Red Brigades

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Red Brigades emblem

The Red Brigades (Italian Brigate Rosse , BR) were an underground communist organization in Italy . They were founded in Milan in 1970 . Renato Curcio , his wife Margherita Cagol and Alberto Franceschini were among the founders . The BR viewed themselves as urban guerrillas modeled on the Uruguayan Tupamaros . Between 1970 and 1988, the group carried out 73 assassinations and organized numerous kidnappings and bank robberies. The high point of Italian left-wing terrorism was the kidnapping and murder of the former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. Between 1969 and 1989, a total of 1337 alleged Red Brigades activists were investigated.

prehistory

As in almost all countries in the western world , there was a revolt of the students in Italy around 1968 ( movement of 68 ). Their protests were directed against the poor study conditions and against authoritarian structures at universities and in society. The Vietnam War , which turned the US into an enemy of the left, was also of crucial importance .

The Italian students succeeded in combining their protest with that of the workers, as was the case in France in May 1968 . This union culminated in the so-called Hot Autumn ( Italian autunno caldo ) 1969, which was to become the “most subversive year in the history of Italian workers”: Supported by all three unions and supported by the students' protests, the labor disputes became unprecedented Intensity led. In total, the workers spent more than 300 million hours on strike and thus fought for wage increases of 18.3 percent (1970) and a further 9.8 and 9 percent respectively in the two following years.

In the course of 1969, numerous left-wing radical groups such as Lotta Continua (“The fight goes on”) or Potere operaio (“workers' power”) emerged. In Milan, some activists around Renato Curcio and Mara Cagol founded the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano (CPM, "Political Metropolitan Collective") on September 8, 1969 , which was to become the birth cell of the BR.

In addition to these (mostly) operating legally groups emerged also the first underground organizations : in October In 1969 in Genoa to the 32-year-old Mario Rossi secretly operating group XXII Ottobre , which consisted of only a few members and in the early seventies by the judiciary was smashed. The activists saw themselves in the tradition of the Resistance and even had a former partisan in their ranks, Silvio Malagoli . No less important was the example of the Resistancea for the Gruppi di Azione Partigiana (GAP, "Partisan Action Groups ") of the Milanese publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli , which had also been operating in secret since the spring of 1970.

This tendency towards armed struggle was intensified after December 12, 1969, when a bomb exploded in Piazza Fontana in Milan , killing 16 people and injuring 88 others. The attack should first be pushed into the shoes of the left. Numerous activists from the radical left spectrum were arrested, most of them anarchists from Milan. During the interrogation, the anarchist Giuseppe Pinelli died , who fell out of a window under unknown circumstances. The attack with the subsequent death of Pinelli was the beginning of the numerous terrorist bombings that were carried out by right-wing extremists over the next few years. In their effect on the radical left, the events of December 1969 were comparable to the death of Benno Ohnesorg on June 2, 1967 or the assassination attempt on Rudi Dutschke in April 1968 in the Federal Republic of Germany . Renato Curcio writes about the attack on December 12th: “These events triggered a qualitative leap. First in our thinking and then in our actions. We assessed the bombing as a declaration of war on the left movement, which made it clear that we were at a very high level of confrontation. "

Armed Propaganda (1970–1974)

Creation: The Pecorile Congress

The BR was founded in August / September 1970. In August , around 100 left-wing activists came together in Pecorile , a village near Reggio Emilia , to discuss issues and strategies of the armed struggle. This congress was organized by the CPM and a group around Alberto Franceschini , who had founded a “Political Workers and Students Collective ” (Italian Collettivo politico operai-studenti ) in Reggio Emilia . This congress can be seen as the beginning of the BR without it having already been formally founded there. But it was decided here by a minority of the participants to switch to armed struggle.

As a result of this congress a document was published by the CPM magazine Sinistra Proletaria , which deals very specifically with questions of armed struggle. Among other things, it says: “The years of autonomous struggles were not in vain, but today we know that you cannot meet armed men unarmed. […] We are strong today, but we are still unarmed and without a revolutionary organization. [...] Let's build groups to attack and defend the workers! [...] An organization of violence is a necessity of the class struggle. "

Immediately after the convegno di Pecorile , some activists from Reggio Emilia went to Milan , including Alberto Franceschini, and on September 17, 1970, just a few weeks after the congress, the first attack was carried out under the Brigate Rosse logo .

Name and symbol

With their name, the Brigate Rosse refer directly to the tradition of the partisan brigades of the Resistancea . Legendary were z. B. the Brigate Garibaldi . Alberto Franceschini writes about the addition Rosse (German Rote) : “Brigate Rosse… rosse; That was the right expression, it conveyed the idea of ​​revolutionary communism in a simple and clear manner. “If you follow Renato Curcio , then you also used the RAF as your guide when choosing a name .

In the first few months, the pamphlets that were distributed in Milan were still signed with Brigata Rossa , the singular form (German "Red Brigade"). It was not until Comunicato n ° 7 ( Nuove forme di lotta ) of March 1971 that Brigate Rosse was signed .

The signet, the asymmetrical, five-pointed star, resembled that of Brigate Garibaldi and was also the symbol of the Uruguayan Tupamaros .

1970–1972: The beginnings of the BR

The BR initially consisted of around 15 members and until 1972 were only active in Milan. They carried out the first attack on September 17, 1970 on the car belonging to SIT Siemens manager Giuseppe Leoni . This attack heralded the first phase in the history of the BR, which followed the concept of "armed propaganda " (Italian Propaganda armata ). The tactics and scope of this first phase were strictly limited to the factories in Milan.

The aim of this first phase was to win as many followers and sympathizers as possible through popular campaigns, which was quite successful in the beginning. The first attack was followed by further mini-attacks against managers or foremen. The attacks were initially directed exclusively against their property, usually against the car, and not against the people themselves. The actions initially hardly differed from those of the students and workers in previous years.

From November 1970 to March 1971 the BR actions were directed almost exclusively against Pirelli . Again arson attacks were carried out against manager vehicles. On the night of January 26, 1971, the BR set three trucks on fire on the Pirelli test track in Lainate, causing considerable property damage.

The first bank robberies were also carried out to raise funds. The raid on a bank in Pergine in Valsugana was spectacular, and in the spring of 1971 nine million lire were stolen. It was also founded its own magazine, which was called resistenza in renewed allusion to the resistenza Nuova resistenza . In addition to the numerous documents of the BR, u. a. Texts published by the RAF and the GAP.

The texts that the BR published during these months were written in an emphatically violent language and propagated the principle of continuous escalation. In January 1971 it says: "The only weapon we have in our hands is to respond to the fight more and more effectively and violently: That alone is our power." The BR now faced the problem that between their cocky texts and their relatively harmless actions existed in a large discrepancy. This was also clear to the activists, who therefore decided, after a few more mini-attacks, to use violence against people for the first time.

This was implemented with the kidnapping of the Siemens manager Idalgo Macchiarini (March 3, 1972), according to Renato Curcio , a “symbolic punitive action against a particularly hated person”. After Macchiarini was symbolically sentenced in a so-called “People's Court”, he was released after about twenty minutes. The kidnapping of Macchiarini was the BR's most spectacular action to date. It succeeded here for the first time to attract national attention.

1972–1974: The transition to underground activity

Until 1972, the BR activists were still able to move relatively freely in a broad circle of sympathizers in Milan. This status of “half legality” was by no means unusual, but corresponded to the beginnings of the Prima Linea , the June 2nd Movement or the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). In the first half of 1972 the police increased the pressure: at the beginning of May there were several raids on various BR apartments in Milan. About 30 activists were arrested, including the former GAP activist Marco Pisetta , who then gave evidence against the BR on a large scale.

Giangiacomo Feltrinelli had already died on March 15, 1972 in an unsuccessful attack on his CAP. Feltrinelli's death brought a break for the radical left: The CAP was practically at an end and the radical groups Lotta Continua and Potere operaio, which had previously received financial support from Feltrinelli, also fell into a crisis. Feltrinelli had established almost all international contacts for the BR (including with the RAF ), which now broke off.

These events caused the first major turning point in the history of the BR, whose founders now finally chose the path of full clandestinity . Curcio and Cagol then left Milan to set up a new BR column in Turin. In Milan, Alberto Franceschini and Mario Moretti took over the leadership of the column there.

After the BR had used the second half of 1972 almost exclusively for reorganization, a new offensive took place in early 1973: On January 15, a BR command raided the Milan office of the right-wing business association Unione cristiana imprenditori e dirigenti d'azienda (abbreviated UCID ) to steal their membership lists. In the course of the first half of 1973 there were also other short-term kidnappings (e.g. the kidnapping of Alfa Romeo engineer Michele Mincuzzi on June 28, 1973).

On December 10, 1973 the BR kidnapped Ettore Amerio , FIAT's personnel manager. The aim of the kidnapping was to force the FIAT group to withdraw pronounced layoffs. This abduction was the longest abduction of the BR until then, lasting a total of eight days. This indicated a new quality and a more radical form of armed struggle, which was then reflected in terrorist practice since 1974.

During this phase, the Italian economy fell into a crisis that was exacerbated by the 1973 oil shock . The BR interpreted this economic crisis as a “crisis of the regime” and drew the conclusion that the confrontation was intensifying. The new target proclaimed a few months after the Amerio kidnapping was: "Portare l'attacco al cuore dello stato!"

The Assault on the Heart of the State (1974-1977)

The escalation of violence

The BR expressed the expectation that the "crisis of the regime" would intensify counter-revolutionary tendencies. They expected that there would be another coup attempt. They also warned of neo-Gaullist developments in Italian politics. From this analysis the BR derived the demand: “In order to win, the mass movement must overcome the spontaneous phase and organize itself for the struggle for power. The working class will only gain power through armed struggle. "

For the BR, the heart of the state was primarily the all-powerful Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Christian Democratic politicians were often victims of attacks in the second half of the 1970s (e.g. Aldo Moro). The new concept was first implemented with the kidnapping of the Genoese public prosecutor Mario Sossi (April 18, 1974). This was significantly involved in the trials against Group XXII Ottobre . With the Sossi kidnapping, an unsuccessful attempt was made to blackmail the imprisoned XXII Ottobre activists. Without any consideration, Sossi was released after 35 days.

The BR's terrorist repertoire was expanded to include the use of firearms from 1974. On June 17, 1974, BR activists shot and killed two MSI members in Padua . However, it was not a targeted attack, but a more random shootout. In 1975 the BR went over to inflicting targeted gunshot wounds to victims in the open street (mostly shots on the legs, hence the neologism gambizzare ).

On June 8, 1976, the BR carried out their first targeted assassination attempt. The victim was the Genoese public prosecutor Francesco Coco , who prevented the exchange of prisoners during the Sossi kidnapping. So the murder was also an act of revenge. Above all, it was a deliberate escalation of violence. The letter of confession states: "With this action, a new phase of the class war begins, which aims to dismantle the state apparatus by attacking the people who embody it and direct its counter-revolutionary initiatives."

The year 1977 then represented a year of transition for Italian left-wing terrorism. The actions were still clearly in the tradition of symbolic punitive actions, but took on more violent forms. In addition to a few gambizzare attacks, two targeted murders were carried out: On April 28, 1977, Fulvio Croce , President of the Turin Bar Association, was shot. On November 16, 1977, a BR commando murdered Carlo Casalegno , deputy director of La Stampa , who had sharply criticized the BR and the Autonomia movement in his articles . In addition to this murder, there were other attacks against representatives of the press. The BR justified this campaign with its alleged importance for the “ counterrevolution ”: “Casalegno was by no means a simple journalist, but an agent of the active counterrevolution who was aware of his role in the field of psychological warfare. The newspaper offices accommodate many agents like him. "

The response of the state

In the fight against terrorism, Italian policy focused primarily on strengthening the executive branch. As a result, several anti-terror laws were enacted during the 1970s:

  • May 22, 1975 ( legge Reale ): The first anti-terror law provided, among other things, that police officers who had injured or killed someone in the course of their duties could be protected from prosecution if ordered by the Attorney General. The law enforcement agencies were also allowed to conduct house searches without a judicial order.
  • On August 8, 1977, the legal basis for the establishment of special prisons with high-security units was laid.
  • February 6, 1980 ( legge Cossiga ): The most important new regulation of this law was the creation of a leniency program. Terrorists who renounced the armed struggle and decided to cooperate with the criminal authorities could now count on reduced sentences. These key witnesses are referred to as pentiti (German "the repentant").

As early as 1973, under Carabinieri- General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, a special unit to fight terrorism was set up. This enabled a more effective prosecution, so that the first spectacular arrests were made as early as 1974: On May 27, BR co-founder Paolo Maurizio Ferrari was arrested in Florence. On September 8th, Franceschini and Curcio were also arrested. However, Curcio managed to escape from the prison of Casale Monferrato on February 18, 1975 with the help of an armed BR command . On January 18, 1976, he was finally arrested. Dalla Chiesa's special groups also uncovered numerous BR covert flats.

A total of 38 BR bases were uncovered and 152 brigatisti were arrested between 1973 and May 1978 .

On May 17, 1976, the first major trial against the historic core of the BR began in Turin, which ended on June 23, 1978 with the conviction of 29 defendants. Curcio was sentenced to 15 years, Franceschini to 14 years and 6 months. During the trial, the defendants read several political statements in the courtroom, including following the murder of Coco and during the Moro kidnapping. In addition, the BR carried out several attacks against representatives of the judiciary (e.g. Coco, Croce). The process therefore had to be interrupted and postponed several times.

Curcio's wife Margherita Cagol was shot dead on June 5, 1975 in a firefight with Carabinieri. After the Legge Reale had been passed , twelve other members of the BR were shot by law enforcement officers between 1976 and 1982.

In 1976, a large part of the leading heads of the BR's founding generation were in custody or dead. Mario Moretti now assumed the leading role in the BR hierarchy.

The development of the organizational structure

Characteristic of the organizational structure of the BR decentralized division (called in local basic cell columns , Italian colonne ) in individual cities. This column in turn was divided into individual brigades (Italian brigate ). A brigata was made up of about five members (called cell, Italian cellula ) who, partly legally, partly illegally, were active in the individual factories or working-class neighborhoods. Colonne existed from 1970 in Milan , from 1972 in Turin and from 1974 also in Genoa , Florence , Venice and especially Rome .

This expansion in 1974 made a realignment and centralization of the strategic management necessary. A Strategic Direction (Italian direzione strategica ) was therefore set up as the highest decision-making body within the group . The direzione strategica was subordinated to an executive committee (Italian Comitato esecutivo ), which should coordinate the activities of the column and the newly formed fronts (Italian fronti ). These fronti primarily served the political debate. They should also submit proposals for new campaigns to the Comitato esecutivo and develop existing structures in the factories and working-class neighborhoods. A total of four fronti were formed:

  • the logistics front (Italian fronte logistico ) for the expansion of the logistical structure (organization of conspiratorial housing, procurement of money and weapons, etc.),
  • the factory front (Italian fronte delle grandi fabbriche , often also referred to as fronte di massa ) for the expansion of structures within the factories (propaganda, recruiting sympathizers, etc.),
  • the front for the struggle against the counter-revolution (Italian fronte di lotta alla controrivoluzione ), which was supposed to prepare the “attack on the heart of the state”, and
  • the prison front (Italian fronte delle carceri ), which was developed after the wave of arrests in the mid-1970s to address the needs and ideas of prisoners.

In addition to the strictly hierarchical, vertical structure brigata - colonna - esecutivo, a horizontal structure was to be created with the fronti . In practice, however, none of these fronti could actually be established. Instead, the tendency towards centralization and hierarchization continued in the second half of the 1970s.

The Years of Terror (1978–1980)

The radicalization of the left

Italy experienced a wave of violence in the second half of the 1970s. For the total period from 1970 to 1983, the left-wing terrorist actions add up to 1,159 (645 by the BR alone). 850 of these relate to the years 1976–1980. During this period, left-wing terrorism claimed 97 lives, 81 of them in the years 1978–1980 alone. From 1977 onwards, the BR's terrorist repertoire consisted almost exclusively of violence against people.

From the mid-seventies onwards, new armed groups emerged, partly as splits from the Brigate Rosse, such as B. the Formazioni comuniste combattenti (German Combat Communist Formations, abbreviated FCC) around the former BR activists Fabrizio Pelli and Corrado Alunni . Independently of the BR, the group Prima Linea (German Vorderste Front, abbreviated PL) was founded in 1976 , which developed alongside the BR to become the most active left-wing terrorist association in Italy. It was responsible for 258 actions in the six years of its existence (including 11 targeted assassinations). Their aim was to close the gap between the armed organization and the labor movement. The BR, so the criticism, had not only left the operative line, but were also too isolated and had lost contact with the workers. The PL therefore saw itself as a more open and less militant counter-model to the BR.

In addition to these armed groups, there was also a general radicalization within the extra-parliamentary left, which culminated in the so-called '77 movement . Some of the protests by settantasette were markedly violent. Attempts by the PCI and the CGIL to capture the protests ended in desolate street battles, some of which were even armed. This radical anti-authority, far more radical than in the movement of 1968, shows that traditional left institutions no longer found support in the extra-parliamentary left.

In this very context of diffuse and ever-present violence, the new radicalism of the BR developed.

The kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro

Aldo Moro in captivity

In the first three months of 1978, the BR carried out two targeted murders, and three people were deliberately injured. The undoubtedly most spectacular coup was the kidnapping of the former Prime Minister Aldo Moro (DC) on March 16, 1978 in Rome. His five companions were shot.

This kidnapping was the culmination of a whole series of politically motivated kidnapping operations since 1972, which basically all followed the same pattern: the kidnapped person was symbolically tried and then released. The BR followed this tradition in the Moro case - however, this time the kidnapper was not released, but shot after 55 days. There was a period of extreme tension between the day of the kidnapping and the day of the murder. The situation can definitely be compared with that of the German Autumn . The Italian government also adopted a policy of harshness and refused to negotiate with the kidnappers.

During the 55 days, the BR carried out further attacks in an attempt to create the impression of a major offensive. To this end, the BR also called on PL to carry out support actions. The BR intended to intensify the “attack on the heart of the state” in order to be able to “expose and destroy the centers of the imperialist counterrevolution”. According to the BR, it was an indispensable prerequisite for this general offensive to unite “the revolutionary movement by building up the fighting communist party”. The kidnapping of Aldo Moro thus served the double purpose of intensifying the attack on the heart of the state on the one hand and thus asserting its own claim to leadership within the diffuse left-wing scene in Italy on the other.

During these weeks Moro wrote over 80 letters to his family and also to some party friends, whom he sharply criticized because of their uncompromising line. Only the socialist Bettino Craxi advocated starting negotiations with the kidnappers. But all attempts at mediation remained without result; neither Craxi nor Moro's letters could dissuade the crisis team from its tough stance.

On May 9, 1978, 55 days after his abduction, Aldo Moro was finally shot by the BR. The body was found in the trunk of a red Renault 4 . The vehicle had been parked in Via Caetani in Rome; halfway between the party headquarters of the PCI and the DC.

The background and motives for the crime are still controversial today; In particular, there is speculation about the involvement of secret services and foreign governments (see in detail the personal article on contemporary history ).

After the kidnapping of Aldo Moro

Although the kidnapping did not succeed in achieving close political goals, the BR recorded this spring campaign as a success. Above all, the goal of "opening a new phase of class war" had been achieved. This new phase should be marked by the "maximum political unity of the proletarian movement". Through this unity, which they believed they had achieved, the transition to a more open conflict resolution was to be achieved. In terrorist practice, this was reflected in the fact that firearms were used more and more often and, above all, more indiscriminately. The years 1978–1980 were the most sacrificed in the history of Italian left-wing terrorism.

This new radicalism accelerated the process of de-solidarization within the left and the desired proletarian unity also remained unattainable. Instead, the anti-terror laws, and especially the legge Cossiga (see above), led to quick successes. In 1980 alone 1,021 suspected terrorists were arrested and by 1983 a further 1703. This wave of arrests meant the end of most armed groups.

Crisis and decline of the Red Brigades (1980–1988)

Many of those arrested chose to take advantage of the newly created leniency program and cooperate with the police. This contributed significantly to the rapid decline of the BR. The most important key witness was Patrizio Peci . The Neapolitan BR column kidnapped his brother Roberto (June 10, 1981), whom they then shot on August 3 in front of the camera. Roberto Peci had been a member of the BR since 1976 and had also worked with the police.

In addition, the BR announced new attacks against representatives of the judiciary. The highlight was the kidnapping of the Roman judge Giovanni D'Urso , who was responsible for the high-security prisons , on December 12, 1980 . In addition, a prisoner uprising was organized in the special prison of Trani , but it was suppressed. In retaliation, the BR shot dead Carabinieri General Enrico Dalvaligi on December 31, 1980. D'Urso, however, was released on January 15, 1981.

On April 4, 1981, long-time BR boss Mario Moretti was arrested. Moretti had held the BR together by virtue of his personal authority, which was now less and less successful. In view of the search pressure and the lack of success, the rifts deepened between the factions within the BR. As early as 1980, the Walter Alasia column in Milan had abandoned the course of the BR in order to return to its operaist roots. In October 1981 the Venetian column followed this example and also went into business under the name Colonna 2 Agosto . In December 1981 the BR split on a national level. A part organized itself in the Partito della Guerriglia . The guerrilla party believed that civil war was imminent, so they followed a strategy of open confrontation in which they killed 11 people by 1983. All three groups organized some kidnappings and murders, but were crushed by the police in the wave of arrests in 1982/83.

The BR Partito Comunista Combattente (Fighting Communist Party), which were active until 1987, proved to be more durable . The BR-PCC wanted to build an anti-imperialist front in Western Europe together with the RAF and the French Action Directe . In this context, they carried out the last spectacular coup of the BR on December 17, 1981 with the kidnapping of the high-ranking NATO general James Lee Dozier . Dozier was freed on January 28, 1982 by a special police unit. After 1982, numerous arrests put the BR-PCC on the defensive. Further attacks followed until 1987, but the number of attacks decreased significantly. As a rule, only one major attack per year was carried out until 1987. There was also a further split in 1985/86, which led to the establishment of the Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti (Union of Communists in War). Almost all of the UdCC activists were arrested in 1987 before any major action took place. Not least because of these experiences, the majority of the BR-PCC declared the armed struggle to be over in 1987. Some militants continued the armed struggle and killed the Christian Democratic Senator Roberto Ruffilli on April 16, 1988 . It was the BR's last murder.

Groups seen in succession

The group Partito Comunista Politico-Militare (Communist Party - political-military arm, PC pm), which appeared in 1999, was seen in the German-language press as the ideological successor to the Red Brigades. The group is held responsible for the murder of Massimo D'Antona (1999), Marco Biagi (2002) and Emanuele Petri (2003) and is also said to have planned several attacks, including on the multiple Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi . In early 2007, 15 people were arrested.

literature

Overall representations

  • Pino Casamassima: Il libro nero delle Brigate Rosse: Gli episodi e le azioni della più nota organizzazione armata dagli “anni di piombo” fino ai nostri giorni. Newton Compton, Rome 2007. (Italian).
  • Marco Clementi: Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007 (Italian).
  • Giorgio Galli: Piombo Rosso: La storia completa della lotta armata in Italia dal 1970 a oggi. Baldini Castoldi Dalai, Milan 2007 (new edition, Italian).
  • Henner Hess: Italy: The ambivalent revolt. In the S. among others: attack on the heart of the state. Social Development and Terrorism. Volume 2, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt / Main 1988, pp. 9-166.
  • Robert C. Meade: Red Brigades: the Story of Italian Terrorism. Saint Martin's Press, London et al. 1989 (English).
  • Alessandro Orsini: Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-set of Modern Terrorists. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2009, ISBN 978-0-8014-4986-4 .
  • Stefan Seifert: Lotta armata: Armed struggle in Italy. The history of the Red Brigades. Edition ID archive, Berlin / Amsterdam 1991, ISBN 3-89408-013-2 .

Documents

  • Progetto Memoria (Ed.): Le parole scritte. Sensibili alle Foglie, Dogliani 1996 (Italian).
  • Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007 (Italian).
  • Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1976–1978: Le BR sanguinarie di Moretti: documenti, comunicati e censure. Kaos, Milan 2007 (Italian).
  • Soccorso Rosso (Ed.): Brigate Rosse. che cosa hanno fatto, che cosa hanno detto, che cosa se ne è detto. Feltrinelli, Milan 1976 (Italian).
  • Vincenzo Tessandori: BR Imputazione: Banda armata. Cronaca e documenti delle Brigate Rosse. Baldini Castoldi Dalai, Milan 2004 (new edition, Italian).

On individual aspects

  • Amedeo Benedetti: Il linguaggio delle nuove Brigate Rosse. Erga, Genua 2002, ISBN 88-8163-292-6 (Italian).
  • Donatella della Porta : Social movements, political violence and the state. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge 1995 (English).
  • Aldo Giannuli: bomb a inchiostro. Luci e ombre della Controinformazione tra il '68 e gli anni di piombo. Milan 2008 (Italian).
  • David Moss: The politics of left-wing violence in Italy, 1969–1985. Macmillan, Basingstoke, et al. a. 1989, ISBN 0-333-41254-0 .
  • Giampaolo Pansa: L'utopia armata. Come è nato il terrorismo in Italia: Dal delitto Calabresi all'omicidio Tobagi. Sperling & Kupfer , Milan 2006 (Italian).
  • Progetto Memoria (Ed.): La mappa perduta. Sensibili alle foglie, Dogliani 2007 (Italian).
  • Alessandro Silj: Crime, Politics, Democracy in Italy. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt / Main 1998, (new edition) ISBN 3-518-11911-7 .
  • Petra Terhoeven : Images of victims - images of perpetrators. Photography as a medium of left-wing terrorist self-empowerment in Germany and Italy during the 1970s. In: History in Science and Education . Volume 58, 2007, Issue 7/8, pp. 380-399.
  • Petra Terhoeven: German autumn in Europe. Left-wing terrorism in the 1970s as a transnational phenomenon. Oldenbourg, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-486-71866-9 .

documentation

  • They were the terrorists of the Red Brigades. Production: Arte , Direction: Mosco Boucault , France 2011.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Of these, the classic BR (1970–1983) accounted for 52 assassinations; the others were perpetrated by splits / subgroups: BR-Walter Alasia: 3 (1980–1983); BR-Partito Guerriglia: 11 (1981-1982); BR-Partito Comunista Combattente: 6 (1981-1988); BR-Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti: 1 (1985-1987); see: Progetto Memoria (ed.): La mappa perduta . Sensibili alle foglie, Dogliani 2007. p. 495; see. also: Donatella Della Porta, Social movements, political violence and the state. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany , Cambridge 1995. pp. 124ff.
  2. ↑ This is attributable to the classic BR 911; BR-Walter Alasia 113; BR-Partito Guerriglia 147; BR-Partito Comunista Combattente 93; BR-Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti 73; see. the respective entries in: Progetto Memoria (ed.): La mappa perduta . Sensibili alle foglie, Dogliani 2007.
  3. ^ Paul Ginsborg : A History of Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943–1988. New York 2003, p. 313.
  4. ^ Paul Ginsborg: A History of Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943–1988. New York 2003, p. 309 ff .; Friederike Hausmann : A brief history of Italy from 1943 to the era after Berlusconi. Berlin 2006, p. 81 f.
  5. ^ To group XXII Ottobre Paolo Piano: La "banda 22 Ottobre". Agli albori della lotta armata in Italia. Derive Approdi, Rome 2008; in addition to the formation of the first armed groups Marco Clementi: Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007, p. 20 f.
  6. ↑ Luciano Lanza: Bombs and Secrets - History of the Massacre of the Piazza Fontana. Hamburg 1998.
  7. ^ Camilla Cederna: Pinelli. Una finestra sulla strage. Net, Milan 2004.
  8. ↑ Renato Curcio: With an open eye. A conversation about the history of the Red Brigades in Italy by Mario Scialoja. Berlin 1997, p. 45.
  9. ↑ See the Sinistra Proletaria document Fogli di lotta di Sinistra Proletaria , printed in excerpts in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (Ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. pp. 73ff .; On the congress in Pecorile: Prospero Gallinari: Un contadino nella metropoli: Ricordi di un militante delle Brigate Rosse. , Bompiani 2008. pp. 72ff .; Alberto Franceschini: Mara Renato e io , Mondadori, Milan 1988. pp. 23ff .; Renato Curcio, with an open eye. A conversation on the history of the Red Brigades in Italy by Mario Scialoja, Berlin 1997. P. 47f.
  10. ^ Alberto Franceschini: Mara Renato e io , Mondadori, Milan 1988. p. 32.
  11. ↑ Renato Curcio, With an Open Eye. A conversation on the history of the Red Brigades in Italy by Mario Scialoja, Berlin 1997. p. 11.
  12. ↑ Printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. pp. 101f.
  13. ↑ Cf. u. a. Stefan Seifert: Lotta armata: Armed struggle in Italy. The history of the Red Brigades. Edition ID Archive, Berlin / Amsterdam 1991. S. 38ff.
  14. ↑ Marco Clementi, Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007. pp. 27ff .; on the bank robbery in Pergine also: Mario Moretti, Carla Mosca, Rossana Rossanda: Brigate Rosse: Una storia italiana. Mondadori, Milan 2007. p. 25.
  15. ↑ Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. p. 98.
  16. ↑ Renato Curcio, With an Open Eye. A conversation on the history of the Red Brigades in Italy by Mario Scialoja, Berlin 1997. p. 63.
  17. ↑ Letters of responsibility and reactions of the press printed in: Vincenzo Tessandori: BR Imputazione: Banda armata. Cronaca e documenti delle Brigate Rosse. Baldini Castoldi Dalai, Milan 2004. 75ff.
  18. ↑ Donatella Della Porta, Social movements, political violence and the state. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany , Cambridge 1995. p. 118; Mario Moretti, Carla Mosca, Rossana Rossanda: Brigate Rosse: Una storia italiana , Mondadori, Milan 2007. p. 25; Renato Curcio, with an open eye. A conversation on the history of the Red Brigades in Italy by Mario Scialoja, Berlin 1997. p. 58.
  19. ↑ Il memoriale Pisetta printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. pp. 160-192; see. also: Marco Clementi: Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007. pp. 43ff.
  20. ↑ See Alberto Franceschini, Giovanni Fasanella: Che cosa sono le BR. , Rizzoli BUR, Milan 2004. pp. 117ff.
  21. ↑ Note: Mario Moretti accidentally drew a six-pointed Star of David instead of the five-pointed star of the BR on the sign of the Mincuzzi kidnapping . The photo was published in the Corriere della Sera and led to wild speculation about a possible involvement of Israeli intelligence services. Photo printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. p. 204; see. also: Mario Moretti, Carla Mosca, Rossana Rossanda: Brigate Rosse: Una storia italiana , Mondadori, Milan 2007. p. 20; Alberto Franceschini, Giovanni Fasanella: Che cosa sono le BR. , Rizzoli BUR, Milan 2004. p. 123
  22. ↑ The three comunicati on the Amerio kidnapping printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (Ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. pp. 225-131 (here p. 231); see. also: Vincenzo Tessandori: BR Imputazione: Banda armata. Cronaca e documenti delle Brigate Rosse. Baldini Castoldi Dalai, Milan 2004. pp. 117ff.
  23. ↑ See the BR document Contro il neogollismo portare l'attacco al cuore dello stato (April 1974), printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. pp. 253–156 (here p. 256)
  24. ↑ Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1976–1978: Le BR sanguinarie di Moretti: documenti, comunicati e censure. Kaos, Milan 2007. p. 44
  25. ↑ Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1976–1978: Le BR sanguinarie di Moretti: documenti, comunicati e censure. Kaos, Milan 2007. p. 155; in detail on the events of 1977: Concetto Vecchio: Ali di piombo. Il 1977, trent'anni dopo, Rizzoli BUR, Milan 2007. (On Croce, p. 112ff .; on Casalegno, p. 165ff.)
  26. ↑ In detail on anti-terror legislation: Marco Clementi: Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007. ( legge Reale : p. 119f .; on special prisons: p. 166ff .; on legge Cossiga p. 245ff.)
  27. ↑ Marco Clementi: Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007. pp. 96ff .; see. also Stefan Seifert: Lotta armata: Armed struggle in Italy. The history of the Red Brigades. Edition ID archive, Berlin / Amsterdam 1991. S. 58ff.
  28. ↑ Marco Clementi: Storia delle Brigate Rosse. Odradek, Rome 2007. p. 186
  29. ↑ Cesare Bermani: Il nemico interno. Guerra civile e lotte di classe in Italia (1943–1976). Odradek, Rome 1997. p. 310; more statistics on the effects of the legge Reale : http://isole.ecn.org/lucarossi/625/625/
  30. ^ Donatella Della Porta, Il terrorismo di sinistra , Bologna 1990. p. 127
  31. ↑ See the BR document Alcune questioni per la discussione sull'Organizzazione , printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1969–1975: La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime BR. Kaos, Milan 2007. pp. 300ff .; see. also Stefan Seifert: Lotta armata: Armed struggle in Italy. The history of the Red Brigades. Edition ID Archive, Berlin / Amsterdam 1991. pp. 60ff .; Robert C. Meade: Red Brigades: the Story of Italian Terrorism. London, etc. 1989. pp. 61f.
  32. ↑ In Italy, official statistics on terrorism have never been kept. There are therefore various surveys, the results of which sometimes differ considerably from one another. However, the tendency for left-wing terrorism to peak in the second half of the 1970s is all agreed. Statistical information here after: Donatella Della Porta, Social movements, political violence and the state. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany , Cambridge 1995. p. 126ff .; Donatella Della Porta, Il terrorismo di sinistra , Bologna 1990. p. 92; P. 237. The BR fatality figures also include terrorists killed. Statistics on PL: Sergio Segio, Una vita in Prima Linea , Rizzoli, Milan 2006. S. 379f.
  33. ↑ Sergio Segio: Una vita in Prima Linea. Rizzoli, Milan 2006, p. 127.
  34. ↑ See BR document: Risoluzione della Direzione strategica (February 1978), printed in: Lorenzo Ruggiero (ed.): Dossier Brigate Rosse 1976–1978: Le BR sanguinarie di Moretti: documenti, comunicati e censure. Kaos, Milan 2007, pp. 220-288; Quotations from p. 288.
  35. ↑ Cf. the BR document “La campagna di primavera” from March 1979; reprinted in and quoted here from: Progetto Memoria (Ed.): Le parole scritte . Sensibili alle Foglie, Dogliani 1996. pp. 129-148; Quotations from p. 129.
  36. ^ Progetto Memoria (ed.): La mappa perduta . Sensibili alle foglie, Dogliani 2007. p. 488.
  37. ↑ See the BR document “Direzione strategica” from October 1980; Printed in: Progetto Memoria (Ed.): Le parole scritte. Sensibili alle Foglie, Dogliani 1996. pp. 148-197; on prisons: pp. 175–184. All explanations of the D'Urso kidnapping are also printed there (pp. 198–223).
  38. ^ For the column Walter Alasia see: Wildcat (Ed.): Rote Brigaden. Factory guerrilla in Milan 1980–1981. Karlsruhe undated; the most important documents of the respective BR spin-offs are printed in: Progetto Memoria (ed.): Le parole scritte. Sensibili alle Foglie, Dogliani 1996.
  39. ↑ See Red Brigades planning attack on Berlusconi. In: Der Tagesspiegel , February 14, 2007. About the new BR Pino Casamassima: Il libro nero delle Brigate Rosse. Gli episodi e le azioni della più nota organizzazione armata dagli “anni di piombo” fino ai nostri giorni. Newton Compton, Rome 2007, p. 285 ff .; Giorgio Galli: Piombo Rosso. La storia completa della lotta armata in Italia dal 1970 a oggi. Milan 2007, p. 299 ff.