Dmitriev-Sevsk operation
The Dmitryev-Sevsk Operation ( Russian Дмитриев-Севская операция, also Sevsk-Orlower Operation ) from February 24 to March 28, 1943 was an offensive operation in World War II against the southern part of the German Army Group center of the Soviet central front in the area Bryansk was carried out. The breakthrough on the German front hoped for by the Soviets could not be achieved.
prehistory
At the end of January 1943, during the Voronezh-Kastornoje operation, the German 2nd Army had to endure tough defensive battles on both sides of the city of Voronezh against the advancing Soviet Voronezh Front , which at the beginning of February 1943 led to a large retreat to the west via Kursk . The commander-in-chief, General Hans von Salmuth , was held responsible for this defeat and had to hand over the supreme command to General of the Infantry Walter Weiß on February 3, 1943 . As a result of the German withdrawal, a deep indentation in the area north of Kursk was created in the course of the front (Orlower front projection in Russian Орловский выступ ). A circumstance that the Soviet high command, Stawka , tried to use for another offensive.
After the end of the Battle of Stalingrad , the Soviet Don Front was cleared under Marshal Rokossovsky and renamed the Central Front on February 15 . The Stawka moved the freed armies over 700 kilometers to the north, in the area north of Kursk, and added this force as reinforcement at the seam between the Voronezh and Brjansk fronts . The first offensive of the central front was originally planned for February 15, but because the transport of the armies from the Don sector was not yet completed, it was not scheduled for February 25. According to the first operational plan of the Stawka, the troops of the Brjansk Front and the Western Front should break through the German front of the 2nd Panzer Army . Then the Soviet Western Front should advance from the north and east to Smolensk and, together with the Kalinin Front, try to encompass the bulk of Army Group Center (German 4th and 9th Armies ) over a large area and force them to retreat.
Deployment and first attacks
The task for the troops of the Central Front on February 6, 1943 was specified by the Stawka in Directive No. 30043. After the breakthrough was achieved, a subsequent attack by the Soviet western front between Rzhev and Vyazma was supposed to push the front into the Bryansk area. For the central front, reinforcement was ordered by the 2nd Panzer Army , which was concentrated as a reserve in the Dolgoje area near Tula until February 12th .
On February 12th, the Brjansk Front with the 61st and 48th Armies (General GA Chaljusin ) began the Maloarchangelsk Operation and on February 22nd the Western Front with the 16th Army (later 11th Guards Army under General Bagramjan ) the Shizdra operation. On February 23, Maloarchangelsk was liberated after heavy fighting, after which the 48th Army could not advance more than 5 kilometers. By the end of the month, the German troops had been able to contain the Soviet offensive on the Novosil - Maloarchangelsk - Roshdestvenskoye line . The heavy Soviet losses amounted to 19,684 dead and 34,615 wounded, the army leader General Chaljusin was released and replaced by General Romanenko . These first unsuccessful attacks revealed to the German high command in broad outline the approach of the future Soviet lines of attack. Opposite the central front was the threatened XIII. Army corps of the German 2nd Army reinforced with several divisions from the reserves of the 4th and 9th Armies .
The following offensive on the central front included, on the one hand, the breakthrough in the direction of Klimovichi and Krichev and, in the south, the encirclement of Smolensk . On the other hand, on the left flank, the Kryukov cavalry group, designated as a shock group, had to conduct an attack via the Bychow train station in order to reach the west bank of the Dnieper . The depth of the extensively planned operation was almost 450 kilometers, Rokossowski reckoned 42 days for the time that the successful offensive needed. The main Soviet forces were deployed in the first phase between Trubchevsk and Novgorod-Seversky . After Sevsk and the train station near Unetscha had been taken over , the Bryansk- Konotop train line was to be crossed on March 2 and the Suzemka train station was to be taken near Kholmetsch. The Bryansk - Gomel railway line was then to be interrupted by March 10 when the Klinzy railway station was taken . In the second phase, two rifle divisions should follow and break through Semjonowka to Gomel and after the establishment on the western bank of the Dnieper, try to liberate the cities of Shlobin and Retschitza . In view of the high snow cover and the lack of usable roads necessary for the transport of the heavy artillery, the first days of the offensive should not proceed more than 10 to 15 kilometers per day.
Central Front offensive
The offensive of the central front began on February 24th, the strength of the three armies participating in the offensive amounted to 256,820 men. The planes of the Soviet 16th Air Army (General Rudenko ) were supposed to help the 2nd Panzer Army to cross the Swapa section and prevent German counterattacks against the right flank of the attacking forces from the north and northeast and against the left flank from the south and southwest.
The deployment was marked by further delays, only two armies - the 65th Army (General Pawel Batow ) and the 2nd Panzer Army (General Alexei Rodin ) - had already entered the front. The troops of the 21st Army (General Tschistjakow ) were still not fully unloaded in the Jelez area , the 251st and 259th Panzer Regiments were still stuck in Livny due to lack of fuel . Many of the heavy howitzers and guns were left behind due to the lack of tractors.
The motorized units of the 2nd Panzer Army reached the Swapa River on foot on February 23rd, followed by a strong reconnaissance battle on the morning of February 24th. Four rifle divisions of the 65th Army (69th, 149th and 354th Rifle Division and 37th Guards Division) marched in the Ponyri area . Of the material already available from the 2nd Panzer Army, only 182 out of 408 tanks could be used. The 70th Army under Major General Tarasov (255th, 240th, 40th Rifle Division and independent 30th Panzer Regiment) concentrated more successfully in the second season , the thrust of which was set to the northwest.
On the morning of February 24, troops of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army opened the offensive on the Kopenkow, Zorin, Michailowka, Karmanowo, Generalshino, Obuchowka and Dmitrijew-Lgowski lines . By the end of the first day, the German positions at Michailowka, Rotmanowa and Novo Perschin were broken. At the head of the 2nd Panzer Army was the 11th Panzer Corps under Major General Ivan Lasarew with 102 tanks (mostly T-34s, 11 of them KW). On the evening of February 24th, the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 53rd Armored Brigade crossed the frozen Swap River and launched an attack on the village of Fateevka, 10 km across the river.
On the morning of February 25, the units of the first squadron were reinforced, the 2nd Panzer Army and the 65th Army, with the support of the 16th Air Army, were in the general attack in the direction of Sevsk and Unetscha . The introduction of the 16th Panzer Corps (at the head 11th Panzer Brigade with 47 tanks (including 25 T-34s) and 29th Panzer Regiment with 15 KW tanks) was expected during the day. The second squadron (193rd, 112th, 246th Rifle Division and 42nd Rifle Brigade) of the 65th Army continued the advance on February 26th. In the next phase, the collapse should reach the Dubrowa - Androsow line to a depth of 60 kilometers, an undertaking that was estimated to take place until February 25th. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps under General Vladimir Kryukov (three cavalry divisions reinforced with three ski brigades and two armored regiments) was used out of the room Cheremisino antretend on the left wing, had about Novgorod-Seversky proceed on Bychow and the Dnieper at Mogilev to exceed.
From February 25, the troops of the Soviet central front also went on the offensive. The German 2nd Panzer Army on the Oryol section was reinforced with 7 infantry and motorized divisions and successfully resisted. The statements of prisoners showed the Soviets that the German High Command to the south was preparing a counter-offensive to the 4th Panzer Army against Kharkov attack.
On the morning of February 26, motorized infantry of the 11th Panzer Corps reached the western edge of the forest about 6 km from Fatejewka, which stretched over Ulyanovka to Yasnaya Polyana. Over the next two days there were repeated German counter-attacks to stabilize the situation. From the Karmanowo area, the attack of the 16th Panzer Corps on the right wing, followed by the 60th Rifle Division, had also started late. The 194th Rifle Division was concentrated in the rear of this tank corps on the eastern bank of the Swapa. The German troops had to evacuate Dmitriev-Lgowski. On the southern wing of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps successfully continued its breakthrough. On the right wing of the 65th Army, the German defense of the enemy could not be breached, the attackers were drawn into lengthy positional battles. After heavy fighting, the enemy had to leave Fateevka at 2:30 p.m. To replenish the losses of the 2nd Panzer Army so far, another 85 tanks had arrived by rail as reinforcements. Colonel General Rokossowski explained the great loss of material of the 16th Panzer Corps by the poor leadership of the corps commander Major General Alexei Maslow (former chief of staff of the 9th Mechanized Corps) and his chief of staff, Colonel Pupkow. Until February 23, there was only one gas station for the fuel supply. The Kryukov cavalry group, which was far ahead, did not have enough fuel and fodder either, and the advance had to be halted. In view of these difficulties, the commandant of the Central Front had ordered the second squadron to be demonstrated on the morning of February 27. The first squadron of the 70th Army was to cross the Dmitrowsk-Orlowski-Fatejewka line 30 km southwest of Dmitriev-Lgov, three other rifle divisions were to attack at Trofimovka. By February 27, the 70th Army's offensive in the direction of Karachi was supposed to break through and cut off the railway line between Bryansk and east of Karachev . After the liberation of Karachev, General Tarasov's troops were supposed to try to push the success further across the Dnieper to Roslavl .
Battle of Sevsk from early March
On the morning of February 28th, Major General Rodin dispatched the 11th Panzer Corps to the village of Dobrowodje in order to gain possession of Sevsk by the evening of that day and to further advance to the Suzemka train station. However, due to the weather, the major offensive could only begin on March 1 at 6 a.m. The 160th Panzer Brigade advanced in the northeastern apron of Sevsk in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana and Dobrowodje. On the right flank, the 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade was deployed directly on Sevsk. The 59th Panzer Brigade was to circumvent the city from the south and attack the southwestern outskirts. The 53rd Panzer Brigade formed the reserve and was followed in the second squadron behind the 160th Panzer Brigade. Parts of the 160th Panzer Brigade and the 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which had occupied the suburbs of Sennaya and Dobrowodje on the evening of March 1st, attacked Sevsk head-on. The city was defended by the 108th Light Division of the Hungarian VIII Corps as well as the German 747 Infantry Regiment and the Kaminski Brigade. The 59th Tank Brigade, which reached the southern and western outskirts of Sevsk, also took control of the roads to Seredina-Buda and cut off the enemy’s retreat. After that, parts of the 11th Panzer Corps advanced a further 30 kilometers to the west without encountering serious resistance. The German front had been breached and Sevsk was liberated on March 2, the German troops withdrew to the south.
On the morning of March 3, the Soviet corps commander pulled the 160th Panzer Brigade under Colonel NV Dawydenko forward to start the pursuit. At 9:00 am, Colonel Dawydenko occupied the Suzemka train station and brought in about 600 prisoners. The offensive of the Soviet 16th Panzer Corps on the right flank of the 2nd Panzer Army developed at the same time much more slowly. After taking Dmitrijew-Lgowski, the tank corps was only able to advance 10–15 km to the village of Derjugino by March 4. It was not until March 7 that parts of the corps occupied the southern part of Lyutesch, but could not cross the left bank of the river.
The slow advance of the Central Front forces forced the Stawka to intervene in the operations. The 65th Army (without the 60th and 194th Rifle Divisions and 115th Brigade) was now instructed to attack in the direction of Werbsk and Karachi to cut off the local railway line. The second group (11th Panzer Corps supported by 60th Rifle Division and 115th Rifle Brigade) had the task of crossing the Bobrjk-Stolbowo-Brasov line in cooperation with the 65th Army and the Radogosch-Igrickii-Ugrejewitschi railway station line Reach Usosha.
On March 7, the advance of the 2nd Panzer Army reached a depth of 60 km. At that time, however, the Stawka had already made the decision to transfer the promised 21st Army to the Voronezh Front, because at the same time a strong German counter-offensive had started on Kharkov. Without the troops of the 21st Army, it was not possible for the central front to achieve its ambitious targets. Colonel-General Rokossowski concentrated his troops again around at least the German LV. Army Corps (45th, 88th and 383rd ID) in the Orlov front ledge. A new attack by the 70th Army in the Orlov direction was carried out, but it failed completely due to the incompetent leadership of General Tarasov, who was then replaced by Lieutenant General Popov .
On March 11th, the Central Front received orders to go into defense. Regardless of Rokossovsky's orders, General Krijukow had the attack of his 2 Guards Cavalry Corps (with two rifle brigades (28th and 30th) and a tank regiment) continue. On March 12, Krijukov's advance reached a depth of 150 km, the distance of his isolated troops was already 100-120 km. The forces that had broken through remained isolated in the hinterland without the necessary support from infantry with open flanks and increasingly threatened by the re-established German resistance. This advance, which had become militarily pointless - the tanks remained without fuel, the infantry and horses without supplies - was later called the "Sewski Raid" (Sevsk raid).
German counterattacks from March 12th
Due to the break-in of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army, the rear connections of Army Group Center were in danger. To avert the danger in the hinterland, German troops undertook stronger counter-attacks on March 12 and 13. General Rodin noted that from February 23 to March 12, his troops were constantly counterattacked and suffered heavy losses. According to Soviet information, the German XIII. Army Corps deployed 9 divisions: frontal the 137th Infantry Division , Hungarian 102nd and 108th Hungarian Divisions (Hungarian VIII. Corps) and the Kaminski Brigade, on the left the 9th Panzer Division , the 8th SS Cavalry Division " Florian Geyer ” and the 72nd Infantry Division , on the right the 4th Panzer Division, the 340th and 327th Infantry Division .
The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was completely cut off for a long time, but was able to fight its way back to Sevsk in time. Krjukov's unit lost 50% of its tanks and artillery in these battles, the 60th and 194th Rifle Divisions and the 115th Infantry, 12th and 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade lost up to 40% of their personnel. Soviet bombers and fighter planes intervened in support of the isolated group. On the morning of March 17, the troops of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army resumed the offensive: the 16th Panzer Corps stalled in the area 10–15 km southwest of Komaritschi , the 11th Panzer Corps reached the village of Apascha. The 2nd Panzer Army was no longer able to continue the operation with the available forces.
At the same time, the German counterattack on Sevsk began: from March 17 to March 27, fierce street fighting raged in Sevsk. Around two thirds (around 15,000 men) of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were destroyed and Sevsk was set on fire during the fighting. To defend the city, the 7th Cavalry Division, the 181st Rifle Division of the 70th Army and the 11th Guards Tank Brigade of the 65th Army were also subordinate to the Krijukow Cavalry Corps. Parts of the 16th Panzer Corps, operating without infantry support, were cut off and were forced to withdraw. After the 11th Panzer Corps also operated unsuccessfully, the central front ordered its troops to go on the defensive on March 21 on the new front line Maloarchangelsk , Trosna, Lyutesch , Korenewo.
On March 27, parts of the German 82nd Infantry and 4th Panzer Divisions recaptured the city of Sevsk after lengthy fighting. The Kryukov cavalry group was pushed back to the southern outskirts of Jurasov Khutor. On March 27, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps had to evacuate Sevsk and fight their way back to the Sew sector, where they joined the 65th Army. The 2nd Panzer Army was withdrawn to Fatesch as a reserve . The German divisions also suffered heavy losses, and several Hungarian units were largely overrun. The fighting around Sevsk continued until April 6th, but the intensity was already lower and was finally stopped unsuccessfully.
consequences
The objective of the operation was not achieved by the Soviets, the planned breakthrough proved to be unrealistic. Both sides suffered heavy losses. General Rokossovsky recalled this operation with skepticism in his memoirs. The central front lost 30,439 dead and 39,968 wounded during the operation. According to Soviet data, the German and Hungarian losses compared to the section of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army alone amounted to 3,200 prisoners and around 20,000 dead and wounded. As a result of the operation, the northern ledge of the Kursk Front Arc was created .
literature
- Vladimir O. Daines (Владимир Оттович Дайнес): Дмитриев-Севская наступательная операция from Советские танковые армии в бою (Soviet tank armies in battle) page 70-74 Moscow 2010 ISBN 978-5-699-41329-4
Web links
- Operation plan
- Description on arsenal info (Russian)
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b command ( Russian ) mroz.su. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
- ↑ РОССИЯ И СССР В ВОЙНАХ XX ВЕКА ( Russian ) .rus-sky.com. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
