John J. Mearsheimer

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John J. Mearsheimer

John Joseph Mearsheimer (born December 14, 1947 in Brooklyn , New York City ) is an American political scientist at the University of Chicago . He mainly deals with international relations . In 2001 he was best known for his book on offensive neorealism , The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . Mearsheimer is co- author of the New York Times bestseller The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (2007) with Stephen Walt . His 2011 publication Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics categorizes the "Lies States Tell Each Other" According to an interview with Mearsheimer in The Boston Globe , the book's teaching is "Lie Selective, Lie Well, and Do Your Thing." good you can. "

Life

Mearsheimer was born in Brooklyn , New York in December 1947 and grew up in New York City until he was eight when his parents moved to Croton on Hudson.

At the age of 17, Mearsheimer joined the army . After a year, he decided to attend the Military Academy at West Point , where he stayed from 1966 to 1970. After graduating, he served as an officer in the Air Force for five years .

During this time he earned a Masters degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California . He then studied at Cornell University and earned his Ph.D. in government studies with a special focus on international relations. From 1978 to 1979 he worked as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC ; from 1980 to 1982 he was an assistant at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University . From 1998 to 1999 he worked at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

University of Chicago

Since 1982 Mearsheimer has been a member of the political science faculty at the University of Chicago . He became a private lecturer in 1984 , an ordained professor in 1987 and in 1996 he was named "R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor ”. From 1989 to 1992 he was head of the political science department. He is also a faculty member of the graduate program and second director of the international security policy program.

Mearsheimer's publications include Conventional Deterrence (1983), which won the Edgar S. Furniss Jr. Book Prize; Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy (co-editor, 1985); Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988); The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), which won the Lepgold Book Prize; The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (2007) and Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011). His articles appear in journals such as International Security and magazines such as The London Review of Books . He is guest contributor to The New York Times , the Los Angeles Times , and the Chicago Tribune .

Mearsheimer has received multiple academic awards, the 1977 Clark Award for Excellence in Academic Teaching, and the 1985 Quantrell Award for Excellence in Teaching from the University of Chicago. In 2003 he was elected to the Academy of Arts and Sciences.

John Mearsheimer is the main proponent of a branch of neorealist theory in international relations known as offensive neorealism . According to this theory, states are not satisfied with a given level of power, but strive for hegemony for security reasons .

deterrence

Mearsheimer's first monograph, Conventional Deterrence (1983), explores the extent to which the decision to start a war depends on the presumed outcome of the conflict. His main argument about the effectiveness of the deterrent policy that determined foreign policy at the time is that it is only effective if the potential attacker considers the success of his attack to be improbable or too costly. Otherwise the deterrent is ineffective. This assumption of his theory is widely shared. In particular, the attacker's success depends on his opponent's strategy. The first of three possible strategies is that of the Exhaustion War , which brings with it a high degree of uncertainty about the outcome and high costs for the attacker. The second “strategy of limited goals” is less risky and less expensive. The third strategy, planning a "blitzkrieg", promises quick and decisive success at low cost. Mearsheimer attributes the failures in modern theaters of war to the attacker's error of being able to wage a blitzkrieg. The other two strategies hardly lead to a failure of deterrence because (in the case of the war of exhaustion) the low chances of success and high costs or (in the case of the strategy of limited goals) the low profits combined with the risk of a war of exhaustion arise. However, if the attacker has a coherent "blitzkrieg" strategy, an attack is likely because the potential benefits outweigh the costs and risks.

In addition to analyzes of the Second World War and the Arab-Israeli conflict , Mearsheimer draws conclusions for Central Europe during the Cold War . An attack by the Soviet Union seemed unlikely to him in 1983 because a blitzkrieg strategy could not be used. The balance of power and the difficulties of a rapid advance through Central Europe in the face of NATO forces made the outbreak of a conventional war unlikely.

Nuclear deterrence

In 1990 Mearsheimer published an essay in which he argued that Europe could return to a multipolar situation similar to that of the first half of the 20th century if American and Soviet troops withdrew after the end of the Cold War. In another article in The Atlantic he argued that this multipolar situation could promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in Germany.

In this essay and in a 1993 article in Foreign Affairs, "The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent," he advocated to reduce the threat of war that the US should encourage Germany and Ukraine to build a nuclear arsenal to deal with the threat of extreme nationalism to meet. He presented several scenarios for a Europe without the presence of American and Russian armed forces. A Europe with nuclear weapons could very likely keep the peace; without a nuclear deterrent, Germany would certainly conquer the continent again (pages 32–33). It would be strategically unwise for Ukraine to abandon its nuclear arsenal, which was decided in 1994 and implemented by 1996. When asked about his initial assumption in 2006, he continued to argue that his predictions would come true if the US withdrew from Europe.

In 1998 and 2000 guest posts for The New York Times , Mearsheimer defended India's right to acquire nuclear weapons in order to counterbalance China and Pakistan's influence through a deterrent strategy and thus secure peace in the region. He criticized the United States' non-proliferation policy towards India because he considered it unrealistic and contrary to American interests in the region.

Offensive neorealism

John Mearsheimer is the leading proponent of the theory of offensive neorealism . Unlike the classical realism of Hans Morgenthaus, this structural theory places the main emphasis on the competition of the great powers for security within the anarchic international system and not on the personality of politicians and diplomats. In contrast to Kenneth Waltz's defensive realism , he emphasizes that states are not satisfied with a given level of power, but instead strive for hegemony for security reasons, because the anarchic structure of the international system creates great incentives for states to seek opportunities to expand power at the expense of others . Mearsheimer summarized his ideas in 2001 in the book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics as follows:

“Given that it is difficult to determine how much power will suffice today and tomorrow, the great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to attain a hegemonic position now, thereby removing every possibility of a challenge exclude other great powers. Only a misguided state would let the opportunity to become a hegemonic power pass by because it thinks it already has enough power to survive. "

In this world there is no status quo power, since "a great power with a power advantage behaves aggressively towards its opponents because it has the ability and the incentive to do so." He therefore rejects the democratic theory of peace , which postulates that democracies never or only rarely wage wars with one another.

Mearsheimer does not believe in the possibility of global hegemony. States could only achieve regional hegemony. States try to prevent others from attaining regional hegemony because they might interfere in the state affairs of their competitors. States like the USA, which have achieved regional hegemony, act as balancing forces that only intervene in other regions if the powers there are unable to prevent the rise of a hegemon. In 2004 Mearsheimer praised the historian EH Carr for his book The Twenty Years' Crisis , as he had claimed that international relations were a "war of all against all" in which every state considers its interests to be paramount. Mearsheimer believes that Carr's arguments are as valid in 2004 as they were for 1939 and deplored the prevailing idealistic view of international politics in British academic circles.

Second Gulf War

In 1991 Mearsheimer published two guest articles in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times , in which he stated that the war for the liberation of Kuwait could quickly lead to a victorious end and cost less than 1,000 victims on the American side. This view of things contradicted the general perception at the beginning of the war that a month-long war with several thousand victims on the American side was to be expected. Mearsheimer appealed to the backward equipment of the Iraqi armed forces, the better equipment and training of the American troops, especially the artillery, the air superiority and the unfavorable deployment of the Iraqi troops, which made a breakthrough of the American units possible. The course of the war confirmed his assumptions.

Request for a more comprehensive apology to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann

In mid-October 1991, Mearsheimer, as head of department, got into a controversy with visiting professor Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann over an article by Leo Bogart about her work as author and editor of the Nazi newspaper Das Reich . After talking to her, Mearsheimer publicly stated, "I believe Noelle-Neumann was an anti-Semite ." He led a campaign asking her to apologize.

Noelle-Neumann considered it inappropriate to judge her articles from today's perspective, detached from the time they were written, in which they were supported by Lloyd Irving Rudolph : It was only after the war that the otherwise false opinion spread that the USA had dealt with before entering the war worried the fate of the Jews.

Israeli lobby

In March 2006, Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published a working paper and an article in the London Review of Books on the role of the Israeli lobby in US foreign policy. They define it as a "loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to steer American foreign policy in an Israel-friendly direction". The authors stress that it is inappropriate to speak of a “Jewish” lobby, since not all Jews have close ties to Israel and some lobby supporters are not Jews - “Christian Zionists” also played an important role. The Israel lobby is not a conspiracy, but simply a powerful interest group like other lobbies. The main argument of the authors against the Israel lobby is that it works neither in the interests of the US nor in the interests of Israel. The article became part of a book entitled " The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy ".

Conflict between Israel and Palestine

Mearsheimer criticized the 2006 war against Lebanon because Israel's strategy was doomed to fail - it was based on the false assumption that the Israeli air force could defeat a guerrilla force like Hezbollah . In his opinion, the war was a catastrophe for the Lebanese people and a severe setback for the US and Israel. The Israel lobby played a key role in facilitating Israel's counterproductive response by preventing the US from exercising independent influence.

Mearsheimer also criticized Israel's Gaza offensive against Hamas in December 2008. This attack would not disable Hamas' ability to launch rockets on Israel and would not induce Hamas to end its fight with Israel. Relationships would rather continue to deteriorate.

Mearsheimer stressed that the only hope for an end to the conflict was to end the occupation of the West Bank and to be given permission to establish a Palestinian state. Otherwise Israel would turn into an " apartheid state ".

Mearsheimer's criticism of Israel also included its nuclear weapons possession. In 2010, Mearsheimer affirmed that Israel as a nuclear power was not in the American interest and questioned Israel's accountability.

Lecture on the future of Palestine

In April 2010, Mearsheimer described the two-state solution as a “fantasy”, as Israel would incorporate the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into a “Greater Israel”, which would then become an “ apartheid state ”. This state would not be politically viable, most American Jews would not support it. In the end it would become a democratic, binational state in which the Palestinians would have a majority. American Jews, who care about Israel, can be divided into three groups: new "South Africans" who support Israel even if it is an "apartheid state", "just" Jews who believe in the universal validity of human rights, and the large "ambivalent middle". Their relatives would not support an “apartheid state” because American Jews are among the strongest defenders of traditional liberal values, which is why the “South Africa” faction would be marginalized over time. Mearsheimer said that most of the members of the Israel lobby were "new South Africans" and named Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League , David Harris of the American Jewish Committee , Malcolm Hoenlein of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations , Ronald Lauder of the World Jewish Congress , Morton Klein of the Zionist Organization of America ; also “business people” like Sheldon Adelson , Lester Crown , and Mortimer Zuckerman and “media personalities” like Fred Hiatt , Charles Krauthammer , Bret Stephens and Martin Peretz .

Gilad Atzmon

In 2011, John Mearsheimer wrote of Gilad Atzmon's book The Wandering Who : “Gilad Atzmon has written a fascinating and provocative book about Jewish identity in the modern world. He shows how assimilation and liberalism are making it increasingly difficult for Jews in the Diaspora to maintain a strong sense of their 'Jewishness'. Frightened Jewish leaders have turned to Zionism (blind loyalty to Israel) and scare tactics (threat of a new Holocaust) to unite the 'tribe' and separate them from the ' goyim ' of the environment. As Atzmon's own case shows, this strategy is unsuccessful and causes great suffering for many Jews. ”To Jeffrey Goldberg's assertion that Atzmon was an anti-Semite, Mearsheimer replied:“ Atzmon's main argument is the frequent contradiction between universalistic speech and the particularistic thinking and acting of Jews. They speak like liberals, but act like nationalists ... ”. In this context he (Atzmon) deals with what he calls the "Holocaust religion", Zionism and Israel's dealings with the Palestinians. To reiterate, he has no hostile reservations about religion or any individual who is Jewish by birth. Jon Chait cited quotes from Atzmon's book that were explicitly anti-Semitic in that they took up timeless anti-Semitic prejudices.

China

Mearsheimer believes that China's rise will not be peaceful. The US would curb China's influence and prevent its rise to regional power. China will try to dominate the Asia-Pacific region like the USA dominates the western hemisphere. It is about security and superiority over the neighbors, who see this as a possible threat to their position. The US would seek to form a coalition of India, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia to counterbalance China's growing power. He points to the increased alliance with Vietnam and India, which showed this development.

Australia should also be concerned about the rise of China, as this would lead to intense competition between China and the USA and destabilize the region. Mearsheimer points out that China has adopted the aggressive theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan , who has spoken out in favor of control of the world's oceans and "decisive battles".

Lies in international politics

Mearsheimer wrote the first systematic work on the role of lies in international politics. In Why Leaders Lie ( Oxford University Press , 2011) he showed that political leaders lie to other countries as well as to their own people because they believe they are serving their country. President Franklin D. Roosevelt lied about the USS Greer incident in September 1941 because he believed that it was in the national interest of the United States to enter the war.

Mearsheimer's main findings are that lies to foreign countries are not as common and that democratic politicians lie to their own people more often than dictators. Saddam Hussein did not lie about weapons of mass destruction - he truthfully said he did not - but George W. Bush and his chief advisors lied to the American people about the alleged threat from Iraq. Most often, the people in democracies are lied to when it comes to waging a self-chosen war in distant arenas. Lying to other countries is rare, as there is an atmosphere of mutual distrust, especially when it comes to security issues. Successful lying requires trust. So it is easier for politicians to lie to their own people, since they usually have a higher level of trust.

Typology of the lie

Mearsheimer distinguishes five types of political lies:

  • Lies between states
  • Scare tactics
  • Strategic obfuscation
  • National myths
  • Liberal lies.

Lying to other countries can have negative consequences:

  • The boomerang effect leads to a culture of deception at home;
  • The "misfire" means that the political goals are made impossible by the lie.

In addition to the lie, Mearsheimer also distinguishes other techniques of deception:

  • "Concealment" when something important is kept secret, and
  • “Sailor's thread”, when stories are told that one-sidedly influence the evaluation of events.

Ukraine crisis

In the Ukraine crisis in 2014 , Mearsheimer criticized the US foreign policy in retrospect. Mearsheimer had already warned in 1993 that a nuclear-weapon-free Ukraine would remain exposed to the danger of Russian attempts at reconquest. In an article in Foreign Affairs in August 2014, he assigned responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict to a greater extent to the US and its European allies, who had taken the events completely unprepared. Knowing the negative attitude of Russia, which is understandable from the security interests of Russia, they would have pushed the eastward expansion of the EU and, from the Russian point of view, NATO and supported the democratization of Ukraine. Putin's reaction, he said, was understandable. Ukraine was “indispensable” (as a non-aligned state) as a buffer for Russia's security needs.

In line with George F. Kennan's assessment of 1998, he sees the eastward expansion as a potentially dangerous provocation for Russia. Mearsheimer attributes the political mistakes to the lack of political realism and too much influence of the liberals in the wake of Clinton . The only sensible way out of the crisis is to soberly take into account Russia's security interests. Ukraine had to accept the role of the buffer or the bridge that was given to it by its geostrategic situation. Everything else is abstract and insignificant from a political point of view. The constructive cooperation of the West with Russia is of great importance for solving important existing and upcoming problems and should not be jeopardized. Mearsheimer also named the weapons and "advisors" Russia is providing to lead Ukraine into "civil war". He sees the clear role of Russian arms and troops in the conflict, but was still against arms deliveries.

The then US ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul , replied that Russian foreign policy was not a reaction to the US, but was based on the internal Russian dynamics of 2011/12.

Publications (selection)

Books

items

  • Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. In: International Security. Vol. 15, No. 4, summer 1990, pp. 5–56 ( PDF; 5.49 MB )
  • The False Promise of International Institutions. In: International Security. Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/1995, pp. 5–49 ( PDF; 5.592 MB )
    • A realist reply. In: International Security. Vol. 20, No. 1, summer 1995, pp. 82–93 ( PDF; 1.986 MB )
  • with Stephen Van Evera: When peace means war. In: The New Republic . December 18, 1995, pp. 16–21 ( PDF; 2.124 MB )
  • with Stephen M. Walt : Serial offender Saddam? The war advocates' evidence does not stick. In: Sheets for German and international politics . Vol. 48, No. 3, March 2003, pp. 296-306

literature

Web links

Commons : John Mearsheimer  - Collection of Images, Videos and Audio Files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Reid, Stuart ( Jan. 14, 2011) Diplomacy and Duplicity , Slate.com
  2. ↑ Keohane, Jon (Jan. 2, 2011) / ref> Why leaders lie , Boston Globe
  3. ^ A b John Mearsheimer Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
  4. ↑ Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)
  5. ↑ Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II)
  6. ^ Department of Political Science Faculty page ( Memento of February 17, 2012 in the Internet Archive ).
  7. ↑ a b c World Affairs Council of Northern California profile of John Mearsheimer ( Memento from September 27, 2013 in the Internet Archive )
  8. ^ John Mearsheimer, Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe , early article version of Conventional Deterrence chapter, undated.
  9. ↑ [1]
  10. ↑ [2]
  11. ^ A b John Mearsheimer: Back to the Future . In: International Security . 15, No. 1, 1990, pp. 5-56. JSTOR 2538981 . doi : 10.2307 / 2538981 .
  12. ↑ John Mearsheimer: Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War . In: The Atlantic . 90, No. 8, August 1990, pp. 35-50.
  13. ^ "The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent" , 1993.
  14. ^ John Mearsheimer: Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I) . In: International Relations . 20, No. 1, 2006, pp. 105-123, see p. 116. doi : 10.1177 / 0047117806060939 .
  15. ^ India Needs The Bomb , The New York Times , March 24, 2000.
  16. ^ John, J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001.
  17. ^ John Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . WW Norton, New York 2001, ISBN 0-393-02025-8 , p. 35.
  18. ↑ John Mearsheimer: EH Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On . In: International Relations . 19, No. 1, 2005, p. 139. doi : 10.1177 / 0047117805052810 .
  19. ↑ John Mearsheimer: EH Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On . In: International Relations . 19, No. 1, 2005, p. 140. doi : 10.1177 / 0047117805052810 .
  20. ↑ [3]
  21. ↑ [4]
  22. ^ A b Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann: Accused Professor Was Not a Nazi. In: The New York Times. 14 December 1991, p. 14.
  23. Jump up ↑ Peter Wyden: The Hitler Virus: The Insidious Legacy of Adolf Hitler. Arcade Publishing. 1998.
  24. ↑ Professor Is Criticized for Anti-Semitic Past. In: The New York Times. November 28, 1991, sec.US
  25. ^ The Noelle-Neumann Case In: Commentary Magazine. dated Jan. 4, 1992 (Our Readers); Lloyd Irving Rudolph: "It was only after the war when knowledge of the Holocaust seized the world's moral imagination that Hitler's racism became a cause of our involvement. In judging Dr. Noelle-Neumann's underestimation of the Nazi regime's capacity for evil in the 1930's, it is important to remember that she was not alone in her complicity.... "
  26. ↑ The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy ( February 2, 2007 memento in the Internet Archive ) by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt , Harvard University ’s Kennedy School of Government Working Paper, Submitted March 13, 2006.
  27. ^ The Israel Lobby by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt , London Review of Books , March 23, 2006.
  28. ↑ John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt: The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. 2007, pp. 315-6.
  29. ↑ John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt: The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. 2007, p. 326.
  30. ^ John J. Mearsheimer: Another War, Another Defeat. In: American Conservative. January 26, 2009; John J. Mearsheimer: Responses to Gaza. In: London Review of Books , January 29, 2009.
  31. ^ John Mearsheimer: Saving Israel from Itself. In: American Conservative. May 18, 2009.
  32. ↑ John Mearsheimer: Israel's Nukes Harm US National Interests . Retrieved September 2, 2014.
  33. ↑ John Mearsheimer: The Future of Palestine: Righteous Jews vs. the New Afrikaners . In: Hisham B. Sharabi Memorial Lecture . The Jerusalem Fund. April 29, 2010. Retrieved September 2, 2014.
  34. ↑ Mearsheimer responds to Goldberg's latest smear by Stephen M. Walt, September 26, 2011 (posted on Walt.Foreignpolicy.com)
  35. ↑ [5]
  36. ↑ John Mearsheimer J .: China's Unpeaceful Rise . In: Current History Magazine (Ed.): Current History . 105, No. 690, April 2006, pp. 160-162.
  37. ↑ Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully
  38. ↑ China's Unpeaceful Rise, John J Mearsheimer, Current History; Apr 2006; 105, 690; Research Library, pg. 160
  39. ↑ The Atlantic, Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)
  40. ^ The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia
  41. ^ “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All,” The Australian, Nov. 18, 2005
  42. ↑ a b The Spectator, Saturday 2nd October 2010, Australians should fear the rise of China
  43. ↑ Archive link ( Memento of the original dated February 3, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.abc.net.au
  44. ↑ China vs. USA, Der haaufziehende Sturm, Blätter for German and international politics 10/2010, p. 87 ff, German translation of the article in footnote 43
  45. ↑ CLASH OF THE TITANS, Brzezinksi, Zbigniew & Mearsheimer, John J., Foreign Policy, Jan / Feb 2005, Issue 146
  46. ↑ Mearsheimer on August 4, 2010 in his Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security: The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia
  47. ^ Barker, Alexander (October 17, 2011) International Deceit , Oxonian Review
  48. ^ The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent University of Chicago / Foreign Affairs Summer 1993
  49. ↑ "Putin reacts - Why the West is to blame for the Ukraine crisis" . Translated and printed on the website of the "IPG - International Politics and Society" of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on September 1, 2014 (with a link to the original article)
  50. ↑ [6]
  51. ^ John J. Mearsheimer: Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin - FA, issue Sept./Oct. 2014
  52. ^ Don't Arm Ukraine , NYT, February 8, 2015; "There is no question that Ukraine's military is badly outgunned by the separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side."
  53. ↑ Faulty Powers - Who Started the Ukraine Crisis? , Foreign Affairs November 2014; “Russian foreign policy did not grow more aggressive in response to US policies; it changed as a result of Russian internal political dynamics. The shift began when Putin and his regime came under attack for the first time ever. "
personal data
SURNAME Mearsheimer, John J.
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Mearsheimer, John Joseph
BRIEF DESCRIPTION American political scientist
DATE OF BIRTH December 14, 1947
PLACE OF BIRTH Brooklyn