Battle of Orsha (1514)

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Orsha
Part of: Russo-Lithuanian War 1512–1522
date September 8, 1514
place Orsha (Grand Duchy of Lithuania, now Belarus)
output Defeat of the Russians
Parties to the conflict
Commander
Troop strength
12,000 12,000
losses

high

low

The Battle of Orsha occurred on September 8, 1514 near the city of Orsha in what is now Belarus in the course of the Russo-Lithuanian War 1512-1522 . The armed forces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania , allied by the Polish-Lithuanian Union with the Kingdom of Poland , defeated the army of the Grand Duchy of Moscow under the command of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania , Prince Konstantin Ivanovich Ostroschski, under the command of the stable master Ivan Chelyadnin .

The Lithuanians and Poles captured the Russian camp and captured many Russian dignitaries and commanders. Despite the tactical victory, the strategic importance of the battle remained low, since the aim of the Polish-Lithuanian campaign, the recapture of Smolensk , which had been lost to Moscow a month earlier , could not be achieved. In the course of the Polish-Lithuanian victory, however, Emperor Maximilian I left the German-Russian alliance directed against the Kingdom of Poland.

background

Lithuania's expansion to the southeast in the 14th century

There has been a longstanding rivalry between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which has resulted in numerous conflicts known as the Russo-Lithuanian Wars . Both states claimed the legacy of the Kievan Rus for themselves and were engaged in “ collecting the Russian soil ”. Lithuania had previously taken advantage of the devastation of the Rus by the Mongols and gradually brought the western part of the former Rus under its rule (see Battle of the Irpen ). As a result, the majority of its inhabitants consisted of Eastern Orthodox Slavs , who were ruled by an initially pagan Baltic elite, which soon converted to Polish Catholicism. In the free part of Russia, however, there was a consolidation around the Grand Duchy of Moscow, whose ruling Rurikid dynasty soon also reclaimed Russian (East Slavic) areas in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In the previous three wars a predominance of Moscow emerged, which had freed itself from the supremacy of the Golden Horde . Due to the defeat in the Battle of Wedroscha in 1503, Lithuania de facto lost a third of its national territory to the Moscow Grand Duke Ivan III. The Orthodox feudal lords east of the Dnepr had already started to defeat the Catholics and in particular since the Lithuanian defeat on the Wedroscha, to overflow en masse with their lands and to swear allegiance to the Moscow Grand Duke.

Conflicts leading up to the battle

A Russian horseman in the mid-16th century, contemporary engraving

Towards the end of 1512 a new war began between Moscow and Lithuania. The immediate cause was the arrest of the Russian-born Lithuanian Grand Duchess Helena of Moscow in Vilnius , who appeared as the patroness of the Orthodox in Lithuania and a sister of Vasily III. was. A second reason was the new treaty between Lithuania and the Crimean Khanate , according to which Lithuania paid the Crimean Tatars for raids on the Moscow state.

The Smolensk Fortress was the most important eastern outpost of the Jagiellonians after it was conquered around 100 years ago . They successfully repelled the first Russian sieges at the beginning of the conflict in 1512 and 1513. In 1514, Grand Duke Vasily III. Put a 42,000-strong invasion army with up to 300 cannons under the leadership of Princes Glinski and Shtschenja on the march against Smolensk. The Russians began to siege the city on March 17, while the Smolensk area was sacked by raids by Novgorod governors Shuysky and Morozov . Grand Duke Vasily appeared in person in July before Smolensk and had the fortress bombarded with his artillery on July 29th .

On July 30, 1514, Smolensk finally fell through the betrayal of the garrison commander Yuri Solohub . Knjas Glinski, an apostate vassal of the Polish-Lithuanian king with good contacts in Lithuania, convinced Solohub of the need to surrender. In the event of a military or diplomatic success at Smolensk on the basis of Glinski's initiative, the Moscow Grand Duke promised him to reward his actions with rule over the city and the surrounding area in the form of a Russian inheritance. One day later, the Russian Grand Duke made a solemn entry into the conquered city and immediately had the local nobility resettled in the interior of the Moscow state, while Moscow nobles were settled on their lands.

A depiction of the Muscovite-Lithuanian War from the work of Jacob Pisos: The Battle of the Kunig von Poln and with the Moscowite, 1514

By taking the city, the Grand Duchy of Moscow gained a key position on the upper reaches of the Dnieper . The news of the defeat of the Poles and Lithuanians spread across Europe. Encouraged by this victory, Grand Duke Vasily III. At the beginning of August several troop units operating separately from one another into the border area of ​​the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to capture the cities of Krytschau , Mstsislaw and Dubrouna . Some Russian researchers estimate their total strength at a maximum of 12,000 men. Older sources, which refer to glorifying writings of victory from the Polish king to the Pope, speak of an invading army of 80,000 men.

Meanwhile, the Polish King and Lithuanian Grand Duke Sigismund gathered his troops for the reconquest of Smolensk under the command of Prince Konstantin Ivanovich Ostroschski. The Lithuanian army is estimated by Russian historians at 7,000 men. On the Polish side, a large part of the Szlachta initially ignored the mobilization; according to Russian sources, 9,000 men could only be assembled in Minsk by August with great difficulty . According to Polish sources, the total army strength of the Polish-Lithuanian alliance was up to 35,000 men. Mercenaries from Western Europe were also used in both armies. Sigismund had a well-trained and heavily armed cavalry, along with a military engineering unit and artillery. King Sigismund advanced with his army to Baryssau . He stayed in the city and added up to 4,000 men to the garrison. The rest of the army, under the command of Prince Ostroschski, moved towards Orsha, where on August 27 the first skirmishes took place at the crossings of the Bjaresina and Drut rivers . According to Russian sources, the total strength of the Polish-Lithuanian army at Orsha came to about 12,000 men.

Polish hussar rider from the first half of the 16th century

After securing the conquered cities (Smolensk, Mstsislaw, Krytschau, Dubrouna, etc.), the troops of the Moscow Grand Duke moved up to 12,000 men (according to other sources up to 80,000 men including entourage) under the leadership of Konjuschis Ivan Chelyadnin area around Vitebsk where they set up camp between Orsha and Dubroŭna the river Kropiwna ago. According to the Grand Duke's instructions, they should initially only observe the movements of the enemy troops, which, however, was completely disregarded due to differences of opinion between the commanders Chelyadnin and Knjas Bulgakov-Golitsa . Chelyadnin took the view that the Polish-Lithuanian troops had to cross at least one of the two bridges over the Dnieper in order to conquer it. Consequently, he divided his forces to secure those crossings. However, the army of the Grand Hetman moved a few kilometers north of the bridges mentioned on the night of September 7th to 8th, about five kilometers east of Orsha, with two pontoon bridges and a ford across from the village of Paschino to the southern bank, which was sporadic Negotiations with the Russian side was camouflaged.

The Polish part of the allied force consisted of infantry, light and heavy cavalry and artillery and was commanded by the Hetmans Świerczowski and Sampoliński . The command of the 12,000 men of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian horsemen was partly subordinate to the Kiev voivod Radziwiłł , partly directly to the commander-in-chief Ostroschski.

Line up for battle

A member of the Russian noble cavalry ( поместная конница ), drawing on the basis of armor in the armory of the Moscow Kremlin

At nine o'clock in the morning the entire army was standing in a loop of the river and was thus surrounded on three sides by the water. Its formation followed the so-called old Polish tradition, which had the aim of tying the opposing main force in the center of their lines and then smashing them with the help of the heavy Polish cavalry stationed on the flanks .

The center of the Polish-Lithuanian formation was in the forefront of the infantry, including some of the artillery. The infantry formation with the artillery stood in the middle between the cavalry contingents of Polish cavalry under Sampoliński on their left flank, while the Lithuanians and Ruthenians under Ostroschski were equally strong on their right. On the left wing , a little behind Sampoliński, was Świerczowski with his heavy Polish cavalry, while behind Ostroschski was Radziwiłł's army. Both wings were additionally strengthened by a cavalry reserve made up of light Polish and Lithuanian cavalry. The rest of the infantry and most of the artillery hid themselves in the area of ​​a ravine in a wooded area. It appears that Ostroschski expected a massive advance by Russian troops into this area and took countermeasures early on.

The Muscovite Army, consisting of five regiments (Polks), was set up in a traditional battle formation. In the middle the Great Polk under the leadership of Chelyadnin. In front of him the regiment of the voivode Rostovsky formed in a broad formation . On the right side stood a Polk of Knjas Bulgakow-Galitzin, on the left the regiment under Knjas Obolensky . The reserve stood in the back rows under the command of the voivode Chelyadin-Davydov .

Course of the battle

Phase 1

On September 8, 1514, around noon, Chelyadnin gave the order to attack. Bulgakov-Goliza attacked with his regiment from the right flank first and tried to encompass the enemy on his Polish left flank. Without waiting for Ostroschski's order to attack, Sampoliński and his riders opposed him. He was surprised by the superior attack force of the opponent, so that he retreated to his starting position. Among the losses of the Poles were representatives of old noble families such as Zborowski and Slupecki. Supported by the light cavalry of Jan Amor Tarnowski , Sampoliński tried twice to counterattack without success. Only the heavy cavalry from Świerczowski completely dispersed the opposing regiment. The core force of the Polk threw them back, the rest they drove towards the Dnieper. Taken in such a way, Bulgakov-Goliza received no discharge from the other Russian troops. According to chronicler Herberstein, the cause of the lack of support was a personal feud between Bulgakov-Golitsa and Commander-in-Chief Chelyadnin. Such feuds, about hierarchy and honor of the sexes, hampered Russian warfare for a long time into the 17th century.

Phase 2

At the same time, the "regiment on the left hand" of Prince Pronski attacked the right Lithuanian-Ruthenian flank under Ostroschski. Chelyadnin decided to reinforce his offensive with part of his Polk and the "front regiment" of Temka-Rostovsky. Ostroschski ordered his troops to withdraw in an orderly manner towards the ravine, where part of the Polish-Lithuanian infantry and almost all of the artillery were posted. The Ruthenian prince succeeded in the ruse. The Russian cavalry misunderstood the situation and followed Ostroschski's troops into the narrow ravine towards the Dnieper. The following Russians came here under heavy fire from hand rifles and falconettes . An artillery bullet killed the voivod Temka-Rostovsky, Knjas Obolensky was also killed and the Russian army, consisting of two polks including the reserves, was severely decimated in the dense battle.

Phase 3

The destruction of the Rostovsky and Obolensky regiments ushered in the fall of the Russian army. Ostroschski went over to the general attack and put his troops with the reserves against the great Polk of Chelyadnins. As a result, the Russians suffered heavy losses in the center. Tscheljadnin was only able to reach Davydov's rear reserve with difficulty, where the heavy Polish cavalry Świerczowski and Radziwiłł's units soon advanced and smashed the Russian armed forces.

Polish and Lithuanian cavalry pursued the disorderly retreating Russians to the Krapiuna (Kropiwna) River , four kilometers from the battle site, where many of the refugees drowned. By evening (around 6 p.m.) the fighting was largely over, but the pursuit of broken Russian units lasted until midnight.

losses

The Polish-Lithuanian King Sigismund I sought political benefit by means of Europe-wide propaganda from the victory of his military leader Ostroschski. In his letters to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order , he wrote that the losses of the Russians amounted to about 30,000 men, while their total strength should have been about 80,000 men. In his victory pamphlet to the Roman Pope, he claimed that among the Russian casualties, 16,000 men were dead and 14,000 were in captivity. Sigismund followed suit by describing the Russians as non-Christians and Asians who, in league with Turks and Tatars, sought to destroy Christianity.

Numerous Polish sources of the 19th and sometimes 20th centuries also refer to these writings uncritically. Some Russian sources, which deal with the mobilization ability of the Moscow state at this time, significantly reduce the possible army strength of the Russians and accordingly also the possible losses, while they give the figures for the battle of the Vedroscha (maximum up to 40,000 men). The Polish historian Tomasz Bohun also describes King Sigismund's numbers as untrustworthy. According to Polish-Lithuanian documents, only 611 prisoners of the Russian aristocracy are mentioned by name.

Nonetheless, this defeat was very sensitive to the Russians. Numerous top military leaders were taken prisoner, including Ivan Chelyadnin, Mikhail Bulgakov-Goliza, and Ivan Pronsky. Temka-Rostovsky and Andrei Obolenski voivodes were killed.

consequences

Heavy cavalry armor from the first half of the 16th century

Ostroschski continued to pursue the Russian army and retook most of the fortresses it occupied (Krytschau, Dubrouna, Mstsislaw), but the Polish-Lithuanian forces were too exhausted to besiege Smolensk before winter. Because Ostroschski reached the gates of Smolensk only towards the end of September and only with about 6,000 men. The late arrival of the Allies prevented a reconquest of Smolensk, as Grand Duke Vasily had the defense of the fortress prepared immediately after the battle. A survey with the aim of a defection of the Smolensk population from the Moscow state towards Poland-Lithuania in the same year 1514 was nipped in the bud by the Russian governor, Prince Vasily Shuisky. The conspirators were hung on the city wall, the leader of the uprising, the Orthodox Bishop Varsonophius, was imprisoned in Moscow. Shuiski successfully fended off a storming of the fortress by Ostroschski's troops. Since Ostroschski's troops were insufficient for a permanent siege, they withdrew to Lithuania for winter quarters . The original aim of the Lithuanian-Polish campaign, the recapture of Smolensk, was thus missed. The strategic importance of the battle of Orsha turned out to be minor.

Nevertheless, Ostroschski, who was also called " Scipio Ruthenus " after the battle, triumphantly marched into Vilnius in December 1514 and was celebrated as a hero by Poles and Lithuanians. To commemorate the victory, he was granted the privilege to build two Orthodox churches in Vilnius, the Catholic capital of the Grand Duchy; the Church of the Holy Trinity and the Church of St. Nicholas, which are some of the most impressive examples of Orthodox church architecture in Lithuania.

The battle had no territorial consequences for the loser, but it diminished the image of the Moscow Grand Duke as a potential ally and increased the prestige of the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy. Following the battle, the Roman-German Emperor Maximilian I left the German-Russian alliance unilaterally, although he did not attack the Polish kingdom as agreed before the battle. He was afraid that the Polish king and his brother-in-law , the Hungarian magnate Johann Zápolya , who prevailed over the peasant uprising of György Dózsa in the same year , would unite their two victorious armies against him as instigator of these wars. He asked the Bohemian-Hungarian King Vladislav II , the older brother of the Polish King Sigismund, to mediate a reconciliation and alliance with Krakow . The military defeat of the Russian side is attributed by historians Ivan Chelyadnin and Prince Bulgakov-Golitsa, since they were unable to coordinate their armed forces successfully in their disagreement. For the Moscow state it was tantamount to an "elite catastrophe", and limits were set for Russia's western expansion against Lithuania up to around 1563 by weakening the offensive power of Russia. The battle of Orsha could not, however, revise the decisive strategic-territorial results of the previous battle of the Wedroscha in 1500 (Muscovite-Lithuanian War 1500–1503).

The war between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Moscow continued in a border war of mutual raids without a decisive battle until 1522. It ended in the Treaty of Moscow, which initially imposed a five-year armistice on both sides, and Lithuania had to renounce up to a third of its Ruthenian territories, including Smolensk, on the basis of Uti possidetis .

swell

literature

  • Schlözer, August Ludwig: General World History , Edition 50, Johann Jacob Gebauer Verlag, Halle 1785, pp. 232–237.
  • Schulz, A .: About a painting probably by Georg Preu (Polish battle from the beginning of the 16th century) in Silesia's prehistory in pictures and writing , vol. 3, 1877, p. 180.
  • Caro, Jakob: The Battle of Orsza 1514 (after the large picture in the Museum of Silesian Antiquities) , in Silesia's prehistory in pictures and writing , Vol. 3, 1879, pp. 345–353.
  • Müller, Heinrich, Kunter, Fritz: European helmets from the collection of the Museum of German History , Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1971, pp. 92–93.
  • Sach, Maike: Hochmeister und Großfürst - The relations between the Teutonic Order in Prussia and the Moscow State at the turn of the modern era , sources and studies on the history of Eastern Europe (SGO), Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Volume 62, 1st edition 2002, ISBN 3-515-08047-3 .
  • Stryjkowski, Maciej: Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiéj Rusi , Vol. 2, Stanisław Strąbski Verlag, Warszawa 1846, pp. 381–388.
  • Dróżdż, Piotr: Orsza 1514 , Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, ​​Warszawa 2000, ISBN 978-83-1109134-4 .

Web links

Commons : Battle of Orsha  - album with pictures, videos and audio files

Remarks

  1. ↑ In Western Europe called Muscovite through Polish mediation
  2. ^ Brian Davies: Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2009 № 1-2. Pp. 120-121.
  3. ↑ a b c d Лобин А. Н. К вопросу о численности вооружённых сил Российского государства в XVI в .// Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2009 № 1-2. С.45-78
  4. ^ The Lithuanian troops, which were made up of ethnic Lithuanians and Ruthenians [Belarusians, Ukrainians, etc.]
  5. ↑ There were also Czech and German contingents among the Poles
  6. ↑ Peter Nitsche, Eckhard Hübner: Between Christianization and Europeanization , Stuttgart 1998, p. 91
  7. ^ Hermann Wiesflecker: Kaiser Maximilian I. , Vol. 1, Cologne 1971, pp. 311-312
  8. ↑ В.В. Каргалов: Конец ордынского ига . М .: Наука, 1980
  9. ↑ Nikolai Karamsin : History of the Russian State, Volume 7, Chapter 11
  10. ↑ According to Philipp Strahl and Ernst Herrmann in History of the Russian State , p. 18… the case belli was among other things a secret alliance between King Sigismund and Meñli I. Giray, the khan of the Crimea. According to [Paweł Jasienica: Polska Jagiellonów , 6th edition, Warsaw 1992, pp. 315–316], the Khan ordered after the battle of Wiśniowiec in 1512, in which a large Tatar raid by Ostroschski and Kamieniecki [according to Chambers's encyclopaedia , under Sigismund , p . 715, up to 27,000 Crimean Tatars and their allies were killed in the battle], against Polish tributes with the title of an “Upominek” (literally a souvenir, here meant as a “gift”) amounting to 15,000 zloty, the Moscow region [Ryazan with the surrounding area] with raids [the Polish-Crimean Tatar alliance lasted until around 1519, then the Khan changed sides again]. The first siege began around November 1512 [the authors do not mention the exact date, only that the Grand Duke appeared in December]. The Grand Duke appeared in person at Smolensk on December 19, but was forced to withdraw in March 1513 due to the floods of the Dnieper, which made communication and supply difficult
  11. ↑ Philipp Carl Strahl, Ernst Herrmann: History of the Russian State , edition 3, 1832, p. 18, the second siege began in September 1513 and was canceled after six weeks due to the bad autumn weather
  12. ↑ Кром М. М. О численности русского войска в первой половине XVIв. // Российское государство в XIV - XVII вв .: Сборник статей, посвященный 75-летию со дня рождения Ю.Г. Алексеева. - СПб .: 2002. - С. 77.
  13. ↑ According to Stryjkowski, Maciej: Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiéj Rusi , vol. 2, p. 377; Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie: Dzieje narodu polskiego , p. 91
  14. ↑ General World History by August Ludwig Schlözer, Vol. 50, 1785, p. 232: March 17, 1514
  15. ^ Philipp Strahl, Ernst Herrmann: History of the Russian State , p. 19
  16. ^ Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie: Dzieje narodu polskiego , p. 91; Meyers Konversationslexikon: Glinski, Michael , p. 435; Norman Davies: God's Playground: The origins to 1795 , Oxford 2005, p. 114
  17. ↑ Jerzy Hrycyk, Józef Buszko, Walter Leitsch, Stanisław Dzida: Austria Poland , p. 35, 1996; Sigmund von Herberstein, Wolfram von den Steinen , Paul König, Walter Leitsch: Das alten Russland , p. 185, 1984; Paweł Jasienica: Polska Jagiellonów , 6th edition, Warsaw 1992, p. 317: only July
  18. ↑ General World History by August Ludwig Schlözer, Vol. 50, 1785, p. 233; After the fall of Smolensk, however, Grand Duke Vasily was no longer bound by his promise; Maciej Stryjkowski indirectly sums up the behavior of the Russian leader as treacherous promises
  19. ↑ Solohub, who initially resisted the hasty surrender and promised relief to the townspeople from the Polish king [General World History by August Ludwig Schlözer, vol. 50, 1785, p. 233], but after death threats against his person by local dignitaries Had given in to demands of the pro-Russian conspirators, according to [Paweł Jasienica: Polska Jagiellonów , 6th edition, Warsaw 1992, p. 317], he was later indicted and executed for his decision
  20. ^ Hermann Aubin: Geschichtliche Landeskunde und Universalgeschichte , p. 170, 1950
  21. ↑ According to Stryjkowski, Maciej: Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiéj Rusi , vol. 2, p. 387… Grand Duke Vasily gave the (abducted) Smolenskern Russian names, the settled Russians Smolenskish
  22. ↑ Paweł Jasienica: Polska Jagiellonów , 6th edition, Warsaw 1992, p. 317
  23. ↑ In Rome it was assumed that the end of the Kingdom of Poland had arrived, and an attack by the German states (Emperor Maximilian von Habsburg in league with Grand Master Albrecht von Hohenzollern) [Paweł Jasienica: Polska Jagiellonów , 6th edition, Warsaw 1992, p . 317] in support of the Muscovite offensive. On August 4, 1514, Emperor Maximilian ratified the alliance document submitted to Grand Duke Vasily of Russia in January 1514, which was directed against King Sigismund of Poland-Lithuania [Maike Sach: Hochmeister und Grossfürst , p. 210, 1st edition 2002].
  24. ↑ Форум // Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2009 № 1-2. С.120-121.
  25. ↑ Курбатов О. А. Отклик на статью А. Н. Лобина // Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2009 № 1-2. С.104-119
  26. ↑ Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie, Dzieje narodu polskiego, p. 91 among other things: 80,000 men against Wilno
  27. ↑ Лобин А. Н. К вопросу о численности вооружённых сил Российского государства в XVI в .// Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2009 № 1-2. С.45-78
  28. ↑ Лобин А.Н. Мифы Оршанской битвы // Родина. 2010. № 9. С. 112.
  29. ↑ http://wyborcza.pl/duzyformat/1,127290,5667687,8_wrzesnia_1514_r__Ja_to_wam_namaluje_.html?as=1&ias=2&startsz=x
  30. ^ Under the direction of Jan Baszta from Żywiec
  31. ↑ Under the direction of the Nuremberg-based Hans Weiß and Jan Behem
  32. ^ Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie: Dzieje narodu polskiego , p. 91
  33. ↑ Stryjkowski, Maciej: Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiéj Rusi , vol. 2, p. 382
  34. ↑ General World History by August Ludwig Schlözer, Vol. 50, 1785, p. 235
  35. ↑ Rzeczpospolita of March 25, 2006, No. 72, ORSZA ROK 1514, Bitwa pod Orszą
  36. ↑ in Russian Polk , Polk = regiment; Regiments that were divided into the "Front Polk" and Polks "to the left" and "right hand" and a .; almost exclusively light cavalry
  37. ↑ According to General Encyclopedia of Sciences and Arts , p. 241, ... Attack of the Russians against enemy lines; Gazeta Wyborcza from September 9, 2008, Włodzimierz Kalicki: 8 września 1514 r. Yes to wam namaluję!
  38. ↑ a b c d e Rzeczpospolita of March 25, 2006, No. 72, ORSZA ROK 1514, Przez Orszę do Europy; Gazeta Wyborcza from September 9, 2008, Włodzimierz Kalicki: 8 września 1514 r. Yes to wam namaluję!
  39. ↑ Лобин А.Н. Мифы Оршанской битвы // Родина. 2010. № 9. С. 113-114
  40. ↑ According to the Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste , p. 241, ... disguised retreat into the area of ​​the cannons
  41. ↑ General Encyclopedia of Sciences and Arts , p. 241; Stryjkowski, Maciej: Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiéj Rusi , vol. 2, p. 386
  42. ↑ General World History by August Ludwig Schlözer, Vol. 50, 1785, p. 236
  43. ↑ Acta Tomiciana III, № 232, 288, 289, 293, 295, 298, 301
  44. ↑ Acta Tomiciana III, № 234.
  45. ^ Poe, Marshall T. (2001). A People Born to Slavery: Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography , 1478-1748. Cornell University Press. P. 21. ISBN 0-8014-3798-9 .
  46. ↑ Bohun T .: Bitwa pod Orsza September 8, 1514 // Rzeczpospolita. 2006. ¹ 4/20. P. 13.
  47. ↑ called Warsonofi in Russian
  48. ^ Philipp Strahl, Ernst Herrmann: History of the Russian State , p. 22; General Encyclopedia of Sciences and Arts , p. 241; General world history by August Ludwig Schlözer, vol. 50, 1785, p. 237
  49. ^ Richard Roepell, Jakob Caro: Geschichte Polens , p. 793, 1886; Journal for Eastern European History , p. 308, 1966; Ruthenian [Belarusian-Ukrainian] Scipio
  50. ^ A b Philipp Strahl, Ernst Herrmann: History of the Russian State , p. 22
  51. ^ Philipp Strahl, Ernst Herrmann: History of the Russian State , p. 22; General world history by August Ludwig Schlözer, vol. 50, 1785, p. 237
  52. ↑ Smolensk and the surrounding area remained under Russian-Muscovite rule from 1514 to 1611
  53. ↑ Maike Sach: Grand Master and Grand Duke. Relations between the Teutonic Order in Prussia and the Moscow State at the turn of the modern era. Stuttgart 2002, p. 212.
  54. ↑ General World History by August Ludwig Schlözer, Vol. 50, 1785, p. 237; The anti-Jagiellonian league that was formed under the leadership of the House of Habsburg, consisting of German states in the Holy Roman Empire, Denmark, Russia, the Teutonic Order in Prussia and Livonia, collapsed like a house of cards as a result of the battle
  55. ↑ According to Rzeczpospolita of March 25, 2006, No. 72, ORSZA ROK 1514, Przez Orszę do Europy; Almost the entire Russian military leadership, namely Chelyadnin and Bulgakow-Golitsa, representatives of several royal and boyar houses, such as the Rurikid princes of the Ryazan, Yaroslavl, Smolensk and Starodub lines, were captured
  56. ↑ Loss of Polatsk and the surrounding area north of the Daugava in 1563 to Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Lithuanian War 1562–1570
  57. ↑ According to Feliks Koneczny, Dzieje Rosji : Poland-Lithuania did not surrender with the loss of Smolensk, consequently only an armistice was concluded, which was extended for a further six years in 1527; Carol Belkin Stevens: Russia's wars of emergence, 1460-1730 , p. 59, 2007; Eduard Pelz: History of Peter the Great , p. 47