Helge Ingstad (ship)

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KNM Helge Ingstad (F313) August 2018
KNM Helge Ingstad (F313) August 2018
Overview
Type frigate
Shipyard

Navantia , Spain

Keel laying April 28, 2006
Launch November 23, 2007
Namesake Helge Ingstad
Commissioning September 29, 2009
Decommissioning June 21, 2019
home port Haakonsvern
Whereabouts will be scrapped
Technical specifications
displacement

5,290 ts

length

133.25 m

width

16.8 m

Draft

4.6 m

crew

120

drive

2 shafts with adjustable propellers
2 Bazán Bravo-Caterpillar 12V marine diesel engines, each 4.5 MW
1 General Electric LM2500 gas turbine, 21.5 MW
4 MTU diesel generators , each 1250 kW

speed

27 kn

Range

4500

Armament
Defense system

Aegis combat system

helicopter

1 x NH-90

Radar system

AN / SPY-1 F.

The Helge Ingstad (F313) was a Norwegian frigate of the Fridtjof Nansen class . Its construction began on April 28, 2006. After her launch on November 23, 2007, she was put into service with the Norwegian Navy on September 29, 2009 . It is named after the archaeologist and writer Helge Ingstad . The construction costs were given at around 500 million euros.

The ship, which was lifted after an accident in 2018, was scrapped because repairs would have exceeded the costs of a new building.

KNM Helge Ingstad F313 in Sørfjord (June 2018)

Average 2018

On November 8, 2018, the Helge Ingstad collided in the Hjeltefjord ( ) in the province of Hordaland with the oil tanker Sola TS of the Greek shipping company Tsakos Energy Navigation, which was sailing under the Maltese flag . Eight sailors were slightly injured on the frigate. The frigate was so badly damaged that it was aground near the Sture oil terminal of the Equinor oil company in Øygarden ( ) and sank a few days later. The 137-strong crew was able to leave the ship. The Helge Ingstad was as part of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 after completion of the military maneuver Trident Juncture 2018 en route to Dundee in Scotland. In order to maintain and train navigation skills , the ship's command had chosen a course near the Norwegian coast.

Course of the collision

In a preliminary accident report dated November 29, 2018, the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) presented its first findings on the course of the collision.

Accordingly, the Helge Ingstad ran in the early morning hours of November 8, 2018 on a southerly course in the Hjeltefjord north of the Sture oil terminal, in the coastal waters northwest of the city of Bergen . She reported her intended route at 02:40 local time to the responsible traffic control center on the island of Fedje , Fedje Vessel Traffic Service Center . The frigate ran at 17 to 18 knots with the AIS transmitter deactivated , but the position lights switched on and listening in on Fedje's marine radio frequency.

The changing of the guard began on the Helge Ingstad at 03:40. The navigational officer entering service was informed of three vessels heading north, which were monitored by radar. It was a clear night. At the position of the Sture oil terminal, an object with many lights that appeared motionless was visually perceived from a great distance.

The oil tanker Sola TS moored there had picked up a pilot shortly before 0300 and reported to Fedje at 03:13 that he would begin casting. Supported by the tugs Ajax and Tenax , the oil tanker left the terminal at 03:45, reported this to Fedje, turned and set off in a northbound direction, accompanied by the Tenax . The three ships, Silver Firda , Vestbris and Seigrunn , sailing further east to the north and soon catching up at this point were also noticed on the Sola TS .

The new officer on watch on the Helge Ingstad took command at 03:55, whereupon the detached officer left the bridge. From the perspective of the frigate, the Sola TS had hardly changed its position relative to the terminal in the course of the casting and turning maneuver. This contributed to the bridge crew mistaking the tanker for a stationary object. The AIBN assumes that its bright deck lighting outshone the position lights.

At around 03:57, the pilot on the Sola TS saw the radar echo and a green position light of a ship traveling southwards from which there was no AIS signal. At 03:58 he asked Fedje to identify the ship that was on his port side. Fedje replied that there was no information about this ship. The pilot had his own course changed slightly from 350 ° to 0 °, and he and the master of the Sola TS attempted to contact the unidentified ship using a signal lamp .

Around 04:00, Fedje called Sola TS and announced that the ship might be the Helge Ingstad . The pilot then called the frigate and asked her to turn to starboard immediately. The bridge crew replied that this would only be possible after they had passed an object on their starboard side. According to AIBN, the bridge crew mistakenly thought they were talking to one of the three ships traveling further east to the north. She still believed the brightly lit object to be the stationary terminal with which or with the nearby rocky coast she would collide if she changed course to starboard, and not an approaching oil tanker which she should urgently have avoided according to the collision avoidance rules .

Shortly after 4:00 a.m., the Helge Ingstad was around 400 meters from the Sola TS . Since she did not change her course, she was called by Fedje and the pilot on the Sola TS and asked to react. Thereupon she began an evasive maneuver, contrary to the rules of evacuation between vessels, but as a turn to port instead of starboard, and thus exactly in front of the ice-reinforced bow of the Sola TS .

Helge Ingstad lost control of the rudder and drive and ran out to shore at around 04:11, bow ahead.

Damage after the collision

According to the AIBN, three watertight compartments leaked: the aft generator room , the crew quarters on the orlop deck and the load . At first it was not clear to the crew whether the eighth division, the steering gear room , was also taking in water. Taking into account the technical documentation on ship stability , she assessed the ship as unstable, but buoyant, at that early point in time. But if other departments were flooded, the ship would have to be abandoned.

As a result, it turned out that water flowed through the hollow shafts from the aft generator room into the gear room, which quickly filled up. From the gear room, in turn, the water ran through the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads into both the aft and the forward engine room. This additional flooding significantly exceeded the initial extent of the damage. After the gear room was flooded, the crew prepared to leave their ship. The tugs Ajax and Velox of the terminal service provider Østensjø Rederi picked up 121 of the 137 crew members and brought them to the Sture terminal on Alvøy in Øygarden .

Securing and recovery

The tugs pushed the wrecked ship onto the rocky coast of the fjord to prevent it from sinking into the deep water. Ten steel cables were deployed between land and the wreck on the starboard side, which moved with the tides . The anchorages in the rock gave way in the night of November 12th to 13th. On November 13, only parts of the radar mast and the hangar were above water.

The Norwegian company BOA Offshore AS from Trondheim was commissioned with the recovery, for which three weeks were initially estimated. The wreck was secured with additional cables and chains to prevent it from slipping into deeper water. However, at the turn of the year another hawser tore in a storm and the wreck sagged another 30 centimeters.

Due to the weather, the uplift could only begin on February 26, 2019. Since disturbing waves were predicted for the following days, the wreck was initially only partially lifted by the two floating cranes Rambiz and Gulliver and then suspended from a total of four cranes transferred to more protected waters off Hanøytangen, where it arrived on the 28th. There the hull was pumped out and taken up by the semi- submersible light Boa barge 33 for the onward journey . With the delivery of the Helge Ingstad to the Haakonsvern naval base , the salvage work came to an end on March 3rd.

On June 21, 2019, the Norwegian government confirmed the decision to scrap the recovered ship and consider a new acquisition.

Accident investigation

On November 29, 2018, the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) published a preliminary report, linked to safety notices addressed to the Norwegian military and the Navantia shipyard.

The AIBN found safety-critical deficiencies in relation to the watertight bulkheads, which mean that the intended level of stability is not guaranteed in the event of an accident. It assumes that these deficiencies are also present in the four other ships of the Fridtjof Nansen class, and warns that the inadequate design concept could also have been used in comparable ship types at the Navantia shipyard.

See also

Web links

Commons : F313 Helge Ingstad  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. Norway to scrap damaged frigate Janes, June 25, 2019
  2. a b KNM Helge Ingstad fikk clear advarslers from tank skipet for ulykken. In: aftenbladet.no. November 11, 2018. Retrieved November 11, 2018 (Norwegian).
  3. "'Helge Ingstad'! Spin! We will collide! ” Www.welt.de, November 11, 2018, accessed on November 13, 2018 .
  4. Collision with tanker: radio traffic confirms warnings to frigate. In: n-tv.de. Retrieved November 11, 2018 .
  5. KNM Helge Ingstad kjørt on green etter collision with tankbåt. In: tu.no. November 8, 2018. Retrieved November 8, 2018 (Norwegian).
  6. Maneuvering accident off Norway: warship collides with oil tanker. www.n-tv.de, November 8, 2018, accessed November 8, 2018 .
  7. Norway: Warship "Helge Ingstad" rams tankers and threatens to sink. www.t-online.de, November 8, 2018, accessed on November 8, 2018 .
  8. Ulykke frigates on various parts of Scotland. Trønder-Avisa, Steinkjer, December 7, 2018, archived from the original on December 10, 2018 ; Retrieved February 17, 2019 (Norwegian).
  9. ^ A b c Investigation of marine accident, collision outside the Sture Oil Terminal in Hjeltefjorden, Norway. The Accident Investigation Board Norway, Sophie Radichs vei 17, 2003 Lillestrøm, Norway, November 29, 2018, accessed December 1, 2018 .
  10. a b An important part of the rescue operation. Østensjø Rederi, Smedasundet 97, Haugesund, Norway, November 19, 2018, archived from the original on December 2, 2018 ; accessed on December 2, 2018 .
  11. ^ Salvage Work Resumes for the Wreck of the Helge Ingstad. In: The Maritime Executive. January 4, 2019, accessed January 7, 2019 .
  12. Einar Otto Stangvik et al .: Krigsskipet som krasjet og sank. In: VG. Retrieved March 14, 2019 (Norwegian).
  13. ulz / dpa / Reuters: Norway: Several people injured in a collision between the frigate and the tanker. In: Spiegel Online . November 8, 2018, accessed May 8, 2020 .
  14. Olav Eggesvik, Hanne Mellingsæter: Forsvaret håper å få frigatten til Haakonsvern om tre uker. Aftenposten, Oslo, November 14, 2018, archived from the original on November 16, 2018 ; Retrieved November 14, 2018 (Norwegian).
  15. Flere vaiere har røket, billion skipet "Helge Ingstad" har sunket. www.vg.no, Oslo, November 13, 2018, accessed on November 13, 2018 (Norwegian).
  16. ^ Salvage Work Resumes for the Wreck of the Helge Ingstad. In: The Maritime Executive. January 4, 2019, accessed January 7, 2019 .
  17. ^ Mike Schuler: Crews Complete Salvage of Norwegian Frigate KNM Helge Ingstad. In: gCaptain. March 8, 2019, accessed March 14, 2019 .
  18. HNoMS Helge Ingstad salvage a success as frigate arrives at Haakonsvern naval base. In: NavalToday. March 4, 2019, accessed on March 14, 2019 .
  19. ^ Nathan Gain: Norway Officially Decides To Scrap KNM Helge Ingstad Frigate. In: NavalNews. June 25, 2019, accessed June 29, 2019 .
  20. Kyle Mizokami: How Confusion and Defects Led to a Norwegian Warship's Embarrassing Accident. www.popularmechanics.com, December 3, 2018, accessed December 15, 2018 .