Horseshoe plan

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Horseshoe Plan , Operations Plan Horseshoe (in the alleged original: Potkova Plan) was the name of an alleged military strategic plan for the systematic expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo , which was ascribed to the Yugoslav government. It served as an additional reason for the military intervention in the Kosovo conflict . Its actual existence has not yet been proven.

overview

Accessible information on the content of the alleged plan

The exact content of the plan, the summary of which is said to have been in the possession of German and other military and security authorities, never came to the public. The only information available to the public was roughly that the Yugoslav army had formed its main positions in the form of a horseshoe, the open end of which would lie roughly on the border between Kosovo and neighboring Albania. From this it was concluded - among others by the German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping - that the Serbs wanted to expel the Albanian population towards Albania by "contracting" the horseshoe, which was proven by intelligence information. Corresponding evidence of this intention has never been presented.

Subsequent additional legitimation of the attacks

After the start of the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia in spring 1999, the plan was introduced by the then German ministers Joschka Fischer and Rudolf Scharping , among others , to justify the NATO military intervention in the Kosovo war against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . The military intervention was originally justified by the rejection of the Rambouillet Treaty . Since the war was waged without a UN mandate , many supporters of what they considered to be humanitarian intervention saw the horseshoe plan as evidence of plans by the Yugoslav leadership to expel the Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo before the NATO attack. The plan subsequently served as additional legitimation for the attack on Yugoslavia.

Controversy over the Bulgarian origin of the plan

On January 10, 2000, Der Spiegel reported that the horseshoe plan had been leaked to the Federal Ministry of Defense by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry and that it came from the Bulgarian secret service. The former Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nadezhda Michajlowa (today: Nadezhda Nejnski ) vehemently denied this in 2000, only to confirm it in 2012, meanwhile as a member of the European Parliament .

Rejection of the document in The Hague

The Hague War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) assessed the documents presented by Scharping to Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbor as being of little conclusiveness and evidential value, and the prosecution did not include the alleged horseshoe plan in their indictments in the Milošević trial.

Content and public presentation of the plan

Report of long-planned ethnic cleansing (Bill Clinton and NATO) on March 29, 1999

On March 29, 1999, five days after the start of the NATO air strikes, then US President Bill Clinton announced that Slobodan Milošević had planned “ ethnic cleansing ” for a long time and had carried out this plan without NATO intervention. From that day on, this view was also expressed by NATO to the press, without, however, being further explained.

Scharping on the operational plan for the expulsion on April 8, 1999

According to Heinz Loquai , Brigadier General a. D. and former military advisor at the German OSCE representation in Vienna , this accusation against the FRY was raised above the level that would have been classified as "general claims" of "usual war propaganda" by the German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping can. Because Scharping assured the press on April 8, 1999 that he had an operation plan of the Serbian-Yugoslav leadership to expel the Kosovar-Albanian population from Kosovo.

According to Scharping's "diary" on March 31, 1999 there were indications of evidence of a "long-established plan of operations" for the "Yugoslav approach in Kosovo", which "condensed" on April 2, until Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on April 5 On April 7th, Scharping presented the defense minister with a “ paper that proves the preparations and implementation of the 'Operation Horseshoe' of the Yugoslav army ”, the evaluation of which was available to Scharping on April 7th as “ proof ” that “ a systematic The cleansing and expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians had been planned, with all the details and naming all the Yugoslav units to be used for this [...] ”.

Specification by Scharping and objection by Wesley Clarks (BBC broadcast) on April 19, 1999

On April 19, 1999, Rudolf Scharping specified his information on the “horseshoe plan” in a special broadcast on the BBC: The plan of operations had the clear goal of ethnically “cleansing” the whole of Kosovo and deporting the entire civilian population. It was planned in Belgrade by the military staff, Milošević and his regime. The plan was organized at the end of November and beginning of December 1998 and has been implemented since January 1999. "Operation Horseshoe" began during the negotiations in France and was intensified after the negotiations and after the withdrawal of the OSCE from Kosovo, said Scharping.

On the same broadcast, the NATO commander in chief, General Wesley Clark , stated , among other things, that he had never seen any details of the plan and that this information was not shared with him. In the unauthorized BBC transcript, Clark continues that the instructions of the political leadership were followed. These were not intended to serve as a means of blocking the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs. The official aim of NATO's Allied Force operation on April 12, 1999 was to force the Yugoslav government to accept the provisions of the Rambouillet Treaty and to immediately end violence and repression and withdraw its armed forces from Kosovo.

Contradictions between "overview of the horseshoe plan" and Scharping's "operation plan"

An “overview” of the “horseshoe plan” from April 1999 by the intelligence experts of the Ministry of Defense shows a number of profound contradictions to the “plan of operations” explained by Scharping, for example: While Scharping in his “diary”, according to the current military terminology, of one Knowledge of all Yugoslav units down to company level reported, it is said of the "overview" version of the news experts that the plan is "not known in its details". Contrary to the objective of ethnic "cleansing" declared by Scharping, the main objective of the "overview" is the "dismantling or neutralization of the KLA in Kosovo". While Scharping already spoke of considerable Yugoslav reinforcements in Kosovo for February 1999, the “overview” only mentions “some reinforcements of the land forces” in Kosovo for March 1999.

Written declaration by the Ministry of Defense with photo documents dated May 11, 1999

On May 11, 1999, the German Defense Minister sent the members of the Bundestag a written notice stating that it had been known since April that “ the evictions and violent attacks were by no means direct reactions to the air strikes by the Alliance, but were part of the so-called from the outset Operation 'Horseshoe' , which was developed at the end of 1998 and carried out since the beginning of 1999. Surtitled as " The Yugoslav leadership is proceeding according to plan and is implementing its plan step by step ", this document showed three images apparently intended as evidence, the first of which referred to the bloody incident at the UÇK base in Rogovo , while the other two images showed aerial photographs of burning houses. which were recorded by German drones on April 10th and 13th, 1999, about three weeks after the start of the NATO air raids, according to the date-time groups in the pictures .

doubt

The existence of the plan was questioned early on. Whether the federal government , which publicly invoked it, knew of its questionable value is still controversial today. According to internal reports from the Ministry of Defense, the information was sent directly to Minister Scharping via the headquarters of the armed forces, Department II 3.

Government loss of credibility from early April 1999

At the beginning of April, the government's credibility had already been damaged by “embarrassing misinformation about the alleged atrocities of the Serbs that Scharping had denounced”. Neither the existence of concentration camps nor that of mass executions by the Serbs had come true. "Also several Kosovar Albanian intellectuals reported as murdered," said Der Spiegel , "suddenly reappeared".

Differences in the original language name of the plan

The Inspector General of the Bundeswehr , Hans-Peter von Kirchbach , claimed on April 8, 1999 that this plan was called Potkova , Serbian for “horseshoe”. The PDS deputy Gregor Gysi claimed in the German Bundestag on April 15 that the heading to the plan was in Croatian and not in Serbian . Indeed, in several standard South Slavic languages ​​that are linked by a dialect continuum , the term “horseshoe” is expressed using very similar words, such as: B. “potkova” in Croatian, “podkova” in Bulgarian, while the diminutive form “potkovica” is commonly used in Serbian .

Other references to preliminary planning

At least after the NATO air strikes began, there have been expulsions by Serbian troops and paramilitaries , but also expulsions of Serbs by the Albanian UÇK. The Independent International Commission On Kosovo (German: "Independent International Commission for Kosovo") assumes a long-term, systematic and deliberate expulsion of Kosovar Albanians by the Serbian because of these expulsions, even without proof of the actual existence of the horseshoe plan Military, because in their opinion such an extensive process cannot be carried out without planning and preparation. The extensive OSCE report on human rights violations in Kosovo also suggests that there were indications for “pre-planning of the operations” and justifies this with the fact that very soon after the OSCE KVM withdrew, between the March 24th and the morning of April 2nd, a total of 177,500 Kosovar Albanians arrived in Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, that another 130,000 arrived in Albania and Macedonia the next day alone and that the routes that use the “internally displaced persons ”and the refugees took after this first outflow was regulated by the Serbs.

Eviction plans cannot be used in court

Despite the allegations made by Scharping and the German Defense Ministry as well as Fischer and the German Foreign Ministry, according to which the implementation of the plan had already started in 1998 and January 1999, the Foreign Office has repeatedly provided the courts with information and situation reports on asylum and immigration issues, according to which group persecution of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo was found to be non-existent.

"There are no sufficiently reliable indications for a secret program or an existing tacit consensus on the Serbian side to exterminate, expel or otherwise persecute the Albanian people in the extreme manner described above."

- Judgment of the Higher Administrative Court of Münster of February 24, 1999 (Az: 14 A 3840 / 94.A)

Withdrawal of the management report from November 18, 1998

On the 37th day of the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO, the Federal Foreign Office withdrew its Kosovo situation report of November 18, 1998.

“Unstructured source material” of different origins as a possible basis

The former Foreign Minister of Austria, Wolfgang Schüssel , declared in April 1999 that he had passed on information from the Austrian Army Intelligence Service (HNaA) "to the foreign ministers of the EU states". The former Austrian Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend replied to a request from the Greens that the Bundeswehr's sketches on the Internet “do not represent the plans for Operation Potkova, but a graphic processing of the events from January to April 1999 that can be identified from open sources”. According to an Austrian secret service employee, the papers handed over to Joschka Fischer were "unstructured, analytical material from a scientist in the Bulgarian secret service", which reproduced the events in January and February 1999. In addition, data from the military radio traffic in Yugoslavia that was intercepted by the HNA in its monitoring station in Königswarte near Hainburg "went to Bonn."

Alleged source from the Bulgarian Secret Service

A short time later, Der Spiegel reported (January 2000) that the horseshoe plan had been leaked to the Germans by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in Sofia and that it came from the Bulgarian secret service, which is trying to join NATO . The source remains dubious, the authenticity uncertain. Due to its questionable authenticity, the horseshoe map was not used as a document for indictment before the Hague Tribunal (ICTY). However, at the end of March or beginning of April 2000, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nadezhda Nejnski (formerly: Nadezhda Michailowa) vehemently denied having handed over the horseshoe plan to German Foreign Minister Fischer in spring 1999. At this time, Scharping further rejected any doubts about the existence of the so-called horseshoe plan.

News experts: no systematic eviction before attack

In March 2000, according to research by Franz-Josef Hutsch, an unnamed high-ranking source from the Ministry of Defense reported that an "analysis of certain intelligence services" had been available, but nothing "firsthand". Contrary to Scharping's assertions that the systematic evictions under the Horseshoe Plan had been "organized by Milosevic and his regime, organized since November 1998 and started during the Rambouillet negotiations" and that the Yugoslav forces had been "significantly strengthened", stated the department's intelligence experts FüS II 3 immediately before the start of the NATO air raids: " There are no signs of the start of a major offensive against the KLA ." And "The army and police are not yet capable of a major offensive against the KLA throughout Kosovo". There are locally and temporally limited operations that would continue in the next few days in order to lead the offensive across Kosovo, but would require extensive reinforcement by infantry forces. On the other hand, Scharping's experts predicted that the KLA would try to use the hit-and-run tactics it had used to provoke massive reactions from the police and the military, in order to induce NATO to intervene due to the extent of destruction and refugees. Up until the NATO air strikes, the Yugoslav army had only brought a very limited number of reinforcing personnel and material into Kosovo. A systematic displacement of the civilian population had not yet taken place at this point in time, according to Heinz Loquai's assessment of the military situation on the basis of various reports from the Military Intelligence System, which were based on OSCE reports, information from the air surveillance and findings from the broader area of ​​intelligence.

Analysis of the situation by the Federal Foreign Office and the BMV denied the impending humanitarian catastrophe

In a panorama report broadcast on May 18, 2000 , Scharping's media work and his war diary, which was later published, were presented as war propaganda. His "repeatedly invoked war argument for the pacifist base" in Germany was to "avert a humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo.

"The military activities of NATO serve a political goal, namely to avert a humanitarian catastrophe or to prevent its further growth."

- Rudolf Scharping, Federal Minister of Defense, March 25, 1999

The so-called "humanitarian catastrophe", ie the stated reason for the German participation in the NATO war against Yugoslavia, is not to be found in the relevant internal reports of the German government, neither in the situation report of the Foreign Office of March 19, i.e. five days before the start of the war, still in the situation analysis of the Federal Ministry of Defense of March 23, that is, one day before the start of the war. In contrast, both situation analyzes assumed that no “humanitarian catastrophe” was imminent.

Scharping's “justification strategy” based on the panorama report of May 18, 2000

When the air raids on Yugoslavia started by NATO then actually led to a catastrophe with huge flows of refugees, torture and murder, without the Yugoslav leadership being defeated, public criticism of the war in Germany increased. In this situation, Scharping cited the horseshoe plan as a justification for waging the war.

Heinz Loquais study: Scharping's account is not truthful

In the Panorama Report, however, Heinz Loquai spoke for the first time in a television interview , who had carried out a study on the subject, taking into account reports from the Ministry of Defense and the OSCE, and who had come to the conclusion after his research and a discussion in the Ministry of Defense about the horseshoe plan was that the Ministry of Defense, according to the Ministry of Defense, had no such plan, but only "a description of the operations of the Serbian police and the Serbian military in a civil war". According to information from the Defense Ministry, the graphics presented by Scharping for the horseshoe plan were also created in the German Defense Ministry itself. Loquai disagreed with the validity of Scharping's statements regarding the horseshoe plan:

"All I can say is that the Secretary of Defense is not telling the truth about what he says about the horseshoe plan."

- Heinz Loquai, retired general D.

According to Loquai, important reports had been withheld at the beginning of the war, which meant that even the German parliament was not adequately informed about the actual situation in Kosovo.

“I had asked to be able to use the reports from the embassy in Belgrade for my study and to be able to quote them. This request was not granted because these reports were said to be too politically sensitive at the moment. If the experts' reports had been presented to the Bundestag, for example, the Bundestag would have had a different picture than it actually had at the time the war began. And I don't know whether the votes would have been so clear then. "

- Heinz Loquai, retired general D.

Scharping, on the other hand, continued to affirm the existence of the horseshoe plan:

“I said there was this plan, and there is a wealth of knowledge that this plan exists. And this knowledge is all proven by reality. "

- Rudolf Scharping, Federal Minister of Defense, April 5, 2000

Demands for clarification

After the publication of Loquai's book The Kosovo Conflict in 2000, the former Defense State Secretary Willy Wimmer (CDU) demanded clarification from the Federal Government and demanded that “[...] Defense Minister Scharping must answer parliamentary questions. He must bear in mind that this plan legitimized air strikes and prepared the deployment of German soldiers. People died for it. ”The Hamburg peace researcher Dieter S. Lutz also doubted that the defense minister had ever been in possession of the plan and asked Scharping to publish the horseshoe plan with all the details and with his signature. " He owes that to the public and the victims of the war, " said Lutz. " For the sake of democracy, publication is imperative ."

Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP) asked Scharping and Fischer for clarification on how they "respond to the allegations that the horseshoe plan used to justify the NATO bombing may not even exist" and whether the so-called " Račak massacre ", that had been used for the moral legitimation of the military intervention in the form claimed by the Federal Government.

Scharping's confirmation that the horseshoe plan is a summary and the name is not original

In April 2000, Scharping confirmed the research by Heinz Loquai and Franz-Josef Hutsch, according to which the horseshoe plan is a summary of intelligence from second and third hand, but not a copy or the original of a Serbian-Yugoslav plan. Colonel Karl Gunter von Kajdacsy, head of the armed forces' headquarters, was named as a possible creator of the term “horseshoe plan”.

Documentation "It started with a lie" 2001: Plan as a free invention to justify military operations

The WDR documentary “It began with a lie”, which was first broadcast in 2001 , assumes that the entire story was fictitious and only served to justify the military operations. This report was in turn massively criticized by Matthias Rüb (FAZ), who was accused of one-sided reporting, and by Claus Christian Malzahn (Der Spiegel) for the selective reproduction of witness statements and “unclean” research methods. This criticism was supported by Rupert Neudeck and Norbert Blüm (CDU), who both want to have the WDR film checked through their own research. The WDR editor Mathias Werth, co-author of the documentary, replied in an interview with the Stattzeitung für Südbaden to the criticism of many media: “ You saw the work of your correspondents on site as discredited by this film. I understand that, because some people may see criticism in the film of how this war was reported. […] The question is, what are the factual allegations against the film in the end ? And to this day not a single accusation has remained. “The WDR stuck to its presentation.

Bulgarian documentation 2012: Nadezhda Nejnski as the messenger of the plan to fishermen

In January 2012, a Bulgarian TV documentary appeared on the private broadcaster BTV , which announced that it would investigate the horseshoe plan and the role of Bulgaria in "one of the largest secret service manipulations in Europe". The documentary shows interviews with the retired Ivan Penkov, who was deputy director of the military intelligence service from 1999 to 2002 and head of "secret missions" of the military intelligence service in 1999, as well as with Nadezhda Neynsky , who from 1997 to 2001 under the surname of her first Husband "Mikhailova" had been Bulgaria's foreign minister. Nejnski, who has meanwhile become a member of the European Parliament , confirmed in the interview that she had provided the German Minister Fischer with a report on the horseshoe plan. This plan had been prepared by the Serbian Special Forces and their leader Milošević and had as the first goal the smashing of the UÇK and the second goal the "cleansing" of Kosovo by deporting and expelling a large number of Kosovar Albanians. According to Nejnski, the plan was "started" at the end of February 1999, before the start of the NATO air strikes. You don't have to be a politician or a spy to know that there has to be a reason when 400,000 people decide to leave Kosovo. The responsibility for the decision as to whether the information in the horseshoe plan is to be assessed as relevant, correct and conclusive does not have to be borne by them, but by those who have decided to use it. Bulgaria's decision not to accept refugees from Kosovo was, however, decisive for the stability of Bulgaria.

In the interviews, Penkow emphasizes that the existence of the horseshoe plan has never been confirmed, but that he believes that the Yugoslav leadership had a clear idea of ​​driving the Albanians out of Kosovo or reducing their numbers.

Quotes

“At the end of this horror-rich century, a crazy, power-obsessed dictator is trying again to drive out or wipe out an entire ethnic group and to come closer to his racist goal of an 'ethnically pure' Serbia. This description of the situation is shared by all members of my group. […] Since 1989 Milosevic has been pursuing his chauvinist idea of ​​an 'ethnically pure' Greater Serbia. So far he has fought wars against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. […] Since spring 1998, Milosevic has been carrying out large-scale expulsions and village demolitions in Kosovo. After and during the Holbrooke-Milosevic Accords, the 'Horseshoe' eviction plan was drafted and put into action while Milosevic left his people at the negotiating table. This plan provides for the depopulation of Kosovo from Albanians. This must not be allowed. The NATO air strikes began when all attempts at peaceful conflict resolution had failed due to the continued violent policy of the Serbian leadership. "

- Peter Struck, as parliamentary group leader of the SPD

"I say this as someone who, God knows, [...] found it difficult to deal with this plague of the European past, a Greater Serbian nationalism like the one we also had with Greater German nationalism, this form that relies on our own People is the most important thing and that is why other peoples may be expelled, oppressed and massacred to accept. We had that too. I really struggled to accept that this is back, that this is a raw form of fascism. A Europe of democracy cannot accept this crude form of fascism. I ask you: where are the several thousand men from Srebrenica? In which mass grave are they located? Who is responsible for it? Call the plan what you like. The crucial question is that it started last year. Read the biographies of the families who came to Germany today, their stories of displacement. Read it! Then you will find out: It started last year, for some even in the spring of last year. We had 300,000 internally displaced people, which means that the matter was already well underway. Seselj, the deputy prime minister in the government, wants and wanted Albanian-free Kosovo. That was then implemented. Then came the bomb threat from NATO, which we all accepted with a heavy heart. It came to a standstill. We managed to interrupt the humanitarian catastrophe - unfortunately only to interrupt it. "

- Joschka Fischer, as Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs

“The pattern of the logistical arrangements made for deportations and the coordination of actions by the Yugoslav army, paramilitary groups and the police shows that this huge expulsion of Kosovo-Albanians was systematic and deliberately organized. The NATO air campaign did not provoke the attacks on the civilian Kosovar population but the bombing created an environment that made such an operation feasible. "

“The pattern of logistical arrangements for deportations and the coordination of the actions of the Yugoslav army, paramilitary groups and police show that this massive displacement of Kosovar Albanians was systematically and deliberately organized. The NATO air strikes did not cause the attacks on the Kosovar civilian population, but the bombardment created an environment that made such an operation feasible. "

- The Independent Commission on Kosovo.

“I then asked to speak to the Ministry of Defense, I got it, that was in November, and they told me there was no 'Horseshoe Operation Plan', but what they had was a description of the events that took place in the Kosovo expired, and this account of events could be understood from the OSCE reports and other reports. But there was no 'Horseshoe Operation Plan', at least according to the Defense Ministry experts. "

- Heinz Loquai, retired general D.

“The defense minister claimed two things in connection with the 'horseshoe plan': on the one hand, there had been a secret plan of the political and military Serbian-Yugoslav leadership to completely expel the Albanian civilian population from Kosovo. Second, this plan has been systematically implemented since January 1999. As for the first claim, it can only be said that what was presented as the facts of this plan by the Defense Minister and his house could be compiled by any staff officer based on what happened on the ground. The probable Yugoslav intentions could also be analyzed analytically. The whole secret of the plan is not so much its content as its existence; H. Evidence that the Yugoslav leadership had already drawn up such a plan in November 1998 and thus also showed that, while the West still believed and negotiated a peaceful solution to the conflict, it did not matter at all. However, the contradictions in the defense minister's evidence are so great that one must have well-founded doubts about the existence of such a document, which is actually genuine. […] Scharping's second allegation, that the FRY had already started in January, was large-scale, Carrying out systematic evictions of the Albanian civilian population is not proven by the events in Kosovo. […] The example of the 'horseshoe plan' shows impressively how easy it can be to conduct successful political campaigns to justify political action when the ground is prepared. [...] What is even more remarkable is that his claims were willingly and almost uncritically accepted. However - the 'horseshoe plan' fulfilled its domestic political function. He brushed aside the public criticism of the NATO airstrikes, he even created an additional justification for them that the politicians had not known about when they made the decision to go to war. There is a connection between the “ Racak Massacre ” and the “Horseshoe Plan ”. The head of the KVM, Walker, lit the fuse for the war against Yugoslavia with his unproven version of "Racak". With the "horseshoe plan", Scharping erased criticism of this war. Both allegations, although there were actually doubts, were held to be true unchecked and were thus able to serve their purpose.

- Heinz Loquai, retired general D.

“If you look at the events and also the statements of Scharping in the overall view, you have to admit that he always exaggerated, was always on the verge of what the truth is, up to and including false statements when we take the horseshoe plan. And I think it can be explained by the fact that he tried to make himself inviolable through these exaggerations and exaggerations. "

- Dieter S. Lutz , Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (Hamburg)

literature

Web links

Documentary:

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Tino Moritz: lonely doubters. In: taz.de. April 6, 2001, accessed July 23, 2008 .
  2. ↑ a b Erich Follath , Siegesmund von Ilsemann & Alexander Szandar: The slightly different war . In: Der Spiegel . No. 2 , 2000, pp. 134 ff . ( online ).
  3. ↑ a b "Horseshoe": She also denies ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 76, March 30, 2000, page 6, archived from the original ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  4. ↑ a b c d Escape to the front - Scharping confirms the existence of the horseshoe plan ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 79, April 3, 2000, page 4, archived from the original ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  5. ↑ a b Nadeshda Michajlowa. A “strong woman” in Bulgarian politics ( memento from March 1, 2013 on WebCite ) , OWEP (East-West - European Perspectives), 4/2002, by Johanna Deimel, archived from the original on March 1, 2013.
  6. ↑ a b Bulgaria Leaked Milosevic's Kosovo Ethnic Cleansing Plan in 1999 ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , www.novinite.com, January 9, 2012, archived from the original on February 28, 2013. With reference to the TV documentary The Secret History of the Horseshoe Plan (Bulgarian: Тайната история на плана "Подкова" ) by BTV .
  7. ↑ a b Bulgaria forwards Horseshoe plan data to Germany ( Memento from March 1, 2013 on WebCite ), Tanjug , January 10, 2012, archived on March 1, 2013.
  8. ↑ a b c d e f Тайната история на плана "Подкова" ( Tajnata istorija na plana "Podkova" ; German about: The secret story of the plan "Horseshoe" ) (Bulgarian, about 46 minutes). TV documentary, БТВ (BTV), production: Радостина Констатинова (Radostina Konstatinova), author: Тодор Пройчев (Todor Projčev), director: Огнян Ангелов (Ognjan Angelov). The film is available online on the BTV homepage: Тайната история на плана "Подкова" ( memento from March 1, 2013 on WebCite ), January 7, 2012, archived from the original ( memento from June 14, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) on March 1 2013; or on (Bulgarian, film stream), January 9, 2012. The film is also available on online video portals such as YouTube.
  9. ↑ a b Scharping's simulation games - The Hague also confirms doubts about the "Operation Horseshoe" ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , No. 71, March 24, 2000, page 2, archived from the original ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  10. ↑ Indictment of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, IT-99-37 ( Memento from January 9, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). ICTY indictment against Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić and Vlajko Stojiljković, file number IT-99-37, signed by Louise Arbor, May 22, 1999, archived from the original on January 9, 2013.
  11. ^ (First) Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-99-37-I ( Memento from January 7, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). ICTY, June 29, 2001, archived from the original on January 7, 2013.
  12. ↑ Second Amended Indictment of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, IT-99-37-PT , ICTY's second processed indictment against Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić and Vlajko Stojiljković, reference number IT-99 -37-PT, signed by Carla del Ponte, October 16, 2001.
  13. ↑ Rudolf Scharping, We mustn't look away , Berlin 1999, p. 92 ff., Quoted from Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo conflict - ways into an avoidable war - the time from the end of November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, 183 pp., ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , p. 138.
  14. ↑ Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo Conflict - Ways to an Avoidable War - The time from the end of November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, 183 p., ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , p. 138.
  15. ↑ Rudolf Scharping, In: Broadcast of the BBC-1, Panorama - War Room , on April 19, 1999, BBC-Transcript (no original script, transcription errors possible!)
  16. ↑ Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo Conflict - Ways to an Avoidable War - The time from the end of November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, 183 p., ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , p. 140 f .
  17. ↑ a b news.bbc.co.uk "We were operating, however, under the instructions from the political leadership. It was not designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing. It was not designed as a way of waging war against the Serb and mob forces in Kosovo in any way. There was never any intent to do that. That was not the idea. "
  18. ↑ http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm "NATO's objectives NATO's objectives in relation to the conflict in Kosovo were set out in the Statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO on 12 April 1999 and were reaffirmed by Heads of State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999: a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression; the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces; the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Throughout the conflict, the achievement of these objectives, accompanied by measures to ensure their full implementation , has been regarded by the Alliance as the prerequisite for bringing to an end the violence and human suffering in Kosovo. "
  19. ↑ Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo Conflict - Ways to an Avoidable War - The time from the end of November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, 183 p., ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , p. 141.
  20. ↑ Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo Conflict - Ways to an Avoidable War - The time from the end of November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, 183 pp., ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , p. 142, with reference to: Federal Ministry of Defense, The Federal Minister, The Kosovo Conflict, Bonn 1999.
  21. ↑ Twice totally miscalculated ( memento from March 2, 2013 on WebCite ) , Der Spiegel, 15/1999, April 12, 1999, by Jürgen Hogrefe, Paul Lersch, Rainer Pörtner, Alexander Szandar, archived from the original on March 2, 2013.
  22. ↑ Search for sources - How the German ministers find out about the Kosovo war ( Memento from March 2, 2013 on WebCite ) , Der Spiegel, 15/1999, April 12, 1999, p. 28, by Claus Christian Mahlzahn, archived from the original on March 2, 2013.
  23. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 399 ff.
  24. ↑ Truth, Censorship, Propaganda - The Media and the War - Part 2 , Panorama , broadcast on April 15, 1999 on March 2, 2013.
  25. ^ Hermann Meyn, mass media in Germany , UVK, Konstanz, new edition. 2004, ISBN 3-89669-420-0 , here p. 270.
  26. ↑ Thomas Deichmann, From 'Never Again War' to 'Never again Auschwitz': Dilemmas of German Media Policy in the War Against Yugoslavia , in: P. Hammond & ES Herman (eds.), Degraded Capability: The Media And The Kosovo Crisis , 2000, pp. 153-163, here p. 156.
  27. ^ History of War Propaganda ( January 7, 2013 memento on WebCite ) , What is Propaganda? ( Memento from January 7, 2013 on WebCite ) . Federal Agency for Civic Education, October 1, 2011, archived from the first and second originals on January 7, 2013;
  28. ↑ JK Chambers & P. Trudgill, Dialectology , Cambridge University Press, 1998; P. 6.
  29. ↑ Robert Loborec: fire Kosovo . Taunusstein 2002, ISBN 3-936328-03-X , p. 123 f .
  30. ↑ B. Jakic, A. Hurm: Hrvatsko ili Srpsko - Njemacki Rjecnik . Zagreb 1974, p. 451 .
  31. ^ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report - Conflict - International Response - Lessons Learned , Oxford University Press 2000, 372 pp. ISBN 0-19-924309-3 , p. 333; Note: This report was prepared by nine of the eleven commissioners, two from the USA and one each from Benin, Japan, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany and the Czech Republic, while the two members from Palestine and Russia did not were involved in the report. The FRY did not enter into discussions with this commission, however, as the chairman of the commission, Richard Goldstone from South Africa, as the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from August 1994 to September 1996, was accused of anti-Serbian bias has been.
  32. ^ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo Report. Conflict, International Response, Lessons learned , Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, pp. 3, 88.
  33. ↑ OSCE: Kosovo / Kosova - As Seen, As Told - An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission - October 1998 to June 1999 , 1999, ISBN 83-912750-0-0 ; P. 98.
  34. ↑ Status report of Serbia by the Federal Foreign Office: May 6, 1998 .; June 8, 1998 .; July 13, 1998 .; November 18, 1998 .; January 12, 1999 and January 12, 1999 to VG Trier; of December 28, 1998. to OVG Lüneburg and from December 23, 1998. to VGH Kassel
  35. ^ Court rulings: Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg of February 4, 1999. (Ref .: A 14 S 22276/98); of January 6, 1999 to the Bavarian Administrative Court of Ansbach, of January 12, 1999. to the Trier Administrative Court (Az .: 514-516.80 / 32 426), of March 15, 1999. to the Mainz Administrative Court (Az .: 514-516 , 80/33841) etc.
  36. ↑ a b Horseshoe Plan - The War Riddle ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 68, Page 3, March 21, 2000, by Franz-Josef Hutsch, archived from the original ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  37. ^ A b Carl Polónyi, Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004 , Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, 528 p., ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 374.
  38. ↑ a b Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo conflict - way in an avoidable war - The period from late November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, 183 pp, ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , S. 44.
  39. ↑ a b c d e f Revelations of an insider - Scharping's propaganda in the Kosovo war ( memento from March 2, 2013 on WebCite ) (TV report, 10:38 minutes). Panorama , Das Erste , May 18, 2000, Report by: Mathis Feldhoff and Volker Steinhoff, archived from the original on March 2, 2013.
  40. ↑ a b c d e f Revelations of an insider - Scharping's propaganda in the Kosovo war ( memento from March 2, 2013 on WebCite ) (transcript of the TV report). Panorama , Das Erste , May 18, 2000, Report by: Mathis Feldhoff and Volker Steinhoff, archived from the original on March 2, 2013.
  41. ^ The late admission - Defense Minister Scharping under pressure ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 69, March 22, 2000, page 1, archived from the original ( Memento from April 13, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) on February 28, 2013.
  42. ↑ Going to war with half-truths? - Kosovo: German Brigadier General raises serious allegations against Scharping ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 68, March 21, 2000, page 1, archived from the original ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  43. ↑ Scharping admits: Horseshoe plan is not available in writing ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 82, April 6, 2000, page 4, archived from the original ( Memento from February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  44. ^ A colonel was Scharping's blacksmith ( memento of February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 80, April 4, 2000, page 3, by Franz-Josef Hutsch, archived from the original ( memento of February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28, 2013.
  45. ^ Horseshoe plan - the work of a colonel ( memento of February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Hamburger Abendblatt, No. 80, April 4, 2000, page 1, archived from the original ( memento of February 28, 2013 on WebCite ) on February 28 2013.
  46. ↑ It started with a lie (TV documentary). WDR, by Jo Angerer and Mathias Werth, broadcast on ARD on February 8, 2001. Transcription ( memento from March 4, 2013 on WebCite ), archived from the Internet version of the Peace Research Working Group on March 4, 2013. The documentation is on video portals (e.g. YouTube and Google ) accessible.
  47. ^ The dress rehearsal for the attack on Iraq - In conversation with Franz-Josef Hutsch, ex-major of the German armed forces and witness in the Milosevic trial, about private US military companies in the Yugoslav civil war ( memento of February 22, 2013 on WebCite ) , Friday , November 5, 2004, interview conducted by Mira Beham, archived from the original on February 22, 2013.
  48. ↑ Heinz Loquai: media as a switchman for war. In: Hans J. Gießmann, Kurt P. Tudyka (Ed.): Serving Peace - In memory of Prof. Dr. Dr. Dieter Lutz , 1st edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0702-5 , pp. 147-163, here pp. 153f.
  49. ↑ Media as a switch to war. Heinz Loquai, after a lecture by the Summer Academy at Burg Schlaining (Austria), here quoted from an Internet version of www.ag-friedensforschung.de ( memento from January 10, 2013 on WebCite ), archived from the original on January 10, 2013, with reference on: Matthias Rüb: Kosovo. Munich, November 1999, p. 120 f.
  50. ^ Matthias Rüb: A case of bulldozer journalism. What the WDR film "It began with a lie" withheld about Kosovo , in: FAZ from March 1, 2001, p. 51.
  51. ↑ Nice brandishing the apartheid ( Memento from 1 March 2013 to Webcite ) Der Spiegel, 11/2001, March 12, 2001, pp 157-159, by Claus Christian Malzahn, archived from the original on March 1, 2013.
  52. ↑ Interview with WDR editor Mathias Werth ( Memento from July 1, 2017 in the Internet Archive ). In :stattweb.de, 2001
  53. ↑ a b c d Тайният план "Подкова" и ударите на НАТО в Югославия ( Memento from March 4, 2013 on WebCite ) (Bulgarian). Vesti.bg, January 11, 2012, archived from the original ( memento of April 29, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) on March 4, 2013.
  54. ↑ German Bundestag: Plenary Protocol 14/32 of April 15, 1999, page: 2627f. URL: dip21.bundestag.de and http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/026/14032026.28
  55. ^ German Bundestag: Plenary Protocol 14/32 of April 15, 1999, page: 2638f. URL: dip21.bundestag.de and http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/026/14032026.39
  56. ^ The Kosovo Report. Conflict, International Response, Lessons learned. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 3.
  57. ↑ Jo Angerer, Mathias Werth: It started with a lie . In: Monitor (TV magazine) . February 2001.
  58. ↑ Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo Conflict - Ways to an Avoidable War: the period from the end of November 1997 to March 1999 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , p. 143 f.
  59. ↑ Erich Rathfelder: Kosovo. History of a Conflict - Pearl Divers. In: www.perlentaucher.de. Retrieved August 25, 2016 .
  60. ^ Marie-Janine Calic: History of Yugoslavia in the 20th century - pearl divers. In: www.perlentaucher.de. Retrieved August 25, 2016 .
  61. ↑ Rafael Biermann: Apprenticeship years in Kosovo. The failure of international crisis prevention before the outbreak of war - pearl divers. In: www.perlentaucher.de. Retrieved August 25, 2016 .
  62. ↑ Günter Joetze: The last war in Europe ?. Kosovo and German politics - pearl divers. In: www.perlentaucher.de. Retrieved August 25, 2016 .
  63. ↑ Johannes M. Becker / Gertrud Brücher (eds.): The War of Yugoslavia. An interim balance sheet - pearl divers. In: www.perlentaucher.de. Retrieved August 25, 2016 .