Heinz Magenheimer

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Heinz Horst Magenheimer (born January 21, 1943 in Vienna ) is an Austrian military historian . In historical research he is the main proponent of the preventive war thesis , which has been scientifically refuted.

Training and activities

Magenheimer came after graduation in 1961 at Bundesrealgymnasium Vienna V as an officer cadet in the army one. From 1962 to 1965 he completed an officer training at the Theresian Military Academy in Vienna, which remained without a degree. From 1965 to 1969 he studied history at the University of Vienna . In 1969 he was with his thesis The German attack on Soviet Russia in 1941. The operational problem in scheduling and sequencing of the campaign at the Institute of Contemporary History at the University of Vienna to Dr. phil. PhD . His supervisor was Ludwig Jedlicka , the second reviewer was Heinrich Appelt .

In October 1972 he became a consultant at the Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy in Vienna. Until 2000 he was court advisor and deputy head of the research department. Since 1982 he has also been a lecturer in security policy at the University of Salzburg . In 1991 he completed his habilitation there with a thesis on Euro Strategy, Arms Control and the Balance of Power in Europe . Since 1991 he has been a university lecturer on the subjects of security policy , international politics , contemporary history and military history in the Department of Political Science and Sociology.

Magenheimer publishes articles in various periodicals on contemporary history, including at the latest since 1975 for the Austrian Military Journal (ÖMZ). This led him from 1985 as a member of the editorial team. He was also the author of the magazine series German History - Europe and the World of the far-right publishing company Berg .

Preventive strike thesis

Since 1990, Magenheimer has continuously advocated the thesis of an attack plan by the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin on the German Reich . The Soviet attack was imminent in June 1941; the Nazi regime only just got ahead of him with its " Operation Barbarossa ". He approached this thesis as early as 1969 in his dissertation. In German-language historical research, Magenheimer has therefore been classified as the main proponent of the scientifically refuted preventive strike thesis since the 1990s. He is placed alongside other proponents of this thesis who often quoted each other in their works: including right-wing extremists such as Walter Post and Wolfgang Strauss and right-wing conservatives such as Joachim Hoffmann , Werner Maser , Ernst Nolte , Franz W. Seidler , Ernst Topitsch .

Since 1991, Magenheimer has been referring to a concept paper on the "strategic deployment of the Soviet armed forces" of May 15, 1941, which became known in Russia in 1990. He published the document in the ÖMZ together with an essay by the Russian military historian Valeri Danilow. Danilov assigned pencil corrections on the paper to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army, justifying the fact that General Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov had authorized the paper. Magenheimer agreed with Danilov's thesis in 1994 that the deployment plan outlined in the document had been presented to Stalin, had been approved by him and had been implemented to some extent before the German attack began. In 1995, he again relied on Danilov's theses on the document in agreement. In 1997 he quoted a former Soviet general who interpreted the document as the basis of an attack strategy that had actually been planned. He represented the preventive war thesis in 1999 and often also in articles for the right-wing extremist German military magazine (DMZ).

As historical revisionists applicable historian Walter Post, Werner Maser (2004) and Stefan Scheil (2011) and authors from right-wing extremist environment as Andreas Naumann (2005), Rolf-Josef Eibicht and Hans Meiser have stomach Wertheimer emptive strike theory, his appeal to Danilov and his attempts to relativize the German responsibility for the beginning of the Second World War, received approvingly. In the Nazi research recognized historians such Roland G. Foerster , Rolf-Dieter Müller , Hans-Erich Volkmann ( Military History Research Institute against) and others dispute both Stalin's agreement to the deployment design from May 15, 1941 as well as its implementation since 1,993th In 1998 Gerd R. Ueberschär stated to Magenheimer that the archive material now accessible in Moscow did not offer “convincing evidence of Stalin's intention to attack in the summer of 1941”. Russian historical research has also rejected the “preventive war thesis” since 1998.

Since Magenheimer was a consultant at an institute of the Austrian Ministry of Defense, MP Brigitte Ederer (SPÖ) addressed a parliamentary question to the Defense Minister in 1996 as to whether historical revisionist views would be tolerated in the armed forces. In an article on this, Brigitte Bailer-Galanda , Wolfgang Neugebauer and Walter Manoschek from the Documentation Archive of the Austrian Resistance (DÖW) confirmed the assessment that Magenheimer was a revisionist.

In 1997, Magenheimer relied on an alleged speech by Stalin on August 19, 1939, which was only known from a press release. In 2000 he described this as a “key document” for Stalin's intentions to go to war against Germany. He claimed Russian historians believed the document to be genuine. However, the Russian historian Sergej Slutsch proved in 2004 that it was a fake. He thus confirmed the assessment of Western historians such as Eberhard Jäckel and Bernd Bonwetsch .

Other theses on the Second World War

In addition to the preventive strike thesis, Magenheimer argued that the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 brought the German side mainly disadvantages, while Stalin only brought advantages. Alexander Pollack classified this view as revisionist.

In 1995, Magenheimer represented the turning point in the war in Europe from 1939-1945 : German politics (of the Nazi regime) had developed “a suitable 'recipe' for the political and economic reorganization of Europe in the sense of a mutually satisfactory international understanding ” by summer 1940 ”. The "fire strike" on June 22, 1941 (the attack on the Soviet Union) had "opened the gate into the unknown". The Wehrmacht could have ended the battle for Moscow (October 2, 1941 - January 15, 1942) victoriously if they had attacked just ten days earlier. A reviewer for the FAZ criticized that Magenheimer had apparently welcomed more permanent German victories because he still regarded Nazi Germany as a force for order in Europe despite its wars of aggression before 1941, the attack on Poland in 1939 and the western campaign in 1940. In addition, he uses a " Landserdeutsch " which is inappropriate for a military historian .

Magenheimer appeared publicly in Austria as an opponent of both versions of the Wehrmacht exhibition and their historical theses. He is made partly responsible for the fact that after 1945 Austrian military history hardly dealt critically with the Wehrmacht and its participation in the Holocaust .

In 2005 he advocated the thesis of a “heroic and legitimate defensive battle” by the Wehrmacht against the Red Army in the final phase of World War II , which had saved the lives of many refugees from East Prussia in 1944/45. Historians of contemporary history, on the other hand, emphasize that the Nazi propaganda of the time with its perseverance slogans prevented many Germans from fleeing. Since Magenheimer repeatedly advocated such unrecognized historical theses in the journal Junge Freiheit , he is classified as a representative of the New Right . He also wrote an article in a commemorative publication for the British Holocaust denier David Irving , which is received by right-wing extremist authors. A 1982 article by Magenheimer on the Allied air warfare was received by Nazi research.

Positions on events after 1945

Magenheimer judged the 2003 US Iraq war as a war of aggression , which was wrongly presented as a preventive war and which violated the norms of international martial law enshrined in the UN Charter . He did not consider preventive wars to be fundamentally inadmissible, but in this case to be militarily unsuitable for the threat of proliferation weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism .

Fonts (selection)

  • The German attack on Soviet Russia in 1941. The operational problem in the planning and course of the campaign. Dissertation, University of Vienna, 1969.
  • The development of the defense system in the area of ​​the pacts as well as the neutrals and non-aligned Europe . Institute for Basic Military Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy, Vienna 1976.
  • Defense battle on the Vistula in 1945. Preparation, course, experiences (= individual publications on the military history of the Second World War , Volume 20). Rombach Verlag, Freiburg im Breisgau 1976, ISBN 3-7930-0179-2 .
  • Defense in Europe (1977) . Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy, Vienna 1977.
  • Tactical and Euro-strategic nuclear weapons. On the status of "retrofitting" in Europe . Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy, Vienna 1986.
  • Defense of Western Europe. Doctrine, strength, plan of action. An inventory from the perspective of NATO (= Bernard & Graefe current series , volume 42). Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Koblenz 1986, ISBN 3-7637-5345-1 .
  • Comments on strength in Central Europe . Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy, Vienna 1987.
  • From the “double decision” of NATO to the INF treaty of December 8, 1987. “Eurostrategic” problems and negotiation steps . Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy, Vienna 1988.
  • Doctrine and operational concept of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe . Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy, Vienna 1989.
  • Euro strategy and arms control. Between nuclear weapon modernization and denuclearization 1983–1990 (= Nomos-Universitätsschriften, Politik , Volume 29). Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1992, ISBN 3-7890-2591-7 . (plus habilitation, University of Salzburg, 1990: Euro strategy, arms control and the balance of power in Europe )
  • Politics, strategy and the eastward expansion of NATO (= series of publications of the National Defense Academy, 1997/2). National Defense Academy, Vienna 1997, ISBN 3-901328-22-X .
  • On the question of general conscription. Determination of the current situation , alternatives, consequences (= series of publications of the National Defense Academy, 1999/3). National Defense Academy, Vienna 1999, ISBN 3-901328-38-6 .
  • The decisive battle in 1941. Soviet preparations for war, deployment, clash . Osning Verlag, Bielefeld 2000, ISBN 3-9806268-1-4 .
  • Comprehensive security. For an expanded understanding of security (= series of publications of the National Defense Academy, 2001/2). National Defense Academy, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-901328-55-6 .
  • The military strategy of Germany 1940–1945. 3rd, expanded and revised edition. Herbig Verlag, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-7766-2309-8 . (en: Hitler's war. Germany's key strategic decisions 1940–1945 . Cassell & Co, London 1999, ISBN 0-304-35339-6 )
  • Security policy in theory and practice (= series of publications of the National Defense Academy, 2003/4). Institute for Strategy and Security Policy, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-901328-85-8 .
  • War aims and strategies of the great powers 1939–1945. Osning Verlag, Bielefeld 2006, ISBN 3-9806268-4-9 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Peter Broucek, Kurt Peball: History of Austrian Military Historiography. Böhlau, Vienna 2000, ISBN 3412057002 , p. 499
  2. ↑ Dissertations at the Institute for Contemporary History , 1969, Diss. 54 (PDF)
  3. ^ Association of Scientific Societies in Austria (ed.): Short extracts of Austrian dissertations. Humanities and social sciences 1969. Vienna 1973, p. 271.
  4. ↑ German National Library Leipzig / Frankfurt am Main (original work title under "Hochschulschrift")
  5. ↑ Werner Schuder (Ed.): Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender 1996, 17th edition, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1996, ISBN 3-11-014916-8 , p. 889.
  6. ^ University of Salzburg: Heinz Magenheimer's visiting card
  7. ^ Study Society for Contemporary History and Political Education (ed.): Geschichte und Gegenwart, Volume 2. Styria, 1983, p. 324
  8. ^ Franz Freistetter (Ed.): Austrian Military Journal. C. Ueberreuter, 1985, p. 188
  9. ^ Wolfram Wette: Filbinger, a German career. Dietrich zu Klampen, 2006, ISBN 3934920748 , p. 136
  10. ^ Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: Hitler's War in the East 1941-1945: a research report. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2000, ISBN 3534147685 , p. 84 and p. 169, fn. 410
  11. ↑ Fabian Virchow: Against civilism: International relations and the military in the political conceptions of the extreme right. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Münster 2006, ISBN 3-531-90365-9 , p. 344 ; Christa Mitterrutzner: Truth and "Auschwitz Lie". In: Brigitte Bailer-Galanda, Wolfgang Benz, Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds.): Documentation archive of the Austrian resistance. Deuticke, 1995, ISBN 3216301249 , p. 178; Karl-Heinz Schmick: Investigations on the exhibition "War of Extermination, Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941-1944". Ludwigsfelder Verlagshaus, 2000, ISBN 3933022096 , p. 142, fn. 324; Bernd Struß: " Eternal yesterday" and "Nest defilter ": The debate about the Wehrmacht exhibitions - a linguistic analysis. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2009, ISBN 9783631587362 , p. 218, fn. 334 ; Zeitgeschichte Volume 24, Geyer Edition, 1997, p. 363; Gertraud Diendorfer, Gerhard Jagschitz, Oliver Rathkolb (eds.): Contemporary history in change. Institute for Contemporary History, University of Vienna, StudienVerlag, Vienna 1998, ISBN 3706512262 , p. 129, fn. 20
  12. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: New findings on "Operation Barbarossa". In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, issue 5/1991, pp. 539-542
  13. ^ Valery Danilov: Has the General Staff of the Red Army prepared a preventive strike against Germany? ÖMZ 1/1993, p. 41ff.
  14. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: On the German-Soviet War 1941. New sources and findings , ÖMZ 1/1994, pp. 51–60; as an example of the preventive war thesis mentioned by Bianka Pietrow-Ennker (ed.): Preventive war? The German attack on the Soviet Union. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2011, ISBN 3-10-401402-7 , p. 212 f., Fn. 53
  15. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: Turns of the war in Europe 1939-1945. 1995, p. 219, footnote 1
  16. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: decisive battle 1941: Soviet war preparations, deployment, clash. 1997/2000, p. 108
  17. ^ Matthias Marschik, Georg Spitaler (ed.): The Vienna Russian Monument: Architecture, History, Conflicts. Turia + Kant, 2005, ISBN 3851324285 , p. 60
  18. ↑ Walter Post: The causes of the Second World War: a plan of international diplomacy from Versailles to Pearl Harbor. Grabert, 2003, ISBN 3878472056 , p. 558
  19. ↑ Werner Maser: Forgery, poetry and truth about Hitler and Stalin. Olzog, 2004, ISBN 3789281344 , p. 233
  20. ↑ Stefan Scheil: The escalation of the Second World War from 1940 to the Barbarossa company. Duncker & Humblot, 2011, ISBN 3-428-53377-1 , p. 255, fn. 148
  21. ↑ Andreas Naumann: "Operation Barbarossa" put to the test again. Grabert, 2005, ISBN 3878472153 , p. 170
  22. ^ Rolf-Josef Eibicht: Suppression and persecution of German patriots: a dictatorship of convictions in Germany? Hutten, 1997, ISBN 3980584704 , p. 210
  23. ↑ Hans Meiser: Germany's defensive struggle against Bolshevism. Grabert Verlag , ISBN 3878472560 , p. 132
  24. ↑ Roland G Foerster: "Operation Barbarossa": On the historical site of German-Soviet relations from 1933 to autumn 1941. Oldenbourg, Munich 1993, ISBN 9783486559798 , p. 11, footnote 4 ; Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hans Erich Volkmann: The Wehrmacht: Myth and Reality. Oldenbourg, Munich 1999, ISBN 3486563831 , p. 1242
  25. ↑ Gerd R. Ueberschär: Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 and Stalin's intentions. The evaluation in German historiography and the more recent "preventive war thesis" . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär, Lew Alexandrowitsch Besymenski : The German attack on the Soviet Union 1941. The controversy over the preventive war thesis. (1998) Primus, 2nd edition, Darmstadt 2011, ISBN 978-3-89678-776-7 , p. 57.
  26. ↑ Gerd R. Ueberschär, Lev A. Bezymenskij: The German attack on the Soviet Union 1941: The controversy about the preventive war thesis . 2011, foreword and main part II
  27. ↑ Inquiry 432 / J from MPs Brigitte Ederer and comrades to the Federal Minister for National Defense regarding the dissemination of right-wing extremist images of history by a representative of the defense department .
  28. ^ Wolfgang Neugebauer, Brigitte Bailer-Galanda, Walter Manoschek, W. Lasek: "Revisionist" tendencies in the Austrian armed forces? Statement on statements by Dr. Heinz Magenheimer. Documentation archive of Austrian resistance, Vienna 1996, pp. 1–28
  29. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: The military strategy of Germany 1940-1945: leadership decisions, backgrounds, alternatives. 2nd expanded and revised edition, Munich 1997, pp. 45f.
  30. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: decisive battle 1941. Soviet preparations for war - deployment - clash. Bielefeld 2000, p. 18f.
  31. ↑ Sergej Slutsch ( Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4/2004): Stalin's “War Scenario 1939”: A speech that never existed. The story of a forgery (PDF p. 622 and fn. 136/137)
  32. ↑ Alexander Pollak: The Wehrmacht legend in Austria. Böhlau, Vienna 2002, ISBN 3205770218 , p. 144
  33. ↑ FAZ, December 1, 1995 (No. 280, p. 13): Landserdeutsch
  34. ^ Hannes Heer : How history is made: Zür construction of memories of the Wehrmacht and the Second World War. Czernin, 2003, ISBN 3707601617 , p. 293, fn. 21
  35. ^ Zeitgeschichte Volume 24, Geyer Edition, 1997, p. 363, fn. 12
  36. ^ Stefan Berger: Kaliningrad in Europe. Neighborhood Perspectives after the End of the Cold War. Harrassowitz, 2010, ISBN 3-447-06163-4 , p. 93, fn. 181
  37. ↑ Stefan Kubon: The West German newspaper "Junge Freiheit" and the legacy of the "conservative revolution" of the Weimar Republic: an investigation into the continuity of "conservative-revolutionary" political ideas. Ergon, 2006, ISBN 389913527X , p. 112
  38. ↑ Joachim Nolywaika: Die Ära Kohl: Wende abwärts 1982 - 1998. Arndt, 2000, ISBN 3887410289 , p. 256
  39. ^ Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hans Schadek: Freiburg in the air war. Ploetz, 1990, ISBN 3876403324 , pp. 113, 116, 475
  40. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer: Preventive War and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In: Hanns Seidel Foundation (Hrsg.): Politische Studien 391 ( Memento of the original from September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , 54th year, September / October, Atwerb, Munich 2003, ISSN 0032-3462 , pp. 43–53 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hss.de 
personal data
SURNAME Magenheimer, Heinz
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Magenheimer, Heinz Horst (full name)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION Austrian historian and author
DATE OF BIRTH January 21, 1943
PLACE OF BIRTH Vienna