Pike Committee

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The Pike Committee was a parliamentary committee of the House of Representatives of the United States of America chaired by the eponymous MP Otis G. Pike . It replaced the Nedzi Committee and dealt primarily with the efficient organization of the Intelligence Community (German secret service community). The Congress gave the committee from July 17, 1975 to January 31, 1976 time.

The commission, consisting of 13 MPs, examined the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). Witnesses were charged for public and closed hearings among others, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense of the United States and the Government Accountability Office (dt. General Accounting Office) and the Internal Revenue Service (Eng. Internal Revenue Service).

The commission was critical of the work of the United States National Security Council and the "Committee of 40" chaired by Henry Kissinger . In its final report, the committee made suggestions for improving intelligence oversight and budget planning. However, the efforts were undermined by the government and most recently hampered by a scandal surrounding the final report leaked to the outside world.

background

Seymour Hersh, an investigative journalist , came very close to the so-called family jewels of the CIA in his coverage of the Watergate affair . After months of collecting stories , such as research into the surveillance of anti-war activists against the Vietnam War , and conversations with anonymous informants, as well as after an interview with the director of the CIA William Colby , Hersh published his result in the editorial on December 22, 1974 in the New York Times under the headline : Huge CIA operation reported in US against antiwar forces, other dissidents in Nixon years , and reported:

"The Central Intelligence Agency directly violated its constitution by conducting a massive illegal domestic operation during the Nixon administration against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups, as confirmed by high-ranking government sources."

The disclosure made the White House and Congress of the United States respond. President Gerald Ford , successor in office to Richard Nixon, who resigned because of the Watergate Affair which became a scandal, called the Rockefeller Commission to investigate. The intelligence agencies had also planned political murders . Ford raised the CIA's involvement in the matter. As a result, Congress began its own inquiries into the American intelligence community for possible abuse. On January 27, 1975, the Senate set up the Church Committee , and the House of Representatives voted on February 19, 1975 to convene the Nedzi Committee.

The Nedzi Committee did not come to work, however. Co-MPs had concerns about Lucien Nedzi shortly after the appointment. An article Seymour Hersh made in the New York Times publicized that the MPs had been informed of the actions of the CIA in 1973 by William Colby. Nedzi was briefed on the so-called "family jewels," such as the CIA's domestic operation, code-named Operation CHAOS . He did not contribute to the clarification and remained silent. The members of the Republican Party refused to cooperate; eventually a new commission was created. Congress named Pike chairman because he was not involved. He was considered a conservative democrat. He held on to the Vietnam War longer than most MPs. Nobody expected Pike to question the national security state.

Importance and focus

For the first time in the history of Congress, it no longer stood unconditionally behind the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency. The commissions delved into aspects of intelligence . It exposed human rights violations . The CIA became a point of contention between Congress and the President of the United States over foreign policy and presidential powers. The Church Commission, chaired by Senator Frank Church , focused on the illegal activities of the intelligence community. Otis G. Pike's commission, on the other hand, focused on the costs to the taxpayer and the efficiency of the CIA.

The commission under Pike

The committee was formed on July 17, 1975 and had until January 31, 1976 to work through its proposals after careful study.

Composition of the Commission

Three other MEPs were appointed to face the commission headed by Nediz. The 13-member committee was chaired by Democrat Pike. Also on the commission were Democratic Party MPs Robert Giaimo , J. William Stanton , Ron Dellums Morgan F. Murphy Les Aspin Philip H. Hayes William Lehman and Dale Milford and, as representatives of the Republican Party, Robert McClory , David C. Treen Bob Kasten and James Paul Johnson involved. While nine of the MPs consistently questioned the Ford administration and secret services, including the vast majority of the Democrats, four did the opposite. Johnson as Republican and vice versa Milford on the Democratic side were in opposition to their own party members. Gerald K. Haines of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence describes that the committee was ideologically divided. The majority of the members came from the Democratic Party. The committee had taken a stance against the intelligence community and the CIA. In contrast to the Church Commission, which included politically more experienced MPs in addition to younger people and ex-secret service members, the Pike Committee was predominantly made up of young MPs with little experience. In his opinion, this led to problems in dealing with the authorities and the White House.

Searle Field was responsible for the staff of the Pike Commission. Aaron Donner served as a general adviser to the committee. The committee had to complete its work within six months, which was time-sensitive. The other side took advantage of this fact through delays. Henry Kissinger, for example, took this approach. On the other hand, there was William Colby's approach. The staff of 40 members was inundated with documents. The crowd was not manageable enough. The CIA alone gave the commission 90,000 documents for review. In addition, another 77,000 documents came from the rest of the intelligence community. Pike's staff assistant replied that in this situation you could have used five years and 300 people.

Pike did not let the agenda of the White House or the intelligence community dictate the subject of the committee's investigation. This lifted the committee under his control from the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee . In addition, he did not want to promote the sensationalism of the media. The investigation of the political murders or the spying was far removed from him. He intended to avoid a content overlap with the Church Commission. Pike's endeavor was to keep the focus on researching budget and efficiency. Pike was keen to hold all committee meetings as public hearings. There he did not agree that information would only be shown to him as chairman and he insisted on the greatest possible publicity.

Start of examination and disability

In a conversation on July 24, 1975 between William Colby and the representatives of the committee, this assured full cooperation. Responsible for protecting the CIA agents and their methods, a dispute arose over the disclosure of classified documents. Pike believed the intelligence work needed to be exposed, which in his opinion included the committee's authority to release classified information . This made the cooperation with the CIA Review Staff , which was responsible for providing the documents, much more difficult . In the meeting, Pike attached importance to examining the budget of the secret services; this should be conveyed to the public.

Cooperation with the White House was also strained. Henry Kissinger, who also agreed to cooperate, blocked the release of documents to the committee and is working to destroy the investigation. In addition, Les Aspin was a member of the committee who intrigued with Kissinger. He also pursued his own political plans. Aspin, for example, made a copy of the CIA's final report available without the Commission's approval. In the course of this, relationships also deteriorate. Cooperation with the CIA was, after Searle Field, much less problematic than with the White House, State Department and Department of Defense of the United States .

These circumstances frustrated Pike and other members of the committee. On August 4, 1975, this was raised in a public hearing by Pike. In the final report, one section describes only the experiences in “cooperation”, which is described as “practically non-existent”. From the point of view of the committee, the report describes that delaying tactics, blocking attitudes and deception in the demand for information were encountered. The report says that information sharing has been restricted. It is also stated that investigative questions were avoided.

Investigations into the state budget of the secret services

In a letter to William Colby, Pike made it clear that he was "looking for information on how much taxpayer dollars" the CIA is spending and for what purposes. Pike derived the claim to find out about this from Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution .

To this end, the government's public budget was first examined. This did not include the CIA budget. The questioning of James Thomas Lynn , director of the Office of Management and Budget (German office for administration and budgetary) was inconclusive. In the first hearing before the committee, Elmer B. Staats from the Government Accountability Office was unable to make any statement about the financing of the secret services. The Court of Auditors attests that the authority did not have any information; the size of the CIA's budget is unknown; there has been no management since 1962; Whether the money was used sensibly or wasted is not verifiable. Lynn at the public hearing acknowledged the understaffing of the Pike Commission staff. There were six staff members in the Pike Commission for the budget investigation; the Lynns authority would have used over 300 employees for such a task for a budget comparable to that of the secret service budget.

On August 4, 1975, William Colby was summoned who refused to testify at the public intelligence budget hearing. The following day, in camera, Colby provided some details, emphasizing that most of the budget would be used on the primary objectives of the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China . But even here he refused to mention the total budget of the CIA. Colby justified this stance with the argument that from the size it could be deduced what capacities the secret service would have and the publication of the information would harm the efforts of the US secret services. The US intelligence community would derive considerable benefit from such information if it knew this from, for example, the Soviet Union.

For this part of the investigation, the committee also received testimony from the Internal Revenue Service , the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency . For example, on August 8, 1975, NSA director Lew Allen, Jr. confirmed the existence of Project Shamrock .

Presentation in the draft report

Colby's statements were received positively within the intelligence community. The assessment by the Pike Committee was contrary. The preliminary final report of the Pike Group put the budget of the foreign intelligence services at three to four times what it was told. The funds would be hidden in various federal budgets, so that a complete investigation would appear incredible. The executive control over the budget of the CIA ranged between "not detailed and non-existent." As the supervisory authority of the congress over the secret service community and in the special case the CIA had no handling. Security concerns prevent the Supreme Audit Office from looking into the budgets of the security authorities. The committee concluded that there was insufficient executive and legislative oversight. "The taxpayer as well as most members of Congress could not find out how much is spent on espionage activities," argued the final report, seeing it as a conflict with the constitution, which required "regular and public accounting of all items used by the federal government." The draft report said at last that the Soviet Union had long since had detailed information, only the people who were concerned were uninformed about the costs, i.e. the American taxpayers. In addition, the preliminary report found that the Director of Intelligence (DCI) controlled only 15% of the total budget, whereas the Department of Defense wielded much greater power and control over a large portion of the intelligence budget.

CIA officials who examined the draft budget report saw it as a bias. If published in this way, there would be a misinterpretation by the public about the actual expenditure. Public pressure follows from this and there is the possibility of irreparable damage to US foreign and defense policy. It is a misrepresentation that there is no budget review. As a result, the CIA officials recommended that almost all budgetary comments be deleted from the report.

Performance of the US intelligence services

The Pike Committee also saw the investigation of the effectiveness of intelligence reconnaissance as its essential task. The review of the efficiency of the past 10 years also led to a confrontation with the authorities and the White House. On September 9, the committee requested all CIA assessments, current intelligence reports and summaries, situation reports and other relevant documents. The committee urged the release of documents in the case of the 1968 invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops on the occasion of the Prague Spring , the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War , the 1972 martial law in the Philippines and Korea , the Yom Kippur War that began in 1973, as well the 1974 nuclear test in India , the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the coup in Portugal .

The hearings began on September 11 with questioning about the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, whereby the secret services misjudged the maneuvers. In connection with this, classified documents were uncovered that revealed the United States' capacity to monitor Egyptian communications. The publication led to conflict, although the same information had been leaked to Kissinger's biographers Marvin and Bernard Kalb when they wrote their book. On September 12th, the Tet Offensive was discussed, which escalated into President Ford ordering the Pike Committee to be denied all access to classified information. The White House ordered officials not to testify to the committee. A compromise between the White House, the CIA and the House of Representatives was negotiated. The Pike Commission suggested a 24-hour advance notice in order to coordinate with the institutions involved before information was made public. On September 26, Ford withdrew the order, and in exchange the committee agreed to recognize the president as the ultimate judge on clearance matters.

The dispute over the release of classified documents hampered the actual aim of the performance appraisal. The committee found the predictions about the Yom Kippur War, the Tet Offensive, the coup in Cyprus and Portugal, the nuclear test in India, and the troop invasion on the occasion of the Prague Spring as critical. In the case of the Yom Kippur War, the CIA's own analysis admitted the failure itself. William Colby admitted at the hearing that the CIA "did not adorn itself with fame;" he said, "We predicted the day before the war broke out that it would not break out."

Presentation in the draft report

Here, too, the authorities reacted defensively to the performance findings in the draft report. Contrary to the CIA's self-assessment, which supported the committee's findings, attempts were made to censor sections that deal with the failure of the Yom Kippur War, for example. It feared the deterioration in foreign relations and the disclosure of the possibility of wiretapping communications between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Both sides were hardened. The Pike Commission had names and sources removed, but left the statements, since they argued that if they were removed nothing would be left.

Covert Surgery Investigations

When the Pike Committee announced that it would investigate covert actions, there was renewed dispute with both the authorities and the White House they were close to. They wanted to examine 10 years of operations management with a special focus on the actions of the CIA. These included the 1972 elections in Italy , aid to the Kurds in Iraq between 1972 and 1975, and activities in Angola . The White House blocked public hearings. Instead, there were surveys of Congressman Michael J. Harrington , the law professor of the Harvard Law School Roger Fisher , the National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy , who spoke out against covert operations in peacetime, and the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger . The latter was of the opinion that the secret services required strict supervision by the executive and legislative branches and that budgets should be drastically cut in order to curb covert operations.

A detailed investigation of the National Security Council and the “Committee of 40”, Kissinger was part of it, as mainly responsible for decisions on covert operations, was carried out. The committee found that Kissinger was the key figure in this appendix to the National Security Council. The “Committee of 40”, however, rarely met when making decisions; Kissinger alone had done this. Kissinger's activities during the presidential tenure touched on almost every subject the commission addressed. It was precisely because of this that Kissinger saw the committee as a threat. The question was whether the president controlled the CIA or whether the agency was a "monster that had become independent"; which at first also reflected Pike's personal feelings, but changed towards the end.

The Church committee tried unsuccessfully to link covert operations to an instruction from the President. However, the Pike Committee did so when asked Henry Kissinger, although it did not investigate. At the Kissinger hearing, where it was established that the "Committee of 40" did not meet from 1972 to 1974, but that 40 secret operations had been approved, the latter also testified that all actions had been approved by the President at that time Richard Nixon.

Presentation in the draft report

The Pike Committee found the investigated actions "irregularly approved, sloppily implemented, and in some cases were a reluctant CIA, imposed by the President and his national security advisers." With the exception of political murders, it did not recommend avoiding covert operations; stricter supervision would be appropriate. Stricter controls stipulated that the director of the secret services should report in detail the nature, size, purpose and cost of such operations in writing to the secret service committee within 48 hours of the start of execution. The President also had to put down in writing that such an operation was necessary for the “national security” of the United States.

Recommendations of the final report

With the fixed time for the end of the investigation, Pike pressed for the final report . Searle Field commissioned the political scientist Stanley Bach to prepare a draft report. First and foremost, Bach produced this draft from the transcripts of the hearings. The Atomic Energy Commission (German Atomic Energy Commission ) as a model in mind, Bach designed a supervisory commission for the intelligence community. However, Pike rejected the draft and transferred responsibility for a satisfactory final report to Field and Aaron Donner. These prepared a draft of the final report in early January.

The Pike Committee's recommendations included banning political assassinations, opening up the intelligence budget, allowing the Supreme Court to conduct audits of the CIA, and tighter oversight of covert operations. To this end, the commission thought of setting up a permanent secret service committee in Congress like the Church Committee. But unlike the Senate proposal, the House of Representatives proposal stipulated that the House Intelligence Committee would be responsible for all legislative projects and a supervisory function over all US agencies and departments involved in foreign intelligence. This committee would have sole budgetary authority over all intelligence activities and all covert operations. In addition, this committee should be able to issue subpoenas and have the right to communicate information and documents of its control to the public. Linked to this was an additional section on criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of information.

publication

The protests by the authorities against the draft report and its recommendations had little effect on the final report. The final report recommended that Congress integrate intelligence expenditures into the presidential budget as one budget and separate each agency's budget. If there were budget overlaps, these would have to be listed separately. The legislature was also recommended to enact legislation. Without specific approval by Congress or its intelligence committees, significant budget transfers between the intelligence services would have to be restricted and substantial increases prohibited. In addition, the Supreme Audit Office should be empowered to establish a management and to audit the secret services financially. Gerald K. Haines found these proposals by the Pike Commission to be well founded. The committee repeated the findings on secret operations in the final report. He even confirmed that the CIA acted correctly, there was evidence of evidence for the statement of the CIA: "No, don't do this." In contrast, there was evidence of "We will do it," by the State Department or the White House.

On January 19, 1976, Field submitted a copy of the 338-page final report from the Central Intelligence Agency. The authorities should have checked it back on January 20th. One reacted heatedly to that. Mitchell Rogovin , special advisor to William Colby, who represented the agency, criticized the report heavily and was outraged by the short time it took to review it. He therefore drew the picture of a report that portrays “relentless accusation embedded in prejudice” and is “derogatory and factually incorrectly worded”. According to Rogovin, as well as most in the authority, the report focuses on the negative actions and there is no balanced view. The public was given a disturbing picture of the CIA.

Notwithstanding the protest on January 23, the Pike Commission voted 9 to 7 along the party lines to publish the report without any substantial changes. The MPs of the Republican Party, supported by the authority as well as the White House, sought to suppress the report. William Colby called a press conference to criticize the report, as did Mitchell Rogovin. It was wrestled on Capitol Hill about the January 26th release. While this was still being debated, the New York Times printed large sections of the draft report that same day .

Three days later, Congress voted 246 to 124 that the Pike Committee report should not be published until the "President confirmed that it contained no information that would influence CIA intelligence activities." Poll. He told the House, “The House has voted not to publish a document that it has not read. Our committee voted to publish the document we read. ”Later, Pike reflected that it was unacceptable for the final report to be precensored. His view was: "A report in which the CIA makes the last stroke of the pen would be a lie." In an attempt at publication by the government, McClory made a proposal to the commission. He planned to hand over the report to the president and to approve it after all. This proposal was rejected by 7 to 4 votes. The CBS News reporter Daniel Schorr, who had received a copy of the entire Pike Report, passed this on to the weekly Village Voice , which published it in full on February 16, 1976 under the title The Report on the CIA that President Ford Doesn't Want You to Read (The report on the CIA that President Ford doesn't want you to read) reprinted. A commission of inquiry was then appointed to clarify who had leaked the report to Daniel Schorr. All members of the committee of inquiry testified under oath that they had not issued the report. Daniel Schorr refused to reveal his source under oath.

Follow for Otis G. Pike

"Seriously, there will be retribution," said Mitchell Rogovin. “Every political ambition that pike [had] in New York is through. We'll destroy him for that. ”As a result, Conservative Democrat Pike was portrayed as a revolutionary radical in his conservative Long Island constituency. After that, Pike withdrew his candidacy for a Senate post. In a 1978 interview with the New York Times , he was bitterly disappointed and stated that voters in his district drove with stickers on their bumpers that read Pike Is 2 Liberal 4 Me .

Reception of the commission's work and the final report

Frank John Smist concludes that the Pike Committee has uncovered significant gaps and weaknesses in US intelligence that needed to be addressed. He went on to say that unfortunately the Commission's mistakes overshadowed the positive revelations. The committee asked questions that needed to be asked. Ironically, the Intelligence Monitoring Committee was established in 1977, but it distanced itself from the Pike Committee. And in doing so, it completely ignored the substantial achievements that were being worked out under Pike. In conclusion, Smist quotes member Kasten, who said in 1976: “It is tragic that it was necessary to create such a committee to investigate the activities of the authorities on whom we depend so much for our safety. But it would be all the more tragic if the results of our investigations were now ignored. ”Smist sees Henry Kissinger and the CIA responsible for using their connections in the media to influence Pike and the press coverage in their favor.

Historian at the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, Gerald K. Haines, found the Pike Committee's proposals well-founded and solid. Improvements in the executive oversight of Congress over the intelligence community and a strengthening of the DCI were overlooked when the report was leaked to the press. The controversy surrounding the release resulted in the report being ignored or simply forgotten. Haines believes that everything has been lumped together; the excitement ignored the arguments. It was not until July 1977 that parliament voted for a permanent committee. He cites Pike's reflection on this, who viewed the leaks and fights over the publication as a distraction from the results of the committee. Despite its failure, Haines sees the Pike Committee as a dramatic break with the past. In his opinion, it represented the first significant investigation into the intelligence community since the CIA was founded in 1947. Both the Commission and the CIA have been caught in the power struggle between the legislature and the executive in an attempt by Congress to regain control over the activities of US intelligence and foreign policy.

Journalist Mark Ames believes that all will to reform ended in 1978, and quotes Washington Post reporter George Lardner for American culture , who described the year as follows: “Everything that remains, it seems, is permanent Tattoo of suggestions that the scandals were somehow imaginary. "On Pike's death (deceased 2014), Adams says:" He was destroyed. And after it was destroyed, it was forgotten. Now he's dead, and no one noticed, no one cares. ”Journalist Lisa Pease sees Pike as the only MP who led extensive and in-depth investigations into government abuse in the 1970s . She cites that even the CIA recognized in a report by its own historian Gerald K. Haines that Pike was exposed to a counterattack by the White House that accused the Pikes Committee of ruthlessness. She also notes that Pike was punished for his commission work.

See also

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj Gerald K. Haines : The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI , CIA , accessed June 25, 2015 (English, winter 98/99).
  2. ↑ Tim Weiner : CIA . The whole story. 2nd Edition. Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt am Main 2012, ISBN 978-3-596-19059-1 , pp. 446 (English, original title: Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA . New York City 2007. Translated by Elke Enderwitz, Ulrich Enderwitz, Monika Noll, Rolf Schubert).
  3. ↑ Robert Miraldi: Seymour Hersh . Scoop Artist. First edition. Potomac Books, University of Nebraska, Nebraska 2013, ISBN 978-1-61234-475-1 , pp. 189 (English): "You would be wrong if you went ahead with your story in the way you've laid it out."
  4. ↑ Tim Weiner: CIA . The whole story. 2nd Edition. Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt am Main 2012, ISBN 978-3-596-19059-1 , pp. 446 f . (English, original title: Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA . New York City 2007. Translated by Elke Enderwitz, Ulrich Enderwitz, Monika Noll, Rolf Schubert).
  5. ↑ Seymour Hersh: Huge CIA Operation reported in US against Antiwar Forces, other Dissidents in Nixon Years. (PDF 556 kB) In: s3.documentcloud.org. The New York Times, December 22, 1974, accessed June 23, 2015 (Reproduced by permission of copy right holder; further reproduction prohibited.).
  6. ^ Seymour Hersh: Huge CIA operation reported in US against antiwar forces, other dissidents in Nixon years. In: archive.org. The New York Times, December 22, 1974, accessed June 23, 2015 : “The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States according to well-placed Government sources "
  7. ↑ a b L. Britt Snider: The Agency and the Hill . CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1948-2004. Ed .: Center for Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 2008, ISBN 978-1-929667-17-8 , pp. 49 (English, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/agency-and-the-hill/The%20Agency% 20and% 20the% 20Hill_Book_1May2008.pdf full PDF version).
  8. ↑ a b c Mark Ames: The first congressman to battle the NSA is dead. No-one noticed, no-one cares. pando.com, February 4, 2014, accessed June 25, 2015 .
  9. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 160 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  10. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 161 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  11. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 167 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  12. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 178 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  13. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 180 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  14. ↑ a b Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 154 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  15. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 155 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  16. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 181 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  17. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 164 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  18. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): "Devoting an entire section of the report to describing its experience, the committee characterized Agency and White House cooperation as' virtually nonexistent." The report asserted that the executive branch practiced 'footdragging, stonewalling, and deception' in response to committee requests for information. It told the committee only what it wanted the committee to know. It restricted the dissemination of the information and ducked penetrating questions. "
  19. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI , CIA , accessed June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): “I am seeking to obtain information on how much of the taxpayers' dollars you spend each year and the basic purposes for which it is spent, [. ..]. "&" No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of public money be published from time to time. "
  20. ^ A b c Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947–1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 192 (English, limited preview in Google Book search).
  21. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): “The CIA assessment was very different from the Pike Committee's. The Pike group's final report concluded that the foreign intelligence budget was three or four times larger than Congress had been told; that money appropriated for the IC was hidden throughout the entire Federal budget; that the total amount of funds expended on intelligence was extremely difficult to determine; and that Congressional and executive scrutiny of the budget ranged between "cursory and nonexistent". "
  22. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): "Taking on the issue of secrecy, the report argued that" taxpayers and most of Congress did not know and cannot find out how much they spend on spy activities. "The committee saw this as being in direct conflict with the Constitution, which required a regular and public accounting for all funds spent by the Federal Government."
  23. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): “In earlier testimony before the committee, Colby admitted that, 'We did not cover ourselves with glory. We predicted the day before the war broke out that it was not going to break out. '"
  24. ↑ a b Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): "The key question for the committee was whether the CIA was a 'rogue elephant' or under strict control of the President and the executive branch?"
  25. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 195 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  26. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 195 f . (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  27. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI , CIA , accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): "These clearly were not wild and crazy recommendations."
  28. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): “We did find evidence, upon evidence, upon evidence where the CIA said: 'No, don't do it.' The State Department or the White House said, 'We're going to do it.' "
  29. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): “Rogovin responded with a scalding attack on the report. He criticized the extreme time constraints placed on the Agency in making its response and pictured the report as an 'unrelenting indictment couched in biased, pejorative and factually erroneous terms.' "
  30. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI, CIA, accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, winter 98/99): “The House just voted not to release a document it had not read. Our committee voted to release a document it had read. "Pike was so upset that he threatened not to file" a report at all with the House because a report on the CIA in which the CIA would do the final rewrite would be a lie. "
  31. ^ Profiles: Searle Field. Searle Field was a participant or observer in the following events: January 29, 1976: Pike Committee Report Criticizing US Intelligence Agencies Is Suppressed. historycommons.org, June 25, 2015, accessed June 25, 2015 .
  32. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 136 f . (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  33. ↑ a b c Mark Ames: The first congressman to battle the NSA is dead. No-one noticed, no-one cares. pando.com, February 4, 2014, accessed June 25, 2015 (English): "I'm serious, there will be retaliation," Mitchell Rogovin said. "Any political ambitions that Pike had in New York are through. We will destroy him for this. "
  34. ^ The Review of News . tape 12 , p. 63 (English, limited preview in Google Book search).
  35. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 212 ff . (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  36. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 219 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search): "It is tragic that it was necessary to establish this committee to inquire into the activities of agencies on which we depend so heavily for our security. But it would be even more tragic [sic] if the results of our investigation were now to be ignored. "
  37. ↑ Frank John Smist, Jr .: United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 . 2nd Edition. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1994, ISBN 0-87049-841-X , pp. 189 (English, limited preview in Google Book Search).
  38. ↑ Gerald K. Haines: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA. Looking for a rogue elephant. CSI , CIA , accessed on June 25, 2015 (English, Winter 98/99): “Despite its failures, the Pike Committee inquiry was a new and dramatic break with the past. It was the first significant House investigation of the IC since the creation of the CIA in 1947. "
  39. ↑ a b Lisa Pease: When the CIA's Empire Struck Back. consortiumnews.com, February 6, 2014, accessed June 25, 2015 .