Freedom of Belief in Islam

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According to Islamic law, freedom of belief in Islam means the freedom of Muslims to practice their belief and the freedom of all to accept Islam. The Islamic legal system recognizes no negative religious freedom for Muslims and also does not recognize the right not to belong to any religion. Accordingly, Muslims do not have the right to convert to another religion or to live without religion. On the other hand, freedom of belief in Islam includes the right of the owner of the scriptures ( ahl al-kitāb ) to practice their belief within certain limits and against payment (the jizya ). Followers of other religious communities - Zoroastrians , Mandaeans and others - were also tolerated.

The Islamic understanding of freedom of belief

The apostasy is after the Sharia with the death penalty punished. The right to practice Judaism , Christianity or Zoroastrianism is given with considerable restrictions according to Sharia law. Other religions are forbidden according to classical teaching, but were later partially allowed. According to classical teaching, polytheists ( Muschrik ūn) have the choice between Islam or death.

Taking into account historically grown boundaries defined in legal doctrine, the members of the other revealed religions - Jews and Christians - can retain their religions de jure with recognition of the Islamic authorities and fulfill their cultic duties.

The exegesis of the Koranic norm " In religion there is no compulsion " (2: 256) plays an important role in assessing freedom of belief in Islam . Both the Islamic Koranic exegesis and Islamic research offer different interpretations of this verse. (See the corresponding paragraphs in the article No compulsion in religion ) So this verse - according to several classic Koran commentaries - has been abrogated , while other commentators limit its scope to the owners of the scriptures . Regardless of theories put forward about its original meaning - so Rudi Paret argues that this verse at the time of its revelation was an expression of resignation, not of religious tolerance, which he regards as confirmed by Koran verses like 10:99 - is emphasized in contemporary Islamic studies that this principle " the foundation of Islamic tolerance in matters of faith and religious practice [was] . Islamic tradition has understood this verse as a prohibition against forcing people to believe, not just as a statement that no one but God can force people to believe. "

The community order of Medina , which Mohammed concluded with the extended Medina families and the Jewish clans in and around Medina , draws a clear dividing line between the Muslims and the Jews in the recognition of their religion in the concise formulation: “The Jews have their religion and they Believers (that is, Muslims) have their religion ”. This attitude towards those of different faiths is already evident in the early Meccan phase of Muhammad's prophecy:

« لَكُمْ دِينُكُمْ وَلِیَ دِينِ »

"Lakum dīnukum wa-liya dīn"

"You have your religion and I mean it."

- 109 : 6; Translation: Rudi Paret

Ash-Shafii (767–820) at the latest formulated the treatment of the polytheists and the “book owners” in his work Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (legal provisions of the Koran) according to Koranic standards: “God made two judgments about the polytheists; he has ruled to fight the idol worshipers ( ahl al-auṯān ) until they accept Islam and fight the book owners until they pay the poll tax ( jizya ) if they do not accept Islam ”. The fact that even the “book owners” can be counted among the polytheists lies in the Islamic understanding of Judaism and Christianity anchored in the Koran; for according to sura 9, verse 30-31, the Jews believe that ʿUzayr ( Esra ) is the Son of God , the Christians believe that Christ (al-masīḥ) is the Son of God.

As a result of the conquests in the 7th and 8th centuries , Islamic doctrine also deals with the legal status of prisoners and their religious affiliation beyond the interpretation of the above verses from the Qur'an. Century redefined and the compulsion to enter Islam is not excluded. The Koran commentator and Qadi of Valencia and Murcia al-Qurtubi († 1223) reports in this context the legal doctrine of the Malikite school of law of the late 8th century as follows: “Minors have no religion. Therefore they were forced to enter Islam in order not to enter a false religion ( dīn bātil ) ”. What is meant here are the underage descendants of fallen fighters against the Muslims, who could probably be forced to accept Islam when they reached the age of majority under Muslim rule.

Freedom of belief for Muslims and those of other faiths

When considering freedom of belief in Islam, a distinction must be made between granting freedom of belief to members of Islam itself and granting this freedom to followers of other religious communities.

If Islam regards itself in the classical sense as a unity of religion and state or as a unity of religion and law ( Sharia ), the practice of religious customs for both Muslims and non-Muslim religious communities is defined by Islamic law.

Islamic law grants followers of the revealed religions - Jews and Christians - freedom in the exercise of their religious customs and, with restrictions laid down by Islamic law, in the exercise of their religious duties. It does not provide a penalty for failing to perform religious duties by a non-Muslim. From a historical perspective, however, Islamic law imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of religious duties by people of different faiths. The best-known document for the treatment of Christians after the conquest of the cities of Syria and Mesopotamia is the treaty confirmed by the second caliph Umar ibn al-Chattab (592-644), which should serve as a guideline for future treaties and in works of aliens law - as was the case with Abu Bakr al-Challal, who was active until 923. Some of the conditions that Christians had to meet were: no new churches or monasteries to be built ; no reconstruction of destroyed churches in the residential quarters of the Muslims; no cross on the steeples ; no public showing of the cross or the Bible in the presence of Muslims; no loud prayer or loud recitation of the sacred texts; no proselytizing . Since the late 7th century, the social pressure on the Christian population in the conquered former Roman Orient provinces has also increased (see Islamic expansion # Situation of other religions under Muslim rule ). There was discrimination, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the administration, interference in internal Christian affairs and the confiscation of church property and individual attacks on churches.

Islamic legal doctrine has defined the status of places of worship of the named non-Muslim religious communities in more detail according to the type of conquest of countries and divided it into three groups:

  • Cities founded by the Muslims such as Kufa , Basra , Wasit and the like a .: There is general agreement among legal scholars that no churches, synagogues and other religious meeting places may be built in new Muslim foundations, as these areas and cities are owned by the Muslims. The legal doctrine refers here to an alleged saying of Muhammad, which is said to have said in a general sense: “In Dār al-Islām ” neither a church may be built nor a destroyed church rebuilt.
  • Areas that the Muslims have taken possession of by force ( ʿanwatan ): No new places of worship from other religious communities may be built here. In legal doctrine, however, it is controversial whether existing places of worship have to be destroyed. The Maliki and part of the Hanbali advocate for maintaining and refer to one in historiography documented statement of the Umayyad -Kalifs Umar II († 720), "does not destroy synagogues, nor churches nor places of worship of the Zoroastrians." The Shafiites, on the other hand, consider the destruction of places of worship to be a duty (wajib).
  • Areas that the Muslims have taken possession of through a treaty ( ṣulḥan ): If the area remains in the possession of the non-Muslim population according to the treaty and the property tax (Charādsch) is paid, new places of worship may also be built there. In Dhimma ratio against and upon payment of the jizya no new religious buildings may be erected.

Similar, restrictive requirements are also documented in other parts of the Islamic world; the Andalusian legal scholar 'Îsâ b. Sahl († 1093) from Córdoba , who has summarized the legal decisions of his predecessors in a book, mentions one of the chief judge Ziyād b. ʿAbd ar-Rahmān (in office until 925) pronounced judgment against the new building of the synagogue at the Judentor ( Bāb al-Yahūd ; later: Bāb Leon ) on the north wall of Cordoba: “According to Islamic law, it is not permissible to open churches of Christians and To rebuild synagogues of Jews in cities of Muslims ”.

The restriction for non-Muslims based on Islamic law was presented as groundbreaking in the classical epoch of Islamic law, which has been handed down in writing by Ibn al-Qayyim († 1350) and Ibn Taimiya († 1328). The Azhar scholar ad-Damanhuri († 1739) is in their tradition with his treatise on the position of the churches in Egypt and Cairo under the title Iqāmat al-huǧǧati l-bāhira ʿalā hadm kanāʾis Misr wa-l-Qāhira (“The splendid Evidence for the Destruction of the Churches in Egypt and Cairo ”).

In interreligious marriages between a Muslim and a non-Muslim woman, the free exercise of religious customs can be restricted. Islamic law does not prevent the adherents of the "owners of the scriptures" from keeping their faith, nor does it force them to profess Islam. Nevertheless: The legal opinion ( fatwa ) 70177 shows how legal practice in an interreligious partnership is determined both in history and in modern times by Islamic norms. There it says in detail:

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(Islam) ... allows marriage to a Christian or Jewish woman, ie, it permits a man to marry such a woman whilst she continues to follow her religion. The husband does not have the right to force her to become Muslim, or to stop her worshiping in her own way. But he does have the right to forbid her to go out of the house, even if she is going to go out to go to church, because she is commanded to obey him. He also has the right to forbid her to commit evil openly in the house, such as setting up statues or ringing bells.
That also includes celebrating innovated festivals, such as Easter, because that is an evil action according to Islam, in two ways. It is an innovation for which there is no basis, like celebrating the birthday of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) and Mother's Day, and it also includes false beliefs, namely the belief that the Messiah was killed and crucified, then placed in the grave, then rose from it.

In the classic legal arguments of the school founder asch-Schafii it says in this context: If it is the Muslim husband's right to prevent his Muslim wife from visiting the mosque, he also has the right to forbid his non-Muslim wife from going to church, as this is a "void Action ”(bātil) is. Differing, but isolated, doctrines in early jurisprudence are not taken up in content in contemporary jurisprudence or in current legal opinions. The Islamic marriage and aliens law, which regulates the status of the non-Muslim side in an interreligious marriage exclusively according to Islamic legal principles, also decides on the religious affiliation of the children resulting from such a marriage and stipulates that the faith of the Islamic parent must be followed.

Apostasy and freedom of belief

→ Main article: Apostasy in Islam

Islamic law provides for the negative belief achieving freedom for members of Islam not before. Rather, it establishes the fulfillment of the religious duties ( farā'id ) of the individual. The individual's deliberate renunciation of the performance of the duties prescribed by law - for example the consistent omission of daily prayer or the "withdrawal" from the Islamic community either by word or by word and deed - is and becomes apostasy ( irtidād / ridda ) Punished with death under Sharia law . Contemporary advocates of law ( Yusuf al-Qaradawi , Mahmūd Schaltūt and others) do not regard the omission of prayer as kāfir and only recommend his chastisement ( ta'zīr ) by beatings and imprisonment.

References to apostasy can be found in the Koran in both the Meccan and the Medinan period of prophecy: Sura 16 , verses 106-109; Sura 3, verses 82-85; Sura 4, verse 137. In these verses, however, the punishment of the apostates is transferred to the hereafter . The most important Koran commentaries also interpret these verses in this sense and do not speak of a worldly punishment.

The first collections of traditions, the creation and written tradition of which can be dated to the second half of the 8th century at the latest - for example al-Muwatta by the Medinan scholar Mālik ibn Anas - refer in the form of statements by the Prophet ( hadith ) to the punishment of the apostate to death: "kills the one who changes his religion ". In a further statement - handed down in the generally recognized collections of hadiths of the 8th and 9th centuries - Mohammed declared the killing of those Muslims allowed who leaves his religion ( at-tārik li-dīnihi ) and leaves the Muslim community ( al -mufāriq li-l-jamāʿa ).

Islamic jurisprudence ( Fiqh ) regards the above statements of the Prophet with their innumerable variants in the wording as the basis for the legal discussion and justification of the death penalty for apostasy. The only controversial answer is whether an apostate should or must be asked to repent ( istitāba ) and whether women can be punished with death. On the other hand, there is consensus that apostasy and leaving the Muslim community are sufficient to impose the death penalty even if the apostate does not fight the Islamic community with words or with weapons. Another offense that jurisprudence regards as apostasy is the denigration ( sabb ) of the Prophet Mohammed.

With reference to the position of classical Islamic law, attempts have been made to establish the legitimacy of the death penalty for apostasy in the Arab-Islamic world right up to modern times. Even in states whose state religion is Islam and whose constitutions guarantee freedom of belief for everyone, this tendency, which is based on classical law, is noticeable. Following the adoption of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (1971) which related Azhar -Professor Taufiq Ali Wahba in the official language organ of the Islamic Al-Azhar University on this issue as follows:

“We see no contradiction at all between the wording of the constitution, according to which Islam is the state religion, and the guarantee of freedom of belief. Islam leaves people free in the religious convictions in which they grow up and does not force them to accept them (quote from sura 2, verse 256 follows). If a person converts to Islam without coercion and then returns to disbelief (kufr) or adopts another religion, this is not considered to be "freedom of belief". Rather, it is the mockery and contempt of Islam that cannot be justified. This is a violation of the inviolability of Islam and a massive attack on public order, society and its achievements. Hence the killing of the apostate is seen as his punishment and as a deterrent for other religious duties. "

Since one sees divine legislation in religious law (Sharia), which manifests itself primarily in the Revelation ( Koran ) and in the Sunna , i.e. in the sum of the doctrines, actions and instructions ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed and his contemporaries ( sahaba ), Doubting the correctness of which is equated with unbelief ( kufr ), one also considers the rights of the individual from this point of view under Islamic law. All basic human freedoms are seen as God-given rights, the limits of which are drawn where the interests of Islamic society as well as the traditional basic tenets of Islam are violated and endangered - write professors of the Faculty of Islamic (Sharî'a) and positive things Law ( qânun ) of Azhar University in a joint publication and d. T. “Islamic Law. The Islamic Legal System in International Law ” . (Cairo 1972, pp. 7-8).

Freedom of Belief in the Islamic World

In the Arab-Islamic states there is no actual freedom of belief . The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam as a declaration of intent by the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference makes all its articles, including those on freedom of belief, expressly subject to Sharia law.

In the constitution of Egypt, the state guarantees “freedom of belief” ( ʿaqīda / iʿtiqād ) and the “exercise of religious customs” ( schaʿāʾir dīniyya ). Similar formulations can be found in the constitutions of other countries. The constitutions use the term religion ( dīn ) only to guarantee the principle of equality, according to which citizens may not be favored or disadvantaged because of their gender, descent, language or religion ( dīn ), or belief ( ʿaqīda ).

As the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1923, during the drafting of the Constitution of Egypt "freedom of religious belief" (which formulation Hurriyat al-i'tiqad ad-Dini ) earned in the Egyptian parliament, there was tumultuous protests. The members of the Islamic faith demanded that a clear line be drawn between "religion" ( dīn ) and "belief" ( iʿtiqād ). The well-known prophetic saying served as the basis of the argument:

" My community will split up into 73 (var. 72) sects, all of which will go into hellfire, except for one: it is the unity (jamāʿa) of Muslims" .

In the discussion it was made clear that the Muslims are divided into 73 sects, each of which has its own belief ( ʿaqīda ), although they all belong to one religion ( dīn ). In Arabic, the term "religious freedom" ( hurriyat ad-dīn ) is not in use; The constitutional commentaries also always speak of “freedom of belief” ( hurriyat al-ʿaqīda ).

In Saudi Arabia, for example, the practice of any faith other than Islam is still forbidden. In Iran , the Baha'i are still considered to have fallen away from Islam. After the Islamic revolution there were therefore countless executions (see also: Persecution of the Baha'i ).

In Egypt , according to the new constitution of 2014, Islam is the state religion, while Christianity and Judaism have a preferred position. In many areas of society, the Christian Egyptians, mostly Copts , are restricted in their possibilities.

There is a secular criminal and civil law in Turkey . Article 115 of the Turkish Criminal Code provides

  • the forced revelation and change of religious beliefs
  • hindering the spread of religious beliefs
  • and the prevention of acts of worship and religious ceremonies is a punishable offense.

The sentence is up to three years in prison.

Text of the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam

The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam regarding religious freedom reads as follows:

Article 10

“Islam is the religion of pure nature. It is forbidden to put any kind of pressure on a person or to take advantage of his poverty or ignorance to convert him to another religion or to atheism. "

Article 18

"A) Everyone has the right to personal security, to the security of his religion, his relatives, his honor and his property."

The Cairo Declaration provides all provisions subject to the Sharia and Muslims granted no freedom to change their religion or abandon.

See also

literature

  • Rudi Paret : Sura 2, 256: la ikrāha fi d-dīni . Tolerance or resignation? In: Der Islam 45 (1969) 299-300.
  • Rudi Paret: Tolerance and Intolerance in Islam . In: Saeculum 21 (1970) 344-365
  • Albrecht Noth : Possibilities and Limits of Islamic Tolerance . In: Saeculum 29 (1978). Pp. 190-204
  • Adel Theodor Khoury : Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Islam. Munich / Mainz 1980 (and NDe).
  • E. Gräf: The problem of the death penalty in Islam . In: Journal for Comparative Religious Studies. 59 (1957) 84ff.
  • Frank Griffel : Apostasy and Tolerance in Islam . Brill, Leiden 2000.
  • M. Fierro: Andalusian fatāwā on blasphemy . In: Annales Islamologiques 25 (1991) 103-117.
  • Yohanan Friedmann: Classification of Unbelievers in Sunnī Muslim Law and Tradition. In: Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 22 (1998) 163–195.
  • Yohanan Friedmann: Tolerance and Coercion in Islam . Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. Cambridge University Press 2003. ISBN 0521827035
  • R.Peters & GJJ de Vries: Apostasy in Islam . In: Die Welt des Islam 17 (1976–1977) 1–25.
  • Uri Rubin: The Constitution of Medina : some notes. In: Studia Islamica 62 (1985)
  • HC Miller Davis: Some aspects of religious liberty of nationals in the Near East . London / New York 1938.
  • Miklós Murányi : The Kitāb Aḥkām Ibn Ziyād . In: Journal of the German Oriental Society. Vol. 148 (1998) 241ff.
  • The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition . Vol. VII. 635-636. Suffer. Brill 1993. ISBN 9004094199 .
  • Christian Müller: Legal practice in the city-state of Córdoba . On the law of society in a Malikite-Islamic legal tradition of 5/11. Century. Suffer. Brill 1999. ISBN 9004113541
  • Shaykh Damanhuri on the Churches of Cairo (1739). Edited and Translated with Introduction an Notes by Mosche Perlmann. University of California Press. Los Angeles 1975. ISBN 0520095138 .
  • El-Mikayis, Abdalwahhab: International and interreligious personal, family and inheritance law in the VAR . In: Rabel's Journal of Comparative and International Private Law. 33: 535-536 (1969).
  • Abd al-Mutaal al-Saidi: al-ḥurriya ad-dīniyya fī ʾl-islām . 2nd ed. Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi. Cairo (no year).
  • Mahmud Schaltut: al-Fatāwā (legal opinion). Cairo 1975.
  • Muhammad Khallaf: Wathāʾiq fī aḥkām qaḍā 'ahl al-dhimma fi ʾl-Andalus . Cairo 1980.
  • Alpmann & Schmidt: Fundamental Rights (Constitutional Law II). Edited by Hartmut Fromm. Munster 1976.
  • Ibn Warraq : Why I am not a Muslim. Matthes and Seitz, Berlin, 2004. ISBN 978-3-88221-838-1 . Especially chapter: The totalitarian character of Islam (pp. 230–240)
  • Bat Ye'or : The Decline of Oriental Christianity under Islam. 7-20 Century. Between jihad and dhimmitude. Resch, Graefelfing, 2002. ISBN 3-935197-19-5 . Especially Chapter 4: The Islamization of the Conquered Territories (pages 107–153)

Web links

Remarks

  1. ^ Yohanan Friedmann: Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition . Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 94
  2. ↑ See Yohanan Friedmann: Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition . Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. 102 ff. And sources cited there
  3. ↑ See his miscella Sura 2, 256: lā ikrāha fī d-dīni Tolerance or resignation? In: Islam . Vol. 45. Berlin, 1969. pp. 299-300
  4. ↑ Adel Th. Khoury: What does the Koran say about holy war? Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007. p. 61; see. for example Bernard Lewis: The Jews in the Islamic World: From the Early Middle Ages to the 20th Century . Beck, 2004. p. 22; Mark R. Cohen: Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages . Princeton University Press, 1994. p. 55
  5. ↑ See Wolfgang Kallfelz: Non-Muslim Subjects in Islam. Wiesbaden 1995, p. 49ff.
  6. ↑ a b c al-mausūʿa al-fiqhiyya . Volume 7, p. 129. 5th edition. Kuwait 2004
  7. ^ Journal of the German Oriental Society. Vol. 149 (1998), pp. 255-257
  8. ↑ Ibn Taimiya wrote a legal treatise on the position of the churches in Islam. This was published in Riyadh in 1995
  9. ↑ [1]
  10. ^ Yohanan Friedmann: Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition . Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. 189 f. according to the Kitāb al-Umm of the asch-Shafii
  11. ^ Translation from: Majallat al-Azhar (Journal of the Azhar, Cairo), Vol. 44 (1972–1973), pp. 570–571.
  12. ↑ The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam ( Memento of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (German)
  13. ↑ The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam ( Memento of the original of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Revised version of a lecture at a conference of the Islamic Academy Cologne Islah, published in: Moslemische Revue 21 (76), 2000, 54–66  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de
  14. ^ Siegfried G. Richter : The Coptic Egypt. Treasures in the shadow of the pharaohs. (with photos by Jo Bischof). Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2019, ISBN 978-3-8053-5211-6 , pp. 120–127.