Heinrich Popitz

Heinrich Popitz (born May 14, 1925 in Berlin ; † April 1, 2002 in Freiburg im Breisgau ) was a German sociologist who made significant contributions to general sociology against the background of philosophical anthropology . Popitz published in particular on elementary terms such as social norm , social role or power and violence .

Life

Heinrich Popitz grew up in Berlin, he was the son of the Prussian finance minister and resistance fighter Johannes Popitz . His mother died when he was a child. His father was executed when he was 19 years old. Popitz studied philosophy , history and economics in Heidelberg , Göttingen and Oxford . After receiving his doctorate in 1949 with Karl Jaspers , he completed his habilitation in 1957 with Arnold Bergstraesser and then worked at the social research center at the University of Münster in Dortmund. In 1959 he became professor of sociology in Basel . In 1964 he became the founding director of the newly created Institute for Sociology at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg , where he worked until his death in 2002. In 1970/71 Popitz was a guest at the New School for Social Research in New York for a year , where he taught at the Theodor Heuss Chair.

"The estranged person"

With his writing “The Alienated Man. The Critique of Time and Philosophy of History of the Young Marx ”(dissertation from 1949), Popitz played a decisive role in the rediscovery and interpretation of Marx's Paris manuscripts from 1844 in Germany. Popitz showed, and that pointed the way, that Marx "understands man as a 'natural being', as a social species, not a 'fixed' being with 'static' properties, but subject to changing nature, which is neither objectively nor subjectively direct and adequate to him is available".

Contributions to sociology

Popitz made important contributions to industrial sociology ( the worker’s image of society , technology and industrial work , together with Hans Paul Bahrdt , among others ), to the social role ( the concept of the social role as an element of sociological theory ), to social norms ( about the preventive effect of ignorance , The normative construction of society ), the sociology of power ( processes of power formation , phenomena of power ) and historical anthropology or sociology of technology ( the departure to an artificial society , ways of creativity ).

Like his Freiburg colleague Günter Dux , Popitz worked in the 1970s and 1980s to bring the basic ideas of philosophical anthropology into the form of sociological enlightenment. Since then, his work has consistently been elementary sociological. He outlined his interest in knowledge as follows:

“General sociological theory, whether pronounced or unspoken, is guided by the idea of ​​exploring the fundamental principles of human socialization. So to fathom, in order to put it less dryly, what holds society together at its core or, perhaps even more demanding, what moves it at its core. "

Popitz is considered a “master of the small form” , who presented his theories in essays and only published two monographs . He was characterized by a constant effort to keep things short, "everything that seemed a little too long to him immediately went to the wastebasket."

Power theory

Popitz developed his power theory in various essays that were collected under the title Phenomena of Power (first 1986, expanded edition 1992). Popitz understands power as “the ability to assert oneself against foreign forces” . Starting with this definition of power, which was fundamental to Max Weber , Popitz developed his phenomenology of power under the influence of Helmuth Plessner's anthropology. On the basis of people's ability to act and their dependencies, which are based on their “ eccentric positionality ”, Popitz differentiates between four basic forms of exercise of power.

1. Action power . The power to take action is based on the ability and vulnerability of humans. Accordingly, Popitz understands power to act as the power to inflict damage on others in an action directed against them - to do something to others. Action power means primarily violence , but also includes actions to reduce social participation (e.g. pillory , bullying ). Action power relates to the whole person and does not necessarily aim to influence the behavior of other people, e.g. B. in the case of acts of revenge .
2. Instrumental power is based on the future-oriented nature of human existence and care. It aims to control the behavior of others through threats or promises, i.e. through negative or positive social sanctions . In contrast to the selective action power instrumental power is more durable because they are " profitable ", and extensible: A successful threat saves compliant action the costs of their implementation, the instruments of power can then also be used against others. Even if you only have one bullet in your pistol, you can credibly threaten several people with it.
3. Authoritative power , i.e. the exercise of power on the basis of authority , is based on the fundamental need for standards and recognition of people and their need for recognition. Correspondingly, persons exercise authority, the recognition of which is decisive for the self-esteem of the person dependent on authority. He is tied to the relationship that connects him, real or imaginary, with others. For those wielding power, the advantage of authoritative power lies in the fact that not only the observable, controllable behavior of others, but also attitudes and norms can be influenced and crude means can be dispensed with.
4. Data-setting power arises from the determination of the human being through technical artifacts . As deficient beings, humans rely on making artifacts in order to survive. Technical action is linked to the exercise of social power in several ways: It changes the reality found not only for the agent, but also for others. Who z. B. building a bridge or cutting down a forest, interferes with the living conditions of other people. In the intended use of technology there is also the question of property claims and in the manufacturing process a form of division of labor .

Going further than Max Weber , Heinrich Popitz included violence as a special form of exercise of the “death power of people over people”, locating it anthropologically and specifying it sociologically: “People never have to, but can always act violently, they never have to, but can always kill [ ...]. Violence in general and the violence of killing in particular is [...] not a mere industrial accident of social relationships, not a marginal phenomenon of social order and not just an extreme case or an ultima ratio (of which not so much should be made). Indeed, violence is [...] an option of human action that is constantly present. No comprehensive social order is based on the premise of non-violence. The power to kill and the impotence of the victim are latent or manifest determinants of the structure of social coexistence. "

violence

Heinrich Popitz defines violence as one

"Power action that leads to the deliberate physical injury of others, irrespective of whether it has its purpose in the execution itself [...] for the person carrying it out [...] or, when implemented in threats, should lead to permanent submission [...]" (Popitz 1986 : 48).

In another place, he describes violence, which has its purpose in the execution itself, as mere power of action and distinguishes it from binding power of action. By binding action power, Popitz understands instrumentalized violence for the purpose of permanent subjugation and gain in power. These conceptual definitions enable him, taking into account the context of an act of violence, to reconstruct both the “how” and the “what” of violence that is an end in itself as well as the “why” of permanently binding phenomena of violence (cf. von Trotha 1997: 20). Popitz wants to understand violence as a more or less strongly formalized and depersonalized phenomenon of violence and to justify it as something that has become historical.

With the concept of binding action power, Popitz went back to the differentiation of power, rule and violence and conveyed their contradictions. Because with binding power to act, he understands violence as an experience that creates order (cf. Popitz 1986: 61ff.). However, order is a fundamental fact of human life and violence has become the same. The radical rejection of violence becomes superfluous. At the lower stages of the historical process, Popitz still regards violence as morally reprehensible under certain circumstances. Only when power has made its way from sporadic power to its institutionalization (cf. Popitz 1986: 233f.) Does it paradoxically appear as a social order in a civilized form. Popitz reflects on this paradoxical connection:

“Social order is a necessary condition for containing violence - violence is a necessary condition for maintaining social order. Without a system of norms that is protected by sanction regulations, a permanent and reasonably reliable limitation of violence cannot succeed ”(Popitz 1986: 63).

Norm theory

Popitz sees norms as the basic element of human social existence. He tried to present the universal construction principles of social standardization. He prepared this in several essays and summarized it in the narrow volume "The normative construction of society" (1980). In his famous essay “On the Preventive Effect of Not Knowing” (1968) in particular , he shows that norms are based on sanctions, but that comprehensive sanctions (without exception all deviations from the norm would be discovered and punished) are norm-destructive; the total transparency of behavior would undermine the legitimacy of social norms.

Popitz names four universally valid basic characteristics of social behavior standardization:

“A behavior that we can expect as future behavior; behavior that corresponds to certain regularities of behavior; an intended, desiderative behavior, a behavior that is associated with the risk of sanctions in the event of deviations. "

According to Popitz, there are three basic elements of social norming in all societies: general norms and non- reciprocal and reciprocal particular norms .

1. General norms assume the equality of all (regardless of gender, age or origin-related differences). These norms apply to all members of society. For example: “Nobody may offend the supernatural powers.” - “Nobody may destroy common goods, steal property of others.” - “Nobody may physically injure a member of their own society (apart from defined exceptions)” - “Everyone must do every other member stand by that is attacked by strangers. "
2. Non-reciprocal particular norms assume inequality and otherness. Example: “Fathers have different obligations towards children than children towards fathers.” Popitz emphasizes: “Every person learns the form of communication that is assumed here: communications in which the related rights and obligations are not the same. The other does not react in a mirror image; he doesn't do to me what I do to him. "
3. Reciprocal particular norms presuppose a bracketing of equality and otherness. In these constellations, nobody can expect something from the other that the latter cannot expect from him. Such equality can be noisy Popitz as "exist between brothers (although not necessarily between all brothers), between generation likes the same origin, between age-matched gender groups, between warriors, between rank equal in work organizations." Similar behavior can also serve as insular reciprocity are called .

At Popitz, the three forms of social standardization have a universal structural basis, that of the integration of subsequent generations. In all societies children grow up in a primary social housing that is structured by general norms of membership and reciprocal and non-reciprocal particular norms.

In one of the shaky rhymes he wrote frequently, Popitz wrote:

Do you see them in naked forms,

this is how facts become norms for you.

PhD students

• Baldo Blinkert • Klaus H. Fischer • Friedrich Pohlmann • Christian Sigrist • Gerd Spittler • Hubert Driver

Fonts (selection)

• The estranged person. Criticism of the times and philosophy of history of the young Marx (first publishing house for law and society, Basel 1953). Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1980, ISBN 3-534-06474-7 .
• The living wishes of the miners. Sociological survey, interpretation and criticism of the living ideas of a job (with Elisabeth Pfeil , Gunther Ipsen ). Mohr, Tübingen 1954, ISBN 3-16-506991-3 .
• Technology and industrial work. Sociological research in the metallurgical industry (with HP Barth , EA Jüres ). Mohr, Tübingen 1957, ISBN 3-16-538512-2 .
• The social image of the worker. Sociological investigation in the metallurgical industry (with HP Barth , EA Jüres , H. Kesting ). Mohr, Tübingen 1957, ISBN 3-16-539192-0 .
• The concept of social role as an element of sociological theory . Mohr, Tübingen 1967, ISBN 3-16-537801-0 .
• About the preventive effect of not knowing. Dark figure, norm and punishment (first Mohr, Tübingen 1968). BWV, Berlin 2003, ISBN 3-8305-0522-1 .
• Power-building processes . Mohr, Tübingen 1968, ISBN 3-16-538071-6 .
• The normative construction of society . Mohr, Tübingen 1980, ISBN 3-16-543151-5 .
• Phenomena of power . Mohr, Tübingen 1986, ISBN 3-16-145897-4 .
• The departure to an artificial society. On the anthropology of technology . Mohr, Tübingen 1995, ISBN 3-16-146381-1 .
• Ways of creativity . Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2000, ISBN 3-16-147310-8 .
• The quadrature of the Gordian knot. Slip verse . Jürgen Cromm WiSoMed-Verlag, Göttingen, Augsburg, 2006, ISBN 3-921969-27-1 .
• Social norms . Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ​​2006, ISBN 978-3-518-29394-2 (a collection of Popitz texts on norm theory, edited by Friedrich Pohlmann and Wolfgang Eßbach )
• Introduction to Sociology . Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-3-86253-002-1 (publication of the lecture that Popitz has given annually since 1957/58, edited by Jochen Dreher and Michael K. Walter).
• General Sociology , Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-3-86253-018-2 (lecture transcript).

literature

• Hans Oswald (ed.): Power and law. Festschrift for Heinrich Popitz on his 65th birthday. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1990, ISBN 3-531-12173-1 .
• Friedrich Pohlmann : Heinrich Popitz - contours of his thought and work. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, Vol. 15, No. 1/2005, pp. 5–24.
• Hubert Driver : On the death of the sociologist Heinrich Popitz (1925–2002). Zeitschrift für Soziologie , Vol. 31, No. 5/2002, pp. 349–353.

Web links

• Literature by and about Heinrich Popitz in the catalog of the German National Library
• General sociological theory by Heinrich Popitz (research project at the University of Konstanz)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ See Joachim Fischer , Heinrich Popitz - a classic of the sociology of the Federal Republic of Germany , in: Heinrich Popitz, Introduction to Sociology , Konstanz 2010, pp. 261–281, here pp. 261f.
2. ↑ Together with Hans Paul Bahrdt , Burkart Lutz and Theo Pirker . See: Norman Birnbaum , Toward a Critical Sociology, New York 1971, p. 222. Marx's manuscripts were first published in 1932.
3. ↑ Klaus H. Fischer, On the sociology of law. Preliminary studies on social change through law, Schutterwald / Baden 2018, Volume 1, p. 126. ISBN 978-3-946764-01-4 and ISBN 978-3-946764-02-1 ; see. Heinrich Popitz, Der efremdete Mensch, p. 122 ff.
4. ^ Heinrich Popitz: The normative construction of society , Tübingen 1980, p. 15.
5. ^ ^{A b} So Friedrich Pohlmann: Heinrich Popitz - his thinking and his work , in: Heinrich Popitz: Norms , Frankfurt am Main 2006, p. 13 f.
6. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Edition Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 22.
7. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Edition Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 68.
8. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Edition Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 79.
9. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 94.
10. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 57ff.
11. ↑ Von Trotha, T. (1997): On the sociology of violence. Pp. 9-58. In the S. (Ed.): Sociology of violence. Opladen: West German publishing house.
12. ↑ He describes the first analytical level as sporadic power. He describes the second level as normative power, which increases the repeatability, predictability and regularity of behavior through normalization. These normalization processes culminate in the positionalization of power. This describes a supra-personal position of power, "a place that is transferable and that is taken care of (Popitz 1986: 244)." The fourth stage of the consolidation of power describes the development of a positional structure of rule. This apparatus of power is organized around the central, supra-personal power position based on a division of labor (cf. Popitz 1986: 256). Popitz describes state rule as the fifth level of power stabilization, which monopolizes normative functions by means of central authorities (Popitz 1986: 260).
13. ↑ Heinrich Popitz: About the Preventive Effect of Not Knowing (1968), 1968, p. 18. Compiled from: Andreas Diekmann, Wojtek Przepiorka, Heiko Rauhut, The Preventive Effect of Not Knowing in Experiment , 2011, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Volume 40, Issue 1 ( PDF ( Memento of the original from October 15, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ). 
14. ^ Heinrich Popitz: The normative construction of society , Tübingen 1980, p. 10.
15. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Edition Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 69 ff.
16. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Edition Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 71.
17. ↑ H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Edition Tübingen: Mohr 1992, p. 74.
18. ↑ ^{a b} H. Popitz: Phenomena of Power . 2., ext. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr 1992, pp. 75f.
19. ↑ See in particular: Heinrich Popitz, The primary social housing , in: ders., Social norms , Frankfurt am Main 2006, pp. 187-202.
20. ↑ Quoted from Ralf Dahrendorf : About borders. Life memories . Munich 2002, p. 182.