Tardjīh

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Tardjīh ( Arabic ترجيح' DMG tarǧīḥ  ' determination of excess weight, preference ') is a procedure of Islamic jurisprudence in which two similar but contradicting pieces of evidence are weighed against each other in order to determine which one has the greater weight. Hadiths and the results of conclusions by analogy come into consideration as evidence . The rules for practicing the tardjīh are described in the works of Islamic legal theory . The decisive criteria ( muraǧǧiḥāt ) are also listed here, by means of which the evidence with the greater weight can be determined.

One of the first texts in which the Tardjīh concept was dealt with was the work "The Sections on the Basics" ( al-Fuṣūl bi-l-ulūl ) by the legal scholar al-Jassās (d. 981), who was influenced by the Muʿtazila . The concept of tardjīh gave the Muslim scholars of the post-formative period great scope for decision-making, especially after its scope was expanded to include the weighing of the doctrines of different schools of law .

Basics

Linguistic derivation and definitions

Grammatically tarǧīḥ is the verbal noun to the second stem of the Arabic verb raǧaḥa , which describes the lowering of the scales under the excess weight ( ruǧḥān ). The second trunk has a causative function and has the meaning of "give the excess weight, let it outweigh it, put more weight on, consider it more weighty, prefer it, prefer it." It is emphasized that this process "after the equilibrium between the two scales has been reached" ( baʿda ṯubūt al-muʿādala baina kaffatai al-mīzān ) takes place. The one that has more weight is called ar-rāǧiḥ in Arabic , the excess is called al-marǧūḥ .

In terms of its terminological meaning, the Andalusian scholar al-Bādschī (d. 1081) defined tardjīh as “the demonstration of the preference of one proof over the other proof.” According to the definition of the Shafiite al-Āmidī, tardjīh means “the combination of one of two facts, the in spite of their incompatibility in the case of the desideratum are suitable as evidence, with the obligation to adhere to them, and the simultaneous neglect of the other facts ”. The Hanbali scholar Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī explained to Tardjīh, “It is the act of deliberation examining evidence and the preposition of either of the two methods that are suitable for acquiring knowledge of the judgment based on fact that this method has a special evidential value. ”According to Hanafi teaching, tardjīh is“ the showing of the excess in one of two similar things over the other by something that is not independent of it. ”

Justifications and criticism

Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and al-Āmidī justified the obligation to tardjīh and the validity of its result with three arguments:

  1. with the consensus of the Prophet's Companions , since they are said to have preferred different hadiths to others. As an example, reference is made to a hadith by Aisha bint Abi Bakr on the Ghusl , which the Prophet's companions preferred to a hadith by Abū Huraira .
  2. so that it conforms to the ʿUrf , in the presence of two incompatible presumptions, to follow the one that has the greater weight. Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī refers in this connection to the dictum of ʿAbdallāh ibn Masʿūd : “What the Muslims consider good is also good with God” ( mā raʾā-hu l-muslimūn ḥasanan fa-hwa ʿinda Llāhi ḥasan ).
  3. with the fact that after spontaneous insight ( fī badāhat al-ʿaql ) it is undesirable to hold on to something that is less likely than something else.

Al-Āmidī also discusses the Qur'anic request in sura 59 : 2 “Think, who have insight!” And the traditional prophetic word: “We judge according to the external appearance ( aẓ-ẓāhir ) and leave the hidden things to God” as possible reasons for the Tardjīh procedure.

There have been very few prominent Muslim scholars who have rejected the concept of tardjīh outright. Among them was Al-Baqillani . He justified his rejection of the Tardjīh with the fact that, even in a trial, the testimony of four witnesses is not weighted more heavily than two, because the only decisive factor is that two witnesses exist. Al-Āmidī countered this by stating that, in his own opinion, the statements of four witnesses should very well be valued higher than those of two.

A modern critic of Tardjīh was the radical-conservative Egyptian television chaplain Mustafā Mahmūd . In his 1979 book “The Koran - an attempt to understand my time” ( al-Qurʾān - muḥāwa li-fahm ʿaṣrī ), in which he sharply rejected relevant reform approaches , he wrote: “Only religion ( dīn ) leads to certain knowledge, but by no means skepticism ( šakk ), probability ( iḥtimāl ) or weighing ( tarǧīḥ ). "

Scope and requirements

According to general teaching, the Tardjīh may only be applied to probative evidence ( adilla ẓannīya ), but not to definitive evidence ( adilla qaṭʿīya ) such as textual evidence from the Koran, because these are generally considered to be free of contradictions. If the mujtahid encounters an alleged contradiction in definitive evidence, he can only resolve it by resorting to abrogation or must abstain from judgment. According to at-Tūfī, “heard formulations” ( alfāẓ masmūʿa ) and “rational meanings” ( maʿānī maʿqūla ) belong to the probative proofs to which the tardjīh is supposed to be applicable . To the former he counts the book and the Sunnah , to the latter the analogous conclusions . The question of whether the Tardjīh could be applied to entire disciplines was a matter of dispute . Those who advocated this included the Muʿtazilit ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad and the Hanbalit Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī .

Ash-Shaukānī names three requirements for the performance of a Tardjīh: 1. The equality of the establishment ( ṯubūt ) of the two proofs; 2. the equality of strength ( qūwa ) of the two proofs; 3. The consistency of the two pieces of evidence in terms of time, place and aspect of the assessment.

While in general the view prevails that anyone who is qualified to ijtihad has, can operate Tardschīh, there was also the view in the Hanafi that those qualifications during the closure lost ijtihad Gate. For example, the Ottoman scholar Ibn Kamālpascha (d. 1534), who divided the Hanafi legal scholars into a total of seven consecutive classes, said that idschtihād was only practiced in the first three classes, while only the possibility of taqlid was open in the subsequent classes . But even for them, the possibility of free choice of law has been increasingly restricted in the course of time. The last to practice Tardjīh were the fifth-grade scholars, who included Abū l-Husain al-Qudūrī (d. 1037) and al-Marghīnānī (d. 1197). They proceeded with the various traditions in such a way that they said: “That is more appropriate” ( hāḏā aulā ), “that is more correct from the tradition” ( hāḏā aṣaḥḥ riwāyatan ), “that is more correct in understanding” ( hāḏā aṣaḥḥ dirāyatan ), “that fits better with the conclusion by analogy” ( hāḏā aufaq li-l-qiyās ) or “that is more suitable for people” ( hāḏā aufaq li-n-nās ). This is why they were called the "people of weight" ( aṣḥāb at-tarǧīḥ ).

Legal consequences

As soon as a mujtahid has established that one argument has greater weight than the other, he has an obligation to formulate the norms on the basis of this predominant argument. He and his followers also have a duty to follow this norm.

It is unclear how the mujdahid had to proceed if, in his tardjīh efforts, he came to the conclusion that there was a balance ( taʿādul ) between the examined evidence . It is narrated from al-Bāqillānī that in this case he regarded the mujtahid as “having free choice” ( muḫaiyar ). The Hanbalit Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī , on the other hand, stated that the mujtahid was responsible for abstaining ( tawaqquf ) in this case . He is not allowed to make his judgment ( ḥukm ) on either of the two, nor has he a choice ( taḫyīr ) between them. The Hanafis ruled that if the tardjīh is unsuccessful, the two contradicting norms ( suqūṭ al-mutaʿāriḍain ) cease to exist with recourse to the lower level. From al-Juwainī the testimony is passed down that in this case he would have to commission a scholar who is taller than himself with the tardjīh because his ijjihād had proven to be inadequate.

The different types of tardjīh

Tardjīh in hadiths

The most important type of Tardjīh is the Tardjīh between two traditions ( ḫabarain ), which usually means hadiths . If traditions contradict each other, other methods of defense against the contradiction come into consideration, such as harmonization ( ǧamʿ ), abrogation and the determination of a tradition lie ( kiḏb ar-rāwī ). Different positions are taken with regard to the order in which these methods are to be applied. Abū Ishāq asch-Shīrāzī said, for example, that one should first operate with harmonization and abrogation and only then, when both had not produced a result, one should switch to Tardjīh. The Hanafis, on the other hand, placed the Tardjīh above harmonization. and established the following order overall: abrogation, tardjīh, harmonization. The primacy of abrogation over the Tardjīh was justified by the fact that it can be derived from the Koran itself, while the Tardjīh comes from the Mujtahid . The Hanbalit Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī said that first the possibility of the traditional lie should be examined, then harmonization and abrogation should be tried out and only at the end should the possibility of tardjīh be considered.

If a tardjīh is performed during hadiths, the following indications can be used for the evaluation of the two hadiths available: 1. Isnād , i. H. the chain of transmission of the Hadith, 2. the Matn, d. H. the actual text of the tradition, 3. the textual statement ( madlūl, maʿnā ) or 4. an external factual situation. In turn, a number of different criteria can be created in all four areas.

Weighting based on the supplier chain

As far as the tardjīh of the chain of narrators ( isnād ) is concerned, according to al-Āmidī it can be divided into two subcategories:

  • the Tardjīh in relation to the narrator ( at-tarǧīḥ bi-ʿtibār ar-rāwī ). The rules here include:
    • A hadith narrated by a greater number of people carries greater weight than one narrated by only a few.
    • The hadith whose narrator is more trustworthy ( auṯaq ) or endowed with better memory ( aḥfaẓ ) is preferred.
    • The hadith whose narrator was directly involved in the incident dealt with in the tradition has more weight than a hadith whose narrator does not.
    • The hadith, the narrator of which had frequent contact with the Prophet, should be preferred.
    • Al-idmidī suggested that a hadith narrated by a legal scholar ( faqīh ) should be preferred to other hadiths that did not.
    • The hadith, whose narrator had a more famous family tree, should also be preferred because it could be assumed that he was even more careful not to lie.
    • Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī and al-Baidāwī said that the tradition of the person who converted to Islam late should be preferred to the tradition of another person because one could be more certain that they were the Prophet's Sunnah at the end of his life Life reflected. Al-Āmidī, however, taught the opposite.
  • the Tardjīh regarding the type of tradition ( at-tarǧīḥ bi-ʿtibār nafs ar-riwāya ). The relevant rules included:
    • For example, the message transmitted by many ( al-ḫabar al-mutawātir ) should be preferred to the message transmitted by only one person ( ḫabar al-wāḥid ).
    • Hadiths, which appear in the two saheeh works by al-Buchari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj , should be preferred to other hadiths.
    • Likewise, the tradition in which a reading ( qirāʾa ) had taken place should be preferred to that in which the sheikh only gave an ijāza .

Weighting based on the text

As reference points for the Tardjīh based on the Matn, the actual text of the tradition, various criteria are again mentioned:

  • A statement containing an invitation (amr) carries more weight than a statement containing permission (ibāḥa).
  • a specific statement is preferred to a general statement.
  • a haqīqa statement is preferable to a majaz statement.
  • a complete statement is preferable to an elliptical statement.
  • a statement accompanied by an affirmation ( taʾkīd ) or a threat ( tahdīd ) is preferable to other statements.
  • If in one tradition the reason for setting standards is given but not in the other, the former should be preferred.

Weighting based on content

Al-Āmidī names a total of eleven Tardjīh rules that concern the content ( madlūl ), asch-Shaukānī nine. These include, for example, the following rules:

  • tradition containing a prohibition should be preferred to that containing a permit.
  • tradition which contains a prohibition should be preferred to that which imposes an obligation.
  • a statement ( qaul ) of the prophet on a question has more weight than his related action ( fiʿl ).
  • Traditions with a call for caution ( iḥtiyāṭ ) should be given preference over others who do not have this aspect.
  • the tradition that leads to the omission of a hadd punishment should be preferred to another that does not.

Ash-Shaukānī affirms that only the consideration ( naẓar ) of an absolute mujtahid ( muǧtahid muṭlaq ) can clarify such questions.

Weighting based on external circumstances

Al-Āmidī names a total of 15 Tardschīḥ rules that affect external factors, i.e. not directly related to the textual evidence itself. Ash-Shaukānī reduces their number to ten. These include:

  • Hadiths supported by other evidence from the Koran, Sunna, or Qiyās are preferred to others.
  • Hadith, the content of which is consistent with the conduct of the rightly guided caliphs, are preferred to others.
  • Hadiths narrated by the scholars of Mecca and Medina or that correspond to the behavior of the inhabitants of Medina are preferred to others.

Tardjīh in inferences by analogy

In the case of inferences by analogy , a tardjeh is performed when two inferences by analogy lead to mutually exclusive results. The following can be used as reference points for the evaluation of the two possible conclusions by analogy: 1. the assessment ( ḥukm ) of the original case ( aṣl ), 2. the legal reason ( ʿilla ) for the assessment of the original case, 3. the target case ( farʿ ); 4. external facts.

With regard to the assessment of the original case, the rule applied, for example, that conclusions by analogy in which such an assessment was definitely given were to be preferred to others in which it was based solely on mere assumption. Furthermore, conclusions by analogy in which the assessment of the initial case was affected by abrogation should not be rated as highly as those in which this was not the case.

As far as the legal ground of the original case is concerned, for example, the legal ground explicitly mentioned in the text is preferred to the legal ground that is only intellectually developed. In the same way, a qiyās in which the legal basis is easy and clearly recognizable also outweighs a qiyās in which the legal basis is confused. Further criteria for the higher weighting of a qiyā can be the specificity and the degree of urgency of the legal basis.

With regard to the assessment of the target case, the rule applies that the assessment that can be derived from several legal reasons is “more appropriate” ( aulā ) than that which is based on only one legal reason.

The expansion of the Tardjīh principle

Tardjīh between disciplines

Some scholars have extended the principle of Tardjīh to the level of the various disciplines . Thus, Al-Juwayni (d. 1085) with Muġīṯ al-ḫalq fī tarǧīḥ al-qaul al-Haqq a paper on the preference of the schafiitischen created Madhhab. The Hanbali scholar Nadschm ad-Dīn at-Tūfī (d. 1316) explained that in the fields of teaching a tardjīh is possible both in general ( i alsmālan ) and in individual questions ( taf ,īlan ) if this is based on evidence ( iḏā dalla ʿalai-hi d-dalīl ). For example, one could say that the madhhab of Abū Hanīfa with regard to the correctness of its conclusion by analogy and its consideration of the “influencing correspondences” ( al-munāsabāt al-muʾaṯṯira ) is preferable to all other teaching directions, while conversely the other teaching directions are to be preferred to the “healthy” ones with regard to their use Sunnah provisions ”( as-sunan aṣ-ṣaḥīḥa ) are preferable. The zāhiritic madhhab can be preferred because it is limited to tradition ( aṯar ), while the madhhab of the analogies ( al-qaiyāsūn ) is outweighed because they run the risk of arbitrarily applying the ra'y ( li-muḫāṭarati-him at- taṣarruf ar-raʾy ).

In the same way one could say that a problem ( masʾala ) or a judgment ( ḥukm ) in one madhhab has more to itself than in the other. The tardjīh in the various disciplines already takes place through consensus , because whoever finds a madhhab good, bind himself to him and take him to religion ( wa-ttaḫaḏa-hū dīnan ). So it came about that the Maliki madhhab prevailed among the people of the west , the Hanafit madhhab among the people of the east , the Shafiite madhhab among the people in between, and the Hanbali madhhab among the inhabitants of Gilan . Whoever clings to a madhhab does so either as ijtihad or taqlid based on tardjīh . Since the Muslims did not disapprove of this, according to at-Tūfī, there was a consensus on the admissibility of tardjīh in the fields of teaching.

In today's Saudi Arabia, tardjīh is even seen as a duty in this sense. For example, Hamad al-Faryān, the former deputy minister of justice in Saudi Arabia, has stated that every scholar is obliged to practice tardjīh with regard to the various doctrines, even if these belong to a different madhhab.

The Tardjīh Council of the Muhammadiyah

In the Indonesian organization Muhammadiyah , which is ideologically based on Muhammad Abduh and Raschīd Ridā , a special Tardjīh body was founded in 1927 with the Majelis Tarjih . The idea was that this body should clarify controversial religious questions in order to contribute to unity among Muslims. The meaning of the term tarjih in the Muhammadiyah has changed over time. In the early stages of the organization it still meant "weighing the doctrines of various legal scholars on a particular question". However, the meaning of the term has later expanded to include any intellectual effort expended to resolve new legal cases that have not been dealt with by previous legal scholars. The term has thus become a synonym for ijschtihād . In 1995 the name of the body was changed to “Council for Tardjīh and Development of Islamic Thought” ( Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam ).

The Majelis Tarjih issues fatwas on various problems every 14 days and publishes them in his press organ Suara Muhammadiyah (“Voice of Muhammadiyah”). The fatwas are intended to serve as an instrument to purify faith and to dynamize social life. Another task of the body is the formulation of the ideological foundations of the Muhammadiyah movement. The Majelis Tarjih holds regular conferences at which Tardjīh resolutions ( keputusan tarjih ) are passed, which become binding on the organization and its members as soon as they have been made public by the Central Committee of the Muhammadiyah.

literature

Arabic sources
  • al-Āmidī : al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Razzāq al-ʿAfīfī. Dār aṣ-Ṣamīʿī, Riyad, 2003. 4 Vol. Vol. IV, pp. 291–346. Digitized
  • Ḥusain ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥarbī: Qawāʿid at-tarǧīḥ ʿinda l-mufassirīn. 2 vols. Dar al-Qāsim, Riyad, 1996. Digitized
  • Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Ḥifnāwī: at-Taʿāruḍ wa-t-tarǧīḥ ʿinda l-uṣūlīyīn wa-aṯaruhumā fī l-fiqh al-islamī. Dār al-Wafāʾ, al-Manṣūra, 1985. PDF
  • Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī : Rauḍat an-nāẓir wa-ǧannat al-munāẓir. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī an-Namla. Maktabat ar-Rušd, Beirut, 1993. pp. 1028-1047. Digitized
  • Aš-Šaukānī : Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq min ʿilm al-uṣūl. Ed. Aḥmad ʿAzw ʿInāya. 2 Vol. Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 2010. Vol. II, pp. 257–260, 263–82. Online version
  • Abū Iṣḥāq aš-Šīrāzī: al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Ed. Muṣṭafā Abū Sulaimān an-Nadwī. Dār al-Kalima, Cairo, 1997. pp. 88-92.
  • Naǧm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī : Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Ed. ʿAbdallāh at-Turkī. 3 Vols. Mu'assasat ar-Risāla, Beirut, 1987. Vol. III, pp. 673-750. Digitized
  • Wahba az-Zuhailī : Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. Damascus, 1986. pp. 1185-1207.
  • Mausūʿat muṣṭalaḥāt uṣūl al-fiqh ʿinda l-muslimīn . Ed. Raqīq al-ʿAǧam. Maktabat Lubnān Nāširūn, Beirut, 1998. Vol. I, pp. 420–439. Digitized
Secondary literature
  • Syamsul Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization: a study of Tarjīh in Muhammadiyah” in Islamic Law and Society 12 (2005) 27-44.
  • Mohd Daud Bakar: Conflict of law and the methodology of Tarjih - a study in Islamic legal theory . Ph.D. Thesis, University of St Andrews, July 1994.
  • Birgit Krawietz: “The Weighing of Conflicting Indicators in Islamic Law” in Urbain Vermeulen and JMF van Reeth (ed.): Law, Christianity and Modernism in Islamic Society . Peeters, Leuven 1997. pp. 71-74.
  • Birgit Krawietz: “The hierarchy of legal sources in traditional Sunni Islam.” Berlin 2002. pp. 79–82.
  • Ulrich Rebstock : “Weighing up as a decision-making aid in the uṣūl al-fiqh: the beginnings of the tarǧīḥ method in al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ” in Der Islam 80 (2003) 110–121.
  • Bernard G. Weiss: The Search for God's Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Din al-Amidi . Rev. edition. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2010. pp. 721-731.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See the article by Rebstock: "Weighing as a decision-making aid". 2003.
  2. ↑ Cf. Krawietz: The hierarchy of legal sources. 2002, p. 78.
  3. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1185.
  4. ↑ See Hans Wehr: Arabic dictionary for the written language of the present. Arabic-German. 5th ed. Harrasowitz, Wiesbaden, 1985. p. 452.
  5. ↑ See Mausūʿat muṣṭalaḥāt uṣūl al-fiqh. 1998. p. 424a.
  6. ↑ See Mausūʿat muṣṭalaḥāt uṣūl al-fiqh. 1998. p. 421a.
  7. ↑ Ammā tarǧīḥu fa-ʿibāratun ʿan iqtirāni aḥadi ṣ-ṣāliḥaini li-d-dalālati ʿalā l-maṭlūbi maʿa taʿāruḍi-himā bi-mā yūǧibu l-ʿamā bi-hī wa-himḫar l-l-l. So with al-Āmidī: al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. Vol. IV, p. 291. See also Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, pp. 722, 763.
  8. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Vol. III, p. 676.
  9. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1185.
  10. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq . Vol. II, p. 259.
  11. ↑ Cf. al-Āmidī: al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām . Vol. IV, p. 293 and Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 722f.
  12. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Vol. III, p. 676.
  13. ↑ See Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 723.
  14. ↑ See Rebstock: "Weighing as a decision-making aid". 2003, p. 121.
  15. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, pp. 1186f.
  16. ↑ See Mausūʿat muṣṭalaḥāt uṣūl al-fiqh ʿinda l-muslimīn. 1998. Vol. I, p. 423b.
  17. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa . Vol. III, p. 679.
  18. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Vol. III, pp. 683f.
  19. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq . Vol. II, p. 258.
  20. ↑ Thus quoted in ʿAlī al-Qārī : Šamm al-al-ʿawāriḍ fī ḏamm ar-rawāfiḍ , paragraph Bayān ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ . Wikisource document . The basis is the missive Tabaqat al-muǧtahidīn of Ibn Kamālpaša from which this handwriting is visible. See also Wilhelm Ahlwardt : Directory of Arabic manuscripts in the Berlin State Library No. 10026 digitized version
  21. ↑ See Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 722.
  22. ↑ See Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 722 and Rebstock: “Weighing as a decision-making aid”. 2003, p. 116.
  23. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 262.
  24. ↑ Quotation from Rebstock: “Weighing as a decision-making aid”. 2003, p. 114.
  25. ↑ Cf. Krawietz: "The hierarchy of legal sources". 2002, p. 379.
  26. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 263.
  27. ↑ Cf. aš-Šīrāzī: al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. 1997, pp. 88-90.
  28. ↑ Cf. aš-Šīrāzī: al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. 1997, p. 88.
  29. ↑ Cf. Krawietz: "The hierarchy of legal sources". 2002, p. 379.
  30. ↑ Cf. Krawietz: "The hierarchy of legal sources". 2002, p. 380.
  31. ↑ See Rebstock: "Weighing as a decision-making aid". 2003, p. 115.
  32. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1188.
  33. ↑ See Rebstock: "Weighing as a decision-making aid". 2003, p. 115.
  34. ↑ See Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 726f.
  35. ↑ Cf. Krawietz: The Weighing of Conflicting Indicators in Islamic Law. 1997, p. 73.
  36. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 267.
  37. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 267.
  38. ↑ See Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 727.
  39. ↑ See the list in Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 727f.
  40. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1194.
  41. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 271.
  42. ↑ Cf. aš-Šīrāzī: al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. 1997, p. 90.
  43. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 271.
  44. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 271.
  45. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1199.
  46. ↑ Cf. aš-Šaukānī: Iršād al-fuḥūl ilā taḥqīq al-ḥaqq. Vol. II, p. 272.
  47. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1200f.
  48. ↑ See Weiss: The Search for God's Law. 2010, p. 728.
  49. ↑ See Weiss: “The Search for God's Law”. 2010, p. 729.
  50. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1205.
  51. ↑ Cf. az-Zuḥailī: Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī. 1986, p. 1206.
  52. ↑ See Rebstock: "Weighing as a decision-making aid". 2003, p. 116.
  53. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Vol. III, p. 685.
  54. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Vol. III, pp. 685f.
  55. ↑ Cf. aṭ-Ṭūfī: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar ar-Rauḍa. Vol. III, p. 686.
  56. ↑ Cf. Frank E. Vogel: Islamic Law and the Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Brill, Leiden, 2000. p. 78.
  57. ↑ See Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization”. 2005, p. 37f.
  58. ↑ See Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization”. 2005, p. 33.
  59. ↑ See Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization”. 2005, p. 27f.
  60. ↑ See Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization”. 2005, p. 32.
  61. ↑ See Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization”. 2005, p. 34.
  62. ↑ See Anwar: “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization”. 2005, p. 34.