Ruhr question

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Map of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal and industrial area , 1896
"Greetings from the cannon city of Essen" (postcard depicting the "Krupp works" , 1913) - The postcard flirts with the power of a Krupp railway gun , in whose beam the greetings are inscribed.

The Ruhr question was a political topos that the victorious powers put on the political agenda after the First and after the Second World War to decide how to deal with the considerable economic and technological potential of the industrial area on the Rhine and Ruhr . Control of this industrial area was a national and security policy concern pursued by France in particular after it had realized in the Franco-Prussian War and in the World Wars that the economic and technological potentials concentrated on the Rhine and Ruhr were militarily in the Kingdom of Prussia and the German Reich had enabled them to threaten, fight and occupy France. The Ruhr question was linked with the question of the repayment of inter-allied war debts , the German question and the Saar question . The Allied occupation of the Rhineland (1919–1930), the Ruhr occupation (1923–1924 / 1925), the founding of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (1946), the Monnet Plan (1946–1950) and the Marshall Plan (1948 ) were closely related to this –1952), the Ruhr Statute (1949–1952), the Schuman Plan (1950) and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951). The political handling of the Ruhr question is called Ruhrpolitik . With a broader view of the Rhineland , its occupation and attempts to found a Rhenish Republic there in 1923 , the terms Rhine and Ruhr question or Rhine-Ruhr question are used.

history

Ruhr occupation

French soldiers during the occupation of the Ruhr on the premises of the Rheinmetall company in Düsseldorf
Territory of the Ruhr and Rhineland Occupation (1923)

As early as the beginning of the 1920s, the Ruhr question was an important topic in Franco-German disputes, since from the French point of view the area and large parts of the industries on the Rhine and Ruhr, for example the arms industry in the factories of the Krupp companies in Essen and Rheinmetall in Düsseldorf , were considered "Germany's armory" were perceived. After France had traumatically experienced its strength in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1871 and in the First World War 1914–1918, in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 , it initially had to create a "security glacis" against Germany in the form of an assignment of the left bank of the Rhine . In the form of extensive demilitarization and arms restrictions for Germany and an Allied occupation of the Rhineland , it was ultimately able to realize aspects of this demand. Furthermore, France, in cooperation with the other victorious powers, was able to ensure that Germany was imposed considerable reparation obligations for the damage caused in the First World War. The reparations were intended to reduce inter-allied war debts by repaying loans that had been granted mainly by the United States to finance the war during the First World War. If the German Reich did not meet the reparation demands, the negotiations on the London payment plan threatened to occupy the Ruhr area - then understood as the Rhine-Westphalian coal and industrial area with the Lippe in the north, Dortmund in the east and Düsseldorf in the south. When Germany defaulted on reparations, France and Belgium began to occupy the cities of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort in 1921, and in 1923 to occupy the rest of the Ruhr area as far as Dortmund in the east. The occupation of the Ruhr - including control of factories and mines - lasted until 1924, when a new agreement was reached through the Dawes Plan . In Düsseldorf, where the seized Stahlhof had acted as the command center for the occupation of the Ruhr, the withdrawal of the French military only took place on August 25, 1925.

Reorganization of Germany and Europe after the Second World War

According to a non-implemented French draft of March 11, 1946, the Ruhr area and the adjacent Lower Rhine ("Ruhr-Rhénanie") were to be placed under a special Allied occupation regime.

At the end of the Second World War, the Allies again asked themselves how to deal with the economic and technological potential of the Rhine and Ruhr. Within the French deliberations on the future of Germany, the Ruhr question took first place. The industrialized area on the Rhine and Ruhr, which Nazi propaganda had stylized as the “armory of the empire”, also represented far more than just an industrial area for France at the end of the Second World War, but “the symbol of German power and the source of French power Humiliation". As early as February 5, 1945, France's provisional head of government Charles de Gaulle presented the idea in a radio speech of separating the "Ruhr Basin" from a possible future German state - or from German states. At the conferences of the Allies, in which the Ruhr question was increasingly on the agenda between 1945 and 1949, it was mainly French proposals that were put forward. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference, which took place in London from September 11 to October 2, 1945 , the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault circulated a memorandum of September 13, 1945, which stated that France would consider the separation of the Rhineland and Westphalia, including the Ruhr area by the German Reich as "indispensable for the protection of the border and as an essential prerequisite for the security of Europe and the world." An important point of view was the French and neighboring Western European countries that their economy for the reconstruction to be carried out with coal and steel from the Ruhr and Saar area was supplied. With regard to the steel sector, France intended to expand French steel production through the Monnet Plan and to impose a capacity restriction on German steel production after it had understood that it would not get the approval of the other allies for a separation of the industrial area on the Rhine and Ruhr. The Soviet Union took the position that the industrial area on the Rhine and Ruhr should be placed under joint Allied control according to the concept of four-power status . However, the idea that the Soviet Union could have a say in the industrial area on the Rhine and Ruhr, which is important for the reconstruction of Europe, was against the three Western Allies. Fundamental differences of opinion, which at this time led to tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies on various issues relating to the reorganization of Europe and the world, caused the anti-Hitler coalition to break up and led to the start of the Cold War .

The British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin was a staunch opponent of plans for a French annexation or a French supremacy on the Rhine and Ruhr . In a memorandum of June 13, 1946, he wrote about the Ruhr question with a historical view of the Ruhr occupation from 1923 to 1925 and its consequences for the Weimar Republic :

"Finally, it is impossible to consider this question without reference to the disastrous Ruhr experiment of 1923, when the French tried to put into operation similar plans to those which they have now put forward and for the same reasons. This experiment retarded the recovery of Europe after the last war, precipitated the great inflationary wave of 1923-25 ​​and stifled the infant Republic of Weimar and so contributed to paving the way of National Socialism. That fact that the French forget this experiment in their present arguments is yet another proof, that as a result of their experiences at the hand of the Germans they are unable to view this question in a balanced and objective manner. Because we sympathize with sufferings there is no reason why we should adopt the restorted view which results from them. "

In conclusion, it is impossible to ponder this question without referring to the devastating Ruhr experiment of 1923 when the French had similar plans for similar reasons. This experiment delayed the recovery of Europe after the last war, caused the great inflation wave from 1923 to 1925, stifled the young Weimar Republic and thus helped pave the way for National Socialism. The fact that the French have forgotten this experiment in their argument today is further evidence that, as a result of their experiments on the Germans, they are unable to consider this question in a balanced and objective way. The fact that we sympathize with victims is no reason to take the victim's point of view. "

Atlantikhaus in the government district of Düsseldorf , from 1949 to 1953 the seat of the International Ruhr Authority , today the Ministry for Homeland, Local Affairs, Construction and Equality of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia

Because the French side often encountered resistance in their proposals for solving the Ruhr question, especially from the British (who initially pursued their own concept with the establishment of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia since 1946, in which, in addition to dismantling, the socialization of the coal and steel industry was considered ) and among Americans (who, based on the Truman Doctrine, had been pursuing a containment policy since 1947 , had the goals of the Marshall Plan in mind, rejected dismantling and opposed the socialization efforts of the British), in 1948 she finally developed the first idea for a Ruhr Statute , the one provided international supervision and international access to coal and steel products from the Rhine and Ruhr. According to this concept, however, the Soviets should remain outside and have no supervision. This idea then formed the basis for further discussions among the Western Allies. Only after the Ruhr issue between France, the United Kingdom and the United States was fundamentally resolved at the London Conference of 1948 by agreeing to jointly develop a concept for an international authority that would give international access to the German coal and steel market was supposed to guarantee, the later Ruhr Statute, the way was free for the next common step, the creation of a legal basis for the establishment of a German central government in West Germany in accordance with the Frankfurt documents . The Ruhr Statute took concrete form in 1949 and led to the establishment of the International Authority for the Ruhr ( Autorité internationale de la Ruhr ) in Düsseldorf. The authority controlled around 40% of German industrial production. The Parliamentary Council rejected the Ruhr Statute as "discrimination". Karl Arnold , the Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, agreed with the other Prime Ministers of the German states to accept the Ruhr Statute on the condition that the other mining industrial locations in Western Europe are also subject to the same control. This condition was not yet fulfilled with the Ruhr Statute, but discussions subsequently arose about the development of an economic union between European countries. With the Petersberg Agreement , the first federal government under Konrad Adenauer accepted the Ruhr Statute and in December 1949 allowed three voting members to join the Council of the International Ruhr Authority. This laid the foundation for the further development of the deliberations in the form of the Schuman Plan of 1950, which in turn formed a basis for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. The later official French idea that a radical change of direction had to take place in French Ruhr policy and that a "European structure" had to be created was already laid out in a memorandum that Jean Monnet had written on August 5, 1943 in Algiers . A preliminary stage on the way to the Community method of the later European Union was envisaged.

Historical interpretation

The mobility of France in the Ruhr and Germany policy after the Second World War and the move towards a "communitisation" of the coal and steel industry, which was opened by the Schuman Plan, is explained by a process of knowledge on the French side. France gradually realized that its tough Germany policy, which it had shown against the Weimar Republic under its Foreign Minister Raymond Poincaré , ultimately only harmed it itself and thus failed. In addition, the paradigm shift in French foreign policy is explained by the French interest in the Marshall Plan. In order to be able to finance its own reconstruction from the funds of this plan, France had to embark on the political course for the integration of West Germany , which the United States in particular set in the course of its containment policy.

literature

  • Raymond Poidevin : France and the Ruhr question 1945–1951 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , 228, 2 (April 1979), Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 317–334.
  • Raimond Poidevon: The Europe factor in Robert Schuman's policy on Germany (summer 1948 to spring 1949) . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte , 1985, 3, p. 406 ff., Full text .
  • John Gillingham : The French Ruhr Policy and the Origins of the Schuman Plan . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte , 1987, 1, pp. 1 ff., Full text .
  • Martina Kessel : Western Europe and the division of Germany. English and French policy on Germany at the Foreign Ministers' Conferences from 1945 to 1947 . R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1989, ISBN 3-486-55241-4 .
  • Rolf Steininger : The Ruhr question 1945/1946 and the creation of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. British, French and American files . In: The Journal of Modern History , Vol. 62, No. 3 (September 1990), University of Chicago Press , pp. 665-667.
  • Ursula Rombeck-Jaschinski: North Rhine-Westphalia, the Ruhr and Europe. Federalism and European Policy 1945–1955 . Düsseldorf writings on modern history and the history of North Rhine-Westphalia, Volume 29, Düsseldorf 1990.
  • Gaston Haelling: Importance de la Ruhr pour le Bénélux . In: Politique étrangère , 1949, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 49-62, digitized .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Cf. for example Theodor Schieder : The problems of the Rapallo contract. A study of German-Russian relations 1922–1926 . Working group for research of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, essay, issue 43, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1956, ISBN 978-3-663-00298-7 , p. 53.
  2. ↑ See also files of the Reich Chancellery: Weimar Republic: The Marx I / II Cabinets: Ministerial Meeting of January 24, 1924 (Volume 1, Documents, No. 73, Section No. 4, Letter a: Rhine-Ruhr Question: Negotiations of the Economic Committee ), website in the portal bundesarchiv.de , accessed on June 24, 2015
  3. ^ John Gillingham, p. 4.
  4. ^ Rolf Steininger: Reform and Reality. Ruhr question and socialization in the Anglo-American policy on Germany 1947/48 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . Issue 2 (April 1979), p. 168 ( PDF ).
  5. ↑ Ernest Bevins Memorandum of June 13, 1946. In: Rudolf Steininger: The Ruhr question 1946/47 and the emergence of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. British, French and American files . Düsseldorf 1988, Document 188, pp. 883-887. Quoted from: Wilhelm Ribhegge: Does North Rhine-Westphalia need a house of history? In: Saskia Handro, Bernd Schönemann (Ed.): Space and Sense. The spatial dimension of historical culture . LIT Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-643-12483-8 , p. 134 ( Google Books ).
  6. ↑ Rolf Steininger, p. 236 f.
  7. ^ Raymond Poidevin: The European factor in Robert Schuman's policy on Germany . P. 418.
  8. ^ Klaus Joachim Grigoleit : Federal Constitutional Court and German Question . Jus Publicum series of publications , Issue 107, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2004, ISBN 3-16-148367-7 , p. 227 ( Google Books ).
  9. ^ Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne, Archives Jean Monnet, Fund AME. 33/1/4: Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet , August 5, 1943, full text , here p. 2 (scroll): literally entité européenne . See John Gillingham, p. 4.
  10. ^ Franz Knipping: Que faire de l'Allemagne? The French policy on Germany 1945–1950 . In: Franz Knipping, Ernst Weisenfeld (Ed.): An unusual story: Germany - France since 1870 . Europa Union Verlag, Bonn 1988, p. 148.
  11. ^ Anne-Kristin Krämer: The fear in France of Germany as the engine of European integration . Diploma thesis, Cologne University of Applied Sciences, Bochum 1999, p. 23 ( PDF ).