Battle of the Masurian Lakes

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Battle of the Masurian Lakes
Battle of the Masurian Lakes 1914
Battle of the Masurian Lakes 1914
date 6. bis 14. September 1914
place Masuria , East Prussia
output Victory of the German Empire
consequences Withdrawal of Russian troops from East Prussia
Parties to the conflict

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire

Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire Russia

Commander

German EmpireThe German Imperium Paul von Hindenburg Erich Ludendorff Hermann von François Friedrich von Scholtz August von Mackensen
German EmpireThe German Imperium
German EmpireThe German Imperium
German EmpireThe German Imperium
German EmpireThe German Imperium

Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire Jakow Schilinski Paul Rennenkampff Wladimir Sljusarenko Wladimir Smirnow Giray Chan Aliyev
Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire
Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire
Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire
Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire

Troop strength
8th Army and Landwehr Corps Goltz
together about 225,000 men
16 infantry divisions
and 2 cavalry divisions
208 battalions
114 squadrons
1,134 guns 		1st (Nyemen) Army and 10th Army
together around 325,000 men
19 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions
300 battalions
211 squadrons
1,176 guns
losses

40,000 dead and wounded

about 125,000 men, including up to 45,000 prisoners

Major military operations on the
Eastern Front (1914-1918)

The First Battle of the Masurian Lakes from 6. bis 14. September 1914 was a battle between German and Russian troops in East Prussia in the First World War . It ended with the withdrawal or destruction of the Russian troops.

The later winter battle in Masuria of February 1915 is sometimes referred to as the winter battle on the Masurian Lakes . In English literature, the two battles are called First / Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes .

background

General Jakow Schilinksi, Commander in Chief of the Northwest Front

With the annihilation of the Russian 2nd Army under General Samsonov in the Battle of Tannenberg , the Russian plan to conquer East Prussia by attacking both sides from the south and northeast had failed. However, this did not remove the threat to the easternmost German province. On August 20, the previous commander of the German 8th Army , Maximilian von Prittwitz and Gaffron, urgently requested reinforcements from the western front . General Prittwitz had been replaced by Colonel General von Hindenburg because of his defensive operations , but the transport of reinforcements from France continued. So the 8th Army was until the end of August by the XI. Army Corps and the Guard Reserve Corps have been considerably strengthened by four infantry divisions and one cavalry division . This meant that the German forces were temporarily superior to their Russian opponents.

The Russian 1st Army ( Nyemen Army ) under Paul von Rennenkampff had withdrawn into defensive positions in the Insterburg - Gumbinnen area on German territory. Despite the defeat of Tannenberg, the tsarist high command had not yet deviated from its plan to once again carry the war onto German territory. This project was fueled by diplomatic pressure from allied France . At the same time the front staff of the Russian Army Group North under General Schilinsky had a new army set up southeast of East Prussia - the 10th Army under General of the Infantry Vasily Pflug - in order to preserve the possibility of a new offensive.

General Rennkampff, who willingly obeyed the orders of his superior Schilinski, which already made it impossible for him to support the 2nd Army at Tannenberg, had now put his troops on the defensive and was waiting for more forces to break into East Prussia again . He received reinforcements, through which his army was increased to a total of 14 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions. He also hoped for further reinforcements from the newly established 10th Army (initially Siberian III. And XXII. Corps together 6 divisions), which should provide flank cover south of the Nyemen Army.

Planning and deployment

Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, commanders of the German 8th Army
Map of the battle

After the victory of Tannenberg, General von Hindenburg temporarily had an advantage over the Russian Army of Njemen in terms of the number of troops. Only for a short time there was the possibility of pushing back Rennenkampff's army before the Russian forces on the now unhindered southern flank of the 8th Army in the Lyck area were able to strengthen themselves again. The solution to the problem was to establish a numerical superiority at the weakest point of the enemy in order to break up the enemy front. General Ludendorff , Chief of Staff of the 8th Army, followed this approach as he had done before with Tannenberg. The troops were regrouped to the north with the help of the railway network and positioned opposite the Russian 1st Army .

The northern flank at Labiau covered the fortress reserve of Königsberg under Lieutenant General von Pappritz , at Wehlau East Prussian Land Defense units were under General Brodrück .

The march to the east took place on the Allenburg - Gerdauen - Nordenburg line - to the Masurian Lakes near Angerburg . From north to south, the masses of the Russian 1st Army faced:

The main southern attack in the direction of Goldap should lead:

On the southern front between Neidenburg and Mława, Landwehr troops under General von Zastrow remained on the defensive. At Johannisburg , the Higher Landwehr Command , which had already proven effective at Tannenberg, covered Goltz , and in the Lyck lake area , the 3rd Reserve Division under General von Morgen also joined the attack . These formations covered the southern flank of the 8th Army against the Russian 10th Army, which was only moderately involved in the battle.

course

Battle of the Mazury in 1914

As in the Battle of Tannenberg, a unit of two divisions under General von François was to carry out the decisive encircling operation against the left flank of the Russians. The German command had thus correctly identified the weak point on the southern wing of the Nyemen Army. Due to a lack of reconnaissance information, General Rennenkampff still expected an attack from Königsberg, which had been stripped of troops, and concentrated his units northwest against the capital of East Prussia. Its left flank consisted entirely of reserve divisions, supported by strong cavalry. It was positioned in the area of ​​the Masurian Lakes , and raceskampff expected that the rugged terrain would not be an option for a German attack. He ignored inquiries from lower-ranking officers regarding the unsafe position in this area. Contrary to Rennenkampff's view, the Germans started their main thrust on September 6th, precisely here at the Masurian strait.

The 1st Army Corps under General von François launched the attack on Goldap on September 6th with a threefold superiority, its units - the 1st and 2nd Divisions - quickly inflicted heavy losses on the Russian II Corps. To the left of it accompanied the XVII. Army corps under General von Mackensen through its own action on the narrow lake near Lötzen on Possessern . The rugged terrain had an additional negative effect on the Russian reserve divisions in this section, because the individual battalions could hardly maintain contact with one another or even provide coordinated assistance due to the impassability of the terrain. In the center, the German Guard Reserve Corps near Gerdauen , and the 1st Reserve Corps south of Wehlau, also advanced strongly.

The German I. and XVII. Corps increased the pressure against the Russian south wing so that the Russian corps in the center (XX., II. And IV. Corps) had to gradually go back to the Angerapp by September 11th . Starting north of Angerburg , the attack of the XX. Corps the entrance of the XVII. Army corps through the strait at Ogonken . The bulk of the Russian 1st Army was on the retreat over the Angerapp, on the south wing the enemy stopped before the 17th. Corps stood longer for tactical reasons. On the evening of September 11th, the 8th Army stood on the Tolmingkehmen - Goldap (I. Corps) line via Gaweiten (XVII. Corps) to Szabienen-Darkehmen (XX. Corps) to Nemmersdorf (XI. Corps). The 35th Division reached Kleszowen in the evening, the 36th Division could not advance east and north of Szabienen.

The German 8th Army can force the Russian 1st Army to retreat behind the Angerapp through its southern circumferential wing, which was set up against Goldap

According to the plan of the German leadership, the shock formation should now undertake an encirclement of the enemy troops according to the model of Tannenberg. However, two factors prevented this. In his attempt to cut off the enemy troops, François relied mainly on cavalry, which had already proven itself at Tannenberg. However, in the previous battle it had never met really organized resistance and rather it had bypassed the enemy. The resistance of Russian infantry put an end to his rapid advance, and supply problems due to the inadequate routes in the lake district also contributed to the fact that the advance of the Germans came to a standstill.

To make it even more difficult for Rennkampff was that the commander of the Russian 10th Army did not give any help to the troops on his southern wing, so that a Russian counterattack did not take place. The German attacking leaders were able to take 30,000 prisoners unhindered and capture the entire artillery of the attacked divisions.

Given the fate of Samsonov, Rennenkampff decided to generally withdraw from German territory, which meant that no further attempt at encirclement was possible. His Nyemen army crossed the Russian border on September 13th . German troops followed the army and entered Russian territory for the first time during the war the next day.

consequences

Captured Russian soldiers at the Tilsit train station.
( Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung : September 27, 1914)

The success at the Masurian Lakes was frenetically celebrated in German propaganda along with the Battle of Tannenberg. While the previous battle was a strategic victory, only a tactical success had been achieved against the 1st Army . This became evident in the weeks that followed. The Russian front staff under Schilinsky ordered a counter-offensive, because they still wanted willingly to comply with the wishes of the allies. The 10th Army under General Wassili Pflug and Rennenkampff's 1st Army drove the German troops back to the border by September 25 and were even able to occupy smaller parts of East Prussia again . The threat to the German province could only be completely averted in the winter battle in Masuria .

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Data on the battle
  2. ^ Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914 to 1918 The Liberation of East Prussia , ES Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1925, pp. 273–282.
  3. ^ Reichsarchiv Volume II The Liberation of East Prussia, Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1925, p. 297.