headed by Colonel Benedek's brigade with the Gyulai and Paumgartten regiments. By owning Mortara and the road junction between Novara, Vercelli, Casale and Vigevano, the Austrians had already gained significant, decisive advantages. The Savoyards were flanked, already cut off by further reinforcements on the other side of the Po and the Sesia via Vercelli and forced to retreat north. Benedek had already arrived in Mortara with a battalion from the Gyulai regiment and took possession of the city with only 150 men. When the battalions of the Cuneo and Regina Brigade, commanded by La Marmora, approached, Benedek was still numerically inferior, but demanded the surrender of the Piedmontese, many of whom surrendered. 56 officers and 2,000 men stretched out their weapons in front of Benedek, including Colonels Delfino and Abrate. As a result of the march on the flank, victory was achieved. Troops of the Savoy Division tried to counterattack with two battalions of the Cuneo Brigade after San Giorgio; however, when night fell it was no longer possible to restore the situation.
In the course of the day, the Piedmontese lost five hundred men in battle, along with important positions, and another two thousand had been captured. The commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment was bayonet stabbed, while the old General Bussetti, commander of the Cuneo Brigade, was wounded by a saber. In the battle of Mortara, the Austrians lost 190 men, the Piedmontese 2,550 men, including about 500 dead and wounded.
consequences
During the night the rest of the Regina Brigade retreated to Novara, where on the morning of March 22nd the Aosta Brigade, four squadrons of the Novara Cavalry Regiment and the reserve artillery provided sufficient support. King Karl Albert received notification of the defeat at Mortara on March 22nd at 2:00 am. The superintendent found him resting in a ditch, wrapped in his coat, his head resting on a grenadier's backpack. He didn't seem too worried or discouraged about the bad news. He even got up and expressed a desire to try the fate of weapons again with a decisive battle. Chrzanowski wanted to concentrate the armed forces near Novara for the next day and wait for the clash with the Austrians in a good position.
Despite the victory of Mortara, Field Marshal Radetzky could not take advantage of the resulting favorable situation: Instead of going straight to Novara, where the Piedmontese troops were concentrated, he decided to attack the city of Vercelli, which he regarded as the "main camp" of the Piedmontese army has been. This misjudgment gave Chrzanowski the opportunity on March 22nd to cut off only a fraction of the Austrian armed forces with the advantage of numbers. The pursuing troops under D'Aspre and Archduke Albert were repulsed and the Austrian advance temporarily stopped.
Radetzky recognized his assumption as wrong, was able to regroup his armed forces and finally defeat the Piedmontese armed forces on March 23 in the decisive battle of Novara . After the decisive victory, Radetzky went to Vignale on March 24th, where the meeting with the new King Viktor Emanuel took place; on March 26th, the negotiated armistice was signed.
literature
- Austrian military magazine 1864, Volume 1 / Issues 10, 11, 12, 14: The campaign in Piemont 1849 , edited from official sources by AH, captain in the general quartermaster
- Wilhelm Rustow: The Italian War of 1848 and 1849 : with a short war theory, Friedrich Schultheß, Zurich 1862
- Franz Joseph Adolph Schneidawind: The campaign of the emperors. royal Austrian Army under the leadership of Field Marshal Count Radetzky in Italy in 1848 and 1849 . Published by U. Witting, Innsbruck 1853
- The Austrian Army Campaign in Italy in 1848 , War Archives of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Vienna 1852
- Hermann Kunz: The campaigns of Field Marshal Radetzky in Northern Italy in 1848 and 1849 . A. Strauch publishing house, Leipzig 1890.
- Oskar Regele: Ludwig von Benedek , Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1955